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17 hourssched_ext: Pass held rq to SCX_CALL_OP() for core_sched_beforeTejun Heo
[ Upstream commit 4155fb489fa175ec74eedde7d02219cf2fe74303 ] scx_prio_less() runs from core-sched's pick_next_task() path with rq locked but invokes ops.core_sched_before() with NULL locked_rq, leaving scx_locked_rq_state NULL. If the BPF callback calls a kfunc that re-acquires rq based on scx_locked_rq() - e.g. scx_bpf_cpuperf_set(cpu) - it re-acquires the already-held rq. Pass task_rq(a). Fixes: 7b0888b7cc19 ("sched_ext: Implement core-sched support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.12+ Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> [ adapted call to use stable's single `sch`/`SCX_KF_REST` mask and `scx_rq_bypassing(task_rq(a))` signature ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
17 hourssched_ext: Guard scx_dsq_move() against NULL kit->dsq after failed iter_newTejun Heo
[ Upstream commit 4fda9f0e7c950da4fe03cedeb2ac818edf5d03e9 ] bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() clears kit->dsq on failure and bpf_iter_scx_dsq_{next,destroy}() guard against that. scx_dsq_move() doesn't - it dereferences kit->dsq immediately, so a BPF program that calls scx_bpf_dsq_move[_vtime]() after a failed iter_new oopses the kernel. Return false if kit->dsq is NULL. Fixes: 4c30f5ce4f7a ("sched_ext: Implement scx_bpf_dispatch[_vtime]_from_dsq()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.12+ Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> [ dropped upstream `sch = src_dsq->sched` reordering since stable initializes `sch` from `scx_root` instead ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
17 hoursaudit: enforce AUDIT_LOCKED for AUDIT_TRIM and AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIVSergio Correia
commit f9e1c1324b4d98d591a6f7568fdebf5cf456dfc2 upstream. AUDIT_ADD_RULE and AUDIT_DEL_RULE correctly check for AUDIT_LOCKED and return -EPERM, but AUDIT_TRIM and AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV do not. This allows a process with CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to modify directory tree watches and equivalence mappings even when the audit configuration has been locked, undermining the purpose of the lock. Add AUDIT_LOCKED checks to both commands. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Sergio Correia <scorreia@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
17 hourscgroup/dmem: Return -ENOMEM on failed pool preallocationGuopeng Zhang
commit 796ad622040f7f955ccc3973085e953415920496 upstream. get_cg_pool_unlocked() handles allocation failures under dmemcg_lock by dropping the lock, preallocating a pool with GFP_KERNEL, and retrying the locked lookup and creation path. If the fallback allocation fails too, pool remains NULL. Since the loop condition is while (!pool), the function can keep retrying instead of propagating the allocation failure to the caller. Set pool to ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) when the fallback allocation fails so the loop exits through the existing common return path. The callers already handle ERR_PTR() from get_cg_pool_unlocked(), so this restores the expected error path. Fixes: b168ed458dde ("kernel/cgroup: Add "dmem" memory accounting cgroup") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14+ Signed-off-by: Guopeng Zhang <zhangguopeng@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
17 hoursaudit: fix incorrect inheritable capability in CAPSET recordsSergio Correia
commit e4a640475e43f406fdfd56d370b1f34b0cbbc18d upstream. __audit_log_capset() records the effective capability set into the inheritable field due to a copy-paste error. Every CAPSET audit record therefore reports cap_pi (process inheritable) with the value of cap_effective instead of cap_inheritable. This silently corrupts audit data used for compliance and forensic analysis: an attacker who modifies inheritable capabilities to prepare for a privilege-escalating exec would have the change masked in the audit trail. The bug has been present since the original introduction of CAPSET audit records in 2008. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e68b75a027bb ("When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the actual capbilities being added/removed. This patch adds a new record type which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.") Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Sergio Correia <scorreia@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
17 hoursworkqueue: Fix wq->cpu_pwq leak in alloc_and_link_pwqs() WQ_UNBOUND pathBreno Leitao
commit 0143033dc22cdff912cfc13419f5db92fea3b4cb upstream. For WQ_UNBOUND workqueues, alloc_and_link_pwqs() allocates wq->cpu_pwq via alloc_percpu() and then calls apply_workqueue_attrs_locked(). On failure it returns the error directly, bypassing the enomem: label which holds the only free_percpu(wq->cpu_pwq) in this function. The caller's error path kfree()s wq without touching wq->cpu_pwq, leaking one percpu pointer table (nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void *) bytes) per failed call. If kmemleak is enabled, we can see: unreferenced object (percpu) 0xc0fffa5b121048 (size 8): comm "insmod", pid 776, jiffies 4294682844 backtrace (crc 0): pcpu_alloc_noprof+0x665/0xac0 __alloc_workqueue+0x33f/0xa20 alloc_workqueue_noprof+0x60/0x100 Route the error through the existing enomem: cleanup and any error before this one. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 636b927eba5b ("workqueue: Make unbound workqueues to use per-cpu pool_workqueues") Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
17 hourssched/fair: Revert force wakeup preemptionVincent Guittot
[ Upstream commit 15257cc2f905dbf5813c0bfdd3c15885f28093c4 ] This agressively bypasses run_to_parity and slice protection with the assumpiton that this is what waker wants but there is no garantee that the wakee will be the next to run. It is a better choice to use yield_to_task or WF_SYNC in such case. This increases the number of resched and preemption because a task becomes quickly "ineligible" when it runs; We update the task vruntime periodically and before the task exhausted its slice or at least quantum. Example: 2 tasks A and B wake up simultaneously with lag = 0. Both are eligible. Task A runs 1st and wakes up task C. Scheduler updates task A's vruntime which becomes greater than average runtime as all others have a lag == 0 and didn't run yet. Now task A is ineligible because it received more runtime than the other task but it has not yet exhausted its slice nor a min quantum. We force preemption, disable protection but Task B will run 1st not task C. Sidenote, DELAY_ZERO increases this effect by clearing positive lag at wake up. Fixes: e837456fdca8 ("sched/fair: Reimplement NEXT_BUDDY to align with EEVDF goals") Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123102858.52428-1-vincent.guittot@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched/fair: Fix wakeup_preempt_fair() for not waking up taskVincent Guittot
[ Upstream commit 9f6d929ee2c6f0266edb564bcd2bd47fd6e884a8 ] Make sure to only call pick_next_entity() on an non-empty cfs_rq. The assumption that p is always enqueued and not delayed, is only true for wakeup. If p was moved while delayed, pick_next_entity() will dequeue it and the cfs might become empty. Test if there are still queued tasks before trying again to determine if p could be the next one to be picked. There are at least 2 cases: When cfs becomes idle, it tries to pull tasks but if those pulled tasks are delayed, they will be dequeued when attached to cfs. attach_tasks() -> attach_task() -> wakeup_preempt(rq, p, 0); A misfit task running on cfs A triggers a load balance to be pulled on a better cpu, the load balance on cfs B starts an active load balance to pulled the running misfit task. If there is a delayed dequeue task on cfs A, it can be pulled instead of the previously running misfit task. attach_one_task() -> attach_task() -> wakeup_preempt(rq, p, 0); Fixes: ac8e69e69363 ("sched/fair: Fix wakeup_preempt_fair() vs delayed dequeue") Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260503104503.1732682-1-vincent.guittot@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix sync_linked_regs regarding BPF_ADD_CONST32 zext propagationDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit bc308be380c136800e1e94c6ce49cb53141d6506 ] Jenny reported that in sync_linked_regs() the BPF_ADD_CONST32 flag is checked on known_reg (the register narrowed by a conditional branch) instead of reg (the linked target register created by an alu32 operation). Example case with reg: 1. