Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:

 - correct panic handling when running as a Xen guest

 - cleanup the Xen grant driver to remove printing a pointer being
   always NULL

 - remove a soon to be wrong call of of_dma_configure()

* tag 'for-linus-5.4-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  xen: Stop abusing DT of_dma_configure API
  xen/grant-table: remove unnecessary printing
  x86/xen: Return from panic notifier

cgroup v2 introduces two memory protection thresholds: memory.low
(best-effort) and memory.min (hard protection).  While they generally do
what they say on the tin, there is a limitation in their implementation
that makes them difficult to use effectively: that cliff behaviour often
manifests when they become eligible for reclaim.  This patch implements
more intuitive and usable behaviour, where we gradually mount more
reclaim pressure as cgroups further and further exceed their protection
thresholds.

This cliff edge behaviour happens because we only choose whether or not
to reclaim based on whether the memcg is within its protection limits
(see the use of mem_cgroup_protected in shrink_node), but we don't vary
our reclaim behaviour based on this information.  Imagine the following
timeline, with the numbers the lruvec size in this zone:

1. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=999999. 0 pages may be scanned.
2. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000000. 0 pages may be scanned.
3. memory.low=1000000, memory.current=1000001. 1000001* pages may be
   scanned. (?!)

* Of course, we won't usually scan all available pages in the zone even
  without this patch because of scan control priority, over-reclaim
  protection, etc.  However, as shown by the tests at the end, these
  techniques don't sufficiently throttle such an extreme change in input,
  so cliff-like behaviour isn't really averted by their existence alone.

Here's an example of how this plays out in practice.  At Facebook, we are
trying to protect various workloads from "system" software, like
configuration management tools, metric collectors, etc (see this[0] case
study).  In order to find a suitable memory.low value, we start by
determining the expected memory range within which the workload will be
comfortable operating.  This isn't an exact science -- memory usage deemed
"comfortable" will vary over time due to user behaviour, differences in
composition of work, etc, etc.  As such we need to ballpark memory.low,
but doing this is currently problematic:

1. If we end up setting it too low for the workload, it won't have
   *any* effect (see discussion above).  The group will receive the full
   weight of reclaim and won't have any priority while competing with the
   less important system software, as if we had no memory.low configured
   at all.

2. Because of this behaviour, we end up erring on the side of setting
   it too high, such that the comfort range is reliably covered.  However,
   protected memory is completely unavailable to the rest of the system,
   so we might cause undue memory and IO pressure there when we *know* we
   have some elasticity in the workload.

3. Even if we get the value totally right, smack in the middle of the
   comfort zone, we get extreme jumps between no pressure and full
   pressure that cause unpredictable pressure spikes in the workload due
   to the current binary reclaim behaviour.

With this patch, we can set it to our ballpark estimation without too much
worry.  Any undesirable behaviour, such as too much or too little reclaim
pressure on the workload or system will be proportional to how far our
estimation is off.  This means we can set memory.low much more
conservatively and thus waste less resources *without* the risk of the
workload falling off a cliff if we overshoot.

As a more abstract technical description, this unintuitive behaviour
results in having to give high-priority workloads a large protection
buffer on top of their expected usage to function reliably, as otherwise
we have abrupt periods of dramatically increased memory pressure which
hamper performance.  Having to set these thresholds so high wastes
resources and generally works against the principle of work conservation.
In addition, having proportional memory reclaim behaviour has other
benefits.  Most notably, before this patch it's basically mandatory to set
memory.low to a higher than desirable value because otherwise as soon as
you exceed memory.low, all protection is lost, and all pages are eligible
to scan again.  By contrast, having a gradual ramp in reclaim pressure
means that you now still get some protection when thresholds are exceeded,
which means that one can now be more comfortable setting memory.low to
lower values without worrying that all protection will be lost.  This is
important because workingset size is really hard to know exactly,
especially with variable workloads, so at least getting *some* protection
if your workingset size grows larger than you expect increases user
confidence in setting memory.low without a huge buffer on top being
needed.

Thanks a lot to Johannes Weiner and Tejun Heo for their advice and
assistance in thinking about how to make this work better.

