We don't want compiler instrumentation to touch noinstr functions,
which are annotated with the no_profile_instrument_function function
attribute. Add a Kconfig test for this and make GCOV depend on it, and
in the future, PGO.

If an architecture is using noinstr, it should denote that via this
Kconfig value. That makes Kconfigs that depend on noinstr able to express
dependencies in an architecturally agnostic way.

Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YMTn9yjuemKFLbws@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YMcssV%2Fn5IBGv4f0@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210621231822.2848305-4-ndesaulniers@google.com

Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
 "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.

  Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.

  From Mickaël's cover letter:
    "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
     global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
     is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
     sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
     system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
     help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
     behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
     process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
     themselves.

     Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
     syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
     use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
     kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
     sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
     Pledge/Unveil.

     In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
     This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
     series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
     combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
     init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"

  The cover letter and v34 posting is here:

      https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/

  See also:

      https://landlock.io/

  This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
  years"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]

* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
  landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
  samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
  selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
  landlock: Add syscall implementations
  arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
  fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
  landlock: Support filesystem access-control
  LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
  landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
  landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
  landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
  landlock: Add object management

Support huge page vmalloc mappings.  Config option HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMALLOC
enables support on architectures that define HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP and
supports PMD sized vmap mappings.

vmalloc will attempt to allocate PMD-sized pages if allocating PMD size or
larger, and fall back to small pages if that was unsuccessful.

Architectures must ensure that any arch specific vmalloc allocations that
require PAGE_SIZE mappings (e.g., module allocations vs strict module rwx)
use the VM_NOHUGE flag to inhibit larger mappings.

This can result in more internal fragmentation and memory overhead for a
given allocation, an option nohugevmalloc is added to disable at boot.

[colin.king@canonical.com: fix read of uninitialized pointer area]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210318155955.18220-1-colin.king@canonical.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317062402.533919-14-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Evaluate $(call cc-option,...) etc. only for build targets

 - Add CONFIG_VMLINUX_MAP to generate .map file when linking vmlinux

 - Remove unnecessary --gcc-toolchains Clang flag because the --prefix
   flag finds the toolchains

 - Do not pass Clang's --prefix flag when using the integrated as

 - Check the assembler version in Kconfig time

 - Add new CONFIG options, AS_VERSION, AS_IS_GNU, AS_IS_LLVM to clean up
   some dependencies in Kconfig

 - Fix invalid Module.symvers creation when building only modules
   without vmlinux

 - Fix false-positive modpost warnings when CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS is
   set, but there is no module to build

 - Refactor module installation Makefile

 - Support zstd for module compression

 - Convert alpha and ia64 to use generic shell scripts to generate the
   syscall headers

 - Add a new elfnote to indicate if the kernel was built with LTO, which
   will be used by pahole

 - Flatten the directory structure under include/config/ so CONFIG
   options and filenames match

 - Change the deb source package name from linux-$(KERNELRELEASE) to
   linux-upstream

* tag 'kbuild-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (42 commits)
  kbuild: Add $(KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS) to 'has_libelf' test
  kbuild: deb-pkg: change the source package name to linux-upstream
  tools: do not include scripts/Kbuild.include
  kbuild: redo fake deps at include/config/*.h
  kbuild: remove TMPO from try-run
  MAINTAINERS: add pattern for dummy-tools
  kbuild: add an elfnote for whether vmlinux is built with lto
  ia64: syscalls: switch to generic syscallhdr.sh
  ia64: syscalls: switch to generic syscalltbl.sh
  alpha: syscalls: switch to generic syscallhdr.sh
  alpha: syscalls: switch to generic syscalltbl.sh
  sysctl: use min() helper for namecmp()
  kbuild: add support for zstd compressed modules
  kbuild: remove CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS
  kbuild: merge scripts/Makefile.modsign to scripts/Makefile.modinst
  kbuild: move module strip/compression code into scripts/Makefile.modinst
  kbuild: refactor scripts/Makefile.modinst
  kbuild: rename extmod-prefix to extmod_prefix
  kbuild: check module name conflict for external modules as well
  kbuild: show the target directory for depmod log
  ...