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() 2. r7 = r6 (linked, same id) 3. w7 += 5 (alu32 -- r7 gets BPF_ADD_CONST32, zero-extended by CPU) 4. if w6 < 0xFFFFFFFC goto safe (narrows r6 to [0xFFFFFFFC, 0xFFFFFFFF]) 5. sync_linked_regs() propagates to r7 but does NOT call zext_32_to_64() 6. Verifier thinks r7 is [0x100000001, 0x100000004] instead of [1, 4] Since known_reg above does not have BPF_ADD_CONST32 set above, zext_32_to_64() is never called on alu32-derived linked registers. This causes the verifier to track incorrect 64-bit bounds, while the CPU correctly zero-extends the 32-bit result. The code checking known_reg->id was correct however (see scalars_alu32_wrap selftest case), but the real fix needs to handle both directions - zext propagation should be done when either register has BPF_ADD_CONST32, since the linked relationship involves a 32-bit operation regardless of which side has the flag. Example case with known_reg (exercised also by scalars_alu32_wrap): 1. r1 = r0; w1 += 0x100 (alu32 -- r1 gets BPF_ADD_CONST32) 2. if r1 > 0x80 - known_reg = r1 (has BPF_ADD_CONST32), reg = r0 (doesn't) Hence, fix it by checking for (reg->id | known_reg->id) & BPF_ADD_CONST32. Moreover, sync_linked_regs() also has a soundness issue when two linked registers used different ALU widths: one with BPF_ADD_CONST32 and the other with BPF_ADD_CONST64. The delta relationship between linked registers assumes the same arithmetic width though. When one register went through alu32 (CPU zero-extends the 32-bit result) and the other went through alu64 (no zero-extension), the propagation produces incorrect bounds. Example: r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32() // fully unknown if r6 >= 0x100000000 goto out // constrain r6 to [0, U32_MAX] r7 = r6 w7 += 1 // alu32: r7.id = N | BPF_ADD_CONST32 r8 = r6 r8 += 2 // alu64: r8.id = N | BPF_ADD_CONST64 if r7 < 0xFFFFFFFF goto out // narrows r7 to [0xFFFFFFFF, 0xFFFFFFFF] At the branch on r7, sync_linked_regs() runs with known_reg=r7 (BPF_ADD_CONST32) and reg=r8 (BPF_ADD_CONST64). The delta path computes: r8 = r7 + (delta_r8 - delta_r7) = 0xFFFFFFFF + (2 - 1) = 0x100000000 Then, because known_reg->id has BPF_ADD_CONST32, zext_32_to_64(r8) is called, truncating r8 to [0, 0]. But r8 used a 64-bit ALU op -- the CPU does NOT zero-extend it. The actual CPU value of r8 is 0xFFFFFFFE + 2 = 0x100000000, not 0. The verifier now underestimates r8's 64-bit bounds, which is a soundness violation. Fix sync_linked_regs() by skipping propagation when the two registers have mixed ALU widths (one BPF_ADD_CONST32, the other BPF_ADD_CONST64). Lastly, fix regsafe() used for path pruning: the existing checks used "& BPF_ADD_CONST" to test for offset linkage, which treated BPF_ADD_CONST32 and BPF_ADD_CONST64 as equivalent. Fixes: 7a433e519364 ("bpf: Support negative offsets, BPF_SUB, and alu32 for linked register tracking") Reported-by: Jenny Guanni Qu <qguanni@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260319211507.213816-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursfutex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash allocDavidlohr Bueso
[ Upstream commit ee9dce44362b2d8132c32964656ab6dff7dfbc6a ] Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put ... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref no longer points at. Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier CLONE_VM. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAL_bE8LsmCQ-FAtYDuwbJhOkt9p2wwYQwAbMh=PifC=VsiBM6A@mail.gmail.com/ [0] Fixes: d9b05321e21e ("futex: Move futex_hash_free() back to __mmput()") Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursfutex: Prevent lockup in requeue-PI during signal/ timeout wakeupSebastian Andrzej Siewior
[ Upstream commit bc7304f3ae20972d11db6e0b1b541c63feda5f05 ] During wait-requeue-pi (task A) and requeue-PI (task B) the following race can happen: Task A Task B futex_wait_requeue_pi() futex_setup_timer() futex_do_wait() futex_requeue() CLASS(hb, hb1)(&key1); CLASS(hb, hb2)(&key2); *timeout* futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() requeue_state = Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE *blocks on hb->lock* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() futex_requeue_pi_prepare() Q_REQUEUE_PI_IGNORE => -EAGAIN double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2) *retry* Task B acquires both hb locks and attempts to acquire the PI-lock of the top most waiter (task B). Task A is leaving early due to a signal/ timeout and started removing itself from the queue. It updates its requeue_state but can not remove it from the list because this requires the hb lock which is owned by task B. Usually task A is able to swoop the lock after task B unlocked it. However if task B is of higher priority then task A may not be able to wake up in time and acquire the lock before task B gets it again. Especially on a UP system where A is never scheduled. As a result task A blocks on the lock and task B busy loops, trying to make progress but live locks the system instead. Tragic. This can be fixed by removing the top most waiter from the list in this case. This allows task B to grab the next top waiter (if any) in the next iteration and make progress. Remove the top most waiter if futex_requeue_pi_prepare() fails. Let the waiter conditionally remove itself from the list in handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(). Fixes: 07d91ef510fb1 ("futex: Prevent requeue_pi() lock nesting issue on RT") Reported-by: Moritz Klammler <Moritz.Klammler@ferchau.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260428103425.dywXyPd3@linutronix.de Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/VE1PR06MB6894BE61C173D802365BE19DFF4CA@VE1PR06MB6894.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched/fair: Clear rel_deadline when initializing forked entitiesZicheng Qu
[ Upstream commit 3da56dc063cd77b9c0b40add930767fab4e389f3 ] A yield-triggered crash can happen when a newly forked sched_entity enters the fair class with se->rel_deadline unexpectedly set. The failing sequence is: 1. A task is forked while se->rel_deadline is still set. 2. __sched_fork() initializes vruntime, vlag and other sched_entity state, but does not clear rel_deadline. 3. On the first enqueue, enqueue_entity() calls place_entity(). 4. Because se->rel_deadline is set, place_entity() treats se->deadline as a relative deadline and converts it to an absolute deadline by adding the current vruntime. 5. However, the forked entity's deadline is not a valid inherited relative deadline for this new scheduling instance, so the conversion produces an abnormally large deadline. 6. If the task later calls sched_yield(), yield_task_fair() advances se->vruntime to se->deadline. 7. The inflated vruntime is then used by the following enqueue path, where the vruntime-derived key can overflow when multiplied by the entity weight. 8. This corrupts cfs_rq->sum_w_vruntime, breaks EEVDF eligibility calculation, and can eventually make all entities appear ineligible. pick_next_entity() may then return NULL unexpectedly, leading to a later NULL dereference. A captured trace shows the effect clearly. Before yield, the entity's vruntime was around: 9834017729983308 After yield_task_fair() executed: se->vruntime = se->deadline the vruntime jumped to: 19668035460670230 and the deadline was later advanced further to: 19668035463470230 This shows that the deadline had already become abnormally large before yield_task_fair() copied it into vruntime. rel_deadline is only meaningful when se->deadline really carries a relative deadline that still needs to be placed against vruntime. A freshly forked sched_entity should not inherit or retain this state. Clear se->rel_deadline in __sched_fork(), together with the other sched_entity runtime state, so that the first enqueue does not interpret the new entity's deadline as a stale relative deadline. Fixes: 82e9d0456e06 ("sched/fair: Avoid re-setting virtual deadline on 'migrations'") Analyzed-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20@huawei.com> Analyzed-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zicheng Qu <quzicheng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260424071113.1199600-1-quzicheng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched/fair: Fix wakeup_preempt_fair() vs delayed dequeueVincent Guittot
