<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/Documentation/admin-guide, branch v6.5</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel source tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>x86/cpu: Rename srso_(.*)_alias to srso_alias_\1</title>
<updated>2023-08-16T19:58:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Zijlstra</name>
<email>peterz@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-14T11:44:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=42be649dd1f2eee6b1fb185f1a231b9494cf095f'/>
<id>42be649dd1f2eee6b1fb185f1a231b9494cf095f</id>
<content type='text'>
For a more consistent namespace.

  [ bp: Fixup names in the doc too. ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121148.976236447@infradead.org
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
For a more consistent namespace.

  [ bp: Fixup names in the doc too. ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814121148.976236447@infradead.org
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting</title>
<updated>2023-08-10T09:03:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-02T18:07:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=09f9f37c324d90102e8574856ab168c34de1916d'/>
<id>09f9f37c324d90102e8574856ab168c34de1916d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a note about the dependency of the User-&gt;User mitigation on the
previous Spectre v2 IBPB selection.

Make the layout moar pretty.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-4-bp@alien8.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a note about the dependency of the User-&gt;User mitigation on the
previous Spectre v2 IBPB selection.

Make the layout moar pretty.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-4-bp@alien8.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index</title>
<updated>2023-08-10T08:48:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-29T14:53:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=182ac87070e26d32a01445cec7ca7afa07411468'/>
<id>182ac87070e26d32a01445cec7ca7afa07411468</id>
<content type='text'>
Most of the index.rst files in Documentation/ refer to other rst files
without their file extension in the name. Do that here too.

No functional changes.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-2-bp@alien8.de
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Most of the index.rst files in Documentation/ refer to other rst files
without their file extension in the name. Do that here too.

No functional changes.

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809102700.29449-2-bp@alien8.de
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-08-08T00:03:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-08T00:03:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=64094e7e3118aff4b0be8ff713c242303e139834'/>
<id>64094e7e3118aff4b0be8ff713c242303e139834</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86/gds fixes from Dave Hansen:
 "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling issue:

   - Add Base GDS mitigation

   - Support GDS_NO under KVM

   - Fix a documentation typo"

* tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support
  KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM
  x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS
  x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation
  x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86/gds fixes from Dave Hansen:
 "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling issue:

   - Add Base GDS mitigation

   - Support GDS_NO under KVM

   - Fix a documentation typo"

* tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support
  KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM
  x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS
  x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation
  x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'x86_bugs_srso' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip</title>
<updated>2023-08-07T23:35:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-07T23:35:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=138bcddb86d8a4f842e4ed6f0585abc9b1a764ff'/>
<id>138bcddb86d8a4f842e4ed6f0585abc9b1a764ff</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull x86/srso fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 "Add a mitigation for the speculative RAS (Return Address Stack)
  overflow vulnerability on AMD processors.

  In short, this is yet another issue where userspace poisons a
  microarchitectural structure which can then be used to leak privileged
  information through a side channel"

* tag 'x86_bugs_srso' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection
  x86/srso: Add a forgotten NOENDBR annotation
  x86/srso: Fix return thunks in generated code
  x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT
  x86/srso: Add IBPB
  x86/srso: Add SRSO_NO support
  x86/srso: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support
  x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation
  x86/bugs: Increase the x86 bugs vector size to two u32s
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull x86/srso fixes from Borislav Petkov:
 "Add a mitigation for the speculative RAS (Return Address Stack)
  overflow vulnerability on AMD processors.

  In short, this is yet another issue where userspace poisons a
  microarchitectural structure which can then be used to leak privileged
  information through a side channel"

* tag 'x86_bugs_srso' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection
  x86/srso: Add a forgotten NOENDBR annotation
  x86/srso: Fix return thunks in generated code
  x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT
  x86/srso: Add IBPB
  x86/srso: Add SRSO_NO support
  x86/srso: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support
  x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation
  x86/bugs: Increase the x86 bugs vector size to two u32s
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.5-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux</title>
<updated>2023-08-04T23:04:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-04T23:04:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e661f98c82832ddb76423f57dffb4ba6256e0fc6'/>
<id>e661f98c82832ddb76423f57dffb4ba6256e0fc6</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull RISC-V fixes from Palmer Dabbelt:

 - A pair of fixes for build-related failures in the selftests

 - A fix for a sparse warning in acpi_os_ioremap()

 - A fix to restore the kernel PA offset in vmcoreinfo, to fix crash
   handling

* tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.5-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
  Documentation: kdump: Add va_kernel_pa_offset for RISCV64
  riscv: Export va_kernel_pa_offset in vmcoreinfo
  RISC-V: ACPI: Fix acpi_os_ioremap to return iomem address
  selftests: riscv: Fix compilation error with vstate_exec_nolibc.c
  selftests/riscv: fix potential build failure during the "emit_tests" step
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull RISC-V fixes from Palmer Dabbelt:

