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This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.
More information about the patch can be found on:
https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
From: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at>
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=149390087310405&w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
To: <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Cc: <clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at>
Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de>
After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).
With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.
If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!
Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)
[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
(cherry picked from Change-Id: I0eb000c33290af01fc4454ca0c701d00f1d30b1d)
Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
arch/x86/mm/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
init/main.c
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
[bwh: Folded in the follow-up patches from Hugh:
- kaiser: merged update
- kaiser: do not set _PAGE_NX on pgd_none
- kaiser: stack map PAGE_SIZE at THREAD_SIZE-PAGE_SIZE
- kaiser: fix build and FIXME in alloc_ldt_struct()
- kaiser: KAISER depends on SMP
- kaiser: fix regs to do_nmi() ifndef CONFIG_KAISER
- kaiser: fix perf crashes
- kaiser: ENOMEM if kaiser_pagetable_walk() NULL
- kaiser: tidied up asm/kaiser.h somewhat
- kaiser: tidied up kaiser_add/remove_mapping slightly
- kaiser: kaiser_remove_mapping() move along the pgd
- kaiser: align addition to x86/mm/Makefile
- kaiser: cleanups while trying for gold link
- kaiser: name that 0x1000 KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET
- kaiser: delete KAISER_REAL_SWITCH option
- kaiser: vmstat show NR_KAISERTABLE as nr_overhead
- kaiser: enhanced by kernel and user PCIDs
- kaiser: load_new_mm_cr3() let SWITCH_USER_CR3 flush user
- kaiser: PCID 0 for kernel and 128 for user
- kaiser: x86_cr3_pcid_noflush and x86_cr3_pcid_user
- kaiser: paranoid_entry pass cr3 need to paranoid_exit
- kaiser: _pgd_alloc() without __GFP_REPEAT to avoid stalls
- kaiser: fix unlikely error in alloc_ldt_struct()
- kaiser: drop is_atomic arg to kaiser_pagetable_walk()
Backported to 3.16:
- Add missing #include in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
- Use variable PEBS buffer size since we have "perf/x86/intel: Use PAGE_SIZE
for PEBS buffer size on Core2"
- Renumber X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE to avoid collision
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 252d2a4117bc181b287eeddf848863788da733ae upstream.
idle_task_exit() can be called with IRQs on x86 on and therefore
should use switch_mm(), not switch_mm_irqs_off().
This doesn't seem to cause any problems right now, but it will
confuse my upcoming TLB flush changes. Nonetheless, I think it
should be backported because it's trivial. There won't be any
meaningful performance impact because idle_task_exit() is only
used when offlining a CPU.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f98db6013c55 ("sched/core: Add switch_mm_irqs_off() and use it in the scheduler")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ca3d1a9fa93a0b49f5a8ff729eda3640fb6abdf9.1497034141.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit f98db6013c557c216da5038d9c52045be55cd039 upstream.
By default, this is the same thing as switch_mm().
x86 will override it as an optimization.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/df401df47bdd6be3e389c6f1e3f5310d70e81b2c.1461688545.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit c70d9d809fdeecedb96972457ee45c49a232d97f upstream.
When I introduced ptracer_cred I failed to consider the weirdness of
fork where the task_struct copies the old value by default. This
winds up leaving ptracer_cred set even when a process forks and
the child process does not wind up being ptraced.
Because ptracer_cred is not set on non-ptraced processes whose
parents were ptraced this has broken the ability of the enlightenment
window manager to start setuid children.
Fix this by properly initializing ptracer_cred in ptrace_init_task
This must be done with a little bit of care to preserve the current value
of ptracer_cred when ptrace carries through fork. Re-reading the
ptracer_cred from the ptracing process at this point is inconsistent
with how PT_PTRACE_CAP has been maintained all of these years.
Tested-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 84d77d3f06e7e8dea057d10e8ec77ad71f721be3 upstream.
It is the reasonable expectation that if an executable file is not
readable there will be no way for a user without special privileges to
read the file. This is enforced in ptrace_attach but if ptrace
is already attached before exec there is no enforcement for read-only
executables.
As the only way to read such an mm is through access_process_vm
spin a variant called ptrace_access_vm that will fail if the
target process is not being ptraced by the current process, or
the current process did not have sufficient privileges when ptracing
began to read the target processes mm.
In the ptrace implementations replace access_process_vm by
ptrace_access_vm. There remain several ptrace sites that still use
access_process_vm as they are reading the target executables
instructions (for kernel consumption) or register stacks. As such it
does not appear necessary to add a permission check to those calls.
This bug has always existed in Linux.
Fixes: v1.0
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Pass around only a write flag, not gup_flags
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit f84df2a6f268de584a201e8911384a2d244876e3 upstream.
When the user namespace support was merged the need to prevent
ptrace from revealing the contents of an unreadable executable
was overlooked.
Correct this oversight by ensuring that the executed file
or files are in mm->user_ns, by adjusting mm->user_ns.
Use the new function privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid to see if
the executable is a member of the user namespace, and as such
if having CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the user namespace should allow
tracing the executable. If not update mm->user_ns to
the parent user namespace until an appropriate parent is found.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Fixes: 9e4a36ece652 ("userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Add #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 64b875f7ac8a5d60a4e191479299e931ee949b67 upstream.
When the flag PT_PTRACE_CAP was added the PTRACE_TRACEME path was
overlooked. This can result in incorrect behavior when an application
like strace traces an exec of a setuid executable.
Further PT_PTRACE_CAP does not have enough information for making good
security decisions as it does not report which user namespace the
capability is in. This has already allowed one mistake through
insufficient granulariy.
I found this issue when I was testing another corner case of exec and
discovered that I could not get strace to set PT_PTRACE_CAP even when
running strace as root with a full set of caps.
This change fixes the above issue with strace allowing stracing as
root a setuid executable without disabling setuid. More fundamentaly
this change allows what is allowable at all times, by using the correct
information in it's decision.