[ Upstream commit ac8e69e693631689d74d8f1ebee6f84f737f797f ] Similar to how pick_next_entity() must dequeue delayed entities, so too must wakeup_preempt_fair(). Any delayed task being found means it is eligible and hence past the 0-lag point, ready for removal. Worse, by not removing delayed entities from consideration, it can skew the preemption decision, with the end result that a short slice wakeup will not result in a preemption. tip/sched/core tip/sched/core +this patch cyclictest slice (ms) (default)2.8 8 8 hackbench slice (ms) (default)2.8 20 20 Total Samples | 22559 22595 22683 Average (us) | 157 64( 59%) 59( 8%) Median (P50) (us) | 57 57( 0%) 58(- 2%) 90th Percentile (us) | 64 60( 6%) 60( 0%) 99th Percentile (us) | 2407 67( 97%) 67( 0%) 99.9th Percentile (us) | 3400 2288( 33%) 727( 68%) Maximum (us) | 5037 9252(-84%) 7461( 19%) Fixes: f12e148892ed ("sched/fair: Prepare pick_next_task() for delayed dequeue") Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422093400.319251-1-vincent.guittot@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched/fair: Reimplement NEXT_BUDDY to align with EEVDF goalsMel Gorman
[ Upstream commit e837456fdca81899a3c8e47b3fd39e30eae6e291 ] Reimplement NEXT_BUDDY preemption to take into account the deadline and eligibility of the wakee with respect to the waker. In the event multiple buddies could be considered, the one with the earliest deadline is selected. Sync wakeups are treated differently to every other type of wakeup. The WF_SYNC assumption is that the waker promises to sleep in the very near future. This is violated in enough cases that WF_SYNC should be treated as a suggestion instead of a contract. If a waker does go to sleep almost immediately then the delay in wakeup is negligible. In other cases, it's throttled based on the accumulated runtime of the waker so there is a chance that some batched wakeups have been issued before preemption. For all other wakeups, preemption happens if the wakee has a earlier deadline than the waker and eligible to run. While many workloads were tested, the two main targets were a modified dbench4 benchmark and hackbench because the are on opposite ends of the spectrum -- one prefers throughput by avoiding preemption and the other relies on preemption. First is the dbench throughput data even though it is a poor metric but it is the default metric. The test machine is a 2-socket machine and the backing filesystem is XFS as a lot of the IO work is dispatched to kernel threads. It's important to note that these results are not representative across all machines, especially Zen machines, as different bottlenecks are exposed on different machines and filesystems. dbench4 Throughput (misleading but traditional) 6.18-rc1 6.18-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v5 Hmean 1 1268.80 ( 0.00%) 1269.74 ( 0.07%) Hmean 4 3971.74 ( 0.00%) 3950.59 ( -0.53%) Hmean 7 5548.23 ( 0.00%) 5420.08 ( -2.31%) Hmean 12 7310.86 ( 0.00%) 7165.57 ( -1.99%) Hmean 21 8874.53 ( 0.00%) 9149.04 ( 3.09%) Hmean 30 9361.93 ( 0.00%) 10530.04 ( 12.48%) Hmean 48 9540.14 ( 0.00%) 11820.40 ( 23.90%) Hmean 79 9208.74 ( 0.00%) 12193.79 ( 32.42%) Hmean 110 8573.12 ( 0.00%) 11933.72 ( 39.20%) Hmean 141 7791.33 ( 0.00%) 11273.90 ( 44.70%) Hmean 160 7666.60 ( 0.00%) 10768.72 ( 40.46%) As throughput is misleading, the benchmark is modified to use a short loadfile report the completion time duration in milliseconds. dbench4 Loadfile Execution Time 6.18-rc1 6.18-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v5 Amean 1 14.62 ( 0.00%) 14.69 ( -0.46%) Amean 4 18.76 ( 0.00%) 18.85 ( -0.45%) Amean 7 23.71 ( 0.00%) 24.38 ( -2.82%) Amean 12 31.25 ( 0.00%) 31.87 ( -1.97%) Amean 21 45.12 ( 0.00%) 43.69 ( 3.16%) Amean 30 61.07 ( 0.00%) 54.33 ( 11.03%) Amean 48 95.91 ( 0.00%) 77.22 ( 19.49%) Amean 79 163.38 ( 0.00%) 123.08 ( 24.66%) Amean 110 243.91 ( 0.00%) 175.11 ( 28.21%) Amean 141 343.47 ( 0.00%) 239.10 ( 30.39%) Amean 160 401.15 ( 0.00%) 283.73 ( 29.27%) Stddev 1 0.52 ( 0.00%) 0.51 ( 2.45%) Stddev 4 1.36 ( 0.00%) 1.30 ( 4.04%) Stddev 7 1.88 ( 0.00%) 1.87 ( 0.72%) Stddev 12 3.06 ( 0.00%) 2.45 ( 19.83%) Stddev 21 5.78 ( 0.00%) 3.87 ( 33.06%) Stddev 30 9.85 ( 0.00%) 5.25 ( 46.76%) Stddev 48 22.31 ( 0.00%) 8.64 ( 61.27%) Stddev 79 35.96 ( 0.00%) 18.07 ( 49.76%) Stddev 110 59.04 ( 0.00%) 30.93 ( 47.61%) Stddev 141 85.38 ( 0.00%) 40.93 ( 52.06%) Stddev 160 96.38 ( 0.00%) 39.72 ( 58.79%) That is still looking good and the variance is reduced quite a bit. Finally, fairness is a concern so the next report tracks how many milliseconds does it take for all clients to complete a workfile. This one is tricky because dbench makes to effort to synchronise clients so the durations at benchmark start time differ substantially from typical runtimes. This problem could be mitigated by warming up the benchmark for a number of minutes but it's a matter of opinion whether that counts as an evasion of inconvenient results. dbench4 All Clients Loadfile Execution Time 6.18-rc1 6.18-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v5 Amean 1 15.06 ( 0.00%) 15.07 ( -0.03%) Amean 4 603.81 ( 0.00%) 524.29 ( 13.17%) Amean 7 855.32 ( 0.00%) 1331.07 ( -55.62%) Amean 12 1890.02 ( 0.00%) 2323.97 ( -22.96%) Amean 21 3195.23 ( 0.00%) 2009.29 ( 37.12%) Amean 30 13919.53 ( 0.00%) 4579.44 ( 67.10%) Amean 48 25246.07 ( 0.00%) 5705.46 ( 77.40%) Amean 79 29701.84 ( 0.00%) 15509.26 ( 47.78%) Amean 110 22803.03 ( 0.00%) 23782.08 ( -4.29%) Amean 141 36356.07 ( 0.00%) 25074.20 ( 31.03%) Amean 160 17046.71 ( 0.00%) 13247.62 ( 22.29%) Stddev 1 0.47 ( 0.00%) 0.49 ( -3.74%) Stddev 4 395.24 ( 0.00%) 254.18 ( 35.69%) Stddev 7 467.24 ( 0.00%) 764.42 ( -63.60%) Stddev 12 1071.43 ( 0.00%) 1395.90 ( -30.28%) Stddev 21 1694.50 ( 0.00%) 1204.89 ( 28.89%) Stddev 30 7945.63 ( 0.00%) 2552.59 ( 67.87%) Stddev 48 14339.51 ( 0.00%) 3227.55 ( 77.49%) Stddev 79 16620.91 ( 0.00%) 8422.15 ( 49.33%) Stddev 110 12912.15 ( 0.00%) 13560.95 ( -5.02%) Stddev 141 20700.13 ( 0.00%) 14544.51 ( 29.74%) Stddev 160 9079.16 ( 0.00%) 7400.69 ( 18.49%) This is more of a mixed bag but it at least shows that fairness is not crippled. The hackbench results are more neutral but this is still important. It's possible to boost the dbench figures by a large amount but only by crippling the performance of a workload like hackbench. The WF_SYNC behaviour is important for these workloads and is why the WF_SYNC changes are not a separate patch. hackbench-process-pipes 6.18-rc1 6.18-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v5 Amean 1 0.2657 ( 0.00%) 0.2150 ( 19.07%) Amean 4 0.6107 ( 0.00%) 0.6060 ( 0.76%) Amean 7 0.7923 ( 0.00%) 0.7440 ( 6.10%) Amean 12 1.1500 ( 0.00%) 1.1263 ( 2.06%) Amean 21 1.7950 ( 0.00%) 1.7987 ( -0.20%) Amean 30 2.3207 ( 0.00%) 2.5053 ( -7.96%) Amean 48 3.5023 ( 0.00%) 3.9197 ( -11.92%) Amean 79 4.8093 ( 0.00%) 5.2247 ( -8.64%) Amean 110 6.1160 ( 0.00%) 6.6650 ( -8.98%) Amean 141 7.4763 ( 0.00%) 7.8973 ( -5.63%) Amean 172 8.9560 ( 0.00%) 9.3593 ( -4.50%) Amean 203 10.4783 ( 0.00%) 10.8347 ( -3.40%) Amean 234 12.4977 ( 0.00%) 13.0177 ( -4.16%) Amean 265 14.7003 ( 0.00%) 15.5630 ( -5.87%) Amean 296 16.1007 ( 0.00%) 17.4023 ( -8.08%) Processes using pipes are impacted but the variance (not presented) indicates it's close to noise and the results are not always reproducible. If executed across multiple reboots, it may show neutral or small gains so the worst measured results are presented. Hackbench using sockets is more reliably neutral as the wakeup mechanisms are different between sockets and pipes. hackbench-process-sockets 6.18-rc1 6.18-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v2 Amean 1 0.3073 ( 0.00%) 0.3263 ( -6.18%) Amean 4 0.7863 ( 0.00%) 0.7930 ( -0.85%) Amean 7 1.3670 ( 0.00%) 1.3537 ( 0.98%) Amean 12 2.1337 ( 0.00%) 2.1903 ( -2.66%) Amean 21 3.4683 ( 0.00%) 3.4940 ( -0.74%) Amean 30 4.7247 ( 0.00%) 4.8853 ( -3.40%) Amean 48 7.6097 ( 0.00%) 7.8197 ( -2.76%) Amean 79 14.7957 ( 0.00%) 16.1000 ( -8.82%) Amean 110 21.3413 ( 0.00%) 21.9997 ( -3.08%) Amean 141 29.0503 ( 0.00%) 29.0353 ( 0.05%) Amean 172 36.4660 ( 0.00%) 36.1433 ( 0.88%) Amean 203 39.7177 ( 0.00%) 40.5910 ( -2.20%) Amean 234 42.1120 ( 0.00%) 43.5527 ( -3.42%) Amean 265 45.7830 ( 0.00%) 50.0560 ( -9.33%) Amean 296 50.7043 ( 0.00%) 54.3657 ( -7.22%) As schbench has been mentioned in numerous bugs recently, the results are interesting. A test case that represents the default schbench behaviour is schbench Wakeup Latency (usec) 6.18.0-rc1 6.18.0-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v5 Amean Wakeup-50th-80 7.17 ( 0.00%) 6.00 ( 16.28%) Amean Wakeup-90th-80 46.56 ( 0.00%) 19.78 ( 57.52%) Amean Wakeup-99th-80 119.61 ( 0.00%) 89.94 ( 24.80%) Amean Wakeup-99.9th-80 3193.78 ( 0.00%) 328.22 ( 89.72%) schbench Requests Per Second (ops/sec) 6.18.0-rc1 6.18.0-rc1 vanilla sched-preemptnext-v5 Hmean RPS-20th-80 8900.91 ( 0.00%) 9176.78 ( 3.10%) Hmean RPS-50th-80 8987.41 ( 0.00%) 9217.89 ( 2.56%) Hmean RPS-90th-80 9123.73 ( 0.00%) 9273.25 ( 1.64%) Hmean RPS-max-80 9193.50 ( 0.00%) 9301.47 ( 1.17%) Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112122521.1331238-3-mgorman@techsingularity.net Stable-dep-of: ac8e69e69363 ("sched/fair: Fix wakeup_preempt_fair() vs delayed dequeue") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourstracing: branch: Fix inverted check on stat tracer registrationBreno Leitao
