<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/s390/kernel/process.c, branch v5.11</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>s390/mm: remove set_fs / rework address space handling</title>
<updated>2020-11-23T11:01:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiko Carstens</name>
<email>hca@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-16T07:06:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=87d5986345219a7e4f204726d9085ea87f3e22d0'/>
<id>87d5986345219a7e4f204726d9085ea87f3e22d0</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove set_fs support from s390. With doing this rework address space
handling and simplify it. As a result address spaces are now setup
like this:

CPU running in              | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | %cr13 ASCE
----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------
user space                  |  user     |  user     |  kernel
kernel, normal execution    |  kernel   |  user     |  kernel
kernel, kvm guest execution |  gmap     |  user     |  kernel

To achieve this the getcpu vdso syscall is removed in order to avoid
secondary address mode and a separate vdso address space in for user
space. The getcpu vdso syscall will be implemented differently with a
subsequent patch.

The kernel accesses user space always via secondary address space.
This happens in different ways:
- with mvcos in home space mode and directly read/write to secondary
  address space
- with mvcs/mvcp in primary space mode and copy from primary space to
  secondary space or vice versa
- with e.g. cs in secondary space mode and access secondary space

Switching translation modes happens with sacf before and after
instructions which access user space, like before.

Lazy handling of control register reloading is removed in the hope to
make everything simpler, but at the cost of making kernel entry and
exit a bit slower. That is: on kernel entry the primary asce is always
changed to contain the kernel asce, and on kernel exit the primary
asce is changed again so it contains the user asce.

In kernel mode there is only one exception to the primary asce: when
kvm guests are executed the primary asce contains the gmap asce (which
describes the guest address space). The primary asce is reset to
kernel asce whenever kvm guest execution is interrupted, so that this
doesn't has to be taken into account for any user space accesses.

Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Remove set_fs support from s390. With doing this rework address space
handling and simplify it. As a result address spaces are now setup
like this:

CPU running in              | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | %cr13 ASCE
----------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------
user space                  |  user     |  user     |  kernel
kernel, normal execution    |  kernel   |  user     |  kernel
kernel, kvm guest execution |  gmap     |  user     |  kernel

To achieve this the getcpu vdso syscall is removed in order to avoid
secondary address mode and a separate vdso address space in for user
space. The getcpu vdso syscall will be implemented differently with a
subsequent patch.

The kernel accesses user space always via secondary address space.
This happens in different ways:
- with mvcos in home space mode and directly read/write to secondary
  address space
- with mvcs/mvcp in primary space mode and copy from primary space to
  secondary space or vice versa
- with e.g. cs in secondary space mode and access secondary space

Switching translation modes happens with sacf before and after
instructions which access user space, like before.

Lazy handling of control register reloading is removed in the hope to
make everything simpler, but at the cost of making kernel entry and
exit a bit slower. That is: on kernel entry the primary asce is always
changed to contain the kernel asce, and on kernel exit the primary
asce is changed again so it contains the user asce.

In kernel mode there is only one exception to the primary asce: when
kvm guests are executed the primary asce contains the gmap asce (which
describes the guest address space). The primary asce is reset to
kernel asce whenever kvm guest execution is interrupted, so that this
doesn't has to be taken into account for any user space accesses.

Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2020-08-09T20:33:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-09T20:33:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8d3e09b43312991c503478bf0f5f99e92c23ccf1'/>
<id>8d3e09b43312991c503478bf0f5f99e92c23ccf1</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull regset conversion fix from Al Viro:
 "Fix a regression from an unnoticed bisect hazard in the regset series.

  A bunch of old (aout, originally) primitives used by coredumps became
  dead code after fdpic conversion to regsets. Removal of that dead code
  had been the first commit in the followups to regset series;
  unfortunately, it happened to hide the bisect hazard on sh (extern for
  fpregs_get() had not been updated in the main series when it should
  have been; followup simply made fpregs_get() static). And without that
  followup commit this bisect hazard became breakage in the mainline"

Tested-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz &lt;glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de&gt;

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  kill unused dump_fpu() instances
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull regset conversion fix from Al Viro:
 "Fix a regression from an unnoticed bisect hazard in the regset series.

