<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/Documentation/security, branch v5.10</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: remove current_security() reference</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T17:33:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Denis Efremov</name>
<email>efremov@linux.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-30T14:25:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=cf92ec602ac504cdc896314eb0105c69f28c7ab8'/>
<id>cf92ec602ac504cdc896314eb0105c69f28c7ab8</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 15322a0d90b6 ("lsm: remove current_security()") removed
current_security() from the sources.

Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov &lt;efremov@linux.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200830142509.5738-1-efremov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Commit 15322a0d90b6 ("lsm: remove current_security()") removed
current_security() from the sources.

Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov &lt;efremov@linux.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200830142509.5738-1-efremov@linux.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: trusted-encrypted.rst: update parameters for command examples</title>
<updated>2020-09-09T17:30:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Coly Li</name>
<email>colyli@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-21T13:53:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=bb84bc51d206a828893c11c489dfc44571e48b1c'/>
<id>bb84bc51d206a828893c11c489dfc44571e48b1c</id>
<content type='text'>
The parameters in command examples for tpm2_createprimary and
tpm2_evictcontrol are outdated, people (like me) are not able to create
trusted key by these command examples.

This patch updates the parameters of command example tpm2_createprimary
and tpm2_evictcontrol in trusted-encrypted.rst. With Linux kernel v5.8
and tpm2-tools-4.1, people can create a trusted key by following the
examples in this document.

Signed-off-by: Coly Li &lt;colyli@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;jejb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@ziepe.ca&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Huewe &lt;peterhuewe@gmx.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821135356.15737-1-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The parameters in command examples for tpm2_createprimary and
tpm2_evictcontrol are outdated, people (like me) are not able to create
trusted key by these command examples.

This patch updates the parameters of command example tpm2_createprimary
and tpm2_evictcontrol in trusted-encrypted.rst. With Linux kernel v5.8
and tpm2-tools-4.1, people can create a trusted key by following the
examples in this document.

Signed-off-by: Coly Li &lt;colyli@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Dan Williams &lt;dan.j.williams@intel.com&gt;
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;jejb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe &lt;jgg@ziepe.ca&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Huewe &lt;peterhuewe@gmx.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821135356.15737-1-colyli@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: security/keys: eliminate duplicated word</title>
<updated>2020-07-13T15:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-07T18:04:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=b216685bd8cfc17588a24b8da7e056055880b08e'/>
<id>b216685bd8cfc17588a24b8da7e056055880b08e</id>
<content type='text'>
Drop the doubled word "in".

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;jejb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200707180414.10467-19-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Drop the doubled word "in".

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Bottomley &lt;jejb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200707180414.10467-19-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Security: Documentation: Replace deprecated :c:func: Usage</title>
<updated>2020-07-06T20:30:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Puranjay Mohan</name>
<email>puranjay12@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-06T18:49:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=4d010d1447a8bb6a079f817aee76876be70e91e5'/>
<id>4d010d1447a8bb6a079f817aee76876be70e91e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace :c:func: with ``func()`` as the previous usage is deprecated.
Remove an extra ')' to fix broken cross reference.

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706184956.6928-1-puranjay12@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Replace :c:func: with ``func()`` as the previous usage is deprecated.
Remove an extra ')' to fix broken cross reference.

Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan &lt;puranjay12@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706184956.6928-1-puranjay12@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: Clarify f_cred vs current_cred() use</title>
<updated>2020-07-05T20:04:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-03T17:44:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=7303515ae488ce767d3155358bae505dabd9ebe1'/>
<id>7303515ae488ce767d3155358bae505dabd9ebe1</id>
<content type='text'>
When making access control choices from a file-based context, f_cred
must be used instead of current_cred() to avoid confused deputy attacks
where an open file may get passed to a more privileged process. Add a
short paragraph to explicitly state the rationale.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202007031038.8833A35DE4@keescook
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
When making access control choices from a file-based context, f_cred
must be used instead of current_cred() to avoid confused deputy attacks
where an open file may get passed to a more privileged process. Add a
short paragraph to explicitly state the rationale.

