<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S, branch v6.16</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack()</title>
<updated>2025-07-22T15:39:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ada Couprie Diaz</name>
<email>ada.coupriediaz@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-07-18T14:28:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb'/>
<id>d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb</id>
<content type='text'>
`cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change
to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled.
Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions
can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely,
is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks
and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.

In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task,
but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler
tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task
SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0),
clobbering it.

In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack
to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be
interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to
the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses
on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack,
calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with
the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !

This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS,
or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
or FPAC if enabled.

This is possible on a default config, but unlikely.
However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and
instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU
should receive based on priority.
Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU
even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very*
frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading
to unpredictable kernel panics.

Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning.
Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around
the branch.
Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency
of behaviour between all configurations.

Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF,
as the existing one saves but only masks IF.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ada Couprie Diaz &lt;ada.coupriediaz@arm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Cristian Prundeanu &lt;cpru@amazon.com&gt;
Fixes: 59b37fe52f49 ("arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt")
Tested-by: Cristian Prundeanu &lt;cpru@amazon.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250718142814.133329-1-ada.coupriediaz@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
`cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change
to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled.
Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions
can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely,
is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks
and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks.

In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task,
but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler
tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task
SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0),
clobbering it.

In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack
to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be
interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to
the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses
on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack,
calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with
the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use !

This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS,
or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
or FPAC if enabled.

This is possible on a default config, but unlikely.
However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and
instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU
should receive based on priority.
Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU
even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very*
frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading
to unpredictable kernel panics.

Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning.
Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around
the branch.
Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency
of behaviour between all configurations.

Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF,
as the existing one saves but only masks IF.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ada Couprie Diaz &lt;ada.coupriediaz@arm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Cristian Prundeanu &lt;cpru@amazon.com&gt;
Fixes: 59b37fe52f49 ("arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt")
Tested-by: Cristian Prundeanu &lt;cpru@amazon.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250718142814.133329-1-ada.coupriediaz@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T17:06:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-17T09:25:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=c2c6b27b5aa14fa28e3f455f697ccd2e0e75d773'/>
<id>c2c6b27b5aa14fa28e3f455f697ccd2e0e75d773</id>
<content type='text'>
When arm64's stack unwinder encounters an exception boundary, it uses
the pt_regs::stackframe created by the entry code, which has a copy of
the PC and FP at the time the exception was taken. The unwinder doesn't
know anything about pt_regs, and reports the PC from the stackframe, but
does not report the LR.

The LR is only guaranteed to contain the return address at function call
boundaries, and can be used as a scratch register at other times, so the
LR at an exception boundary may or may not be a legitimate return
address. It would be useful to report the LR value regardless, as it can
be helpful when debugging, and in future it will be helpful for reliable
stacktrace support.

This patch changes the way we unwind across exception boundaries,
allowing both the PC and LR to be reported. The entry code creates a
frame_record_meta structure embedded within pt_regs, which the unwinder
uses to find the pt_regs. The unwinder can then extract pt_regs::pc and
pt_regs::lr as two separate unwind steps before continuing with a
regular walk of frame records.

When a PC is unwound from pt_regs::lr, dump_backtrace() will log this
with an "L" marker so that it can be identified easily. For example,
an unwind across an exception boundary will appear as follows:

|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x10/0x60 (P)
|  __aarch64_insn_write+0x6c/0x90 (L)
|  aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync+0x28/0x80

... with a (P) entry for pt_regs::pc, and an (L) entry for pt_regs:lr.

Note that the LR may be stale at the point of the exception, for example,
shortly after a return:

|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  default_idle_call+0x34/0x180 (P)
|  default_idle_call+0x28/0x180 (L)
|  do_idle+0x204/0x268

... where the LR points a few instructions before the current PC.

