linux.git/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c, branch v6.0 Linux kernel source tree arm64/sme: Remove _EL0 from name of SVCR - FIXME sysreg.h 2022-05-16T18:50:20+00:00 Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org 2022-05-10T16:12:01+00:00 ec0067a63e5a37de74025d46095cfe7a7af3114a The defines for SVCR call it SVCR_EL0 however the architecture calls the register SVCR with no _EL0 suffix. In preparation for generating the sysreg definitions rename to match the architecture, no functional change. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510161208.631259-6-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> 
The defines for SVCR call it SVCR_EL0 however the architecture calls the
register SVCR with no _EL0 suffix. In preparation for generating the sysreg
definitions rename to match the architecture, no functional change.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220510161208.631259-6-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
arm64/sme: Implement traps and syscall handling for SME 2022-04-22T17:51:05+00:00 Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org 2022-04-19T11:22:24+00:00 8bd7f91c03d886f41d35f6108078d20be5a4a1bd By default all SME operations in userspace will trap. When this happens we allocate storage space for the SME register state, set up the SVE registers and disable traps. We do not need to initialize ZA since the architecture guarantees that it will be zeroed when enabled and when we trap ZA is disabled. On syscall we exit streaming mode if we were previously in it and ensure that all but the lower 128 bits of the registers are zeroed while preserving the state of ZA. This follows the aarch64 PCS for SME, ZA state is preserved over a function call and streaming mode is exited. Since the traps for SME do not distinguish between streaming mode SVE and ZA usage if ZA is in use rather than reenabling traps we instead zero the parts of the SVE registers not shared with FPSIMD and leave SME enabled, this simplifies handling SME traps. If ZA is not in use then we reenable SME traps and fall through to normal handling of SVE. Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-17-broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> 
By default all SME operations in userspace will trap.  When this happens
we allocate storage space for the SME register state, set up the SVE
registers and disable traps.  We do not need to initialize ZA since the
architecture guarantees that it will be zeroed when enabled and when we
trap ZA is disabled.

On syscall we exit streaming mode if we were previously in it and ensure
that all but the lower 128 bits of the registers are zeroed while
preserving the state of ZA. This follows the aarch64 PCS for SME, ZA
state is preserved over a function call and streaming mode is exited.
Since the traps for SME do not distinguish between streaming mode SVE
and ZA usage if ZA is in use rather than reenabling traps we instead
zero the parts of the SVE registers not shared with FPSIMD and leave SME
enabled, this simplifies handling SME traps. If ZA is not in use then we
reenable SME traps and fall through to normal handling of SVE.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-17-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
arm64: Snapshot thread flags 2021-11-30T23:06:44+00:00 Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com 2021-11-29T13:06:48+00:00 342b3808786518ced347f40b59bae68664e20007 Some thread flags can be set remotely, and so even when IRQs are disabled, the flags can change under our feet. Generally this is unlikely to cause a problem in practice, but it is somewhat unsound, and KCSAN will legitimately warn that there is a data race. To avoid such issues, a snapshot of the flags has to be taken prior to using them. Some places already use READ_ONCE() for that, others do not. Convert them all to the new flag accessor helpers. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129130653.2037928-7-mark.rutland@arm.com 
Some thread flags can be set remotely, and so even when IRQs are disabled,
the flags can change under our feet. Generally this is unlikely to cause a
problem in practice, but it is somewhat unsound, and KCSAN will
legitimately warn that there is a data race.

To avoid such issues, a snapshot of the flags has to be taken prior to
using them. Some places already use READ_ONCE() for that, others do not.

