<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c, branch v5.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>arm64: add basic pointer authentication support</title>
<updated>2018-12-13T16:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-07T18:39:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7503197562567b57ec14feb3a9d5400ebc56812f'/>
<id>7503197562567b57ec14feb3a9d5400ebc56812f</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds basic support for pointer authentication, allowing
userspace to make use of APIAKey, APIBKey, APDAKey, APDBKey, and
APGAKey. The kernel maintains key values for each process (shared by all
threads within), which are initialised to random values at exec() time.

The ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1.{APA,API,GPA,GPI} fields are exposed to userspace,
to describe that pointer authentication instructions are available and
that the kernel is managing the keys. Two new hwcaps are added for the
same reason: PACA (for address authentication) and PACG (for generic
authentication).

Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson &lt;richard.henderson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Adam Wallis &lt;awallis@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan &lt;ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
[will: Fix sizeof() usage and unroll address key initialisation]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch adds basic support for pointer authentication, allowing
userspace to make use of APIAKey, APIBKey, APDAKey, APDBKey, and
APGAKey. The kernel maintains key values for each process (shared by all
threads within), which are initialised to random values at exec() time.

The ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1.{APA,API,GPA,GPI} fields are exposed to userspace,
to describe that pointer authentication instructions are available and
that the kernel is managing the keys. Two new hwcaps are added for the
same reason: PACA (for address authentication) and PACG (for generic
authentication).

Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson &lt;richard.henderson@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko &lt;kristina.martsenko@arm.com&gt;
Tested-by: Adam Wallis &lt;awallis@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan &lt;ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
[will: Fix sizeof() usage and unroll address key initialisation]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Add support for SB barrier and patch in over DSB; ISB sequences</title>
<updated>2018-12-06T16:47:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-14T10:21:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bd4fb6d270bc423a9a4098108784f7f9254c4e6d'/>
<id>bd4fb6d270bc423a9a4098108784f7f9254c4e6d</id>
<content type='text'>
We currently use a DSB; ISB sequence to inhibit speculation in set_fs().
Whilst this works for current CPUs, future CPUs may implement a new SB
barrier instruction which acts as an architected speculation barrier.

On CPUs that support it, patch in an SB; NOP sequence over the DSB; ISB
sequence and advertise the presence of the new instruction to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
We currently use a DSB; ISB sequence to inhibit speculation in set_fs().
Whilst this works for current CPUs, future CPUs may implement a new SB
barrier instruction which acts as an architected speculation barrier.

On CPUs that support it, patch in an SB; NOP sequence over the DSB; ISB
sequence and advertise the presence of the new instruction to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: cpufeature: Fix handling of CTR_EL0.IDC field</title>
<updated>2018-10-16T10:53:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suzuki K Poulose</name>
<email>suzuki.poulose@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T13:47:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1602df02f33f61fe0de1bbfeba0d1c97c14bff19'/>
<id>1602df02f33f61fe0de1bbfeba0d1c97c14bff19</id>
<content type='text'>
CTR_EL0.IDC reports the data cache clean requirements for instruction
to data coherence. However, if the field is 0, we need to check the
CLIDR_EL1 fields to detect the status of the feature. Currently we
don't do this and generate a warning with tainting the kernel, when
there is a mismatch in the field among the CPUs. Also the userspace
doesn't have a reliable way to check the CLIDR_EL1 register to check
the status.

This patch fixes the problem by checking the CLIDR_EL1 fields, when
(CTR_EL0.IDC == 0) and updates the kernel's copy of the CTR_EL0 for
the CPU with the actual status of the feature. This would allow the
sanity check infrastructure to do the proper checking of the fields
and also allow the CTR_EL0 emulation code to supply the real status
of the feature.

Now, if a CPU has raw CTR_EL0.IDC == 0 and effective IDC == 1 (with
overall system wide IDC == 1), we need to expose the real value to
the user. So, we trap CTR_EL0 access on the CPU which reports incorrect
CTR_EL0.IDC.

Fixes: commit 6ae4b6e057888 ("arm64: Add support for new control bits CTR_EL0.DIC and CTR_EL0.IDC")
Cc: Shanker Donthineni &lt;shankerd@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Philip Elcan &lt;pelcan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
CTR_EL0.IDC reports the data cache clean requirements for instruction
to data coherence. However, if the field is 0, we need to check the
CLIDR_EL1 fields to detect the status of the feature. Currently we
don't do this and generate a warning with tainting the kernel, when
there is a mismatch in the field among the CPUs. Also the userspace
doesn't have a reliable way to check the CLIDR_EL1 register to check
the status.

This patch fixes the problem by checking the CLIDR_EL1 fields, when
(CTR_EL0.IDC == 0) and updates the kernel's copy of the CTR_EL0 for
the CPU with the actual status of the feature. This would allow the
sanity check infrastructure to do the proper checking of the fields
and also allow the CTR_EL0 emulation code to supply the real status
of the feature.