Pull CFI on arm64 support from Kees Cook:
 "This builds on last cycle's LTO work, and allows the arm64 kernels to
  be built with Clang's Control Flow Integrity feature. This feature has
  happily lived in Android kernels for almost 3 years[1], so I'm excited
  to have it ready for upstream.

  The wide diffstat is mainly due to the treewide fixing of mismatched
  list_sort prototypes. Other things in core kernel are to address
  various CFI corner cases. The largest code portion is the CFI runtime
  implementation itself (which will be shared by all architectures
  implementing support for CFI). The arm64 pieces are Acked by arm64
  maintainers rather than coming through the arm64 tree since carrying
  this tree over there was going to be awkward.

  CFI support for x86 is still under development, but is pretty close.
  There are a handful of corner cases on x86 that need some improvements
  to Clang and objtool, but otherwise works well.

  Summary:

   - Clean up list_sort prototypes (Sami Tolvanen)

   - Introduce CONFIG_CFI_CLANG for arm64 (Sami Tolvanen)"

* tag 'cfi-v5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  arm64: allow CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to be selected
  KVM: arm64: Disable CFI for nVHE
  arm64: ftrace: use function_nocfi for ftrace_call
  arm64: add __nocfi to __apply_alternatives
  arm64: add __nocfi to functions that jump to a physical address
  arm64: use function_nocfi with __pa_symbol
  arm64: implement function_nocfi
  psci: use function_nocfi for cpu_resume
  lkdtm: use function_nocfi
  treewide: Change list_sort to use const pointers
  bpf: disable CFI in dispatcher functions
  kallsyms: strip ThinLTO hashes from static functions
  kthread: use WARN_ON_FUNCTION_MISMATCH
  workqueue: use WARN_ON_FUNCTION_MISMATCH
  module: ensure __cfi_check alignment
  mm: add generic function_nocfi macro
  cfi: add __cficanonical
  add support for Clang CFI

Documentation/process/changes.rst defines the minimum assembler version
(binutils version), but we have never checked it in the build time.

Kbuild never invokes 'as' directly because all assembly files in the
kernel tree are *.S, hence must be preprocessed. I do not expect
raw assembly source files (*.s) would be added to the kernel tree.

Therefore, we always use $(CC) as the assembler driver, and commit
aa824e0c962b ("kbuild: remove AS variable") removed 'AS'. However,
we are still interested in the version of the assembler acting behind.

As usual, the --version option prints the version string.

  $ as --version | head -n 1
  GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.35.1

But, we do not have $(AS). So, we can add the -Wa prefix so that
$(CC) passes --version down to the backing assembler.

  $ gcc -Wa,--version | head -n 1
  gcc: fatal error: no input files
  compilation terminated.

OK, we need to input something to satisfy gcc.

  $ gcc -Wa,--version -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/null | head -n 1
  GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.35.1

The combination of Clang and GNU assembler works in the same way:

  $ clang -no-integrated-as -Wa,--version -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/null | head -n 1
  GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.35.1

Clang with the integrated assembler fails like this:

  $ clang -integrated-as -Wa,--version -c -x assembler /dev/null -o /dev/null | head -n 1
  clang: error: unsupported argument '--version' to option 'Wa,'

For the last case, checking the error message is fragile. If the
proposal for -Wa,--version support [1] is accepted, this may not be
even an error in the future.

One easy way is to check if -integrated-as is present in the passed
arguments. We did not pass -integrated-as to CLANG_FLAGS before, but
we can make it explicit.

Nathan pointed out -integrated-as is the default for all of the
architectures/targets that the kernel cares about, but it goes
along with "explicit is better than implicit" policy. [2]

With all this in my mind, I implemented scripts/as-version.sh to
check the assembler version in Kconfig time.