In testing these changes, I intended to verify that:

1. Changes in page scanning become gradual and proportional instead of
   binary.

   To test this, I experimented stepping further and further down
   memory.low protection on a workload that floats around 19G workingset
   when under memory.low protection, watching page scan rates for the
   workload cgroup:

   +------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
   | memory.low | test (pgscan/s) | control (pgscan/s) | % of control |
   +------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+
   |        21G |               0 |                  0 | N/A          |
   |        17G |             867 |               3799 | 23%          |
   |        12G |            1203 |               3543 | 34%          |
   |         8G |            2534 |               3979 | 64%          |
   |         4G |            3980 |               4147 | 96%          |
   |          0 |            3799 |               3980 | 95%          |
   +------------+-----------------+--------------------+--------------+

   As you can see, the test kernel (with a kernel containing this
   patch) ramps up page scanning significantly more gradually than the
   control kernel (without this patch).

2. More gradual ramp up in reclaim aggression doesn't result in
   premature OOMs.

   To test this, I wrote a script that slowly increments the number of
   pages held by stress(1)'s --vm-keep mode until a production system
   entered severe overall memory contention.  This script runs in a highly
   protected slice taking up the majority of available system memory.
   Watching vmstat revealed that page scanning continued essentially
   nominally between test and control, without causing forward reclaim
   progress to become arrested.

[0]: https://facebookmicrosites.github.io/cgroup2/docs/overview.html#case-study-the-fbtax2-project

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comments to fit in 80 cols]
[chris@chrisdown.name: handle cgroup_disable=memory when getting memcg protection]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201045711.GA18302@chrisdown.name
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190124014455.GA6396@chrisdown.name
Signed-off-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently execution of panic() continues until Xen's panic notifier
(xen_panic_event()) is called at which point we make a hypercall that
never returns.

This means that any notifier that is supposed to be called later as
well as significant part of panic() code (such as pstore writes from
kmsg_dump()) is never executed.

There is no reason for xen_panic_event() to be this last point in
execution since panic()'s emergency_restart() will call into
xen_emergency_restart() from where we can perform our hypercall.

Nevertheless, we will provide xen_legacy_crash boot option that will
preserve original behavior during crash. This option could be used,
for example, if running kernel dumper (which happens after panic
notifiers) is undesirable.

Reported-by: James Dingwall <james@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...

Merge updates from Andrew Morton:

 - a few hot fixes

 - ocfs2 updates

 - almost all of -mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kmemleak, kasan,
   cleanups, debug, pagecache, memcg, gup, pagemap, memory-hotplug,
   sparsemem, vmalloc, initialization, z3fold, compaction, mempolicy,
   oom-kill, hugetlb, migration, thp, mmap, madvise, shmem, zswap,
   zsmalloc)

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (132 commits)
  mm/zsmalloc.c: fix a -Wunused-function warning
  zswap: do not map same object twice
  zswap: use movable memory if zpool support allocate movable memory
  zpool: add malloc_support_movable to zpool_driver
  shmem: fix obsolete comment in shmem_getpage_gfp()
  mm/madvise: reduce code duplication in error handling paths
  mm: mmap: increase sockets maximum memory size pgoff for 32bits
  mm/mmap.c: refine find_vma_prev() with rb_last()
  riscv: make mmap allocation top-down by default
  mips: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization
  mips: replace arch specific way to determine 32bit task with generic version
  mips: adjust brk randomization offset to fit generic version
  mips: use STACK_TOP when computing mmap base address
  mips: properly account for stack randomization and stack guard gap
  arm: use generic mmap top-down layout and brk randomization
  arm: use STACK_TOP when computing mmap base address
  arm: properly account for stack randomization and stack guard gap
  arm64, mm: make randomization selected by generic topdown mmap layout
  arm64, mm: move generic mmap layout functions to mm
  arm64: consider stack randomization for mmap base only when necessary
  ...

Cgroup v1 memcg controller has exposed a dedicated kmem limit to users
which turned out to be really a bad idea because there are paths which
cannot shrink the kernel memory usage enough to get below the limit (e.g.
because the accounted memory is not reclaimable).  There are cases when
the failure is even not allowed (e.g.  __GFP_NOFAIL).  This means that the
kmem limit is in excess to the hard limit without any way to shrink and
thus completely useless.  OOM killer cannot be invoked to handle the
situation because that would lead to a premature oom killing.

As a result many places might see ENOMEM returning from kmalloc and result
in unexpected errors.  E.g.  a global OOM killer when there is a lot of
free memory because ENOMEM is translated into VM_FAULT_OOM in #PF path and
therefore pagefault_out_of_memory would result in OOM killer.