Convert them all to the new flag accessor helpers.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129130653.2037928-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
arm64: fix compat syscall return truncation 2021-08-03T09:35:03+00:00 Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com 2021-08-02T10:42:00+00:00 e30e8d46cf605d216a799a28c77b8a41c328613a Due to inconsistencies in the way we manipulate compat GPRs, we have a few issues today: * For audit and tracing, where error codes are handled as a (native) long, negative error codes are expected to be sign-extended to the native 64-bits, or they may fail to be matched correctly. Thus a syscall which fails with an error may erroneously be identified as failing. * For ptrace, *all* compat return values should be sign-extended for consistency with 32-bit arm, but we currently only do this for negative return codes. * As we may transiently set the upper 32 bits of some compat GPRs while in the kernel, these can be sampled by perf, which is somewhat confusing. This means that where a syscall returns a pointer above 2G, this will be sign-extended, but will not be mistaken for an error as error codes are constrained to the inclusive range [-4096, -1] where no user pointer can exist. To fix all of these, we must consistently use helpers to get/set the compat GPRs, ensuring that we never write the upper 32 bits of the return code, and always sign-extend when reading the return code. This patch does so, with the following changes: * We re-organise syscall_get_return_value() to always sign-extend for compat tasks, and reimplement syscall_get_error() atop. We update syscall_trace_exit() to use syscall_get_return_value(). * We consistently use syscall_set_return_value() to set the return value, ensureing the upper 32 bits are never set unexpectedly. * As the core audit code currently uses regs_return_value() rather than syscall_get_return_value(), we special-case this for compat_user_mode(regs) such that this will do the right thing. Going forward, we should try to move the core audit code over to syscall_get_return_value(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Reported-by: weiyuchen <weiyuchen3@huawei.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802104200.21390-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> 
Due to inconsistencies in the way we manipulate compat GPRs, we have a
few issues today:

* For audit and tracing, where error codes are handled as a (native)
  long, negative error codes are expected to be sign-extended to the
  native 64-bits, or they may fail to be matched correctly. Thus a
  syscall which fails with an error may erroneously be identified as
  failing.

* For ptrace, *all* compat return values should be sign-extended for
  consistency with 32-bit arm, but we currently only do this for
  negative return codes.

* As we may transiently set the upper 32 bits of some compat GPRs while
  in the kernel, these can be sampled by perf, which is somewhat
  confusing. This means that where a syscall returns a pointer above 2G,
  this will be sign-extended, but will not be mistaken for an error as
  error codes are constrained to the inclusive range [-4096, -1] where
  no user pointer can exist.

To fix all of these, we must consistently use helpers to get/set the
compat GPRs, ensuring that we never write the upper 32 bits of the
return code, and always sign-extend when reading the return code.  This
patch does so, with the following changes:

* We re-organise syscall_get_return_value() to always sign-extend for
  compat tasks, and reimplement syscall_get_error() atop. We update
  syscall_trace_exit() to use syscall_get_return_value().

* We consistently use syscall_set_return_value() to set the return
  value, ensureing the upper 32 bits are never set unexpectedly.

* As the core audit code currently uses regs_return_value() rather than
  syscall_get_return_value(), we special-case this for
  compat_user_mode(regs) such that this will do the right thing. Going
  forward, we should try to move the core audit code over to
  syscall_get_return_value().

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com>
Reported-by: weiyuchen <weiyuchen3@huawei.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802104200.21390-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support 2021-04-08T12:12:19+00:00 Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org 2021-04-01T23:23:46+00:00 70918779aec9bd01d16f4e6e800ffe423d196021 Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly 5 bits of entropy. (And include AAPCS rationale AAPCS thanks to Mark Rutland.) In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute[1], this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. This isn't a problem here, though, since stack protector was not triggered before: examining the resulting syscall.o, there are no changes in canary coverage (none before, none now). [1] a working __attribute__((no_stack_protector)) has been added to GCC and Clang but has not been released in any version yet: https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=346b302d09c1e6db56d9fe69048acb32fbb97845 https://reviews.llvm.org/rG4fbf84c1732fca596ad1d6e96015e19760eb8a9b Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-6-keescook@chromium.org 
Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly
5 bits of entropy. (And include AAPCS rationale AAPCS thanks to Mark
Rutland.)

In order to avoid unconditional stack canaries on syscall entry (due to
the use of alloca()), also disable stack protector to avoid triggering
needless checks and slowing down the entry path. As there is no general
way to control stack protector coverage with a function attribute[1],
this must be disabled at the compilation unit level. This isn't a problem
here, though, since stack protector was not triggered before: examining
the resulting syscall.o, there are no changes in canary coverage (none
before, none now).