Fixes: 4214e42f96d4 ("v2.4.9.11 -> v2.4.9.12")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit bfedb589252c01fa505ac9f6f2a3d5d68d707ef4 upstream.
During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so
it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in
to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when
CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns. The intent of
PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes
the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for
it not to be an issue. task->cred->user_ns is always the same
as or descendent of mm->user_ns. Which guarantees that having
CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks
credentials.
To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered
when a task has no mm. As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes
regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things
such as /proc/<pid>/stat
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 1333ab03150478df8d6f5673a91df1e50dc6ab97 upstream.
This test-case (simplified version of generated by syzkaller)
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
void test(void)
{
for (;;) {
if (fork()) {
wait(NULL);
continue;
}
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, getppid(), 0, 0);
ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, getppid(), 0, 0);
_exit(0);
}
}
int main(void)
{
int np;
for (np = 0; np < 8; ++np)
if (!fork())
test();
while (wait(NULL) > 0)
;
return 0;
}
triggers the 2nd WARN_ON_ONCE(!signr) warning in do_jobctl_trap(). The
problem is that __ptrace_unlink() clears task->jobctl under siglock but
task->ptrace is cleared without this lock held; this fools the "else"
branch which assumes that !PT_SEIZED means PT_PTRACED.
Note also that most of other PTRACE_SEIZE checks can race with detach
from the exiting tracer too. Say, the callers of ptrace_trap_notify()
assume that SEIZED can't go away after it was checked.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit f32d782e31bf079f600dcec126ed117b0577e85c upstream.
The group mask is always used in intersection with the group CPUs. So,
when building the group mask, we don't have to care about CPUs that are
not part of the group.
Signed-off-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: lwang@redhat.com
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492717903-5195-2-git-send-email-lvenanci@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Update another reference to 'span' introduced by an earlier backport of
sched/topology changes
- Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 91eaed0d61319f58a9f8e43d41a8cbb069b4f73d upstream.
Now that the first group will always be the previous domain of this
@cpu this can be simplified.
In fact, writing the code now removed should've been a big clue I was
doing it wrong :/
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit af85596c74de2fd9abb87501ae280038ac28a3f4 upstream.
Its an obsolete debug mechanism and future code wants to rely on
properties this undermines.
Namely, it would be good to assume that SD_OVERLAP domains have
children, but if we build the entire hierarchy with SD_OVERLAP this is
obviously false.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit cef572ad9bd7f85035ba8272e5352040e8be0152 upstream.
When queue_work() is used in irq (not in task context), there is
a potential case that trigger NULL pointer dereference.
----------------------------------------------------------------
worker_thread()
|-spin_lock_irq()
|-process_one_work()
|-worker->current_pwq = pwq
|-spin_unlock_irq()
|-worker->current_func(work)
|-spin_lock_irq()
|-worker->current_pwq = NULL
|-spin_unlock_irq()
//interrupt here
|-irq_handler
|-__queue_work()
//assuming that the wq is draining
|-is_chained_work(wq)
|-current_wq_worker()
//Here, 'current' is the interrupted worker!
|-current->current_pwq is NULL here!
|-schedule()
----------------------------------------------------------------
Avoid it by checking for task context in current_wq_worker(), and
if not in task context, we shouldn't use the 'current' to check the
condition.
Reported-by: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Fixes: 8d03ecfe4718 ("workqueue: reimplement is_chained_work() using current_wq_worker()")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 692b48258dda7c302e777d7d5f4217244478f1f6 upstream.
Josef reported a HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected by
lockdep:
[ 1270.472259] WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[ 1270.472783] 4.14.0-rc1-xfstests-12888-g76833e8 #110 Not tainted
[ 1270.473240] -----------------------------------------------------
[ 1270.473710] kworker/u5:2/5157 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
[ 1270.474239] (&(&lock->wait_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8da253d2>] __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xa2/0x280
[ 1270.474994]
[ 1270.474994] and this task is already holding:
[ 1270.475440] (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at: [<ffffffff8d2992f6>] worker_thread+0x366/0x3c0
[ 1270.476046] which would create a new lock dependency:
[ 1270.476436] (&pool->lock/1){-.-.} -> (&(&lock->wait_lock)->rlock){+.+.}
[ 1270.476949]
[ 1270.476949] but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock:
[ 1270.477553] (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}
...
[ 1270.488900] to a HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
[ 1270.489327] (&(&lock->wait_lock)->rlock){+.+.}
...
[ 1270.494735] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1270.494735]
[ 1270.495250] CPU0 CPU1
[ 1270.495600] ---- ----
[ 1270.495947] lock(&(&lock->wait_lock)->rlock);
[ 1270.496295] local_irq_disable();
[ 1270.496753] lock(&pool->lock/1);
[ 1270.497205] lock(&(&lock->wait_lock)->rlock);
[ 1270.497744] <Interrupt>
[ 1270.497948] lock(&pool->lock/1);
, which will cause a irq inversion deadlock if the above lock scenario
happens.
The root cause of this safe -> unsafe lock order is the
mutex_unlock(pool->manager_arb) in manage_workers() with pool->lock
held.
Unlocking mutex while holding an irq spinlock was never safe and this
problem has been around forever but it never got noticed because the
only time the mutex is usually trylocked while holding irqlock making
actual failures very unlikely and lockdep annotation missed the
condition until the recent b9c16a0e1f73 ("locking/mutex: Fix
lockdep_assert_held() fail").
Using mutex for pool->manager_arb has always been a bit of stretch.
It primarily is an mechanism to arbitrate managership between workers
which can easily be done with a pool flag. The only reason it became
a mutex is that pool destruction path wants to exclude parallel
managing operations.