[ Upstream commit 3b75dd76e64a04771861bb5647951c264919e563 ] init_annotated_branch_stats() and all_annotated_branch_stats() check the return value of register_stat_tracer() with "if (!ret)", but register_stat_tracer() returns 0 on success and a negative errno on failure. The inverted check causes the warning to be printed on every successful registration, e.g.: Warning: could not register annotated branches stats while leaving real failures silent. The initcall also returned a hard-coded 1 instead of the actual error. Invert the check and propagate ret so that the warning fires on real errors and the initcall reports the correct status. Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420-tracing-v1-1-d8f4cd0d6af1@debian.org Fixes: 002bb86d8d42 ("tracing/ftrace: separate events tracing and stats tracing engine") Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourscgroup: Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from rmdir contextPetr Malat
[ Upstream commit 13e786b64bd3fd81c7eb22aa32bf8305c32f2ccf ] Incrementing nr_dying_subsys_* in offline_css(), which is executed by cgroup_offline_wq worker, leads to a race where user can see the value to be 0 if he reads cgroup.stat after calling rmdir and before the worker executes. This makes the user wrongly expect resources released by the removed cgroup to be available for a new assignment. Increment nr_dying_subsys_* from kill_css(), which is called from the cgroup_rmdir() context. Fixes: ab0312526867 ("cgroup: Show # of subsystem CSSes in cgroup.stat") Signed-off-by: Petr Malat <oss@malat.biz> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourscgroup/rdma: fix integer overflow in rdmacg_try_charge()cuitao
[ Upstream commit c802f460dd485c1332b5a35e7adcfb2bc22536a2 ] The expression `rpool->resources[index].usage + 1` is computed in int arithmetic before being assigned to s64 variable `new`. When usage equals INT_MAX (the default "max" value), the addition overflows to INT_MIN. This negative value then passes the `new > max` check incorrectly, allowing a charge that should be rejected and corrupting usage to negative. Fix by casting usage to s64 before the addition so the arithmetic is done in 64-bit. Fixes: 39d3e7584a68 ("rdmacg: Added rdma cgroup controller") Signed-off-by: cuitao <cuitao@kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure writeEdward Adam Davis
[ Upstream commit a5b98009f16d8a5fb4a8ff9a193f5735515c38fa ] A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1]. Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== vfs_rmdir() kernfs_iop_rmdir() cgroup_rmdir() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_destroy_locked() cgroup_addrm_files() cgroup_rm_file() kernfs_remove_by_name() kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() vfs_write() __kernfs_remove() new_sync_write() kernfs_drain() kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_write() kernfs_release_file() pressure_write() cgroup_file_release() ctx = of->priv; kfree(ctx); of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_get(cgrp) cgroup_kn_unlock() if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered. Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write(). And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired. In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition: CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0 =========================== ============================= kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_get_active_of(of) pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure) cgroup_tryget(cgrp) kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) ... blocks on cgroup_mutex cgroup_pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure) cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false) kernfs_show(false) kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_release(of) kfree(ctx) of->priv = NULL cgroup_kn_unlock() ... acquires cgroup_mutex ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this. Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 Call Trace: pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4311 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3b0/0x540 fs/kernfs/file.c:352 Allocated by task 9352: cgroup_file_open+0x90/0x3a0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4256 kernfs_fop_open+0x9eb/0xcb0 fs/kernfs/file.c:724 do_dentry_open+0x83d/0x13e0 fs/open.c:949 Freed by task 9353: cgroup_file_release+0xd6/0x100 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4283 kernfs_release_file fs/kernfs/file.c:764 [inline] kernfs_drain_open_files+0x392/0x720 fs/kernfs/file.c:834 kernfs_drain+0x470/0x600 fs/kernfs/dir.c:525 Fixes: 0e94682b73bf ("psi: introduce psi monitor") Reported-by: syzbot+33e571025d88efd1312c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=33e571025d88efd1312c Tested-by: syzbot+33e571025d88efd1312c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Reviewed-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Validate node_id in arena_alloc_pages()Puranjay Mohan
[ Upstream commit 2845989f2ebaf7848e4eccf9a779daf3156ea0a5 ] arena_alloc_pages() accepts a plain int node_id and forwards it through the entire allocation chain without any bounds checking. Validate node_id before passing it down the allocation chain in arena_alloc_pages(). Fixes: 317460317a02 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.") Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260417152135.1383754-1-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: allow UTF-8 literals in bpf_bprintf_prepare()Yihan Ding
[ Upstream commit b960430ea8862ef37ce53c8bf74a8dc79d3f2404 ] bpf_bprintf_prepare() only needs ASCII parsing for conversion specifiers. Plain text can safely carry bytes >= 0x80, so allow UTF-8 literals outside '%' sequences while keeping ASCII control bytes rejected and format specifiers ASCII-only. This keeps existing parsing rules for format directives unchanged, while allowing helpers such as bpf_trace_printk() to emit UTF-8 literal text. Update test_snprintf_negative() in the same commit so selftests keep matching the new plain-text vs format-specifier split during bisection. Fixes: 48cac3f4a96d ("bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf") Signed-off-by: Yihan Ding <dingyihan@uniontech.com> Acked-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416120142.1420646-2-dingyihan@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix NULL deref in map_kptr_match_type for scalar regsMykyta Yatsenko
[ Upstream commit 4d0a375887ab4d49e4da1ff10f9606cab8f7c3ad ] Commit ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local kptr") refactored map_kptr_match_type() to branch on btf_is_kernel() before checking base_type(). A scalar register stored into a kptr slot has no btf, so the btf_is_kernel(reg->btf) call dereferences NULL. Move the base_type() != PTR_TO_BTF_ID guard before any reg->btf access. Fixes: ab6c637ad027 ("bpf: Fix a bpf_kptr_xchg() issue with local kptr") Reported-by: Hiker Cl <clhiker365@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221372 Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com> Acked-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416-kptr_crash-v1-1-5589356584b4@meta.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourstracing: Rebuild full_name on each hist_field_name() callPengpeng Hou