[1] a working __attribute__((no_stack_protector)) has been added to GCC
and Clang but has not been released in any version yet:
https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=346b302d09c1e6db56d9fe69048acb32fbb97845
https://reviews.llvm.org/rG4fbf84c1732fca596ad1d6e96015e19760eb8a9b

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-6-keescook@chromium.org
arm64: entry: consolidate Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 workaround 2021-02-08T17:39:02+00:00 Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com 2021-02-02T12:03:41+00:00 6459b8469753e9feaa8b34691d097cffad905931 The workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 is split across the syscall and debug handlers in separate files. This structure currently forces us to do some redundant work for debug exceptions from EL0, is a little difficult to follow, and gets in the way of some future rework of the exception entry code as it requires exceptions to be unmasked late in the syscall handling path. To simplify things, and as a preparatory step for future rework of exception entry, this patch moves all the workaround logic into entry-common.c. As the debug handler only needs to run for EL1 debug exceptions, we no longer call it for EL0 debug exceptions, and no longer need to check user_mode(regs) as this is always false. For clarity cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is changed to return bool. In the SVC path, the workaround is applied earlier, but this should have no functional impact as exceptions are still masked. In the debug path we run the fixup before explicitly disabling preemption, but we will not attempt to preempt before returning from the exception. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210202120341.28858-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> 
The workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 is split across the
syscall and debug handlers in separate files. This structure currently
forces us to do some redundant work for debug exceptions from EL0, is a
little difficult to follow, and gets in the way of some future rework of
the exception entry code as it requires exceptions to be unmasked late
in the syscall handling path.

To simplify things, and as a preparatory step for future rework of
exception entry, this patch moves all the workaround logic into
entry-common.c. As the debug handler only needs to run for EL1 debug
exceptions, we no longer call it for EL0 debug exceptions, and no longer
need to check user_mode(regs) as this is always false. For clarity
cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is changed to return bool.

In the SVC path, the workaround is applied earlier, but this should have
no functional impact as exceptions are still masked. In the debug path
we run the fixup before explicitly disabling preemption, but we will not
attempt to preempt before returning from the exception.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210202120341.28858-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
arm64: syscall: include prototype for EL0 SVC functions 2021-01-15T10:05:27+00:00 Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com 2021-01-14T12:48:12+00:00 b6d8878d24e39f213df0f3ea7abebd15edc7be21 The kbuild test robot reports that when building with W=1, GCC will warn for a couple of missing prototypes in syscall.c: | arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:157:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc' [-Wmissing-prototypes] | 157 | void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs) | | ^~~~~~~~~~ | arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:164:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc_compat' [-Wmissing-prototypes] | 164 | void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs) | | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ While this isn't a functional problem, as a general policy we should include the prototype for functions wherever possible to catch any accidental divergence between the prototype and implementation. Here we can easily include <asm/exception.h>, so let's do so. While there are a number of warnings elsewhere and some warnings enabled under W=1 are of questionable benefit, this change helps to make the code more robust as it evolved and reduces the noise somewhat, so it seems worthwhile. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202101141046.n8iPO3mw-lkp@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114124812.17754-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> 
The kbuild test robot reports that when building with W=1, GCC will warn
for a couple of missing prototypes in syscall.c:

|  arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:157:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
|    157 | void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
|        |      ^~~~~~~~~~
|  arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:164:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'do_el0_svc_compat' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
|    164 | void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
|        |      ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

While this isn't a functional problem, as a general policy we should
include the prototype for functions wherever possible to catch any
accidental divergence between the prototype and implementation. Here we
can easily include <asm/exception.h>, so let's do so.