This patch replaces the mutex with a new pool flag POOL_MANAGER_ACTIVE
and make the destruction path wait for the current manager on a wait
queue.
v2: Drop unnecessary flag clearing before pool destruction as
suggested by Boqun.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 630cc2b30a42c70628368a412beb4a5e5dd71abe upstream.
This parameter is named kp, so the documentation should use that.
Fixes: 9b473de87209 ("param: Fix duplicate module prefixes")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170919142656.64aea59e@endymion
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 5ccba44ba118a5000cccc50076b0344632459779 upstream.
System will hang if user set sysctl_sched_time_avg to 0:
[root@XXX ~]# sysctl kernel.sched_time_avg_ms=0
Stack traceback for pid 0
0xffff883f6406c600 0 0 1 3 R 0xffff883f6406cf50 *swapper/3
ffff883f7ccc3ae8 0000000000000018 ffffffff810c4dd0 0000000000000000
0000000000017800 ffff883f7ccc3d78 0000000000000003 ffff883f7ccc3bf8
ffffffff810c4fc9 ffff883f7ccc3c08 00000000810c5043 ffff883f7ccc3c08
Call Trace:
<IRQ> [<ffffffff810c4dd0>] ? update_group_capacity+0x110/0x200
[<ffffffff810c4fc9>] ? update_sd_lb_stats+0x109/0x600
[<ffffffff810c5507>] ? find_busiest_group+0x47/0x530
[<ffffffff810c5b84>] ? load_balance+0x194/0x900
[<ffffffff810ad5ca>] ? update_rq_clock.part.83+0x1a/0xe0
[<ffffffff810c6d42>] ? rebalance_domains+0x152/0x290
[<ffffffff810c6f5c>] ? run_rebalance_domains+0xdc/0x1d0
[<ffffffff8108a75b>] ? __do_softirq+0xfb/0x320
[<ffffffff8108ac85>] ? irq_exit+0x125/0x130
[<ffffffff810b3a17>] ? scheduler_ipi+0x97/0x160
[<ffffffff81052709>] ? smp_reschedule_interrupt+0x29/0x30
[<ffffffff8173a1be>] ? reschedule_interrupt+0x6e/0x80
<EOI> [<ffffffff815bc83c>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xcc/0x230
[<ffffffff815bc80c>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x9c/0x230
[<ffffffff815bc9d7>] ? cpuidle_enter+0x17/0x20
[<ffffffff810cd6dc>] ? cpu_startup_entry+0x38c/0x420
[<ffffffff81053373>] ? start_secondary+0x173/0x1e0
Because divide-by-zero error happens in function:
update_group_capacity()
update_cpu_capacity()
scale_rt_capacity()
{
...
total = sched_avg_period() + delta;
used = div_u64(avg, total);
...
}
To fix this issue, check user input value of sysctl_sched_time_avg, keep
it unchanged when hitting invalid input, and set the minimum limit of
sysctl_sched_time_avg to 1 ms.
Reported-by: James Puthukattukaran <james.puthukattukaran@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <ethan.zhao@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: efault@gmx.de
Cc: ethan.kernel@gmail.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: mcgrof@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1504504774-18253-1-git-send-email-ethan.zhao@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 75df6e688ccd517e339a7c422ef7ad73045b18a2 upstream.
When reading data from trace_pipe, tracing_wait_pipe() performs a
check to see if tracing has been turned off after some data was read.
Currently, this check always looks at global trace state, but it
should be checking the trace instance where trace_pipe is located at.
Because of this bug, cat instances/i1/trace_pipe in the following
script will immediately exit instead of waiting for data:
cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
echo 0 > tracing_on
mkdir -p instances/i1
echo 1 > instances/i1/tracing_on
echo 1 > instances/i1/events/sched/sched_process_exec/enable
cat instances/i1/trace_pipe
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170917102348.1615-1-tahsin@google.com
Fixes: 10246fa35d4f ("tracing: give easy way to clear trace buffer")
Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 8dd33bcb7050dd6f8c1432732f930932c9d3a33e upstream.
One convenient way to erase trace is "echo > trace". However, this
is currently broken if the current tracer is irqsoff tracer. This
is because irqsoff tracer use max_buffer as the default trace
buffer.
Set the max_buffer as the one to be cleared when it's the trace
buffer currently in use.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1505754215-29411-1-git-send-email-byan@nvidia.com
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>
Fixes: 4acd4d00f ("tracing: give easy way to clear trace buffer")
Signed-off-by: Bo Yan <byan@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 12ac1d0f6c3e95732d144ffa65c8b20fbd9aa462 upstream.
for_each_active_irq() iterates the sparse irq allocation bitmap. The caller
must hold sparse_irq_lock. Several code pathes expect that an active bit in
the sparse bitmap also has a valid interrupt descriptor.
Unfortunately that's not true. The (de)allocation is a two step process,
which holds the sparse_irq_lock only across the queue/remove from the radix
tree and the set/clear in the allocation bitmap.
If a iteration locks sparse_irq_lock between the two steps, then it might
see an active bit but the corresponding irq descriptor is NULL. If that is
dereferenced unconditionally, then the kernel oopses. Of course, all
iterator sites could be audited and fixed, but....
There is no reason why the sparse_irq_lock needs to be dropped between the
two steps, in fact the code becomes simpler when the mutex is held across
both and the semantics become more straight forward, so future problems of
missing NULL pointer checks in the iteration are avoided and all existing
sites are fixed in one go.
Expand the lock held sections so both operations are covered and the bitmap
and the radixtree are in sync.
Fixes: a05a900a51c7 ("genirq: Make sparse_lock a mutex")
Reported-and-tested-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 170b3b1050e28d1ba0700e262f0899ffa4fccc52 upstream.
Currently trace_clock timestamps are applied to both regular and max
buffers only for global trace. For instance trace, trace_clock
timestamps are applied only to regular buffer. But, regular and max
buffers can be swapped, for example, following a snapshot. So, for
instance trace, bad timestamps can be seen following a snapshot.