[ Upstream commit 5ec1d1e97de134beed3a5b08235a60fc1c51af96 ] hist_field_name() uses a static MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL buffer for fully qualified variable-reference names, but it currently appends into that buffer with strcat() without rebuilding it first. As a result, repeated calls append a new "system.event.field" name onto the previous one, which can eventually run past the end of full_name. Build the name with snprintf() on each call and return NULL if the fully qualified name does not fit in MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260401112224.85582-1-pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn Fixes: 067fe038e70f ("tracing: Add variable reference handling to hist triggers") Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Tested-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourstracing: move __printf() attribute on __ftrace_vbprintk()Arnd Bergmann
[ Upstream commit 473e470f16f98569d59adc11c4a318780fb68fe9 ] The sunrpc change to use trace_printk() for debugging caused a new warning for every instance of dprintk() in some configurations, when -Wformat-security is enabled: fs/nfs/getroot.c: In function 'nfs_get_root': fs/nfs/getroot.c:90:17: error: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Werror=format-security] 90 | nfs_errorf(fc, "NFS: Couldn't getattr on root"); I've been slowly chipping away at those warnings over time with the intention of enabling them by default in the future. While I could not figure out why this only happens for this one instance, I see that the __trace_bprintk() function is always called with a local variable as the format string, rather than a literal. Move the __printf(2,3) annotation on this function from the declaration to the caller. As this is can only be validated for literals, the attribute on the declaration causes the warnings every time, but removing it entirely introduces a new warning on the __ftrace_vbprintk() definition. The format strings still get checked because the underlying literal keeps getting passed into __trace_printk() in the "else" branch, which is not taken but still evaluated for compile-time warnings. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Yury Norov <ynorov@nvidia.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203164545.3174910-1-arnd@kernel.org Fixes: ec7d8e68ef0e ("sunrpc: add a Kconfig option to redirect dfprintk() output to trace buffer") Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourstracing: remove size parameter in __trace_puts()Steven Rostedt
[ Upstream commit 86e685ff364394b477cd1c476029480a2a1960c5 ] The __trace_puts() function takes a string pointer and the size of the string itself. All users currently simply pass in the strlen() of the string it is also passing in. There's no reason to pass in the size. Instead have the __trace_puts() function do the strlen() within the function itself. This fixes a header recursion issue where using strlen() in the macro calling __trace_puts() requires adding #include <linux/string.h> in order to use strlen(). Removing the use of strlen() from the header fixes the recursion issue. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aUN8Hm377C5A0ILX@yury/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260116042510.241009-6-ynorov@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <ynorov@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@nvidia.com> Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com> Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP) <chleroy@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Stable-dep-of: 473e470f16f9 ("tracing: move __printf() attribute on __ftrace_vbprintk()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursunshare: fix nsproxy leak in ksys_unshare() on set_cred_ucounts() failureMichal Grzedzicki
[ Upstream commit a98621a0f187a934c115dcfe79a49520ae892111 ] When set_cred_ucounts() fails in ksys_unshare() new_nsproxy is leaked. Let's call put_nsproxy() if that happens. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260213193959.2556730-1-mge@meta.com Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred") Signed-off-by: Michal Grzedzicki <mge@meta.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexey Gladkov (Intel) <legion@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org> Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com> Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched_ext: Fix ops.cgroup_move() invocation kf_mask and rq trackingTejun Heo
[ Upstream commit b470e37c1fad72731be6f437e233cb6b16618f41 ] sched_move_task() invokes ops.cgroup_move() inside task_rq_lock(tsk), so @p's rq lock is held. The SCX_CALL_OP_TASK invocation mislabels this: - kf_mask = SCX_KF_UNLOCKED (== 0), claiming no lock is held. - rq = NULL, so update_locked_rq() doesn't run and scx_locked_rq() returns NULL. Switch to SCX_KF_REST and pass task_rq(p), matching ops.set_cpumask() from set_cpus_allowed_scx(). Three effects: - scx_bpf_task_cgroup() becomes callable (was rejected by scx_kf_allowed(__SCX_KF_RQ_LOCKED)). Safe; rq lock is held. - scx_bpf_dsq_move() is now rejected (was allowed via the unlocked branch). Calling it while holding an unrelated task's rq lock is risky; rejection is correct. - scx_bpf_select_cpu_*() previously took the unlocked branch in select_cpu_from_kfunc() and called task_rq_lock(p, &rf), which would deadlock against the already-held pi_lock. Now it takes the locked-rq branch and is rejected with -EPERM via the existing kf_allowed(SCX_KF_SELECT_CPU | SCX_KF_ENQUEUE) check. Latent deadlock fix. No in-tree scheduler is known to call any of these from ops.cgroup_move(). v2: Add Fixes: tag (Andrea Righi). Fixes: 18853ba782be ("sched_ext: Track currently locked rq") Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched_ext: Track @p's rq lock across set_cpus_allowed_scx -> ops.set_cpumaskTejun Heo
[ Upstream commit 9fb457074f6d118b30458624223abef985725a88 ] The SCX_CALL_OP_TASK call site passes rq=NULL incorrectly, leaving scx_locked_rq() unset. Pass task_rq(p) instead so update_locked_rq() reflects reality. v2: Add Fixes: tag (Andrea Righi). Fixes: 18853ba782be ("sched_ext: Track currently locked rq") Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourskho: make debugfs interface optionalPasha Tatashin
[ Upstream commit 03d3963464a43654703938a66503cd686c5fc54e ] Patch series "liveupdate: Rework KHO for in-kernel users", v9. This series refactors the KHO framework to better support in-kernel users like the upcoming LUO. The current design, which relies on a notifier chain and debugfs for control, is too restrictive for direct programmatic use. The core of this rework is the removal of the notifier chain in favor of a direct registration API. This decouples clients from the shutdown-time finalization sequence, allowing them to manage their preserved state more flexibly and at any time. In support of this new model, this series also: - Makes the debugfs interface optional. - Introduces APIs to unpreserve memory and fixes a bug in the abort path where client state was being incorrectly discarded. Note that this is an interim step, as a more comprehensive fix is planned as part of the stateless KHO work [1]. - Moves all KHO code into a new kernel/liveupdate/ directory to consolidate live update components. This patch (of 9): Currently, KHO is controlled via debugfs interface, but once LUO is introduced, it can control KHO, and the debug interface becomes optional. Add a separate config CONFIG_KEXEC_HANDOVER_DEBUGFS that enables the debugfs interface, and allows to inspect the tree. Move all debugfs related code to a new file to keep the .c files clear of ifdefs. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251101142325.1326536-1-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251101142325.1326536-2-pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251020100306.2709352-1-jasonmiu@google.com [1] Co-developed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Reviewed-by: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Cc: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Stable-dep-of: 019fc3687237 ("kho: fix KASAN support for restored vmalloc regions") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourspadata: Put CPU offline callback in ONLINE section to allow failureDaniel Jordan