While there are a number of warnings elsewhere and some warnings enabled
under W=1 are of questionable benefit, this change helps to make the
code more robust as it evolved and reduces the noise somewhat, so it
seems worthwhile.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202101141046.n8iPO3mw-lkp@intel.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114124812.17754-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
arm64: entry: remove redundant IRQ flag tracing 2021-01-13T12:51:30+00:00 Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com 2021-01-07T14:53:10+00:00 df06824767cc9a32fbdb0e3d3b7e169292a5b5fe All EL0 returns go via ret_to_user(), which masks IRQs and notifies lockdep and tracing before calling into do_notify_resume(). Therefore, there's no need for do_notify_resume() to call trace_hardirqs_off(), and the comment is stale. The call is simply redundant. In ret_to_user() we call exit_to_user_mode(), which notifies lockdep and tracing the IRQs will be enabled in userspace, so there's no need for el0_svc_common() to call trace_hardirqs_on() before returning. Further, at the start of ret_to_user() we call trace_hardirqs_off(), so not only is this redundant, but it is immediately undone. In addition to being redundant, the trace_hardirqs_on() in el0_svc_common() leaves lockdep inconsistent with the hardware state, and is liable to cause issues for any C code or instrumentation between this and the call to trace_hardirqs_off() which undoes it in ret_to_user(). This patch removes the redundant tracing calls and associated stale comments. Fixes: 23529049c684 ("arm64: entry: fix non-NMI user<->kernel transitions") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107145310.44616-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> 
All EL0 returns go via ret_to_user(), which masks IRQs and notifies
lockdep and tracing before calling into do_notify_resume(). Therefore,
there's no need for do_notify_resume() to call trace_hardirqs_off(), and
the comment is stale. The call is simply redundant.

In ret_to_user() we call exit_to_user_mode(), which notifies lockdep and
tracing the IRQs will be enabled in userspace, so there's no need for
el0_svc_common() to call trace_hardirqs_on() before returning. Further,
at the start of ret_to_user() we call trace_hardirqs_off(), so not only
is this redundant, but it is immediately undone.

In addition to being redundant, the trace_hardirqs_on() in
el0_svc_common() leaves lockdep inconsistent with the hardware state,
and is liable to cause issues for any C code or instrumentation
between this and the call to trace_hardirqs_off() which undoes it in
ret_to_user().

This patch removes the redundant tracing calls and associated stale
comments.

Fixes: 23529049c684 ("arm64: entry: fix non-NMI user<->kernel transitions")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107145310.44616-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Merge remote-tracking branch 'arm64/for-next/fixes' into for-next/core 2020-12-09T18:04:55+00:00 Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com 2020-12-09T18:04:55+00:00 d889797530c66f699170233474eab3361471e808 * arm64/for-next/fixes: (26 commits) arm64: mte: fix prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) if TCF0=NONE arm64: mte: Fix typo in macro definition arm64: entry: fix EL1 debug transitions arm64: entry: fix NMI {user, kernel}->kernel transitions arm64: entry: fix non-NMI kernel<->kernel transitions arm64: ptrace: prepare for EL1 irq/rcu tracking arm64: entry: fix non-NMI user<->kernel transitions arm64: entry: move el1 irq/nmi logic to C arm64: entry: prepare ret_to_user for function call arm64: entry: move enter_from_user_mode to entry-common.c arm64: entry: mark entry code as noinstr arm64: mark idle code as noinstr arm64: syscall: exit userspace before unmasking exceptions arm64: pgtable: Ensure dirty bit is preserved across pte_wrprotect() arm64: pgtable: Fix pte_accessible() ACPI/IORT: Fix doc warnings in iort.c arm64/fpsimd: add <asm/insn.h> to <asm/kprobes.h> to fix fpsimd build arm64: cpu_errata: Apply Erratum 845719 to KRYO2XX Silver arm64: proton-pack: Add KRYO2XX silver CPUs to spectre-v2 safe-list arm64: kpti: Add KRYO2XX gold/silver CPU cores to kpti safelist ... # Conflicts: # arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h # arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c 
* arm64/for-next/fixes: (26 commits)
  arm64: mte: fix prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) if TCF0=NONE
  arm64: mte: Fix typo in macro definition
  arm64: entry: fix EL1 debug transitions
  arm64: entry: fix NMI {user, kernel}->kernel transitions
  arm64: entry: fix non-NMI kernel<->kernel transitions
  arm64: ptrace: prepare for EL1 irq/rcu tracking
  arm64: entry: fix non-NMI user<->kernel transitions
  arm64: entry: move el1 irq/nmi logic to C
  arm64: entry: prepare ret_to_user for function call
  arm64: entry: move enter_from_user_mode to entry-common.c
  arm64: entry: mark entry code as noinstr
  arm64: mark idle code as noinstr
  arm64: syscall: exit userspace before unmasking exceptions
  arm64: pgtable: Ensure dirty bit is preserved across pte_wrprotect()
  arm64: pgtable: Fix pte_accessible()
  ACPI/IORT: Fix doc warnings in iort.c
  arm64/fpsimd: add <asm/insn.h> to <asm/kprobes.h> to fix fpsimd build
  arm64: cpu_errata: Apply Erratum 845719 to KRYO2XX Silver
  arm64: proton-pack: Add KRYO2XX silver CPUs to spectre-v2 safe-list
  arm64: kpti: Add KRYO2XX gold/silver CPU cores to kpti safelist
  ...