This plays nicely with all the other unwind metadata tracking. With the
ftrace_graph profiler enabled globally, and kretprobes installed on
generic_handle_domain_irq() and do_interrupt_handler(), a backtrace triggered
by magic-sysrq + L reports:

| Call trace:
|  show_stack+0x20/0x40 (CF)
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 (F)
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x28
|  nmi_cpu_backtrace+0xfc/0x140
|  nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x1c8/0x200
|  arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x20/0x40
|  sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x24/0x38 (F)
|  __handle_sysrq+0xa8/0x1b0 (F)
|  handle_sysrq+0x38/0x50 (F)
|  pl011_int+0x460/0x5a8 (F)
|  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220 (F)
|  handle_irq_event+0x54/0xc0 (F)
|  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa8/0x1d0 (F)
|  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x34/0x58 (F)
|  gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x140 (FK)
|  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58 (F)
|  do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0xa0
|  el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68 (FK)
|  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  default_idle_call+0x34/0x180 (P)
|  default_idle_call+0x28/0x180 (L)
|  do_idle+0x204/0x268
|  cpu_startup_entry+0x3c/0x50 (F)
|  rest_init+0xe4/0xf0
|  start_kernel+0x744/0x750
|  __primary_switched+0x88/0x98

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman &lt;madvenka@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017092538.1859841-11-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When arm64's stack unwinder encounters an exception boundary, it uses
the pt_regs::stackframe created by the entry code, which has a copy of
the PC and FP at the time the exception was taken. The unwinder doesn't
know anything about pt_regs, and reports the PC from the stackframe, but
does not report the LR.

The LR is only guaranteed to contain the return address at function call
boundaries, and can be used as a scratch register at other times, so the
LR at an exception boundary may or may not be a legitimate return
address. It would be useful to report the LR value regardless, as it can
be helpful when debugging, and in future it will be helpful for reliable
stacktrace support.

This patch changes the way we unwind across exception boundaries,
allowing both the PC and LR to be reported. The entry code creates a
frame_record_meta structure embedded within pt_regs, which the unwinder
uses to find the pt_regs. The unwinder can then extract pt_regs::pc and
pt_regs::lr as two separate unwind steps before continuing with a
regular walk of frame records.

When a PC is unwound from pt_regs::lr, dump_backtrace() will log this
with an "L" marker so that it can be identified easily. For example,
an unwind across an exception boundary will appear as follows:

|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x10/0x60 (P)
|  __aarch64_insn_write+0x6c/0x90 (L)
|  aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync+0x28/0x80

... with a (P) entry for pt_regs::pc, and an (L) entry for pt_regs:lr.

Note that the LR may be stale at the point of the exception, for example,
shortly after a return:

|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  default_idle_call+0x34/0x180 (P)
|  default_idle_call+0x28/0x180 (L)
|  do_idle+0x204/0x268

... where the LR points a few instructions before the current PC.

This plays nicely with all the other unwind metadata tracking. With the
ftrace_graph profiler enabled globally, and kretprobes installed on
generic_handle_domain_irq() and do_interrupt_handler(), a backtrace triggered
by magic-sysrq + L reports:

| Call trace:
|  show_stack+0x20/0x40 (CF)
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 (F)
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x28
|  nmi_cpu_backtrace+0xfc/0x140
|  nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x1c8/0x200
|  arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x20/0x40
|  sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x24/0x38 (F)
|  __handle_sysrq+0xa8/0x1b0 (F)
|  handle_sysrq+0x38/0x50 (F)
|  pl011_int+0x460/0x5a8 (F)
|  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220 (F)
|  handle_irq_event+0x54/0xc0 (F)
|  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa8/0x1d0 (F)
|  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x34/0x58 (F)
|  gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x140 (FK)
|  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58 (F)
|  do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0xa0
|  el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68 (FK)
|  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  default_idle_call+0x34/0x180 (P)
|  default_idle_call+0x28/0x180 (L)
|  do_idle+0x204/0x268
|  cpu_startup_entry+0x3c/0x50 (F)
|  rest_init+0xe4/0xf0
|  start_kernel+0x744/0x750
|  __primary_switched+0x88/0x98

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman &lt;madvenka@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017092538.1859841-11-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: pt_regs: swap 'unused' and 'pmr' fields</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T17:06:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-17T09:25:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1454363098a0f7f14479f6a45945bf8d3d775a95'/>
<id>1454363098a0f7f14479f6a45945bf8d3d775a95</id>
<content type='text'>
In subsequent patches we'll want to add an additional u64 to struct
pt_regs. To make space, this patch swaps the 'unused' and 'pmr' fields,
as the 'pmr' value only requires bits[7:0] and can safely fit into a
u32, which frees up a 64-bit unused field.