Let's apply trace_clock timestamps to instance max buffer as well.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ebdb168d0be042dcdf51f81e696b17fabe3609c1.1504642143.git.tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com
Fixes: 277ba0446 ("tracing: Add interface to allow multiple trace buffers")
Signed-off-by: Baohong Liu <baohong.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 46320a6acc4fb58f04bcf78c4c942cc43b20f986 upstream.
In the second iteration of trace_selftest_ops(), the error goto label is
wrong in the case where trace_selftest_test_global_cnt is off. In the
case of error, it leaks the dynamic ops that was allocated.
Fixes: 95950c2e ("ftrace: Add self-tests for multiple function trace users")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
is freed
commit 2b1be689f3aadcfe0a768314c80e43483c784659 upstream.
Commit 4c30c6f566c0 ("kernel/printk: do not turn off bootconsole in
printk_late_init() if keep_bootcon") added a check on keep_bootcon to
ensure that boot consoles were kept around until the real console is
registered.
This can lead to problems if the boot console data and code are in the
init section, since it can be freed before the boot console is
unregistered.
Commit 81cc26f2bd11 ("printk: only unregister boot consoles when
necessary") fixed this a better way. It allowed to keep boot consoles
that did not use init data. Unfortunately it did not remove the check
of keep_bootcon.
This can lead to crashes and weird panics when the bootconsole is
accessed after free, especially if page poisoning is in use and the
code / data have been overwritten with a poison value.
To prevent this, always free the boot console if it is within the init
section. In addition, print a warning about that the console is removed
prematurely.
Finally there is a new comment how to avoid the warning. It replaced
an explanation that duplicated a more comprehensive function
description few lines above.
Fixes: 4c30c6f566c0 ("kernel/printk: do not turn off bootconsole in printk_late_init() if keep_bootcon")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500036673-7122-2-git-send-email-pmladek@suse.com
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: "Fabio M. Di Nitto" <fdinitto@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
[pmladek@suse.com: print the warning, code and comments clean up]
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 81cc26f2bd11ba4421a17a2d5cebe4bba206c239 upstream.
Boot consoles are typically replaced by proper consoles during the boot
process. This can be problematic if the boot console data is part of
the init section that is reclaimed late during boot. If the proper
console does not register before this point in time, the boot console
will need to be removed (so that the freed memory is not accessed),
leaving the system without output for some time.
There are various reasons why the proper console may not register early
enough, such as deferred probe or the driver being a loadable module.
If that happens, there is some amount of time where no console messages
are visible to the user, which in turn can mean that they won't see
crashes or other potentially useful information.
To avoid this situation, only remove the boot console when it resides in
the init section. Code exists to replace the boot console by the proper
console when it is registered, keeping a seamless transition between the
boot and proper consoles.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 86038c5ea81b519a8a1fcfcd5e4599aab0cdd119 upstream.
Both Linus (most recent) and Steve (a while ago) reported that perf
related callbacks have massive stack bloat.
The problem is that software events need a pt_regs in order to
properly report the event location and unwind stack. And because we
could not assume one was present we allocated one on stack and filled
it with minimal bits required for operation.
Now, pt_regs is quite large, so this is undesirable. Furthermore it
turns out that most sites actually have a pt_regs pointer available,
making this even more onerous, as the stack space is pointless waste.
This patch addresses the problem by observing that software events
have well defined nesting semantics, therefore we can use static
per-cpu storage instead of on-stack.
Linus made the further observation that all but the scheduler callers
of perf_sw_event() have a pt_regs available, so we change the regular
perf_sw_event() to require a valid pt_regs (where it used to be
optional) and add perf_sw_event_sched() for the scheduler.
We have a scheduler specific call instead of a more generic _noregs()
like construct because we can assume non-recursion from the scheduler
and thereby simplify the code further (_noregs would have to put the
recursion context call inline in order to assertain which __perf_regs
element to use).
One last note on the implementation of perf_trace_buf_prepare(); we
allow .regs = NULL for those cases where we already have a pt_regs
pointer available and do not need another.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vaibhav Nagarnaik <vnagarnaik@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141216115041.GW3337@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 64aee2a965cf2954a038b5522f11d2cd2f0f8f3e upstream.
Regardless of which events form a group, it does not make sense for the
events to target different tasks and/or CPUs, as this leaves the group
inconsistent and impossible to schedule. The core perf code assumes that
these are consistent across (successfully intialised) groups.
Core perf code only verifies this when moving SW events into a HW
context. Thus, we can violate this requirement for pure SW groups and
pure HW groups, unless the relevant PMU driver happens to perform this
verification itself. These mismatched groups subsequently wreak havoc
elsewhere.
For example, we handle watchpoints as SW events, and reserve watchpoint
HW on a per-CPU basis at pmu::event_init() time to ensure that any event
that is initialised is guaranteed to have a slot at pmu::add() time.
However, the core code only checks the group leader's cpu filter (via
event_filter_match()), and can thus install follower events onto CPUs
violating thier (mismatched) CPU filters, potentially installing them
into a CPU without sufficient reserved slots.
This can be triggered with the below test case, resulting in warnings
from arch backends.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, pid_t pid, int cpu,
int group_fd, unsigned long flags)
{
return syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, attr, pid, cpu, group_fd, flags);
}
char watched_char;
struct perf_event_attr wp_attr = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT,
.bp_type = HW_BREAKPOINT_RW,
.bp_addr = (unsigned long)&watched_char,
.bp_len = 1,
.size = sizeof(wp_attr),
};
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int leader, ret;
cpu_set_t cpus;
/*
* Force use of CPU0 to ensure our CPU0-bound events get scheduled.
*/
CPU_ZERO(&cpus);
CPU_SET(0, &cpus);
ret = sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cpus), &cpus);
if (ret) {
printf("Unable to set cpu affinity\n");
return 1;
}
/* open leader event, bound to this task, CPU0 only */
leader = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
if (leader < 0) {
printf("Couldn't open leader: %d\n", leader);
return 1;
}
/*
* Open a follower event that is bound to the same task, but a
* different CPU. This means that the group should never be possible to
* schedule.