Please note that the kernel memory is still accounted to the overall limit
along with the user memory so removing the kmem specific limit should
still allow to contain kernel memory consumption.  Unlike the kmem one,
though, it invokes memory reclaim and targeted memcg oom killing if
necessary.

Start the deprecation process by crying to the kernel log.  Let's see
whether there are relevant usecases and simply return to EINVAL in the
second stage if nobody complains in few releases.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak documentation text]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190911151612.GI4023@dhcp22.suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Thomas Lindroth <thomas.lindroth@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The debug_pagealloc functionality is useful to catch buggy page allocator
users that cause e.g.  use after free or double free.  When page
inconsistency is detected, debugging is often simpler by knowing the call
stack of process that last allocated and freed the page.  When page_owner
is also enabled, we record the allocation stack trace, but not freeing.

This patch therefore adds recording of freeing process stack trace to page
owner info, if both page_owner and debug_pagealloc are configured and
enabled.  With only page_owner enabled, this info is not useful for the
memory leak debugging use case.  dump_page() is adjusted to print the
info.  An example result of calling __free_pages() twice may look like
this (note the page last free stack trace):

BUG: Bad page state in process bash  pfn:13d8f8
page:ffffc31984f63e00 refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
flags: 0x1affff800000000()
raw: 01affff800000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
page_owner tracks the page as freed
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xcc0(GFP_KERNEL)
 prep_new_page+0x143/0x150
 get_page_from_freelist+0x289/0x380
 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2d0
 khugepaged+0x6e/0xc10
 kthread+0xf9/0x130
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
page last free stack trace:
 free_pcp_prepare+0x134/0x1e0
 free_unref_page+0x18/0x90
 khugepaged+0x7b/0xc10
 kthread+0xf9/0x130
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 271 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4-2.g07a1a73-default+ #57
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x85/0xc0
 bad_page.cold+0xba/0xbf
 rmqueue_pcplist.isra.0+0x6c5/0x6d0
 rmqueue+0x2d/0x810
 get_page_from_freelist+0x191/0x380
 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x13c/0x2d0
 __get_free_pages+0xd/0x30
 __pud_alloc+0x2c/0x110
 copy_page_range+0x4f9/0x630
 dup_mmap+0x362/0x480
 dup_mm+0x68/0x110
 copy_process+0x19e1/0x1b40
 _do_fork+0x73/0x310
 __x64_sys_clone+0x75/0x80
 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f10af854a10
...

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190820131828.22684-5-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Pull PCI updates from Bjorn Helgaas:
 "Enumeration:

   - Consolidate _HPP/_HPX stuff in pci-acpi.c and simplify it
     (Krzysztof Wilczynski)

   - Fix incorrect PCIe device types and remove dev->has_secondary_link
     to simplify code that deals with upstream/downstream ports (Mika
     Westerberg)

   - After suspend, restore Resizable BAR size bits correctly for 1MB
     BARs (Sumit Saxena)

   - Enable PCI_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN support for RISC-V (Wesley Terpstra)

  Virtualization:

   - Add ACS quirks for iProc PAXB (Abhinav Ratna), Amazon Annapurna
     Labs (Ali Saidi)

   - Move sysfs SR-IOV functions to iov.c (Kelsey Skunberg)

   - Remove group write permissions from sysfs sriov_numvfs,
     sriov_drivers_autoprobe (Kelsey Skunberg)

  Hotplug:

   - Simplify pciehp indicator control (Denis Efremov)

  Peer-to-peer DMA:

   - Allow P2P DMA between root ports for whitelisted bridges (Logan
     Gunthorpe)

   - Whitelist some Intel host bridges for P2P DMA (Logan Gunthorpe)

   - DMA map P2P DMA requests that traverse host bridge (Logan
     Gunthorpe)

  Amazon Annapurna Labs host bridge driver:

   - Add DT binding and controller driver (Jonathan Chocron)

  Hyper-V host bridge driver:

   - Fix hv_pci_dev->pci_slot use-after-free (Dexuan Cui)

   - Fix PCI domain number collisions (Haiyang Zhang)

   - Use instance ID bytes 4 & 5 as PCI domain numbers (Haiyang Zhang)

