All supported compilers today (gcc v5.1+ and clang v11+) have support for
-mcmodel=medium. As such, NO_MINIMAL_TOC is no longer being set. Remove
NO_MINIMAL_TOC as well as the fallback to -mminimal-toc.

Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240110141237.3179199-1-naveen@kernel.org

PowerVM LPARs may retrieve Vital Product Data (VPD) for system
components using the ibm,get-vpd RTAS function.

We can expose this to user space with a /dev/papr-vpd character
device, where the programming model is:

  struct papr_location_code plc = { .str = "", }; /* obtain all VPD */
  int devfd = open("/dev/papr-vpd", O_RDONLY);
  int vpdfd = ioctl(devfd, PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE, &plc);
  size_t size = lseek(vpdfd, 0, SEEK_END);
  char *buf = malloc(size);
  pread(devfd, buf, size, 0);

When a file descriptor is obtained from ioctl(PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE),
the file contains the result of a complete ibm,get-vpd sequence. The
file contents are immutable from the POV of user space. To get a new
view of the VPD, the client must create a new handle.

This design choice insulates user space from most of the complexities
that ibm,get-vpd brings:

* ibm,get-vpd must be called more than once to obtain complete
  results.

* Only one ibm,get-vpd call sequence should be in progress at a time;
  interleaved sequences will disrupt each other. Callers must have a
  protocol for serializing their use of the function.

* A call sequence in progress may receive a "VPD changed, try again"
  status, requiring the client to abandon the sequence and start
  over.

The memory required for the VPD buffers seems acceptable, around 20KB
for all VPD on one of my systems. And the value of the
/rtas/ibm,vpd-size DT property (the estimated maximum size of VPD) is
consistently 300KB across various systems I've checked.

I've implemented support for this new ABI in the rtas_get_vpd()
function in librtas, which the vpdupdate command currently uses to
populate its VPD database. I've verified that an unmodified vpdupdate
binary generates an identical database when using a librtas.so that
prefers the new ABI.

Along with the papr-vpd.h header exposed to user space, this
introduces a common papr-miscdev.h uapi header to share a base ioctl
ID with similar drivers to come.

Tested-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-9-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com

Define operations for SED Opal to read/write keys
from POWER LPAR Platform KeyStore(PLPKS). This allows
non-volatile storage of SED Opal keys.

Signed-off-by: Greg Joyce <gjoyce@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Derrick <jonathan.derrick@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231004201957.1451669-4-gjoyce@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Introduce a set of APIs for retrieving and updating PAPR system
parameters. This encapsulates the toil of temporary RTAS work area
management, RTAS function call retries, and translation of RTAS call
statuses to conventional error values.

There are several places in the kernel that already retrieve system
parameters by calling the RTAS ibm,get-system-parameter function
directly. These will be converted to papr_sysparm_get() in changes to
follow.

As for updating system parameters, current practice is to use
sys_rtas() from user space; there are no in-kernel users of the RTAS
ibm,set-system-parameter function. However this will become deprecated
in time because it is not compatible with lockdown.

The papr_sysparm_* APIs will form the common basis for in-kernel
and user space access to system parameters. The code to expose the
set/get capabilities to user space will follow.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-14-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com

Various pseries-specific RTAS functions take a temporary "work area"
parameter - a buffer in memory accessible to RTAS. Typically such
functions are passed the statically allocated rtas_data_buf buffer as
the argument. This buffer is protected by a global spinlock. So users
of rtas_data_buf cannot perform sleeping operations while accessing
the buffer.

Most RTAS functions that have a work area parameter can return a
status (-2/990x) that indicates that the caller should retry. Before
retrying, the caller may need to reschedule or sleep (see
rtas_busy_delay() for details). This combination of factors
leads to uncomfortable constructions like this:

	do {
		spin_lock(&rtas_data_buf_lock);
		rc = rtas_call(token, __pa(rtas_data_buf, ...);
		if (rc == 0) {
			/* parse or copy out rtas_data_buf contents */
		}
		spin_unlock(&rtas_data_buf_lock);
	} while (rtas_busy_delay(rc));

Another unfortunately common way of handling this is for callers to
blithely ignore the possibility of a -2/990x status and hope for the
best.

If users were allowed to perform blocking operations while owning a
work area, the programming model would become less tedious and
error-prone. Users could schedule away, sleep, or perform other
blocking operations without having to release and re-acquire
resources.

We could continue to use a single work area buffer, and convert
rtas_data_buf_lock to a mutex. But that would impose an unnecessarily
coarse serialization on all users. As awkward as the current design
is, it prevents longer running operations that need to repeatedly use
rtas_data_buf from blocking the progress of others.

There are more considerations. One is that while 4KB is fine for all
current in-kernel uses, some RTAS calls can take much smaller buffers,
and some (VPD, platform dumps) would likely benefit from larger
ones. Another is that at least one RTAS function (ibm,get-vpd)
has *two* work area parameters. And finally, we should expect the
number of work area users in the kernel to increase over time as we
introduce lockdown-compatible ABIs to replace less safe use cases
based on sys_rtas/librtas.

So a special-purpose allocator for RTAS work area buffers seems worth
trying.

