Commit b655892ffd6d ("leds: trigger: netdev: expose hw_control status
via sysfs") exposed to sysfs the flag that tells whether the LED trigger
is offloaded to hardware, under the name "hw_control", since that is the
name under which this setting is called in the code.

Everywhere else in kernel when some work that is normally done in
software can be made to be done by hardware instead, we use the word
"offloading" to describe this, e.g. "LED blinking is offloaded to
hardware".

Normally renaming sysfs entries is a no-go because of backwards
compatibility. But since this patch was not yet released in a stable
kernel, I think it is still possible to rename it, if there is
consensus.

Fixes: b655892ffd6d ("leds: trigger: netdev: expose hw_control status via sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Marek Behún <kabel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821121453.30203-1-kabel@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:

 - HAS_IOMEM fixes for fsl edma and intel idma

 - return-value fix, interrupt vector setting and typo fix for xilinx
   xdma

 - email updates for codeaurora email domain move

 - correct pause status for pl330 driver

 - idxd clear flag on disable fix

 - function documentation fix for owl dma

 - potential un-allocated memory fix for mcf driver

* tag 'dmaengine-fix-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vkoul/dmaengine:
  dmaengine: xilinx: xdma: Fix typo
  dmaengine: xilinx: xdma: Fix interrupt vector setting
  dmaengine: owl-dma: Modify mismatched function name
  dmaengine: idxd: Clear PRS disable flag when disabling IDXD device
  dmaengine: pl330: Return DMA_PAUSED when transaction is paused
  dmaengine: qcom_hidma: Update codeaurora email domain
  dmaengine: mcf-edma: Fix a potential un-allocated memory access
  dmaengine: xilinx: xdma: Fix Judgment of the return value
  idmaengine: make FSL_EDMA and INTEL_IDMA64 depends on HAS_IOMEM

Pull x86/gds fixes from Dave Hansen:
 "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling issue:

   - Add Base GDS mitigation

   - Support GDS_NO under KVM

   - Fix a documentation typo"

* tag 'gds-for-linus-2023-08-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  Documentation/x86: Fix backwards on/off logic about YMM support
  KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM
  x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDS
  x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation
  x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation

The codeaurora.org email domain is defunct and will bounce.

Update entries to Sinan's kernel.org address which is the address in
MAINTAINERS for this component.

Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>
Acked-By: Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230707195003.6619-1-quic_jhugo@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>

Pull cxl fixes from Vishal Verma:

 - Fixup the Sanitixe device ABI that was merged for v6.5 to hide some
   sysfs files when the necessary support is missing. Update the ABI
   documentation around this as well.

* tag 'cxl-fixes-6.5-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
  cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
  cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc
  cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions

If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands,
hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can
never be attempted.

In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands
found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-4-dave@stgolabs.net
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>

Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same
goes for both sanitize and secure erase.

Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726051940.3570-2-dave@stgolabs.net
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>

When a grant entry is still in use by the remote domain, Linux must put
it on a deferred list.  Normally, this list is very short, because
the PV network and block protocols expect the backend to unmap the grant
first.  However, Qubes OS's GUI protocol is subject to the constraints
of the X Window System, and as such winds up with the frontend unmapping
the window first.  As a result, the list can grow very large, resulting
in a massive memory leak and eventual VM freeze.

To partially solve this problem, make the number of entries that the VM
will attempt to free at each iteration tunable.  The default is still
10, but it can be overridden via a module parameter.

This is Cc: stable because (when combined with appropriate userspace
changes) it fixes a severe performance and stability problem for Qubes
OS users.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726165354.1252-1-demi@invisiblethingslab.com
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.

Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.

This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.

Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.

The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:

    /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

Pull in the currently staged SCSI fixes for 6.5.

Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>