 - A pair of fixes for build-related failures in the selftests

 - A fix for a sparse warning in acpi_os_ioremap()

 - A fix to restore the kernel PA offset in vmcoreinfo, to fix crash
   handling

* tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.5-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
  Documentation: kdump: Add va_kernel_pa_offset for RISCV64
  riscv: Export va_kernel_pa_offset in vmcoreinfo
  RISC-V: ACPI: Fix acpi_os_ioremap to return iomem address
  selftests: riscv: Fix compilation error with vstate_exec_nolibc.c
  selftests/riscv: fix potential build failure during the "emit_tests" step
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation: kdump: Add va_kernel_pa_offset for RISCV64</title>
<updated>2023-08-02T20:50:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Song Shuai</name>
<email>suagrfillet@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-24T10:09:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=640c503d7dbd7d34a62099c933f4db0ed77ccbec'/>
<id>640c503d7dbd7d34a62099c933f4db0ed77ccbec</id>
<content type='text'>
RISC-V Linux exports "va_kernel_pa_offset" in vmcoreinfo to help
Crash-utility translate the kernel virtual address correctly.

Here adds the definition of "va_kernel_pa_offset".

Fixes: 3335068f8721 ("riscv: Use PUD/P4D/PGD pages for the linear mapping")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230724040649.220279-1-suagrfillet@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Song Shuai &lt;suagrfillet@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alexghiti@rivosinc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724100917.309061-2-suagrfillet@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@rivosinc.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
RISC-V Linux exports "va_kernel_pa_offset" in vmcoreinfo to help
Crash-utility translate the kernel virtual address correctly.

Here adds the definition of "va_kernel_pa_offset".

Fixes: 3335068f8721 ("riscv: Use PUD/P4D/PGD pages for the linear mapping")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230724040649.220279-1-suagrfillet@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Song Shuai &lt;suagrfillet@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti &lt;alexghiti@rivosinc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230724100917.309061-2-suagrfillet@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt &lt;palmer@rivosinc.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support</title>
<updated>2023-08-01T22:28:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-01T14:31:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20'/>
<id>1b0fc0345f2852ffe54fb9ae0e12e2ee69ad6a20</id>
<content type='text'>
These options clearly turn *off* XSAVE YMM support.  Correct the
typo.

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: 553a5c03e90a ("x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
These options clearly turn *off* XSAVE YMM support.  Correct the
typo.

Reported-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Fixes: 553a5c03e90a ("x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'tty-6.5-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty</title>
<updated>2023-07-30T18:51:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-30T18:51:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=e6d34ced01bc3aaad616b9446bbaa96cd04617c4'/>
<id>e6d34ced01bc3aaad616b9446bbaa96cd04617c4</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull tty/serial fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small TTY and serial driver fixes for 6.5-rc4 for some
  reported problems. Included in here is:

   - TIOCSTI fix for braille readers

   - documentation fix for minor numbers

   - MAINTAINERS update for new serial files in -rc1

   - minor serial driver fixes for reported problems

  All of these have been in linux-next with no reported problems"

* tag 'tty-6.5-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty:
  serial: 8250_dw: Preserve original value of DLF register
  tty: serial: sh-sci: Fix sleeping in atomic context
  serial: sifive: Fix sifive_serial_console_setup() section
  Documentation: devices.txt: reconcile serial/ucc_uart minor numers
  MAINTAINERS: Update TTY layer for lists and recently added files
  tty: n_gsm: fix UAF in gsm_cleanup_mux
  TIOCSTI: always enable for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull tty/serial fixes from Greg KH:
 "Here are some small TTY and serial driver fixes for 6.5-rc4 for some
  reported problems. Included in here is:

   - TIOCSTI fix for braille readers

   - documentation fix for minor numbers

   - MAINTAINERS update for new serial files in -rc1

   - minor serial driver fixes for reported problems

  All of these have been in linux-next with no reported problems"

* tag 'tty-6.5-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty:
  serial: 8250_dw: Preserve original value of DLF register
  tty: serial: sh-sci: Fix sleeping in atomic context
  serial: sifive: Fix sifive_serial_console_setup() section
  Documentation: devices.txt: reconcile serial/ucc_uart minor numers
  MAINTAINERS: Update TTY layer for lists and recently added files
  tty: n_gsm: fix UAF in gsm_cleanup_mux
  TIOCSTI: always enable for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation</title>
<updated>2023-07-27T09:07:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov (AMD)</name>
<email>bp@alien8.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-28T09:02:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux.git/commit/?id=fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855'/>
<id>fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.

The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence.  To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.

To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference.  In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.

In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