# Conflicts:
#	arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h
#	arch/arm64/kernel/sdei.c
arm64: entry: fix non-NMI user<->kernel transitions 2020-11-30T12:11:38+00:00 Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com 2020-11-30T11:59:46+00:00 23529049c68423820487304f244144e0d576e85a When built with PROVE_LOCKING, NO_HZ_FULL, and CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE will WARN() at boot time that interrupts are enabled when we call context_tracking_user_enter(), despite the DAIF flags indicating that IRQs are masked. The problem is that we're not tracking IRQ flag changes accurately, and so lockdep believes interrupts are enabled when they are not (and vice-versa). We can shuffle things so to make this more accurate. For kernel->user transitions there are a number of constraints we need to consider: 1) When we call __context_tracking_user_enter() HW IRQs must be disabled and lockdep must be up-to-date with this. 2) Userspace should be treated as having IRQs enabled from the PoV of both lockdep and tracing. 3) As context_tracking_user_enter() stops RCU from watching, we cannot use RCU after calling it. 4) IRQ flag tracing and lockdep have state that must be manipulated before RCU is disabled. ... with similar constraints applying for user->kernel transitions, with the ordering reversed. The generic entry code has enter_from_user_mode() and exit_to_user_mode() helpers to handle this. We can't use those directly, so we add arm64 copies for now (without the instrumentation markers which aren't used on arm64). These replace the existing user_exit() and user_exit_irqoff() calls spread throughout handlers, and the exception unmasking is left as-is. Note that: * The accounting for debug exceptions from userspace now happens in el0_dbg() and ret_to_user(), so this is removed from debug_exception_enter() and debug_exception_exit(). As user_exit_irqoff() wakes RCU, the userspace-specific check is removed. * The accounting for syscalls now happens in el0_svc(), el0_svc_compat(), and ret_to_user(), so this is removed from el0_svc_common(). This does not adversely affect the workaround for erratum 1463225, as this does not depend on any of the state tracking. * In ret_to_user() we mask interrupts with local_daif_mask(), and so we need to inform lockdep and tracing. Here a trace_hardirqs_off() is sufficient and safe as we have not yet exited kernel context and RCU is usable. * As PROVE_LOCKING selects TRACE_IRQFLAGS, the ifdeferry in entry.S only needs to check for the latter. * EL0 SError handling will be dealt with in a subsequent patch, as this needs to be treated as an NMI. Prior to this patch, booting an appropriately-configured kernel would result in spats as below: | DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled()) | WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5280 check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0 | Modules linked in: | CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3 #3 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 804003c5 (Nzcv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) | pc : check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0 | lr : check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0 | sp : ffff80001003bd80 | x29: ffff80001003bd80 x28: ffff66ce801e0000 | x27: 00000000ffffffff x26: 00000000000003c0 | x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffc31842527258 | x23: ffffc31842491368 x22: ffffc3184282d000 | x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001 | x19: ffffc318432ce000 x18: 0080000000000000 | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffc31840f18a78 | x15: 0000000000000001 x14: ffffc3184285c810 | x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000 | x11: ffffc318415857a0 x10: ffffc318406614c0 | x9 : ffffc318415857a0 x8 : ffffc31841f1d000 | x7 : 647261685f706564 x6 : ffffc3183ff7c66c | x5 : ffff66ce801e0000 x4 : 0000000000000000 | x3 : ffffc3183fe00000 x2 : ffffc31841500000 | x1 : e956dc24146b3500 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0 | lock_is_held_type+0x10c/0x188 | rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x70/0x98 | __context_tracking_enter+0x310/0x350 | context_tracking_enter.part.3+0x5c/0xc8 | context_tracking_user_enter+0x6c/0x80 | finish_ret_to_user+0x2c/0x13cr Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201130115950.22492-8-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> 
When built with PROVE_LOCKING, NO_HZ_FULL, and CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE
will WARN() at boot time that interrupts are enabled when we call
context_tracking_user_enter(), despite the DAIF flags indicating that
IRQs are masked.