The 'lockdep_hardirqs' and 'exit_rcu' fields should eventually be moved
out of pt_regs and managed locally within entry-common.c, so I've left
those as-is for the moment.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman &lt;madvenka@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017092538.1859841-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In subsequent patches we'll want to add an additional u64 to struct
pt_regs. To make space, this patch swaps the 'unused' and 'pmr' fields,
as the 'pmr' value only requires bits[7:0] and can safely fit into a
u32, which frees up a 64-bit unused field.

The 'lockdep_hardirqs' and 'exit_rcu' fields should eventually be moved
out of pt_regs and managed locally within entry-common.c, so I've left
those as-is for the moment.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman &lt;madvenka@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017092538.1859841-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: pt_regs: rename "pmr_save" -&gt; "pmr"</title>
<updated>2024-10-17T17:06:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-17T09:25:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=00d9597903d0053bb13c74dfe61bcba35e213bd7'/>
<id>00d9597903d0053bb13c74dfe61bcba35e213bd7</id>
<content type='text'>
The pt_regs::pmr_save field is weirdly named relative to all other
pt_regs fields, with a '_save' suffix that doesn't make anything clearer
and only leads to more typing to access the field.

Remove the '_save' suffix.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman &lt;madvenka@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017092538.1859841-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The pt_regs::pmr_save field is weirdly named relative to all other
pt_regs fields, with a '_save' suffix that doesn't make anything clearer
and only leads to more typing to access the field.

Remove the '_save' suffix.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown &lt;broonie@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes &lt;mbenes@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kalesh Singh &lt;kaleshsingh@google.com&gt;
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman &lt;madvenka@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;maz@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017092538.1859841-4-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: entry: simplify kernel_exit logic</title>
<updated>2024-01-18T11:00:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-16T11:02:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=da59f1d051d57e85eca49401a3a36d5a622babde'/>
<id>da59f1d051d57e85eca49401a3a36d5a622babde</id>
<content type='text'>
For historical reasons, the non-KPTI exception return path is duplicated for
EL1 and EL0, with the structure:

	.if \el == 0
	[ KPTI handling ]
	ldr     lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
	[ EL0 exception return workaround ]
	eret
	.else
	ldr     lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
	[ EL1 exception return workaround ]
	eret
	.endif
	sb

This would be simpler and clearer with the common portions factored out,
e.g.

	.if \el == 0
	[ KPTI handling ]
	.endif

	ldr     lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp

	.if \el == 0
	[ EL0 exception return workaround ]
	.else
	[ EL1 exception return workaround ]
	.endif

	eret
	sb

This expands to the same code, but is simpler for a human to follow as
it avoids duplicates the restore of LR+SP, and makes it clear that the
ERET is associated with the SB.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240116110221.420467-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For historical reasons, the non-KPTI exception return path is duplicated for
EL1 and EL0, with the structure:

	.if \el == 0
	[ KPTI handling ]
	ldr     lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
	[ EL0 exception return workaround ]
	eret
	.else
	ldr     lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
	[ EL1 exception return workaround ]
	eret
	.endif
	sb

This would be simpler and clearer with the common portions factored out,
e.g.

	.if \el == 0
	[ KPTI handling ]
	.endif

	ldr     lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp

	.if \el == 0
	[ EL0 exception return workaround ]
	.else
	[ EL1 exception return workaround ]
	.endif

	eret
	sb

This expands to the same code, but is simpler for a human to follow as
it avoids duplicates the restore of LR+SP, and makes it clear that the
ERET is associated with the SB.

There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240116110221.420467-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD</title>
<updated>2024-01-18T11:00:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-16T11:02:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f'/>
<id>832dd634bd1b4e3bbe9f10b9c9ba5db6f6f2b97f</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't
quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit
memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.

The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to
handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,
which are described in:

* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en
* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en

In both cases the workaround is described as:

| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the
| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected
| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:
|
| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including
|    unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`.
|
| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.

The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all
explicit memory accesses".

Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by
an LDR, as we have:

| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| 	tlbi	vale1, xzr
| 	dsb	nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| 	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
| 	eret
| alternative_else_nop_endif
|
| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]

This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB
immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.

The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives
cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for
ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch
to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:

| alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| 	[ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]
| .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@:
|
| 	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
|
| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| 	tlbi	vale1, xzr
| 	dsb	nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| 	eret

The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is
not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the
erratum:

| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the
| issue from occurring.

... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround
is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled".

Fixes: 471470bc7052 ("arm64: errata: Add Cortex-A520 speculative unprivileged load workaround")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240116110221.420467-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't
quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit
memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.

The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to
handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295,
which are described in:

* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en
* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en

In both cases the workaround is described as:

| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the
| kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected
| cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses:
|
| 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including
|    unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`.
|
| 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.

The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all
explicit memory accesses".

Unfortunately, as-implemented, the TLBI+DSB is immediately followed by
an LDR, as we have:

| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| 	tlbi	vale1, xzr
| 	dsb	nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| 	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
| 	eret
| alternative_else_nop_endif
|
| [ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]

This patch fixes this by reworking the logic to place the TLBI+DSB
immediately before the ERET, after all explicit memory accesses.

The ERET is currently in a separate alternative block, and alternatives
cannot be nested. To account for this, the alternative block for
ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 is replaced with a single alternative branch
to skip the KPTI logic, with the new shape of the logic being:

| alternative_insn "b .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@", nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
| 	[ ... KPTI exception return path ... ]
| .L_skip_tramp_exit_\@:
|
| 	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
| 	add	sp, sp, #PT_REGS_SIZE		// restore sp
|
| alternative_if ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
| 	tlbi	vale1, xzr
| 	dsb	nsh
| alternative_else_nop_endif
| 	eret

The new structure means that the workaround is only applied when KPTI is
not in use; this is fine as noted in the documented implications of the
erratum:

| Pagetable isolation between EL0 and higher level ELs prevents the
| issue from occurring.

... and as per the workaround description quoted above, the workaround
is only necessary "If pagetable isolation is disabled".

Fixes: 471470bc7052 ("arm64: errata: Add Cortex-A520 speculative unprivileged load workaround")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240116110221.420467-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Rename ARM64_WORKAROUND_2966298</title>
<updated>2024-01-12T12:51:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rob Herring</name>
<email>robh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-01-10T17:29:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=546b7cde9b1dd36089649101b75266564600ffe5'/>
<id>546b7cde9b1dd36089649101b75266564600ffe5</id>
<content type='text'>
In preparation to apply ARM64_WORKAROUND_2966298 for multiple errata,
rename the kconfig and capability. No functional change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110-arm-errata-a510-v1-1-d02bc51aeeee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In preparation to apply ARM64_WORKAROUND_2966298 for multiple errata,
rename the kconfig and capability. No functional change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240110-arm-errata-a510-v1-1-d02bc51aeeee@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: errata: Add Cortex-A520 speculative unprivileged load workaround</title>
<updated>2023-09-29T15:31:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rob Herring</name>
<email>robh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-21T19:41:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513'/>
<id>471470bc7052d28ce125901877dd10e4c048e513</id>
<content type='text'>
Implement the workaround for ARM Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298. On an
affected Cortex-A520 core, a speculatively executed unprivileged load
might leak data from a privileged load via a cache side channel. The
issue only exists for loads within a translation regime with the same
translation (e.g. same ASID and VMID). Therefore, the issue only affects
the return to EL0.

The workaround is to execute a TLBI before returning to EL0 after all
loads of privileged data. A non-shareable TLBI to any address is
sufficient.

The workaround isn't necessary if page table isolation (KPTI) is
enabled, but for simplicity it will be. Page table isolation should
normally be disabled for Cortex-A520 as it supports the CSV3 feature
and the E0PD feature (used when KASLR is enabled).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921194156.1050055-2-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Implement the workaround for ARM Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298. On an
affected Cortex-A520 core, a speculatively executed unprivileged load
might leak data from a privileged load via a cache side channel. The
issue only exists for loads within a translation regime with the same
translation (e.g. same ASID and VMID). Therefore, the issue only affects
the return to EL0.