[ Upstream commit c8c4a2972f83c8b68ff03b43cecdb898939ff851 ] syzbot reported the following warning: DEAD callback error for CPU1 WARNING: kernel/cpu.c:1463 at _cpu_down+0x759/0x1020 kernel/cpu.c:1463, CPU#0: syz.0.1960/14614 at commit 4ae12d8bd9a8 ("Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-7.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kbuild/linux") which tglx traced to padata_cpu_dead() given it's the only sub-CPUHP_TEARDOWN_CPU callback that returns an error. Failure isn't allowed in hotplug states before CPUHP_TEARDOWN_CPU so move the CPU offline callback to the ONLINE section where failure is possible. Fixes: 894c9ef9780c ("padata: validate cpumask without removed CPU during offline") Reported-by: syzbot+123e1b70473ce213f3af@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69af0a05.050a0220.310d8.002f.GAE@google.com/ Debugged-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourspadata: Remove cpu online check from cpu add and removalChuyi Zhou
[ Upstream commit 73117ea6470dca787f70f33c001f9faf437a1c0b ] During the CPU offline process, the dying CPU is cleared from the cpu_online_mask in takedown_cpu(). After this step, various CPUHP_*_DEAD callbacks are executed to perform cleanup jobs for the dead CPU, so this cpu online check in padata_cpu_dead() is unnecessary. Similarly, when executing padata_cpu_online() during the CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN phase, the CPU has already been set in the cpu_online_mask, the action even occurs earlier than the CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE stage. Remove this unnecessary cpu online check in __padata_add_cpu() and __padata_remove_cpu(). Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: c8c4a2972f83 ("padata: Put CPU offline callback in ONLINE section to allow failure") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix OOB in pcpu_init_valueLang Xu
[ Upstream commit 576afddfee8d1108ee299bf10f581593540d1a36 ] An out-of-bounds read occurs when copying element from a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE map to another pcpu map with the same value_size that is not rounded up to 8 bytes. The issue happens when: 1. A CGROUP_STORAGE map is created with value_size not aligned to 8 bytes (e.g., 4 bytes) 2. A pcpu map is created with the same value_size (e.g., 4 bytes) 3. Update element in 2 with data in 1 pcpu_init_value assumes that all sources are rounded up to 8 bytes, and invokes copy_map_value_long to make a data copy, However, the assumption doesn't stand since there are some cases where the source may not be rounded up to 8 bytes, e.g., CGROUP_STORAGE, skb->data. the verifier verifies exactly the size that the source claims, not the size rounded up to 8 bytes by kernel, an OOB happens when the source has only 4 bytes while the copy size(4) is rounded up to 8. Fixes: d3bec0138bfb ("bpf: Zero-fill re-used per-cpu map element") Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <kaiyanm@hust.edu.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/14e6c70c.6c121.19c0399d948.Coremail.kaiyanm@hust.edu.cn/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/420FEEDDC768A4BE+20260402074236.2187154-1-xulang@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Lang Xu <xulang@uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Allow instructions with arena source and non-arena dest registersEmil Tsalapatis
[ Upstream commit ac61bffe91d4bda08806e12957c6d64756d042db ] The compiler sometimes stores the result of a PTR_TO_ARENA and SCALAR operation into the scalar register rather than the pointer register. Relax the verifier to allow operations between a source arena register and a destination non-arena register, marking the destination's value as a PTR_TO_ARENA. Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Fixes: 6082b6c328b5 ("bpf: Recognize addr_space_cast instruction in the verifier.") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260412174546.18684-2-emil@etsalapatis.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Enforce regsafe base id consistency for BPF_ADD_CONST scalarsDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit 2f2ec8e7730e21fc9bd49e0de9cdd58213ea24d0 ] When regsafe() compares two scalar registers that both carry BPF_ADD_CONST, check_scalar_ids() maps their full compound id (aka base | BPF_ADD_CONST flag) as one idmap entry. However, it never verifies that the underlying base ids, that is, with the flag stripped are consistent with existing idmap mappings. This allows construction of two verifier states where the old state has R3 = R2 + 10 (both sharing base id A) while the current state has R3 = R4 + 10 (base id C, unrelated to R2). The idmap creates two independent entries: A->B (for R2) and A|flag->C|flag (for R3), without catching that A->C conflicts with A->B. State pruning then incorrectly succeeds. Fix this by additionally verifying base ID mapping consistency whenever BPF_ADD_CONST is set: after mapping the compound ids, also invoke check_ids() on the base IDs (flag bits stripped). This ensures that if A was already mapped to B from comparing the source register, any ADD_CONST derivative must also derive from B, not an unrelated C. Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.") Reported-by: STAR Labs SG <info@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260410232651.559778-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Relax scalar id equivalence for state pruningPuranjay Mohan
[ Upstream commit b0388bafa4949bd30af7b3be5ee415f2a25ac014 ] Scalar register IDs are used by the verifier to track relationships between registers and enable bounds propagation across those relationships. Once an ID becomes singular (i.e. only a single register/stack slot carries it), it can no longer contribute to bounds propagation and effectively becomes stale. The previous commit makes the verifier clear such ids before caching the state. When comparing the current and cached states for pruning, these stale IDs can cause technically equivalent states to be considered different and thus prevent pruning. For example, in the selftest added in the next commit, two registers - r6 and r7 are not linked to any other registers and get cached with id=0, in the current state, they are both linked to each other with id=A. Before this commit, check_scalar_ids would give temporary ids to r6 and r7 (say tid1 and tid2) and then check_ids() would map tid1->A, and when it would see tid2->A, it would not consider these state equivalent. Relax scalar ID equivalence by treating rold->id == 0 as "independent": if the old state did not rely on any ID relationships for a register, then any ID/linking present in the current state only adds constraints and is always safe to accept for pruning. Implement this by returning true immediately in check_scalar_ids() when old_id == 0. Maintain correctness for the opposite direction (old_id != 0 && cur_id == 0) by still allocating a temporary ID for cur_id == 0. This avoids incorrectly allowing multiple independent current registers (id==0) to satisfy a single linked old ID during mapping. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260203165102.2302462-5-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 2f2ec8e7730e ("bpf: Enforce regsafe base id consistency for BPF_ADD_CONST scalars") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix RCU stall in bpf_fd_array_map_clear()Sechang Lim
[ Upstream commit 4406942e65ca128c56c67443832988873c21d2e9 ] Add a missing cond_resched() in bpf_fd_array_map_clear() loop. For PROG_ARRAY maps with many entries this loop calls prog_array_map_poke_run() per entry which can be expensive, and without yielding this can cause RCU stalls under load: rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 30932 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 6.14.0-13195-g967e8def1100 #2 PREEMPT(undef) Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred RIP: 0010:write_comp_data+0x38/0x90 kernel/kcov.c:246 Call Trace: <TASK> prog_array_map_poke_run+0x77/0x380 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1096 __fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x197/0x310 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:925 bpf_fd_array_map_clear kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1000 [inline] prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0x119/0x1b0 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1141 process_one_work+0x898/0x19d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x770/0x10b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x465/0x880 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153 ret_from_fork_asm+0x19/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Reviewed-by: Sun Jian <sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com> Fixes: da765a2f5993 ("bpf: Add poke dependency tracking for prog array maps") Signed-off-by: Sechang Lim <rhkrqnwk98@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407103823.3942156-1-rhkrqnwk98@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: return VMA snapshot from task_vma iteratorPuranjay Mohan