  $ scripts/as-version.sh gcc
  GNU 23501
  $ scripts/as-version.sh clang -no-integrated-as
  GNU 23501
  $ scripts/as-version.sh clang -integrated-as
  LLVM 0

[1]: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1320
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kbuild/20210307044253.v3h47ucq6ng25iay@archlinux-ax161/

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes
according to a process's domain.  To enable an unprivileged process to
express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file)
and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through
landlock_add_rule(2).  When checking if a file access request is
allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following
the different mount layers.  The access to each "tagged" inodes are
collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create
access to the requested file hierarchy.  This makes possible to identify
a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the
filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user
has from the filesystem.

Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not
keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are
in use.

This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control
which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions.  This is the
result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease
review.  Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control
without breaking user space will not be a problem.  Moreover, seccomp
filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may
not be currently handled by Landlock.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler
injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure
the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This
restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for
an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored
function pointers. For more details, see:

  https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html

Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain
visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported
with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between
independently compiled components.

With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into
the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For
cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler
calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines
the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This
patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address()
to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a
shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x.

Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and
offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables,
the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi
and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes
__cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone
assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would
result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we
default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler
generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each
address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function
with the address of the jump table entry.

Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local
to each component, they break cross-module function address
equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be
different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local
jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module,
it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This
may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other
components.

CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute.
Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by
filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI.

By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential
exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the
kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution
to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but
should only be enabled during development.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com

This provides the ability for architectures to enable kernel stack base
address offset randomization. This feature is controlled by the boot
param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", with its default value set by
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT.

This feature is based on the original idea from the last public release
of PaX's RANDKSTACK feature: https://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/randkstack.txt
All the credit for the original idea goes to the PaX team. Note that
the design and implementation of this upstream randomize_kstack_offset
feature differs greatly from the RANDKSTACK feature (see below).

Reasoning for the feature:

This feature aims to make harder the various stack-based attacks that
rely on deterministic stack structure. We have had many such attacks in
past (just to name few):

https://jon.oberheide.org/files/infiltrate12-thestackisback.pdf
https://jon.oberheide.org/files/stackjacking-infiltrate11.pdf
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html

As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
(vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:

https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
(page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)

https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
(leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)

The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.

Design description:

During most of the kernel's execution, it runs on the "thread stack",
which is pretty deterministic in its structure: it is fixed in size,
and on every entry from userspace to kernel on a syscall the thread
stack starts construction from an address fetched from the per-cpu
cpu_current_top_of_stack variable. The first element to be pushed to the
thread stack is the pt_regs struct that stores all required CPU registers
and syscall parameters. Finally the specific syscall function is called,
with the stack being used as the kernel executes the resulting request.

The goal of randomize_kstack_offset feature is to add a random offset
after the pt_regs has been pushed to the stack and before the rest of the
thread stack is used during the syscall processing, and to change it every
time a process issues a syscall. The source of randomness is currently
architecture-defined (but x86 is using the low byte of rdtsc()). Future
improvements for different entropy sources is possible, but out of scope
for this patch. Further more, to add more unpredictability, new offsets
are chosen at the end of syscalls (the timing of which should be less
easy to measure from userspace than at syscall entry time), and stored
in a per-CPU variable, so that the life of the value does not stay
explicitly tied to a single task.

As suggested by Andy Lutomirski, the offset is added using alloca()
and an empty asm() statement with an output constraint, since it avoids
changes to assembly syscall entry code, to the unwinder, and provides
correct stack alignment as defined by the compiler.

In order to make this available by default with zero performance impact
for those that don't want it, it is boot-time selectable with static
branches. This way, if the overhead is not wanted, it can just be
left turned off with no performance impact.