Now, if a CPU has raw CTR_EL0.IDC == 0 and effective IDC == 1 (with
overall system wide IDC == 1), we need to expose the real value to
the user. So, we trap CTR_EL0 access on the CPU which reports incorrect
CTR_EL0.IDC.

Fixes: commit 6ae4b6e057888 ("arm64: Add support for new control bits CTR_EL0.DIC and CTR_EL0.IDC")
Cc: Shanker Donthineni &lt;shankerd@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Philip Elcan &lt;pelcan@codeaurora.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace</title>
<updated>2018-09-14T16:46:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Will Deacon</name>
<email>will.deacon@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-15T10:37:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=d71be2b6c0e19180b5f80a6d42039cc074a693a2'/>
<id>d71be2b6c0e19180b5f80a6d42039cc074a693a2</id>
<content type='text'>
Armv8.5 introduces a new PSTATE bit known as Speculative Store Bypass
Safe (SSBS) which can be used as a mitigation against Spectre variant 4.

Additionally, a CPU may provide instructions to manipulate PSTATE.SSBS
directly, so that userspace can toggle the SSBS control without trapping
to the kernel.

This patch probes for the existence of SSBS and advertise the new instructions
to userspace if they exist.

Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Armv8.5 introduces a new PSTATE bit known as Speculative Store Bypass
Safe (SSBS) which can be used as a mitigation against Spectre variant 4.

Additionally, a CPU may provide instructions to manipulate PSTATE.SSBS
directly, so that userspace can toggle the SSBS control without trapping
to the kernel.

This patch probes for the existence of SSBS and advertise the new instructions
to userspace if they exist.

Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Expose Arm v8.4 features</title>
<updated>2018-03-19T18:14:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suzuki K Poulose</name>
<email>suzuki.poulose@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-12T10:04:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7206dc93a58fb76421c4411eefa3c003337bcb2d'/>
<id>7206dc93a58fb76421c4411eefa3c003337bcb2d</id>
<content type='text'>
Expose the new features introduced by Arm v8.4 extensions to
Arm v8-A profile.

These include :

 1) Data indpendent timing of instructions. (DIT, exposed as HWCAP_DIT)
 2) Unaligned atomic instructions and Single-copy atomicity of loads
    and stores. (AT, expose as HWCAP_USCAT)
 3) LDAPR and STLR instructions with immediate offsets (extension to
    LRCPC, exposed as HWCAP_ILRCPC)
 4) Flag manipulation instructions (TS, exposed as HWCAP_FLAGM).

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;dave.martin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Expose the new features introduced by Arm v8.4 extensions to
Arm v8-A profile.

These include :

 1) Data indpendent timing of instructions. (DIT, exposed as HWCAP_DIT)
 2) Unaligned atomic instructions and Single-copy atomicity of loads
    and stores. (AT, expose as HWCAP_USCAT)
 3) LDAPR and STLR instructions with immediate offsets (extension to
    LRCPC, exposed as HWCAP_ILRCPC)
 4) Flag manipulation instructions (TS, exposed as HWCAP_FLAGM).

Cc: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;dave.martin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: v8.4: Support for new floating point multiplication instructions</title>
<updated>2018-01-05T11:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dongjiu Geng</name>
<email>gengdongjiu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-13T10:13:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=3b3b681097fae73b7f5dcdd42db6cfdf32943d4c'/>
<id>3b3b681097fae73b7f5dcdd42db6cfdf32943d4c</id>
<content type='text'>
ARM v8.4 extensions add new neon instructions for performing a
multiplication of each FP16 element of one vector with the corresponding
FP16 element of a second vector, and to add or subtract this without an
intermediate rounding to the corresponding FP32 element in a third vector.

This patch detects this feature and let the userspace know about it via a
HWCAP bit and MRS emulation.

Cc: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dongjiu Geng &lt;gengdongjiu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ARM v8.4 extensions add new neon instructions for performing a
multiplication of each FP16 element of one vector with the corresponding
FP16 element of a second vector, and to add or subtract this without an
intermediate rounding to the corresponding FP32 element in a third vector.

This patch detects this feature and let the userspace know about it via a
HWCAP bit and MRS emulation.

Cc: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dongjiu Geng &lt;gengdongjiu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64/sve: Detect SVE and activate runtime support</title>
<updated>2017-11-03T15:24:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Martin</name>
<email>Dave.Martin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-31T15:51:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=43994d824e8443263dc98b151e6326bf677be52e'/>
<id>43994d824e8443263dc98b151e6326bf677be52e</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch enables detection of hardware SVE support via the
cpufeatures framework, and reports its presence to the kernel and
userspace via the new ARM64_SVE cpucap and HWCAP_SVE hwcap
respectively.

Userspace can also detect SVE using ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, using the
cpufeatures MRS emulation.

When running on hardware that supports SVE, this enables runtime
kernel support for SVE, and allows user tasks to execute SVE
instructions and make of the of the SVE-specific user/kernel
interface extensions implemented by this series.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch enables detection of hardware SVE support via the
cpufeatures framework, and reports its presence to the kernel and
userspace via the new ARM64_SVE cpucap and HWCAP_SVE hwcap
respectively.