*/
ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 1, leader, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
printf("Couldn't open mismatched follower: %d\n", ret);
return 1;
} else {
printf("Opened leader/follower with mismastched CPUs\n");
}
/*
* Open as many independent events as we can, all bound to the same
* task, CPU0 only.
*/
do {
ret = perf_event_open(&wp_attr, 0, 0, -1, 0);
} while (ret >= 0);
/*
* Force enable/disble all events to trigger the erronoeous
* installation of the follower event.
*/
printf("Opened all events. Toggling..\n");
for (;;) {
prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Fix this by validating this requirement regardless of whether we're
moving events.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498142498-15758-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 8b0db1a5bdfcee0dbfa89607672598ae203c9045 upstream.
Performing the following task with kmemleak enabled:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/events/irq/irq_handler_entry/
# echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq >' > trigger
# echo 'enable_event:kmem:kmalloc:3 if irq > 31' > trigger
# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff8800b9290308 (size 32):
comm "bash", pid 1114, jiffies 4294848451 (age 141.139s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81cef5aa>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff81357938>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x158/0x290
[<ffffffff81261c09>] create_filter_start.constprop.28+0x99/0x940
[<ffffffff812639c9>] create_filter+0xa9/0x160
[<ffffffff81263bdc>] create_event_filter+0xc/0x10
[<ffffffff812655e5>] set_trigger_filter+0xe5/0x210
[<ffffffff812660c4>] event_enable_trigger_func+0x324/0x490
[<ffffffff812652e2>] event_trigger_write+0x1a2/0x260
[<ffffffff8138cf87>] __vfs_write+0xd7/0x380
[<ffffffff8138f421>] vfs_write+0x101/0x260
[<ffffffff8139187b>] SyS_write+0xab/0x130
[<ffffffff81cfd501>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
The function create_filter() is passed a 'filterp' pointer that gets
allocated, and if "set_str" is true, it is up to the caller to free it, even
on error. The problem is that the pointer is not freed by create_filter()
when set_str is false. This is a bug, and it is not up to the caller to free
the filter on error if it doesn't care about the string.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502705898-27571-2-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com
Fixes: 38b78eb85 ("tracing: Factorize filter creation")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit d76036ab47eafa6ce52b69482e91ca3ba337d6d6 upstream.
audit_remove_watch_rule() drops watch's reference to parent but then
continues to work with it. That is not safe as parent can get freed once
we drop our reference. The following is a trivial reproducer:
mount -o loop image /mnt
touch /mnt/file
auditctl -w /mnt/file -p wax
umount /mnt
auditctl -D
<crash in fsnotify_destroy_mark()>
Grab our own reference in audit_remove_watch_rule() earlier to make sure
mark does not get freed under us.
Reported-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 16af97dc5a8975371a83d9e30a64038b48f40a2d upstream.
Patch series "fixes of TLB batching races", v6.
It turns out that Linux TLB batching mechanism suffers from various
races. Races that are caused due to batching during reclamation were
recently handled by Mel and this patch-set deals with others. The more
fundamental issue is that concurrent updates of the page-tables allow
for TLB flushes to be batched on one core, while another core changes
the page-tables. This other core may assume a PTE change does not
require a flush based on the updated PTE value, while it is unaware that
TLB flushes are still pending.
This behavior affects KSM (which may result in memory corruption) and
MADV_FREE and MADV_DONTNEED (which may result in incorrect behavior). A
proof-of-concept can easily produce the wrong behavior of MADV_DONTNEED.
Memory corruption in KSM is harder to produce in practice, but was
observed by hacking the kernel and adding a delay before flushing and
replacing the KSM page.
Finally, there is also one memory barrier missing, which may affect
architectures with weak memory model.
This patch (of 7):
Setting and clearing mm->tlb_flush_pending can be performed by multiple
threads, since mmap_sem may only be acquired for read in
task_numa_work(). If this happens, tlb_flush_pending might be cleared
while one of the threads still changes PTEs and batches TLB flushes.
This can lead to the same race between migration and
change_protection_range() that led to the introduction of
tlb_flush_pending. The result of this race was data corruption, which
means that this patch also addresses a theoretically possible data
corruption.
An actual data corruption was not observed, yet the race was was
confirmed by adding assertion to check tlb_flush_pending is not set by
two threads, adding artificial latency in change_protection_range() and
using sysctl to reduce kernel.numa_balancing_scan_delay_ms.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170802000818.4760-2-namit@vmware.com
Fixes: 20841405940e ("mm: fix TLB flush race between migration, and
change_protection_range")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop change to dump_mm()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 0a94efb5acbb6980d7c9ab604372d93cd507e4d8 upstream.
5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be
ordered") automatically enabled ordered attribute for unbound
workqueues w/ max_active == 1. Because ordered workqueues reject
max_active and some attribute changes, this implicit ordered mode
broke cases where the user creates an unbound workqueue w/ max_active
== 1 and later explicitly changes the related attributes.
This patch distinguishes explicit and implicit ordered setting and
overrides from attribute changes if implict.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5c0338c68706 ("workqueue: restore WQ_UNBOUND/max_active==1 to be ordered")
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
|
|
commit 2aeb1883547626d82c597cce2c99f0b9c62e2425 upstream.