Properties:

* The backing memory for the allocator is reserved early in boot in
  order to satisfy RTAS addressing requirements, and then managed with
  genalloc.
* Allocations can block, but they never fail (mempool-like).
* Prioritizes first-come, first-serve fairness over throughput.
* Early boot allocations before the allocator has been initialized are
  served via an internal static buffer.

Intended to replace rtas_data_buf. New code that needs RTAS work area
buffers should prefer this API.

Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230125-b4-powerpc-rtas-queue-v3-12-26929c8cce78@linux.ibm.com

The pseries platform can support dynamic secure boot (i.e. secure boot
using user-defined keys) using variables contained with the PowerVM LPAR
Platform KeyStore (PLPKS).  Using the powerpc secvar API, expose the
relevant variables for pseries dynamic secure boot through the existing
secvar filesystem layout.

The relevant variables for dynamic secure boot are signed in the
keystore, and can only be modified using the H_PKS_SIGNED_UPDATE hcall.
Object labels in the keystore are encoded using ucs2 format.  With our
fixed variable names we don't have to care about encoding outside of the
necessary byte padding.

When a user writes to a variable, the first 8 bytes of data must contain
the signed update flags as defined by the hypervisor.

When a user reads a variable, the first 4 bytes of data contain the
policies defined for the object.

Limitations exist due to the underlying implementation of sysfs binary
attributes, as is the case for the OPAL secvar implementation -
partial writes are unsupported and writes cannot be larger than PAGE_SIZE.
(Even when using bin_attributes, which can be larger than a single page,
sysfs only gives us one page's worth of write buffer at a time, and the
hypervisor does not expose an interface for partial writes.)

Co-developed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc>
[mpe: Add NLS dependency to fix build errors, squash fix from ajd]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-25-ajd@linux.ibm.com

The recently moved dtl code must be compiled-in if
CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE=y even if CONFIG_DTL=n.

Fixes: 6ba5aa541aaa0 ("powerpc/pseries: Move dtl scanning and steal time accounting to pseries platform")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221013073131.1485742-1-npiggin@gmail.com

PowerVM provides an isolated Platform Keystore(PKS) storage allocation
for each LPAR with individually managed access controls to store
sensitive information securely. It provides a new set of hypervisor
calls for Linux kernel to access PKS storage.

Define POWER LPAR Platform KeyStore(PLPKS) driver using H_CALL interface
to access PKS storage.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220723113048.521744-2-nayna@linux.ibm.com

Implement a limited form of KASAN for Book3S 64-bit machines running under
the Radix MMU, supporting only outline mode.

 - Enable the compiler instrumentation to check addresses and maintain the
   shadow region. (This is the guts of KASAN which we can easily reuse.)

 - Require kasan-vmalloc support to handle modules and anything else in
   vmalloc space.

 - KASAN needs to be able to validate all pointer accesses, but we can't
   instrument all kernel addresses - only linear map and vmalloc. On boot,
   set up a single page of read-only shadow that marks all iomap and
   vmemmap accesses as valid.

 - Document KASAN in powerpc docs.

Background
----------

KASAN support on Book3S is a bit tricky to get right:

 - It would be good to support inline instrumentation so as to be able to
   catch stack issues that cannot be caught with outline mode.

 - Inline instrumentation requires a fixed offset.

 - Book3S runs code with translations off ("real mode") during boot,
   including a lot of generic device-tree parsing code which is used to
   determine MMU features.

    [ppc64 mm note: The kernel installs a linear mapping at effective
    address c000...-c008.... This is a one-to-one mapping with physical
    memory from 0000... onward. Because of how memory accesses work on
    powerpc 64-bit Book3S, a kernel pointer in the linear map accesses the
    same memory both with translations on (accessing as an 'effective
    address'), and with translations off (accessing as a 'real
    address'). This works in both guests and the hypervisor. For more
    details, see s5.7 of Book III of version 3 of the ISA, in particular
    the Storage Control Overview, s5.7.3, and s5.7.5 - noting that this
    KASAN implementation currently only supports Radix.]

 - Some code - most notably a lot of KVM code - also runs with translations
   off after boot.

 - Therefore any offset has to point to memory that is valid with
   translations on or off.

One approach is just to give up on inline instrumentation. This way
boot-time checks can be delayed until after the MMU is set is up, and we
can just not instrument any code that runs with translations off after
booting. Take this approach for now and require outline instrumentation.

Previous attempts allowed inline instrumentation. However, they came with
some unfortunate restrictions: only physically contiguous memory could be
used and it had to be specified at compile time. Maybe we can do better in
the future.

[paulus@ozlabs.org - Rebased onto 5.17.  Note that a kernel with
 CONFIG_KASAN=y will crash during boot on a machine using HPT
 translation because not all the entry points to the generic
 KASAN code are protected with a call to kasan_arch_is_ready().]

Originally-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> # ppc64 out-of-line radix version
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
[mpe: Update copyright year and comment formatting]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YoTE69OQwiG7z+Gu@cleo

The kexec code paths involve code that necessarily run in real mode, as
CPUs are disabled and control is transferred to the new kernel. Disable
address sanitization for the kexec code and the functions called in real
mode on CPUs being disabled.

[paulus@ozlabs.org: combined a few work-in-progress commits of
 Daniel's and wrote the commit message.]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
[mpe: Move pseries_machine_kexec() into kexec.c so setup.c can be instrumented]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YoTFSQ2TUSEaDdVC@cleo