Cc: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202007031038.8833A35DE4@keescook
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReST</title>
<updated>2020-06-19T20:03:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauro Carvalho Chehab</name>
<email>mchehab+huawei@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-15T06:50:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=0efaaa86581c596f9426482c731f262d843807b6'/>
<id>0efaaa86581c596f9426482c731f262d843807b6</id>
<content type='text'>
This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes
were needed:

- Adjust document and titles markups;
- Adjust numbered list markups;
- Add a comments markup for the Contents section;
- Add markups for literal blocks.

Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes
were needed:

- Adjust document and titles markups;
- Adjust numbered list markups;
- Add a comments markup for the Contents section;
- Add markups for literal blocks.

Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab &lt;mchehab+huawei@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2020-06-13T16:56:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-13T16:56:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6c3297841472b4e53e22e53826eea9e483d993e5'/>
<id>6c3297841472b4e53e22e53826eea9e483d993e5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux &amp; Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&amp;co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &amp;filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe-&gt;mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe-&gt;mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux &amp; Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&amp;co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &amp;filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe-&gt;mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe-&gt;mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'docs-5.8-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux</title>
<updated>2020-06-10T21:12:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:12:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=6d62c5b21155acaaaeb24862d62cf15d1dc2d8ba'/>
<id>6d62c5b21155acaaaeb24862d62cf15d1dc2d8ba</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull more documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "A handful of late-arriving docs fixes, along with a patch changing a
  lot of HTTP links to HTTPS that had to be yanked and redone before the
  first pull"

* tag 'docs-5.8-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux:
  docs/memory-barriers.txt/kokr: smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic(): update Documentation
  Documentation: devres: add missing entry for devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()
  Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation
  docs: it_IT: address invalid reference warnings
  doc: zh_CN: use doc reference to resolve undefined label warning
  docs: Update the location of the LF NDA program
  docs: dev-tools: coccinelle: underlines
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull more documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "A handful of late-arriving docs fixes, along with a patch changing a
  lot of HTTP links to HTTPS that had to be yanked and redone before the
  first pull"

* tag 'docs-5.8-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux:
  docs/memory-barriers.txt/kokr: smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic(): update Documentation
  Documentation: devres: add missing entry for devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()
  Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation
  docs: it_IT: address invalid reference warnings
  doc: zh_CN: use doc reference to resolve undefined label warning
  docs: Update the location of the LF NDA program
  docs: dev-tools: coccinelle: underlines
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation</title>
<updated>2020-06-08T15:30:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander A. Klimov</name>
<email>grandmaster@al2klimov.de</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-26T06:05:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=93431e0607e58a3c997a134adc0fad4fdc147dab'/>
<id>93431e0607e58a3c997a134adc0fad4fdc147dab</id>
<content type='text'>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  For each line:
    If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
      For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
        If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
        return 200 OK and serve the same content:
          Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov &lt;grandmaster@al2klimov.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526060544.25127-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  For each line:
    If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
      For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
        If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
        return 200 OK and serve the same content:
          Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov &lt;grandmaster@al2klimov.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526060544.25127-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet &lt;corbet@lwn.net&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs</title>
<updated>2020-06-04T17:27:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-04T17:27:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=a484a497c98a0447aca2d70de19d11b1d66e6ef7'/>
<id>a484a497c98a0447aca2d70de19d11b1d66e6ef7</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:

 - Fix a documentation warning.

 - Replace a zero-length array with a flexible one

 - Make the big_key key type use ChaCha20Poly1305 and use the crypto
   algorithm directly rather than going through the crypto layer.

 - Implement the update op for the big_key type.

* tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Implement update for the big_key type
  security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface
  KEYS: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argument
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:

 - Fix a documentation warning.

 - Replace a zero-length array with a flexible one

 - Make the big_key key type use ChaCha20Poly1305 and use the crypto
   algorithm directly rather than going through the crypto layer.

 - Implement the update op for the big_key type.

* tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Implement update for the big_key type
  security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface
  KEYS: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argument
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