[ Upstream commit 4cbee026db54cad39c39db4d356100cb133412b3 ] Holding the per-VMA lock across the BPF program body creates a lock ordering problem when helpers acquire locks that depend on mmap_lock: vm_lock -> i_rwsem -> mmap_lock -> vm_lock Snapshot the VMA under the per-VMA lock in _next() via memcpy(), then drop the lock before returning. The BPF program accesses only the snapshot. The verifier only trusts vm_mm and vm_file pointers (see BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL in verifier.c). vm_file is reference- counted with get_file() under the lock and released via fput() on the next iteration or in _destroy(). vm_mm is already correct because lock_vma_under_rcu() verifies vma->vm_mm == mm. All other pointers are left as-is by memcpy() since the verifier treats them as untrusted. Fixes: 4ac454682158 ("bpf: Introduce task_vma open-coded iterator kfuncs") Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154539.3832150-4-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: switch task_vma iterator from mmap_lock to per-VMA locksPuranjay Mohan
[ Upstream commit bee9ef4a40a277bf401be43d39ba7f7f063cf39c ] The open-coded task_vma iterator holds mmap_lock for the entire duration of iteration, increasing contention on this highly contended lock. Switch to per-VMA locking. Find the next VMA via an RCU-protected maple tree walk and lock it with lock_vma_under_rcu(). lock_next_vma() is not used because its fallback takes mmap_read_lock(), and the iterator must work in non-sleepable contexts. lock_vma_under_rcu() is a point lookup (mas_walk) that finds the VMA containing a given address but cannot iterate across gaps. An RCU-protected vma_next() walk (mas_find) first locates the next VMA's vm_start to pass to lock_vma_under_rcu(). Between the RCU walk and the lock, the VMA may be removed, shrunk, or write-locked. On failure, advance past it using vm_end from the RCU walk. Because the VMA slab is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, vm_end may be stale; fall back to PAGE_SIZE advancement when it does not make forward progress. Concurrent VMA insertions at addresses already passed by the iterator are not detected. CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK is required; return -EOPNOTSUPP without it. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154539.3832150-3-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 4cbee026db54 ("bpf: return VMA snapshot from task_vma iterator") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: fix mm lifecycle in open-coded task_vma iteratorPuranjay Mohan
[ Upstream commit d8e27d2d22b6e2df3a0125b8c08e9aace38c954c ] The open-coded task_vma iterator reads task->mm locklessly and acquires mmap_read_trylock() but never calls mmget(). If the task exits concurrently, the mm_struct can be freed as it is not SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, resulting in a use-after-free. Safely read task->mm with a trylock on alloc_lock and acquire an mm reference. Drop the reference via bpf_iter_mmput_async() in _destroy() and error paths. bpf_iter_mmput_async() is a local wrapper around mmput_async() with a fallback to mmput() on !CONFIG_MMU. Reject irqs-disabled contexts (including NMI) up front. Operations used by _next() and _destroy() (mmap_read_unlock, bpf_iter_mmput_async) take spinlocks with IRQs disabled (pool->lock, pi_lock). Running from NMI or from a tracepoint that fires with those locks held could deadlock. A trylock on alloc_lock is used instead of the blocking task_lock() (get_task_mm) to avoid a deadlock when a softirq BPF program iterates a task that already holds its alloc_lock on the same CPU. Fixes: 4ac454682158 ("bpf: Introduce task_vma open-coded iterator kfuncs") Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154539.3832150-2-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix linked reg delta tracking when src_reg == dst_regDaniel Borkmann
[ Upstream commit d7f14173c0d5866c3cae759dee560ad1bed10d2e ] Consider the case of rX += rX where src_reg and dst_reg are pointers to the same bpf_reg_state in adjust_reg_min_max_vals(). The latter first modifies the dst_reg in-place, and later in the delta tracking, the subsequent is_reg_const(src_reg)/reg_const_value(src_reg) reads the post-{add,sub} value instead of the original source. This is problematic since it sets an incorrect delta, which sync_linked_regs() then propagates to linked registers, thus creating a verifier-vs-runtime mismatch. Fix it by just skipping this corner case. Fixes: 98d7ca374ba4 ("bpf: Track delta between "linked" registers.") Reported-by: STAR Labs SG <info@starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407192421.508817-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Support negative offsets, BPF_SUB, and alu32 for linked register trackingPuranjay Mohan
[ Upstream commit 7a433e519364c3c19643e5c857f4fbfaebec441c ] Previously, the verifier only tracked positive constant deltas between linked registers using BPF_ADD. This limitation meant patterns like: r1 = r0; r1 += -4; if r1 s>= 0 goto l0_%=; // r1 >= 0 implies r0 >= 4 // verifier couldn't propagate bounds back to r0 if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=; r0 /= 0; // Verifier thinks this is reachable l0_%=: Similar limitation exists for 32-bit registers. With this change, the verifier can now track negative deltas in reg->off enabling bound propagation for the above pattern. For alu32, we make sure the destination register has the upper 32 bits as 0s before creating the link. BPF_ADD_CONST is split into BPF_ADD_CONST64 and BPF_ADD_CONST32, the latter is used in case of alu32 and sync_linked_regs uses this to zext the result if known_reg has this flag. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260204151741.2678118-2-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: d7f14173c0d5 ("bpf: Fix linked reg delta tracking when src_reg == dst_reg") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Drop task_to_inode and inet_conn_established from lsm sleepable hooksJiayuan Chen
[ Upstream commit beaf0e96b1da74549a6cabd040f9667d83b2e97e ] bpf_lsm_task_to_inode() is called under rcu_read_lock() and bpf_lsm_inet_conn_established() is called from softirq context, so neither hook can be used by sleepable LSM programs. Fixes: 423f16108c9d8 ("bpf: Augment the set of sleepable LSM hooks") Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/3ab69731-24d1-431a-a351-452aafaaf2a5@std.uestc.edu.cn/T/#u Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407122334.344072-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix stale offload->prog pointer after constant blindingMingTao Huang