The workaround is to execute a TLBI before returning to EL0 after all
loads of privileged data. A non-shareable TLBI to any address is
sufficient.

The workaround isn't necessary if page table isolation (KPTI) is
enabled, but for simplicity it will be. Page table isolation should
normally be disabled for Cortex-A520 as it supports the CSV3 feature
and the E0PD feature (used when KASLR is enabled).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring &lt;robh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921194156.1050055-2-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: sdei: abort running SDEI handlers during crash</title>
<updated>2023-08-04T16:35:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>D Scott Phillips</name>
<email>scott@os.amperecomputing.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-27T00:29:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=5cd474e57368f0957c343bb21e309cf82826b1ef'/>
<id>5cd474e57368f0957c343bb21e309cf82826b1ef</id>
<content type='text'>
Interrupts are blocked in SDEI context, per the SDEI spec: "The client
interrupts cannot preempt the event handler." If we crashed in the SDEI
handler-running context (as with ACPI's AGDI) then we need to clean up the
SDEI state before proceeding to the crash kernel so that the crash kernel
can have working interrupts.

Track the active SDEI handler per-cpu so that we can COMPLETE_AND_RESUME
the handler, discarding the interrupted context.

Fixes: f5df26961853 ("arm64: kernel: Add arch-specific SDEI entry code and CPU masking")
Signed-off-by: D Scott Phillips &lt;scott@os.amperecomputing.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mihai Carabas &lt;mihai.carabas@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230627002939.2758-1-scott@os.amperecomputing.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Interrupts are blocked in SDEI context, per the SDEI spec: "The client
interrupts cannot preempt the event handler." If we crashed in the SDEI
handler-running context (as with ACPI's AGDI) then we need to clean up the
SDEI state before proceeding to the crash kernel so that the crash kernel
can have working interrupts.

Track the active SDEI handler per-cpu so that we can COMPLETE_AND_RESUME
the handler, discarding the interrupted context.

Fixes: f5df26961853 ("arm64: kernel: Add arch-specific SDEI entry code and CPU masking")
Signed-off-by: D Scott Phillips &lt;scott@os.amperecomputing.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Morse &lt;james.morse@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Mihai Carabas &lt;mihai.carabas@oracle.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230627002939.2758-1-scott@os.amperecomputing.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: entry: Simplify tramp_alias macro and tramp_exit routine</title>
<updated>2023-05-25T15:55:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ard Biesheuvel</name>
<email>ardb@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-18T14:36:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=211ceca377f40ff46aef8ceb6e26cf4e7efecaf1'/>
<id>211ceca377f40ff46aef8ceb6e26cf4e7efecaf1</id>
<content type='text'>
The tramp_alias macro constructs the virtual alias of a symbol in the
trampoline text mapping, based on its kernel text address, and does so
in a way that is more convoluted than necessary. So let's simplify that.

Also, now that the address of the vector table is kept in a per-CPU
variable, there is no need to defer the load and the assignment of
VBAR_EL1 to tramp_exit(). This means we can use a PC-relative reference
to the per-CPU variable instead of storing its absolute address in a
global variable in the trampoline rodata.

And given that tramp_alias no longer needs a temp register, this means
we can restore X30 earlier as well, and only leave X29 for tramp_exit()
to restore.

While at it, give some related symbols static linkage, considering that
they are only referenced from the object file that defines them.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418143604.1176437-3-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The tramp_alias macro constructs the virtual alias of a symbol in the
trampoline text mapping, based on its kernel text address, and does so
in a way that is more convoluted than necessary. So let's simplify that.

Also, now that the address of the vector table is kept in a per-CPU
variable, there is no need to defer the load and the assignment of
VBAR_EL1 to tramp_exit(). This means we can use a PC-relative reference
to the per-CPU variable instead of storing its absolute address in a
global variable in the trampoline rodata.

And given that tramp_alias no longer needs a temp register, this means
we can restore X30 earlier as well, and only leave X29 for tramp_exit()
to restore.

While at it, give some related symbols static linkage, considering that
they are only referenced from the object file that defines them.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ardb@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418143604.1176437-3-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