  A bunch of old (aout, originally) primitives used by coredumps became
  dead code after fdpic conversion to regsets. Removal of that dead code
  had been the first commit in the followups to regset series;
  unfortunately, it happened to hide the bisect hazard on sh (extern for
  fpregs_get() had not been updated in the main series when it should
  have been; followup simply made fpregs_get() static). And without that
  followup commit this bisect hazard became breakage in the mainline"

Tested-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz &lt;glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de&gt;

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  kill unused dump_fpu() instances
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kill unused dump_fpu() instances</title>
<updated>2020-07-27T18:33:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-23T00:02:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bb1a773d5b6bf018bf84fdb3fbba01d3ef54e2c9'/>
<id>bb1a773d5b6bf018bf84fdb3fbba01d3ef54e2c9</id>
<content type='text'>
dump_fpu() is used only on the architectures that support elf
and have neither CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET nor ELF_CORE_COPY_FPREGS
defined.

Currently that's csky, m68k, microblaze, nds32 and unicore32.  The rest
of the instances are dead code.

NB: THIS MUST GO AFTER ELF_FDPIC CONVERSION

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
dump_fpu() is used only on the architectures that support elf
and have neither CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET nor ELF_CORE_COPY_FPREGS
defined.

Currently that's csky, m68k, microblaze, nds32 and unicore32.  The rest
of the instances are dead code.

NB: THIS MUST GO AFTER ELF_FDPIC CONVERSION

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arch: rename copy_thread_tls() back to copy_thread()</title>
<updated>2020-07-04T21:41:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian.brauner@ubuntu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-11T09:04:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=714acdbd1c94e7e3ab90f6b6938f1ccb27b662f0'/>
<id>714acdbd1c94e7e3ab90f6b6938f1ccb27b662f0</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS has been removed, rename copy_thread_tls()
back simply copy_thread(). It's a simpler name, and doesn't imply that only
tls is copied here. This finishes an outstanding chunk of internal process
creation work since we've added clone3().

Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;A
Acked-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Greentime Hu &lt;green.hu@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;A
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS has been removed, rename copy_thread_tls()
back simply copy_thread(). It's a simpler name, and doesn't imply that only
tls is copied here. This finishes an outstanding chunk of internal process
creation work since we've added clone3().

Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer &lt;tsbogend@alpha.franken.de&gt;A
Acked-by: Stafford Horne &lt;shorne@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Greentime Hu &lt;green.hu@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;A
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390: prevent leaking kernel address in BEAR</title>
<updated>2020-03-10T14:16:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Schnelle</name>
<email>svens@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-22T12:38:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0b38b5e1d0e2f361e418e05c179db05bb688bbd6'/>
<id>0b38b5e1d0e2f361e418e05c179db05bb688bbd6</id>
<content type='text'>
When userspace executes a syscall or gets interrupted,
BEAR contains a kernel address when returning to userspace.
This make it pretty easy to figure out where the kernel is
mapped even with KASLR enabled. To fix this, add lpswe to
lowcore and always execute it there, so userspace sees only
the lowcore address of lpswe. For this we have to extend
both critical_cleanup and the SWITCH_ASYNC macro to also check
for lpswe addresses in lowcore.

Fixes: b2d24b97b2a9 ("s390/kernel: add support for kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR)")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When userspace executes a syscall or gets interrupted,
BEAR contains a kernel address when returning to userspace.
This make it pretty easy to figure out where the kernel is
mapped even with KASLR enabled. To fix this, add lpswe to
lowcore and always execute it there, so userspace sees only
the lowcore address of lpswe. For this we have to extend
both critical_cleanup and the SWITCH_ASYNC macro to also check
for lpswe addresses in lowcore.

Fixes: b2d24b97b2a9 ("s390/kernel: add support for kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR)")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.2+
Reviewed-by: Gerald Schaefer &lt;gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle &lt;svens@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/process: avoid custom stack unwinding in get_wchan</title>
<updated>2019-10-31T16:20:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Gorbik</name>
<email>gor@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-28T14:17:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6756dd9b890fe50c01a6e7546bd498d57ddb98ae'/>
<id>6756dd9b890fe50c01a6e7546bd498d57ddb98ae</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently get_wchan uses custom stack unwinding implementation which
relies on back_chain presence. Replace it with more abstract stack
unwinding api usage.

Suggested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently get_wchan uses custom stack unwinding implementation which
relies on back_chain presence. Replace it with more abstract stack
unwinding api usage.

