QCOM KRYO2XX Silver cores are Cortex-A53 based and are
susceptible to the 845719 erratum. Add them to the lookup
list to apply the erratum.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@somainline.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201104232218.198800-5-konrad.dybcio@somainline.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

On Cortex-A77 r0p0 and r1p0, a sequence of a non-cacheable or device load
and a store exclusive or PAR_EL1 read can cause a deadlock.

The workaround requires a DMB SY before and after a PAR_EL1 register
read. In addition, it's possible an interrupt (doing a device read) or
KVM guest exit could be taken between the DMB and PAR read, so we
also need a DMB before returning from interrupt and before returning to
a guest.

A deadlock is still possible with the workaround as KVM guests must also
have the workaround. IOW, a malicious guest can deadlock an affected
systems.

This workaround also depends on a firmware counterpart to enable the h/w
to insert DMB SY after load and store exclusive instructions. See the
errata document SDEN-1152370 v10 [1] for more information.

[1] https://static.docs.arm.com/101992/0010/Arm_Cortex_A77_MP074_Software_Developer_Errata_Notice_v10.pdf

Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry.kdev@gmail.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028182839.166037-2-robh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
 "There's quite a lot of code here, but much of it is due to the
  addition of a new PMU driver as well as some arm64-specific selftests
  which is an area where we've traditionally been lagging a bit.

  In terms of exciting features, this includes support for the Memory
  Tagging Extension which narrowly missed 5.9, hopefully allowing
  userspace to run with use-after-free detection in production on CPUs
  that support it. Work is ongoing to integrate the feature with KASAN
  for 5.11.

  Another change that I'm excited about (assuming they get the hardware
  right) is preparing the ASID allocator for sharing the CPU page-table
  with the SMMU. Those changes will also come in via Joerg with the
  IOMMU pull.

  We do stray outside of our usual directories in a few places, mostly
  due to core changes required by MTE. Although much of this has been
  Acked, there were a couple of places where we unfortunately didn't get
  any review feedback.

  Other than that, we ran into a handful of minor conflicts in -next,
  but nothing that should post any issues.

  Summary:

   - Userspace support for the Memory Tagging Extension introduced by
     Armv8.5. Kernel support (via KASAN) is likely to follow in 5.11.

   - Selftests for MTE, Pointer Authentication and FPSIMD/SVE context
     switching.

   - Fix and subsequent rewrite of our Spectre mitigations, including
     the addition of support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC.

   - Support for the Armv8.3 Pointer Authentication enhancements.

   - Support for ASID pinning, which is required when sharing
     page-tables with the SMMU.

   - MM updates, including treating flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault() as a
     no-op.

   - Perf/PMU driver updates, including addition of the ARM CMN PMU
     driver and also support to handle CPU PMU IRQs as NMIs.

   - Allow prefetchable PCI BARs to be exposed to userspace using normal
     non-cacheable mappings.

   - Implementation of ARCH_STACKWALK for unwinding.

   - Improve reporting of unexpected kernel traps due to BPF JIT
     failure.

   - Improve robustness of user-visible HWCAP strings and their
     corresponding numerical constants.

   - Removal of TEXT_OFFSET.

   - Removal of some unused functions, parameters and prototypes.

   - Removal of MPIDR-based topology detection in favour of firmware
     description.

   - Cleanups to handling of SVE and FPSIMD register state in
     preparation for potential future optimisation of handling across
     syscalls.

   - Cleanups to the SDEI driver in preparation for support in KVM.

   - Miscellaneous cleanups and refactoring work"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (148 commits)
  Revert "arm64: initialize per-cpu offsets earlier"
  arm64: random: Remove no longer needed prototypes
  arm64: initialize per-cpu offsets earlier
  kselftest/arm64: Check mte tagged user address in kernel
  kselftest/arm64: Verify KSM page merge for MTE pages
  kselftest/arm64: Verify all different mmap MTE options
  kselftest/arm64: Check forked child mte memory accessibility
  kselftest/arm64: Verify mte tag inclusion via prctl
  kselftest/arm64: Add utilities and a test to validate mte memory
  perf: arm-cmn: Fix conversion specifiers for node type
  perf: arm-cmn: Fix unsigned comparison to less than zero
  arm64: dbm: Invalidate local TLB when setting TCR_EL1.HD
  arm64: mm: Make flush_tlb_fix_spurious_fault() a no-op
  arm64: Add support for PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC prctl() option
  arm64: Pull in task_stack_page() to Spectre-v4 mitigation code
  KVM: arm64: Allow patching EL2 vectors even with KASLR is not enabled
  arm64: Get rid of arm64_ssbd_state
  KVM: arm64: Convert ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 to arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()
  KVM: arm64: Get rid of kvm_arm_have_ssbd()
  KVM: arm64: Simplify handling of ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
  ...

Out with the old ghost, in with the new...

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Owing to the fact that the host kernel is always mitigated, we can
drastically simplify the WA2 handling by keeping the mitigation
state ON when entering the guest. This means the guest is either
unaffected or not mitigated.

This results in a nice simplification of the mitigation space,
and the removal of a lot of code that was never really used anyway.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Rewrite the Spectre-v4 mitigation handling code to follow the same
approach as that taken by Spectre-v2.

For now, report to KVM that the system is vulnerable (by forcing
'ssbd_state' to ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN), as this will be cleared up in
subsequent steps.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

In a similar manner to the renaming of ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
to ARM64_SPECTRE_V2, rename ARM64_SSBD to ARM64_SPECTRE_V4. This isn't
_entirely_ accurate, as we also need to take into account the interaction
with SSBS, but that will be taken care of in subsequent patches.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The Spectre-v2 mitigation code is pretty unwieldy and hard to maintain.
This is largely due to it being written hastily, without much clue as to
how things would pan out, and also because it ends up mixing policy and
state in such a way that it is very difficult to figure out what's going
on.

Rewrite the Spectre-v2 mitigation so that it clearly separates state from
policy and follows a more structured approach to handling the mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The spectre mitigation code is spread over a few different files, which
makes it both hard to follow, but also hard to remove it should we want
to do that in future.

Introduce a new file for housing the spectre mitigations, and populate
it with the spectre-v1 reporting code to start with.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

For better or worse, the world knows about "Spectre" and not about
"Branch predictor hardening". Rename ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR to
ARM64_SPECTRE_V2 as part of moving all of the Spectre mitigations into
their own little corner.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>