We're missing ctx lock when iterating children siblings
within the perf_read path for group reading. Following
race and crash can happen:
User space doing read syscall on event group leader:
T1:
perf_read
lock event->ctx->mutex
perf_read_group
lock leader->child_mutex
__perf_read_group_add(child)
list_for_each_entry(sub, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry)
----> sub might be invalid at this point, because it could
get removed via perf_event_exit_task_context in T2
Child exiting and cleaning up its events:
T2:
perf_event_exit_task_context
lock ctx->mutex
list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &child_ctx->event_list,...
perf_event_exit_event(child)
lock ctx->lock
perf_group_detach(child)
unlock ctx->lock
----> child is removed from sibling_list without any sync
with T1 path above
...
free_event(child)
Before the child is removed from the leader's child_list,
(and thus is omitted from perf_read_group processing), we
need to ensure that perf_read_group touches child's
siblings under its ctx->lock.
Peter further notes:
| One additional note; this bug got exposed by commit:
|
| ba5213ae6b88 ("perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP")
|
| which made it possible to actually trigger this code-path.
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: ba5213ae6b88 ("perf/core: Correct event creation with PERF_FORMAT_GROUP")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170720141455.2106-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit fa8c269353d560b7c28119ad7617029f92e40b15 upstream.
In order to enable the use of perf_event_read(.group = true), we need
to invert the sibling-child loop nesting of perf_read_group().
Currently we iterate the child list for each sibling, this precludes
using group reads. Flip things around so we iterate each group for
each child.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
[ Made the patch compile and things. ]
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1441336073-22750-7-git-send-email-sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as a dependency of commit 2aeb18835476 ("perf/core: Fix
locking for children siblings group read"):
- Keep the function name perf_event_read_group()
- Keep using perf_event_read_value()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit db9108e054700c96322b0f0028546aa4e643cf0b upstream.
Hit the kmemleak when executing instance_rmdir, it forgot releasing
mem of tracing_cpumask. With this fix, the warn does not appear any
more.
unreferenced object 0xffff93a8dfaa7c18 (size 8):
comm "mkdir", pid 1436, jiffies 4294763622 (age 9134.308s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ........
backtrace:
[<ffffffff88b6567a>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
[<ffffffff8861ea41>] __kmalloc_node+0xf1/0x280
[<ffffffff88b505d3>] alloc_cpumask_var_node+0x23/0x30
[<ffffffff88b5060e>] alloc_cpumask_var+0xe/0x10
[<ffffffff88571ab0>] instance_mkdir+0x90/0x240
[<ffffffff886e5100>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x40/0x70
[<ffffffff886565c9>] vfs_mkdir+0x109/0x1b0
[<ffffffff8865b1d0>] SyS_mkdir+0xd0/0x100
[<ffffffff88403857>] do_syscall_64+0x67/0x150
[<ffffffff88b710e7>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1500546969-12594-1-git-send-email-chuhu@redhat.com
Fixes: ccfe9e42e451 ("tracing: Make tracing_cpumask available for all instances")
Signed-off-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 5c0338c68706be53b3dc472e4308961c36e4ece1 upstream.
The combination of WQ_UNBOUND and max_active == 1 used to imply
ordered execution. After NUMA affinity 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue:
implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues"), this is no longer
true due to per-node worker pools.
While the right way to create an ordered workqueue is
alloc_ordered_workqueue(), the documentation has been misleading for a
long time and people do use WQ_UNBOUND and max_active == 1 for ordered
workqueues which can lead to subtle bugs which are very difficult to
trigger.
It's unlikely that we'd see noticeable performance impact by enforcing
ordering on WQ_UNBOUND / max_active == 1 workqueues. Let's
automatically set __WQ_ORDERED for those workqueues.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Alexei Potashnik <alexei@purestorage.com>
Fixes: 4c16bd327c74 ("workqueue: implement NUMA affinity for unbound workqueues")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 2ad654bc5e2b211e92f66da1d819e47d79a866f0 upstream.
When we change cpuset.memory_spread_{page,slab}, cpuset will flip
PF_SPREAD_{PAGE,SLAB} bit of tsk->flags for each task in that cpuset.
This should be done using atomic bitops, but currently we don't,
which is broken.
Tetsuo reported a hard-to-reproduce kernel crash on RHEL6, which happened
when one thread tried to clear PF_USED_MATH while at the same time another
thread tried to flip PF_SPREAD_PAGE/PF_SPREAD_SLAB. They both operate on
the same task.
Here's the full report:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/19/230
To fix this, we make PF_SPREAD_PAGE and PF_SPREAD_SLAB atomic flags.
v4:
- updated mm/slab.c. (Fengguang Wu)
- updated Documentation.
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 950592f7b991 ("cpusets: update tasks' page/slab spread flags in time")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 1d4457f99928a968767f6405b4a1f50845aa15fd upstream.
Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit ba5213ae6b88fb170c4771fef6553f759c7d8cdd upstream.
Andi was asking about PERF_FORMAT_GROUP vs inherited events, which led
to the discovery of a bug from commit:
3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")
- PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP = 1U << 4,
+ PERF_SAMPLE_READ = 1U << 4,
- if (attr->inherit && (attr->sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_GROUP))
+ if (attr->inherit && (attr->read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP))
is a clear fail :/
While this changes user visible behaviour; it was previously possible
to create an inherited event with PERF_SAMPLE_READ; this is deemed
acceptible because its results were always incorrect.
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
Fixes: 3dab77fb1bf8 ("perf: Rework/fix the whole read vs group stuff")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530094512.dy2nljns2uq7qa3j@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 1676330ecfa840113a37b25a49afda068380d19c upstream.
When building the overlapping groups we need to attach a consistent
sched_group_capacity structure. That is, all 'identical' sched_group's
should have the _same_ sched_group_capacity.
This can (once again) be demonstrated with a topology like:
node 0 1 2 3
0: 10 20 30 20
1: 20 10 20 30
2: 30 20 10 20
3: 20 30 20 10
But we need at least 2 CPUs per node for this to show up, after all,
if there is only one CPU per node, our CPU @i is per definition a
unique CPU that reaches this domain (aka balance-cpu).