Suggested-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/kasan: avoid report in get_wchan</title>
<updated>2019-08-21T10:58:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Gorbik</name>
<email>gor@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-13T17:23:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2c7fa8a11cc528e49e88352fce8cf083104b3797'/>
<id>2c7fa8a11cc528e49e88352fce8cf083104b3797</id>
<content type='text'>
Reading other running task's stack can be a dangerous endeavor. Kasan
stack memory access instrumentation includes special prologue and epilogue
to mark/remove red zones in shadow memory between stack variables. For
that reason there is always a race between a task reading value in other
task's stack and that other task returning from a function and entering
another one generating different red zones pattern.

To avoid kasan reports simply perform uninstrumented memory reads.

Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Reading other running task's stack can be a dangerous endeavor. Kasan
stack memory access instrumentation includes special prologue and epilogue
to mark/remove red zones in shadow memory between stack variables. For
that reason there is always a race between a task reading value in other
task's stack and that other task returning from a function and entering
another one generating different red zones pattern.

To avoid kasan reports simply perform uninstrumented memory reads.

Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/process: avoid potential reading of freed stack</title>
<updated>2019-08-21T10:58:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasily Gorbik</name>
<email>gor@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-13T18:11:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=8769f610fe6d473e5e8e221709c3ac402037da6c'/>
<id>8769f610fe6d473e5e8e221709c3ac402037da6c</id>
<content type='text'>
With THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK (which is selected on s390) task's stack usage
is refcounted and should always be protected by get/put when touching
other task's stack to avoid race conditions with task's destruction code.

Fixes: d5c352cdd022 ("s390: move thread_info into task_struct")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
With THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK (which is selected on s390) task's stack usage
is refcounted and should always be protected by get/put when touching
other task's stack to avoid race conditions with task's destruction code.

Fixes: d5c352cdd022 ("s390: move thread_info into task_struct")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich &lt;iii@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/unwind: introduce stack unwind API</title>
<updated>2019-05-02T11:54:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Schwidefsky</name>
<email>schwidefsky@de.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-28T07:33:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=78c98f9074135d3dab4e39544e0a537f92388fce'/>
<id>78c98f9074135d3dab4e39544e0a537f92388fce</id>
<content type='text'>
Rework the dump_trace() stack unwinder interface to support different
unwinding algorithms. The new interface looks like this:

	struct unwind_state state;
	unwind_for_each_frame(&amp;state, task, regs, start_stack)
		do_something(state.sp, state.ip, state.reliable);

The unwind_bc.c file contains the implementation for the classic
back-chain unwinder.

One positive side effect of the new code is it now handles ftraced
functions gracefully. It prints the real name of the return function
instead of 'return_to_handler'.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rework the dump_trace() stack unwinder interface to support different
unwinding algorithms. The new interface looks like this:

	struct unwind_state state;
	unwind_for_each_frame(&amp;state, task, regs, start_stack)
		do_something(state.sp, state.ip, state.reliable);

The unwind_bc.c file contains the implementation for the classic
back-chain unwinder.

One positive side effect of the new code is it now handles ftraced
functions gracefully. It prints the real name of the return function
instead of 'return_to_handler'.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390: update sampling tag after task pid change</title>
<updated>2018-04-23T05:57:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Schwidefsky</name>
<email>schwidefsky@de.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-20T08:21:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2317b07d05d2b136eb4dc9609807c9111bda3b2a'/>
<id>2317b07d05d2b136eb4dc9609807c9111bda3b2a</id>
<content type='text'>
In a multi-threaded program any thread can call execve(). If this
is not done by the thread group leader, the de_thread() function
replaces the pid of the task that calls execve() with the pid of
thread group leader. If the task reaches user space again without
going over __switch_to() the sampling tag is still set to the old
pid.

Define the arch_setup_new_exec function to verify the task pid
and udpate the tag with LPP if it has changed.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In a multi-threaded program any thread can call execve(). If this
is not done by the thread group leader, the de_thread() function
replaces the pid of the task that calls execve() with the pid of
thread group leader. If the task reaches user space again without
going over __switch_to() the sampling tag is still set to the old
pid.

Define the arch_setup_new_exec function to verify the task pid
and udpate the tag with LPP if it has changed.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