The problem is that we're not tracking IRQ flag changes accurately, and
so lockdep believes interrupts are enabled when they are not (and
vice-versa). We can shuffle things so to make this more accurate. For
kernel->user transitions there are a number of constraints we need to
consider:

1) When we call __context_tracking_user_enter() HW IRQs must be disabled
   and lockdep must be up-to-date with this.

2) Userspace should be treated as having IRQs enabled from the PoV of
   both lockdep and tracing.

3) As context_tracking_user_enter() stops RCU from watching, we cannot
   use RCU after calling it.

4) IRQ flag tracing and lockdep have state that must be manipulated
   before RCU is disabled.

... with similar constraints applying for user->kernel transitions, with
the ordering reversed.

The generic entry code has enter_from_user_mode() and
exit_to_user_mode() helpers to handle this. We can't use those directly,
so we add arm64 copies for now (without the instrumentation markers
which aren't used on arm64). These replace the existing user_exit() and
user_exit_irqoff() calls spread throughout handlers, and the exception
unmasking is left as-is.

Note that:

* The accounting for debug exceptions from userspace now happens in
  el0_dbg() and ret_to_user(), so this is removed from
  debug_exception_enter() and debug_exception_exit(). As
  user_exit_irqoff() wakes RCU, the userspace-specific check is removed.

* The accounting for syscalls now happens in el0_svc(),
  el0_svc_compat(), and ret_to_user(), so this is removed from
  el0_svc_common(). This does not adversely affect the workaround for
  erratum 1463225, as this does not depend on any of the state tracking.

* In ret_to_user() we mask interrupts with local_daif_mask(), and so we
  need to inform lockdep and tracing. Here a trace_hardirqs_off() is
  sufficient and safe as we have not yet exited kernel context and RCU
  is usable.

* As PROVE_LOCKING selects TRACE_IRQFLAGS, the ifdeferry in entry.S only
  needs to check for the latter.

* EL0 SError handling will be dealt with in a subsequent patch, as this
  needs to be treated as an NMI.

Prior to this patch, booting an appropriately-configured kernel would
result in spats as below:

| DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lockdep_hardirqs_enabled())
| WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5280 check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3 #3
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 804003c5 (Nzcv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
| pc : check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| lr : check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
| sp : ffff80001003bd80
| x29: ffff80001003bd80 x28: ffff66ce801e0000
| x27: 00000000ffffffff x26: 00000000000003c0
| x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffc31842527258
| x23: ffffc31842491368 x22: ffffc3184282d000
| x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001
| x19: ffffc318432ce000 x18: 0080000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffc31840f18a78
| x15: 0000000000000001 x14: ffffc3184285c810
| x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: ffffc318415857a0 x10: ffffc318406614c0
| x9 : ffffc318415857a0 x8 : ffffc31841f1d000
| x7 : 647261685f706564 x6 : ffffc3183ff7c66c
| x5 : ffff66ce801e0000 x4 : 0000000000000000
| x3 : ffffc3183fe00000 x2 : ffffc31841500000
| x1 : e956dc24146b3500 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
|  check_flags.part.54+0x1dc/0x1f0
|  lock_is_held_type+0x10c/0x188
|  rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x70/0x98
|  __context_tracking_enter+0x310/0x350
|  context_tracking_enter.part.3+0x5c/0xc8
|  context_tracking_user_enter+0x6c/0x80
|  finish_ret_to_user+0x2c/0x13cr

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201130115950.22492-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>