Add userspace support for the Memory Tagging Extension introduced by
Armv8.5.

(Catalin Marinas and others)
* for-next/mte: (30 commits)
  arm64: mte: Fix typo in memory tagging ABI documentation
  arm64: mte: Add Memory Tagging Extension documentation
  arm64: mte: Kconfig entry
  arm64: mte: Save tags when hibernating
  arm64: mte: Enable swap of tagged pages
  mm: Add arch hooks for saving/restoring tags
  fs: Handle intra-page faults in copy_mount_options()
  arm64: mte: ptrace: Add NT_ARM_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL regset
  arm64: mte: ptrace: Add PTRACE_{PEEK,POKE}MTETAGS support
  arm64: mte: Allow {set,get}_tagged_addr_ctrl() on non-current tasks
  arm64: mte: Restore the GCR_EL1 register after a suspend
  arm64: mte: Allow user control of the generated random tags via prctl()
  arm64: mte: Allow user control of the tag check mode via prctl()
  mm: Allow arm64 mmap(PROT_MTE) on RAM-based files
  arm64: mte: Validate the PROT_MTE request via arch_validate_flags()
  mm: Introduce arch_validate_flags()
  arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()
  mm: Introduce arch_calc_vm_flag_bits()
  arm64: mte: Tags-aware aware memcmp_pages() implementation
  arm64: Avoid unnecessary clear_user_page() indirection
  ...

Rewrite the Spectre-v4 mitigation handling code to follow the same
approach as that taken by Spectre-v2.

For now, report to KVM that the system is vulnerable (by forcing
'ssbd_state' to ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN), as this will be cleared up in
subsequent steps.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The is_ttbrX_addr() functions have somehow ended up in the middle of
the start_thread() functions, so move them out of the way to keep the
code readable.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The Spectre-v2 mitigation code is pretty unwieldy and hard to maintain.
This is largely due to it being written hastily, without much clue as to
how things would pan out, and also because it ends up mixing policy and
state in such a way that it is very difficult to figure out what's going
on.

Rewrite the Spectre-v2 mitigation so that it clearly separates state from
policy and follows a more structured approach to handling the mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

In preparation for ptrace() access to the prctl() value, allow calling
these functions on non-current tasks.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

The IRG, ADDG and SUBG instructions insert a random tag in the resulting
address. Certain tags can be excluded via the GCR_EL1.Exclude bitmap
when, for example, the user wants a certain colour for freed buffers.
Since the GCR_EL1 register is not accessible at EL0, extend the
prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) interface to include a 16-bit field in
the first argument for controlling which tags can be generated by the
above instruction (an include rather than exclude mask). Note that by
default all non-zero tags are excluded. This setting is per-thread.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

By default, even if PROT_MTE is set on a memory range, there is no tag
check fault reporting (SIGSEGV). Introduce a set of option to the
exiting prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL) to allow user control of the tag
check fault mode:

  PR_MTE_TCF_NONE  - no reporting (default)
  PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC  - synchronous tag check fault reporting
  PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC - asynchronous tag check fault reporting

These options translate into the corresponding SCTLR_EL1.TCF0 bitfield,
context-switched by the kernel. Note that the kernel accesses to the
user address space (e.g. read() system call) are not checked if the user
thread tag checking mode is PR_MTE_TCF_NONE or PR_MTE_TCF_ASYNC. If the
tag checking mode is PR_MTE_TCF_SYNC, the kernel makes a best effort to
check its user address accesses, however it cannot always guarantee it.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas:
 "The bulk is in-kernel pointer authentication, activity monitors and
  lots of asm symbol annotations. I also queued the sys_mremap() patch
  commenting the asymmetry in the address untagging.

  Summary:

   - In-kernel Pointer Authentication support (previously only offered
     to user space).

   - ARM Activity Monitors (AMU) extension support allowing better CPU
     utilisation numbers for the scheduler (frequency invariance).

   - Memory hot-remove support for arm64.

   - Lots of asm annotations (SYM_*) in preparation for the in-kernel
     Branch Target Identification (BTI) support.

   - arm64 perf updates: ARMv8.5-PMU 64-bit counters, refactoring the
     PMU init callbacks, support for new DT compatibles.

   - IPv6 header checksum optimisation.

   - Fixes: SDEI (software delegated exception interface) double-lock on
     hibernate with shared events.

   - Minor clean-ups and refactoring: cpu_ops accessor,
     cpu_do_switch_mm() converted to C, cpufeature finalisation helper.

   - sys_mremap() comment explaining the asymmetric address untagging
     behaviour"

* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (81 commits)
  mm/mremap: Add comment explaining the untagging behaviour of mremap()
  arm64: head: Convert install_el2_stub to SYM_INNER_LABEL
  arm64: Introduce get_cpu_ops() helper function
  arm64: Rename cpu_read_ops() to init_cpu_ops()
  arm64: Declare ACPI parking protocol CPU operation if needed
  arm64: move kimage_vaddr to .rodata
  arm64: use mov_q instead of literal ldr
  arm64: Kconfig: verify binutils support for ARM64_PTR_AUTH
  lkdtm: arm64: test kernel pointer authentication
  arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing
  kconfig: Add support for 'as-option'
  arm64: suspend: restore the kernel ptrauth keys
  arm64: __show_regs: strip PAC from lr in printk
  arm64: unwind: strip PAC from kernel addresses
  arm64: mask PAC bits of __builtin_return_address
  arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
  arm64: initialize and switch ptrauth kernel keys
  arm64: enable ptrauth earlier
  arm64: cpufeature: handle conflicts based on capability
  arm64: cpufeature: Move cpu capability helpers inside C file
  ...

The vDSO library should only include the necessary headers required for
a userspace library (UAPI and a minimal set of kernel headers). To make
this possible it is necessary to isolate from the kernel headers the
common parts that are strictly necessary to build the library.

Introduce asm/vdso/processor.h to contain all the arm64 specific
functions that are suitable for vDSO inclusion.

Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200320145351.32292-20-vincenzo.frascino@arm.com

Set up keys to use pointer authentication within the kernel. The kernel
will be compiled with APIAKey instructions, the other keys are currently
unused. Each task is given its own APIAKey, which is initialized during
fork. The key is changed during context switch and on kernel entry from
EL0.

The keys for idle threads need to be set before calling any C functions,
because it is not possible to enter and exit a function with different
keys.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
[Amit: Modified secondary cores key structure, comments]
Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>