__user_swpX_asm maybe failed in first STREX operation, emulate_swpX
will try again, but the *data has been changed in first time. which
causes the result is wrong.
This patch is to fix this issue. When STREX succeed, change the *data.
if it fail, *data is not changed.

Signed-off-by: Shengjiu Wang <shengjiu.wang@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Provide a software-based implementation of the priviledged no access
support found in ARMv8.1.

Userspace pages are mapped using a different domain number from the
kernel and IO mappings.  If we switch the user domain to "no access"
when we enter the kernel, we can prevent the kernel from touching
userspace.

However, the kernel needs to be able to access userspace via the
various user accessor functions.  With the wrapping in the previous
patch, we can temporarily enable access when the kernel needs user
access, and re-disable it afterwards.

This allows us to trap non-intended accesses to userspace, eg, caused
by an inadvertent dereference of the LIST_POISON* values, which, with
appropriate user mappings setup, can be made to succeed.  This in turn
can allow use-after-free bugs to be further exploited than would
otherwise be possible.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

This moves all fixup snippets to the .text.fixup section, which is
a special section that gets emitted along with the .text section
for each input object file, i.e., the snippets are kept much closer
to the code they refer to, which helps prevent linker failure on
large kernels.

Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Convert many (but not all) printk(KERN_* to pr_* to simplify the code.
We take the opportunity to join some printk lines together so we don't
split the message across several lines, and we also add a few levels
to some messages which were previously missing them.

Tested-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Tested-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

According to the ARM ARMv7, explicit barriers are necessary when using
synchronisation primitives such as SWP{B}. The use of these
instructions does not automatically imply a barrier and any ordering
requirements by the software must be explicitly expressed with the use
of suitable barriers.

Based on this, remove the barriers from SWP{B} emulation.

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Previous CPUs do not have the ability to trap SWP instructions, so
it's pointless initialising this code there.

Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Don't use create_proc_read_entry() as that is deprecated, but rather use
proc_create_data() and seq_file instead.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@deeprootsystems.com>
cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-omap@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

find_vma() is *not* safe when somebody else is removing vmas.  Not just
the return value might get bogus just as you are getting it (this instance
doesn't try to dereference the resulting vma), the search itself can get
buggered in rather spectacular ways.  IOW, ->mmap_sem really, really is
not optional here.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>