Given the above NUMA topo and 2 CPUs per node:
[] CPU0 attaching sched-domain(s):
[] domain-0: span=0,4 level=DIE
[] groups: 0:{ span=0 }, 4:{ span=4 }
[] domain-1: span=0-1,3-5,7 level=NUMA
[] groups: 0:{ span=0,4 mask=0,4 cap=2048 }, 1:{ span=1,5 mask=1,5 cap=2048 }, 3:{ span=3,7 mask=3,7 cap=2048 }
[] domain-2: span=0-7 level=NUMA
[] groups: 0:{ span=0-1,3-5,7 mask=0,4 cap=6144 }, 2:{ span=1-3,5-7 mask=2,6 cap=6144 }
[] CPU1 attaching sched-domain(s):
[] domain-0: span=1,5 level=DIE
[] groups: 1:{ span=1 }, 5:{ span=5 }
[] domain-1: span=0-2,4-6 level=NUMA
[] groups: 1:{ span=1,5 mask=1,5 cap=2048 }, 2:{ span=2,6 mask=2,6 cap=2048 }, 4:{ span=0,4 mask=0,4 cap=2048 }
[] domain-2: span=0-7 level=NUMA
[] groups: 1:{ span=0-2,4-6 mask=1,5 cap=6144 }, 3:{ span=0,2-4,6-7 mask=3,7 cap=6144 }
Observe how CPU0-domain1-group0 and CPU1-domain1-group4 are the
'same' but have a different id (0 vs 4).
To fix this, use the group balance CPU to select the SGC. This means
we have to compute the full mask for each CPU and require a second
temporary mask to store the group mask in (it otherwise lives in the
SGC).
The fixed topology looks like:
[] CPU0 attaching sched-domain(s):
[] domain-0: span=0,4 level=DIE
[] groups: 0:{ span=0 }, 4:{ span=4 }
[] domain-1: span=0-1,3-5,7 level=NUMA
[] groups: 0:{ span=0,4 mask=0,4 cap=2048 }, 1:{ span=1,5 mask=1,5 cap=2048 }, 3:{ span=3,7 mask=3,7 cap=2048 }
[] domain-2: span=0-7 level=NUMA
[] groups: 0:{ span=0-1,3-5,7 mask=0,4 cap=6144 }, 2:{ span=1-3,5-7 mask=2,6 cap=6144 }
[] CPU1 attaching sched-domain(s):
[] domain-0: span=1,5 level=DIE
[] groups: 1:{ span=1 }, 5:{ span=5 }
[] domain-1: span=0-2,4-6 level=NUMA
[] groups: 1:{ span=1,5 mask=1,5 cap=2048 }, 2:{ span=2,6 mask=2,6 cap=2048 }, 0:{ span=0,4 mask=0,4 cap=2048 }
[] domain-2: span=0-7 level=NUMA
[] groups: 1:{ span=0-2,4-6 mask=1,5 cap=6144 }, 3:{ span=0,2-4,6-7 mask=3,7 cap=6144 }
Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3589f6c81e4 ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 73bb059f9b8a00c5e1bf2f7ca83138c05d05e600 upstream.
The point of sched_group_mask is to select those CPUs from
sched_group_cpus that can actually arrive at this balance domain.
The current code gets it wrong, as can be readily demonstrated with a
topology like:
node 0 1 2 3
0: 10 20 30 20
1: 20 10 20 30
2: 30 20 10 20
3: 20 30 20 10
Where (for example) domain 1 on CPU1 ends up with a mask that includes
CPU0:
[] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
[] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
[] groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0
[] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
[] groups: 0-2 (mask: 0-2) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072)
This causes sched_balance_cpu() to compute the wrong CPU and
consequently should_we_balance() will terminate early resulting in
missed load-balance opportunities.
The fixed topology looks like:
[] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
[] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
[] groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0
[] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
[] groups: 0-2 (mask: 1) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072)
(note: this relies on OVERLAP domains to always have children, this is
true because the regular topology domains are still here -- this is
before degenerate trimming)
Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3589f6c81e4 ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use span, not sg_span
- Adjust filename context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 0372dd2736e02672ac6e189c31f7d8c02ad543cd upstream.
When building the overlapping groups, we very obviously should start
with the previous domain of _this_ @cpu, not CPU-0.
This can be readily demonstrated with a topology like:
node 0 1 2 3
0: 10 20 30 20
1: 20 10 20 30
2: 30 20 10 20
3: 20 30 20 10
Where (for example) CPU1 ends up generating the following nonsensical groups:
[] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
[] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
[] groups: 1 2 0
[] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
[] groups: 1-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0-1,3 (cpu_capacity = 3072)
Where the fact that domain 1 doesn't include a group with span 0-2 is
the obvious fail.
With patch this looks like:
[] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
[] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
[] groups: 1 0 2
[] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
[] groups: 0-2 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072)
Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3589f6c81e4 ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 8c0334697dc37eb3d6d7632304d3a3662248daac upstream.
Create functions build_group_from_child_sched_domain() and
init_overlap_sched_group(). No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492091769-19879-2-git-send-email-lvenanci@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Ccode being moved is slightly different
- Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit aaecac4ad46b35ad308245384d019633fb9bc21b upstream.
The child variable in build_overlap_sched_groups() actually refers to the
peer or sibling domain of the given CPU. Rename it to sibling to be consistent
with the naming in build_group_mask().
Signed-off-by: Zhihui Zhang <zzhsuny@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1406942283-18249-1-git-send-email-zzhsuny@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit caaee6234d05a58c5b4d05e7bf766131b810a657 upstream.
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Update mm_access() calls in fs/proc/task_{,no}mmu.c too
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 9e52b32567126fe146f198971364f68d3bc5233f upstream.
Always try to parse an address, since kstrtoul() will safely fail when
given a symbol as input. If that fails (which will be the case for a
symbol), try to parse a symbol instead.