   - Fix build errors on non-SYSFS config (Randy Dunlap)

  i.MX6 host bridge driver:

   - Limit DBI register length (Stefan Agner)

  Intel VMD host bridge driver:

   - Fix config addressing issues (Jon Derrick)

  Layerscape host bridge driver:

   - Add bar_fixed_64bit property to endpoint driver (Xiaowei Bao)

   - Add CONFIG_PCI_LAYERSCAPE_EP to build EP/RC drivers separately
     (Xiaowei Bao)

  Mediatek host bridge driver:

   - Add MT7629 controller support (Jianjun Wang)

  Mobiveil host bridge driver:

   - Fix CPU base address setup (Hou Zhiqiang)

   - Make "num-lanes" property optional (Hou Zhiqiang)

  Tegra host bridge driver:

   - Fix OF node reference leak (Nishka Dasgupta)

   - Disable MSI for root ports to work around design problem (Vidya
     Sagar)

   - Add Tegra194 DT binding and controller support (Vidya Sagar)

   - Add support for sideband pins and slot regulators (Vidya Sagar)

   - Add PIPE2UPHY support (Vidya Sagar)

  Misc:

   - Remove unused pci_block_cfg_access() et al (Kelsey Skunberg)

   - Unexport pci_bus_get(), etc (Kelsey Skunberg)

   - Hide PM, VC, link speed, ATS, ECRC, PTM constants and interfaces in
     the PCI core (Kelsey Skunberg)

   - Clean up sysfs DEVICE_ATTR() usage (Kelsey Skunberg)

   - Mark expected switch fall-through (Gustavo A. R. Silva)

   - Propagate errors for optional regulators and PHYs (Thierry Reding)

   - Fix kernel command line resource_alignment parameter issues (Logan
     Gunthorpe)"

* tag 'pci-v5.4-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci: (112 commits)
  PCI: Add pci_irq_vector() and other stubs when !CONFIG_PCI
  arm64: tegra: Add PCIe slot supply information in p2972-0000 platform
  arm64: tegra: Add configuration for PCIe C5 sideband signals
  PCI: tegra: Add support to enable slot regulators
  PCI: tegra: Add support to configure sideband pins
  PCI: vmd: Fix shadow offsets to reflect spec changes
  PCI: vmd: Fix config addressing when using bus offsets
  PCI: dwc: Add validation that PCIe core is set to correct mode
  PCI: dwc: al: Add Amazon Annapurna Labs PCIe controller driver
  dt-bindings: PCI: Add Amazon's Annapurna Labs PCIe host bridge binding
  PCI: Add quirk to disable MSI-X support for Amazon's Annapurna Labs Root Port
  PCI/VPD: Prevent VPD access for Amazon's Annapurna Labs Root Port
  PCI: Add ACS quirk for Amazon Annapurna Labs root ports
  PCI: Add Amazon's Annapurna Labs vendor ID
  MAINTAINERS: Add PCI native host/endpoint controllers designated reviewer
  PCI: hv: Use bytes 4 and 5 from instance ID as the PCI domain numbers
  dt-bindings: PCI: tegra: Add PCIe slot supplies regulator entries
  dt-bindings: PCI: tegra: Add sideband pins configuration entries
  PCI: tegra: Add Tegra194 PCIe support
  PCI: Get rid of dev->has_secondary_link flag
  ...

Pull device mapper updates from Mike Snitzer:

 - crypto and DM crypt advances that allow the crypto API to reclaim
   implementation details that do not belong in DM crypt. The wrapper
   template for ESSIV generation that was factored out will also be used
   by fscrypt in the future.

 - Add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification to the DM verity target.

 - Add a new "clone" DM target that allows for efficient remote
   replication of a device.

 - Enhance DM bufio's cache to be tailored to each client based on use.
   Clients that make heavy use of the cache get more of it, and those
   that use less have reduced cache usage.

 - Add a new DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION ioctl to allow userspace to query the
   version number of a DM target (even if the associated module isn't
   yet loaded).

 - Fix invalid memory access in DM zoned target.

 - Fix the max_discard_sectors limit advertised by the DM raid target;
   it was mistakenly storing the limit in bytes rather than sectors.

 - Small optimizations and cleanups in DM writecache target.

 - Various fixes and cleanups in DM core, DM raid1 and space map portion
   of DM persistent data library.