Userspace can also detect SVE using ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, using the
cpufeatures MRS emulation.

When running on hardware that supports SVE, this enables runtime
kernel support for SVE, and allows user tasks to execute SVE
instructions and make of the of the SVE-specific user/kernel
interface extensions implemented by this series.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64/sve: Probe SVE capabilities and usable vector lengths</title>
<updated>2017-11-03T15:24:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Martin</name>
<email>Dave.Martin@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-31T15:51:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=2e0f2478ea37eba945bee007884a2988b8f7d332'/>
<id>2e0f2478ea37eba945bee007884a2988b8f7d332</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch uses the cpufeatures framework to determine common SVE
capabilities and vector lengths, and configures the runtime SVE
support code appropriately.

ZCR_ELx is not really a feature register, but it is convenient to
use it as a template for recording the maximum vector length
supported by a CPU, using the LEN field.  This field is similar to
a feature field in that it is a contiguous bitfield for which we
want to determine the minimum system-wide value.  This patch adds
ZCR as a pseudo-register in cpuinfo/cpufeatures, with appropriate
custom code to populate it.  Finding the minimum supported value of
the LEN field is left to the cpufeatures framework in the usual
way.

The meaning of ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 is not architecturally defined yet,
so for now we just require it to be zero.

Note that much of this code is dormant and SVE still won't be used
yet, since system_supports_sve() remains hardwired to false.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Bennée &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch uses the cpufeatures framework to determine common SVE
capabilities and vector lengths, and configures the runtime SVE
support code appropriately.

ZCR_ELx is not really a feature register, but it is convenient to
use it as a template for recording the maximum vector length
supported by a CPU, using the LEN field.  This field is similar to
a feature field in that it is a contiguous bitfield for which we
want to determine the minimum system-wide value.  This patch adds
ZCR as a pseudo-register in cpuinfo/cpufeatures, with appropriate
custom code to populate it.  Finding the minimum supported value of
the LEN field is left to the cpufeatures framework in the usual
way.

The meaning of ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 is not architecturally defined yet,
so for now we just require it to be zero.

Note that much of this code is dormant and SVE still won't be used
yet, since system_supports_sve() remains hardwired to false.

Signed-off-by: Dave Martin &lt;Dave.Martin@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Alex Bennée &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Expose support for optional ARMv8-A features</title>
<updated>2017-10-11T14:28:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Suzuki K Poulose</name>
<email>suzuki.poulose@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-11T13:01:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=f5e035f8694c3bdddc66ea46ecda965ee6853718'/>
<id>f5e035f8694c3bdddc66ea46ecda965ee6853718</id>
<content type='text'>
ARMv8-A adds a few optional features for ARMv8.2 and ARMv8.3.
Expose them to the userspace via HWCAPs and mrs emulation.

SHA2-512  - Instruction support for SHA512 Hash algorithm (e.g SHA512H,
	    SHA512H2, SHA512U0, SHA512SU1)
SHA3 	  - SHA3 crypto instructions (EOR3, RAX1, XAR, BCAX).
SM3	  - Instruction support for Chinese cryptography algorithm SM3
SM4 	  - Instruction support for Chinese cryptography algorithm SM4
DP	  - Dot Product instructions (UDOT, SDOT).

Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Martin &lt;dave.martin@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
ARMv8-A adds a few optional features for ARMv8.2 and ARMv8.3.
Expose them to the userspace via HWCAPs and mrs emulation.

SHA2-512  - Instruction support for SHA512 Hash algorithm (e.g SHA512H,
	    SHA512H2, SHA512U0, SHA512SU1)
SHA3 	  - SHA3 crypto instructions (EOR3, RAX1, XAR, BCAX).
SM3	  - Instruction support for Chinese cryptography algorithm SM3
SM4 	  - Instruction support for Chinese cryptography algorithm SM4
DP	  - Dot Product instructions (UDOT, SDOT).

Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Martin &lt;dave.martin@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: Expose DC CVAP to userspace</title>
<updated>2017-08-09T10:00:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Robin Murphy</name>
<email>robin.murphy@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-25T10:55:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7aac405ebb3224037efd56b73d82d181111cdac3'/>
<id>7aac405ebb3224037efd56b73d82d181111cdac3</id>
<content type='text'>
The ARMv8.2-DCPoP feature introduces persistent memory support to the
architecture, by defining a point of persistence in the memory
hierarchy, and a corresponding cache maintenance operation, DC CVAP.
Expose the support via HWCAP and MRS emulation.

Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy &lt;robin.murphy@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
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<pre>
The ARMv8.2-DCPoP feature introduces persistent memory support to the
architecture, by defining a point of persistence in the memory
hierarchy, and a corresponding cache maintenance operation, DC CVAP.
Expose the support via HWCAP and MRS emulation.

Reviewed-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy &lt;robin.murphy@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
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