[ Upstream commit a1aa9ef47c299c5bbc30594d3c2f0589edf908e6 ] When a dev-bound-only BPF program (BPF_F_XDP_DEV_BOUND_ONLY) undergoes JIT compilation with constant blinding enabled (bpf_jit_harden >= 2), bpf_jit_blind_constants() clones the program. The original prog is then freed in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(), which updates aux->prog to point to the surviving clone, but fails to update offload->prog. This leaves offload->prog pointing to the freed original program. When the network namespace is subsequently destroyed, cleanup_net() triggers bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister(), which iterates ondev->progs and calls __bpf_prog_offload_destroy(offload->prog). Accessing the freed prog causes a page fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900085f1038 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:__bpf_prog_offload_destroy+0xc/0x80 Call Trace: __bpf_offload_dev_netdev_unregister+0x257/0x350 bpf_dev_bound_netdev_unregister+0x4a/0x90 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x2a2/0x660 ... cleanup_net+0x21a/0x320 The test sequence that triggers this reliably is: 1. Set net.core.bpf_jit_harden=2 (echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden) 2. Run xdp_metadata selftest, which creates a dev-bound-only XDP program on a veth inside a netns (./test_progs -t xdp_metadata) 3. cleanup_net -> page fault in __bpf_prog_offload_destroy Dev-bound-only programs are unique in that they have an offload structure but go through the normal JIT path instead of bpf_prog_offload_compile(). This means they are subject to constant blinding's prog clone-and-replace, while also having offload->prog that must stay in sync. Fix this by updating offload->prog in bpf_jit_prog_release_other(), alongside the existing aux->prog update. Both are back-pointers to the prog that must be kept in sync when the prog is replaced. Fixes: 2b3486bc2d23 ("bpf: Introduce device-bound XDP programs") Signed-off-by: MingTao Huang <mintaohuang@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_BCF692F45859CCE6C22B7B0B64827947D406@qq.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: fix end-of-list detection in cgroup_storage_get_next_key()Weiming Shi
[ Upstream commit 5828b9e5b272ecff7cf5d345128d3de7324117f7 ] list_next_entry() never returns NULL -- when the current element is the last entry it wraps to the list head via container_of(). The subsequent NULL check is therefore dead code and get_next_key() never returns -ENOENT for the last element, instead reading storage->key from a bogus pointer that aliases internal map fields and copying the result to userspace. Replace it with list_entry_is_head() so the function correctly returns -ENOENT when there are no more entries. Fixes: de9cbbaadba5 ("bpf: introduce cgroup storage maps") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sun Jian <sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260403132951.43533-2-bestswngs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix abuse of kprobe_write_ctx via freplaceLeon Hwang
[ Upstream commit 611fe4b79af72d00d80f2223354284447daafae9 ] uprobe programs are allowed to modify struct pt_regs. Since the actual program type of uprobe is KPROBE, it can be abused to modify struct pt_regs via kprobe+freplace when the kprobe attaches to kernel functions. For example, SEC("?kprobe") int kprobe(struct pt_regs *regs) { return 0; } SEC("?freplace") int freplace_kprobe(struct pt_regs *regs) { regs->di = 0; return 0; } freplace_kprobe prog will attach to kprobe prog. kprobe prog will attach to a kernel function. Without this patch, when the kernel function runs, its first arg will always be set as 0 via the freplace_kprobe prog. To fix the abuse of kprobe_write_ctx=true via kprobe+freplace, disallow attaching freplace programs on kprobe programs with different kprobe_write_ctx values. Fixes: 7384893d970e ("bpf: Allow uprobe program to change context registers") Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260331145353.87606-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix variable length stack write over spilled pointersAlexei Starovoitov
[ Upstream commit 4639eb9e30ab10c7935c7c19e872facf9a94713f ] Scrub slots if variable-offset stack write goes over spilled pointers. Otherwise is_spilled_reg() may == true && spilled_ptr.type == NOT_INIT and valid program is rejected by check_stack_read_fixed_off() with obscure "invalid size of register fill" message. Fixes: 01f810ace9ed ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access") Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260324215938.81733-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Use RCU-safe iteration in dev_map_redirect_multi() SKB pathDavid Carlier
[ Upstream commit 8ed82f807bb09d2c8455aaa665f2c6cb17bc6a19 ] The DEVMAP_HASH branch in dev_map_redirect_multi() uses hlist_for_each_entry_safe() to iterate hash buckets, but this function runs under RCU protection (called from xdp_do_generic_redirect_map() in softirq context). Concurrent writers (__dev_map_hash_update_elem, dev_map_hash_delete_elem) modify the list using RCU primitives (hlist_add_head_rcu, hlist_del_rcu). hlist_for_each_entry_safe() performs plain pointer dereferences without rcu_dereference(), missing the acquire barrier needed to pair with writers' rcu_assign_pointer(). On weakly-ordered architectures (ARM64, POWER), a reader can observe a partially-constructed node. It also defeats CONFIG_PROVE_RCU lockdep validation and KCSAN data-race detection. Replace with hlist_for_each_entry_rcu() using rcu_read_lock_bh_held() as the lockdep condition, consistent with the rcu_dereference_check() used in the DEVMAP (non-hash) branch of the same functions. Also fix the same incorrect lockdep_is_held(&dtab->index_lock) condition in dev_map_enqueue_multi(), where the lock is not held either. Fixes: e624d4ed4aa8 ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support") Signed-off-by: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260320072645.16731-1-devnexen@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursbpf: Fix refcount check in check_struct_ops_btf_id()Keisuke Nishimura
[ Upstream commit 25e3e1f1096089a64901ae1faa7b7b13446653db ] The current implementation only checks whether the first argument is refcounted. Fix this by iterating over all arguments. Signed-off-by: Keisuke Nishimura <keisuke.nishimura@inria.fr> Fixes: 38f1e66abd184 ("bpf: Do not allow tail call in strcut_ops program with __ref argument") Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com> Acked-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260320130219.63711-1-keisuke.nishimura@inria.fr Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursmodule: Fix freeing of charp module parameters when CONFIG_SYSFS=nPetr Pavlu
[ Upstream commit deffe1edba626d474fef38007c03646ca5876a0e ] When setting a charp module parameter, the param_set_charp() function allocates memory to store a copy of the input value. Later, when the module is potentially unloaded, the destroy_params() function is called to free this allocated memory. However, destroy_params() is available only when CONFIG_SYSFS=y, otherwise only a dummy variant is present. In the unlikely case that the kernel is configured with CONFIG_MODULES=y and CONFIG_SYSFS=n, this results in a memory leak of charp values when a module is unloaded. Fix this issue by making destroy_params() always available when CONFIG_MODULES=y. Rename the function to module_destroy_params() to clarify that it is intended for use by the module loader. Fixes: e180a6b7759a ("param: fix charp parameters set via sysfs") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hoursparams: Replace __modinit with __init_or_modulePetr Pavlu
[ Upstream commit 3cb0c3bdea5388519bc1bf575dca6421b133302b ] Remove the custom __modinit macro from kernel/params.c and instead use the common __init_or_module macro from include/linux/module.h. Both provide the same functionality. Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Stable-dep-of: deffe1edba62 ("module: Fix freeing of charp module parameters when CONFIG_SYSFS=n") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
17 hourssched/rt: Skip group schedulable check with rt_group_sched=0Michal Koutný
[ Upstream commit 8b016dcec9365675be81d26be88f2c09cf983bd4 ] The warning from the commit 87f1fb77d87a6 ("sched: Add RT_GROUP WARN checks for non-root task_groups") is wrong -- it assumes that only task_groups with rt_rq are traversed, however, the schedulability check would iterate all task_groups even when rt_group_sched=0 is disabled at boot time but some non-root task_groups exist. The schedulability check is supposed to validate: a) that children don't overcommit its parent, b) no RT task group overcommits global RT limit. but with rt_group_sched=0 there is no (non-trivial) hierarchy of RT groups, therefore skip the validation altogether. Otherwise, writes to the global sched_rt_runtime_us knob will be rejected with incorrect validation error. This fix is immaterial with CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED=n. Fixes: 87f1fb77d87a6 ("sched: Add RT_GROUP WARN checks for non-root task_groups") Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323-sched-rert_groups-v3-1-1e7d5ed6b249@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>