* tag 'for-5.4/dm-changes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/device-mapper/linux-dm: (22 commits)
  dm: introduce DM_GET_TARGET_VERSION
  dm bufio: introduce a global cache replacement
  dm bufio: remove old-style buffer cleanup
  dm bufio: introduce a global queue
  dm bufio: refactor adjust_total_allocated
  dm bufio: call adjust_total_allocated from __link_buffer and __unlink_buffer
  dm: add clone target
  dm raid: fix updating of max_discard_sectors limit
  dm writecache: skip writecache_wait for pmem mode
  dm stats: use struct_size() helper
  dm crypt: omit parsing of the encapsulated cipher
  dm crypt: switch to ESSIV crypto API template
  crypto: essiv - create wrapper template for ESSIV generation
  dm space map common: remove check for impossible sm_find_free() return value
  dm raid1: use struct_size() with kzalloc()
  dm writecache: optimize performance by sorting the blocks for writeback_all
  dm writecache: add unlikely for getting two block with same LBA
  dm writecache: remove unused member pointer in writeback_struct
  dm zoned: fix invalid memory access
  dm verity: add root hash pkcs#7 signature verification
  ...

Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
 "This is a bit late, partly due to me travelling, and partly due to a
  power outage knocking out some of my test systems *while* I was
  travelling.

   - Initial support for running on a system with an Ultravisor, which
     is software that runs below the hypervisor and protects guests
     against some attacks by the hypervisor.

   - Support for building the kernel to run as a "Secure Virtual
     Machine", ie. as a guest capable of running on a system with an
     Ultravisor.

   - Some changes to our DMA code on bare metal, to allow devices with
     medium sized DMA masks (> 32 && < 59 bits) to use more than 2GB of
     DMA space.

   - Support for firmware assisted crash dumps on bare metal (powernv).

   - Two series fixing bugs in and refactoring our PCI EEH code.

   - A large series refactoring our exception entry code to use gas
     macros, both to make it more readable and also enable some future
     optimisations.

  As well as many cleanups and other minor features & fixups.

  Thanks to: Adam Zerella, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple, Andrew
  Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Anshuman Khandual,
  Balbir Singh, Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe
  JAILLET, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig,
  Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Gibson, David Hildenbrand,
  Desnes A. Nunes do Rosario, Ganesh Goudar, Gautham R. Shenoy, Greg
  Kurz, Guerney Hunt, Gustavo Romero, Halil Pasic, Hari Bathini, Joakim
  Tjernlund, Jonathan Neuschafer, Jordan Niethe, Leonardo Bras, Lianbo
  Jiang, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mahesh Salgaonkar,
  Masahiro Yamada, Maxiwell S. Garcia, Michael Anderson, Nathan
  Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Nicholas Piggin, Oliver
  O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Ram Pai, Ravi Bangoria, Reza Arbab, Ryan Grimm,
  Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Segher Boessenkool, Sukadev Bhattiprolu,
  Thiago Bauermann, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Thomas Gleixner, Tom
  Lendacky, Vasant Hegde"

* tag 'powerpc-5.4-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (264 commits)
  powerpc/mm/mce: Keep irqs disabled during lockless page table walk
  powerpc: Use ftrace_graph_ret_addr() when unwinding
  powerpc/ftrace: Enable HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR
  ftrace: Look up the address of return_to_handler() using helpers
  powerpc: dump kernel log before carrying out fadump or kdump
  docs: powerpc: Add missing documentation reference
  powerpc/xmon: Fix output of XIVE IPI
  powerpc/xmon: Improve output of XIVE interrupts
  powerpc/mm/radix: remove useless kernel messages
  powerpc/fadump: support holes in kernel boot memory area
  powerpc/fadump: remove RMA_START and RMA_END macros
  powerpc/fadump: update documentation about option to release opalcore
  powerpc/fadump: consider f/w load area
  powerpc/opalcore: provide an option to invalidate /sys/firmware/opal/core file
  powerpc/opalcore: export /sys/firmware/opal/core for analysing opal crashes
  powerpc/fadump: update documentation about CONFIG_PRESERVE_FA_DUMP
  powerpc/fadump: add support to preserve crash data on FADUMP disabled kernel
  powerpc/fadump: improve how crashed kernel's memory is reserved
  powerpc/fadump: consider reserved ranges while releasing memory
  powerpc/fadump: make crash memory ranges array allocation generic
  ...