The generated assembly for x86_64 with GCC looks like this:

...
ffffffff81003977: 65 8b 05 02 ea 00 7f  mov %gs:0x7f00ea02(%rip),%eax
					    # 12380 <kstack_offset>
ffffffff8100397e: 25 ff 03 00 00        and $0x3ff,%eax
ffffffff81003983: 48 83 c0 0f           add $0xf,%rax
ffffffff81003987: 25 f8 07 00 00        and $0x7f8,%eax
ffffffff8100398c: 48 29 c4              sub %rax,%rsp
ffffffff8100398f: 48 8d 44 24 0f        lea 0xf(%rsp),%rax
ffffffff81003994: 48 83 e0 f0           and $0xfffffffffffffff0,%rax
...

As a result of the above stack alignment, this patch introduces about
5 bits of randomness after pt_regs is spilled to the thread stack on
x86_64, and 6 bits on x86_32 (since its has 1 fewer bit required for
stack alignment). The amount of entropy could be adjusted based on how
much of the stack space we wish to trade for security.

My measure of syscall performance overhead (on x86_64):

lmbench: /usr/lib/lmbench/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/lat_syscall -N 10000 null
    randomize_kstack_offset=y	Simple syscall: 0.7082 microseconds
    randomize_kstack_offset=n	Simple syscall: 0.7016 microseconds

So, roughly 0.9% overhead growth for a no-op syscall, which is very
manageable. And for people that don't want this, it's off by default.

There are two gotchas with using the alloca() trick. First,
compilers that have Stack Clash protection (-fstack-clash-protection)
enabled by default (e.g. Ubuntu[3]) add pagesize stack probes to
any dynamic stack allocations. While the randomization offset is
always less than a page, the resulting assembly would still contain
(unreachable!) probing routines, bloating the resulting assembly. To
avoid this, -fno-stack-clash-protection is unconditionally added to
the kernel Makefile since this is the only dynamic stack allocation in
the kernel (now that VLAs have been removed) and it is provably safe
from Stack Clash style attacks.

The second gotcha with alloca() is a negative interaction with
-fstack-protector*, in that it sees the alloca() as an array allocation,
which triggers the unconditional addition of the stack canary function
pre/post-amble which slows down syscalls regardless of the static
branch. In order to avoid adding this unneeded check and its associated
performance impact, architectures need to carefully remove uses of
-fstack-protector-strong (or -fstack-protector) in the compilation units
that use the add_random_kstack() macro and to audit the resulting stack
mitigation coverage (to make sure no desired coverage disappears). No
change is visible for this on x86 because the stack protector is already
unconditionally disabled for the compilation unit, but the change is
required on arm64. There is, unfortunately, no attribute that can be
used to disable stack protector for specific functions.

Comparison to PaX RANDKSTACK feature:

The RANDKSTACK feature randomizes the location of the stack start
(cpu_current_top_of_stack), i.e. including the location of pt_regs
structure itself on the stack. Initially this patch followed the same
approach, but during the recent discussions[2], it has been determined
to be of a little value since, if ptrace functionality is available for
an attacker, they can use PTRACE_PEEKUSR/PTRACE_POKEUSR to read/write
different offsets in the pt_regs struct, observe the cache behavior of
the pt_regs accesses, and figure out the random stack offset. Another
difference is that the random offset is stored in a per-cpu variable,
rather than having it be per-thread. As a result, these implementations
differ a fair bit in their implementation details and results, though
obviously the intent is similar.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/
[3] https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-devel/2019-June/040741.html

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401232347.2791257-4-keescook@chromium.org

As Documentation/kbuild/llvm.rst notes, LLVM=1 switches the default of
tools, but you can still override CC, LD, etc. individually. This LLVM=1
check is unneeded because each tool is already checked separately.

"make CC=clang LD=ld.lld NM=llvm-nm AR=llvm-ar LLVM_IAS=1 menuconfig"
should be able to enable Clang LTO.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>