The SLB bad address handler's trap number fixup does not preserve the
low bit that indicates nonvolatile GPRs have not been saved. This
leads save_nvgprs to skip saving them, and subsequent functions and
return from interrupt will think they are saved.

This causes kernel branch-to-garbage debugging to not have correct
registers, can also cause userspace to have its registers clobbered
after a segfault.

Fixes: f0f558b131db ("powerpc/mm: Preserve CFAR value on SLB miss caused by access to bogus address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

The soft IRQ masking code has to hard-disable interrupts in cases
where the exception is not cleared by the masked handler. External
interrupts used this approach for soft masking. Now recently PMU
interrupts do the same thing.

The soft IRQ masking code additionally allowed for interrupt handlers
to hard-enable interrupts after soft-disabling them. The idea is to
allow PMU interrupts through to profile interrupt handlers.

So when interrupts are being replayed when there is a pending
interrupt that requires hard-disabling, there is a test to prevent
those handlers from hard-enabling them if there is a pending external
interrupt. may_hard_irq_enable() handles this.

After f442d00480 ("powerpc/64s: Add support to mask perf interrupts
and replay them"), may_hard_irq_enable() could prematurely enable
MSR[EE] when a PMU exception exists, which would result in the
interrupt firing again while masked, and MSR[EE] being disabled again.

I haven't seen that this could cause a serious problem, but it's
more consistent to handle these soft-masked interrupts in the same
way. So introduce a define for all types of interrupts that require
MSR[EE] masking in their soft-disable handlers, and use that in
may_hard_irq_enable().

Fixes: f442d004806e ("powerpc/64s: Add support to mask perf interrupts and replay them")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

The fallback RFI flush is used when firmware does not provide a way
to flush the cache. It's a "displacement flush" that evicts useful
data by displacing it with an uninteresting buffer.

The flush has to take care to work with implementation specific cache
replacment policies, so the recipe has been in flux. The initial
slow but conservative approach is to touch all lines of a congruence
class, with dependencies between each load. It has since been
determined that a linear pattern of loads without dependencies is
sufficient, and is significantly faster.

Measuring the speed of a null syscall with RFI fallback flush enabled
gives the relative improvement:

P8 - 1.83x
P9 - 1.75x

The flush also becomes simpler and more adaptable to different cache
geometries.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

Merge our fixes branch from the 4.15 cycle.

Unusually the fixes branch saw some significant features merged,
notably the RFI flush patches, so we want the code in next to be
tested against that, to avoid any surprises when the two are merged.

There's also some other work on the panic handling that was reverted
in fixes and we now want to do properly in next, which would conflict.

And we also fix a few other minor merge conflicts.

Handle Data and  Instruction exceptions caused by memory
protection-key.

The CPU will detect the key fault if the HPTE is already
programmed with the key.

However if the HPTE is not  hashed, a key fault will not
be detected by the hardware. The software will detect
pkey violation in such a case.

Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

Two new bit mask field "IRQ_DISABLE_MASK_PMU" is introduced to support
the masking of PMI and "IRQ_DISABLE_MASK_ALL" to aid interrupt masking
checking.

Couple of new irq #defs "PACA_IRQ_PMI" and "SOFTEN_VALUE_0xf0*" added
to use in the exception code to check for PMI interrupts.

In the masked_interrupt handler, for PMIs we reset the MSR[EE] and
return. In the __check_irq_replay(), replay the PMI interrupt by
calling performance_monitor_common handler.

Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

To support addition of "bitmask" to MASKABLE_* macros, factor out the
EXCPETION_PROLOG_1 macro.

Make it explicit the interrupt masking supported by a gievn interrupt
handler. Patch correspondingly extends the MASKABLE_* macros with an
addition's parameter. "bitmask" parameter is passed to SOFTEN_TEST
macro to decide on masking the interrupt.

Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

The only difference between EXC_COMMON_HV and EXC_COMMON is that the
former adds "2" to the trap number which is supposed to represent the
fact that this is an "HV" interrupt which uses HSRR0/1.

However KVM is the only one who cares and it has its own separate macros.

In fact, we only have one user of EXC_COMMON_HV and it's for an
unknown interrupt case. All the other ones already using EXC_COMMON.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the
L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to
guest.

This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At
this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs
such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale
CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other
mechanisms on those CPUs.

The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally
inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is
speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the
address of a subsequent speculatively executed load.

In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1,
because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is
performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the
vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by
flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for
hypervisor vs guest.

In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at
each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and
patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise
to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D.
If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement
flush in software.

For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and
different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are
prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction
activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at
boot if the hypervisor tells us to.

In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and
Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis
of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc.
Many thanks to all of them.

Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

In the SLB miss handler we may be returning to user or kernel. We need
to add a check early on and save the result in the cr4 register, and
then we bifurcate the return path based on that.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>