This allows creating a probe such as:
p:probe/vlan_gro_receive 8021q:vlan_gro_receive+0
Which is necessary for this command to work:
perf probe -m 8021q -a vlan_gro_receive
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/fd72d666f45b114e2c5b9cf7e27b91de1ec966f1.1498122881.git.sd@queasysnail.net
Fixes: 413d37d1e ("tracing: Add kprobe-based event tracer")
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: preserve the check that an addresses isn't used for
a kretprobe]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 57db7e4a2d92c2d3dfbca4ef8057849b2682436b upstream.
Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> The CRIU support added a 'feature' which allows a user space task to send
> arbitrary (kernel) signals to itself. The changelog says:
>
> The kernel prevents sending of siginfo with positive si_code, because
> these codes are reserved for kernel. I think we can allow a task to
> send such a siginfo to itself. This operation should not be dangerous.
>
> Quite contrary to that claim, it turns out that it is outright dangerous
> for signals with info->si_code == SI_TIMER. The following code sequence in
> a user space task allows to crash the kernel:
>
> id = timer_create(CLOCK_XXX, ..... signo = SIGX);
> timer_set(id, ....);
> info->si_signo = SIGX;
> info->si_code = SI_TIMER:
> info->_sifields._timer._tid = id;
> info->_sifields._timer._sys_private = 2;
> rt_[tg]sigqueueinfo(..., SIGX, info);
> sigemptyset(&sigset);
> sigaddset(&sigset, SIGX);
> rt_sigtimedwait(sigset, info);
>
> For timers based on CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID, CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID this
> results in a kernel crash because sigwait() dequeues the signal and the
> dequeue code observes:
>
> info->si_code == SI_TIMER && info->_sifields._timer._sys_private != 0
>
> which triggers the following callchain:
>
> do_schedule_next_timer() -> posix_cpu_timer_schedule() -> arm_timer()
>
> arm_timer() executes a list_add() on the timer, which is already armed via
> the timer_set() syscall. That's a double list add which corrupts the posix
> cpu timer list. As a consequence the kernel crashes on the next operation
> touching the posix cpu timer list.
>
> Posix clocks which are internally implemented based on hrtimers are not
> affected by this because hrtimer_start() can handle already armed timers
> nicely, but it's a reliable way to trigger the WARN_ON() in
> hrtimer_forward(), which complains about calling that function on an
> already armed timer.
This problem has existed since the posix timer code was merged into
2.5.63. A few releases earlier in 2.5.60 ptrace gained the ability to
inject not just a signal (which linux has supported since 1.0) but the
full siginfo of a signal.
The core problem is that the code will reschedule in response to
signals getting dequeued not just for signals the timers sent but
for other signals that happen to a si_code of SI_TIMER.
Avoid this confusion by testing to see if the queued signal was
preallocated as all timer signals are preallocated, and so far
only the timer code preallocates signals.
Move the check for if a timer needs to be rescheduled up into
collect_signal where the preallocation check must be performed,
and pass the result back to dequeue_signal where the code reschedules
timers. This makes it clear why the code cares about preallocated
timers.
Reported-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reference: 66dd34ad31e5 ("signal: allow to send any siginfo to itself")
Reference: 1669ce53e2ff ("Add PTRACE_GETSIGINFO and PTRACE_SETSIGINFO")
Fixes: db8b50ba75f2 ("[PATCH] POSIX clocks & timers")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit fa07ab72cbb0d843429e61bf179308aed6cbe0dd upstream.
In case __irq_set_trigger() fails the resources requested via
irq_request_resources() are not released.
Add the missing release call into the error handling path.
Fixes: c1bacbae8192 ("genirq: Provide irq_request/release_resources chip callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/655538f5-cb20-a892-ff15-fbd2dd1fa4ec@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 1123a6041654e8f889014659593bad4168e542c2 upstream.
Linu Cherian reported a WARN in cleanup_srcu_struct() when shutting
down a guest running iperf on a VFIO assigned device. This happens
because irqfd_wakeup() calls srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu) in interrupt
context, while a worker thread does the same inside kvm_set_irq(). If the
interrupt happens while the worker thread is executing __srcu_read_lock(),
updates to the Classic SRCU ->lock_count[] field or the Tree SRCU
->srcu_lock_count[] field can be lost.
The docs say you are not supposed to call srcu_read_lock() and
srcu_read_unlock() from irq context, but KVM interrupt injection happens
from (host) interrupt context and it would be nice if SRCU supported the
use case. KVM is using SRCU here not really for the "sleepable" part,
but rather due to its IPI-free fast detection of grace periods. It is
therefore not desirable to switch back to RCU, which would effectively
revert commit 719d93cd5f5c ("kvm/irqchip: Speed up KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING",
2014-01-16).
However, the docs are overly conservative. You can have an SRCU instance
only has users in irq context, and you can mix process and irq context
as long as process context users disable interrupts. In addition,
__srcu_read_unlock() actually uses this_cpu_dec() on both Tree SRCU and
Classic SRCU. For those two implementations, only srcu_read_lock()
is unsafe.
When Classic SRCU's __srcu_read_unlock() was changed to use this_cpu_dec(),
in commit 5a41344a3d83 ("srcu: Simplify __srcu_read_unlock() via
this_cpu_dec()", 2012-11-29), __srcu_read_lock() did two increments.
Therefore it kept __this_cpu_inc(), with preempt_disable/enable in
the caller. Tree SRCU however only does one increment, so on most
architectures it is more efficient for __srcu_read_lock() to use
this_cpu_inc(), and any performance differences appear to be down in
the noise.
Fixes: 719d93cd5f5c ("kvm/irqchip: Speed up KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING")
Reported-by: Linu Cherian <linuc.decode@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linu Cherian <linuc.decode@gmail.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: __srcu_read_lock() still updates two different
counters. So follow what _this_cpu_generic_to_op() does and use
raw_local_irq_{save,restore}() and raw_cpu_ptr().]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 49f5903b473c5f63f3b57856d1bd4593db0a2eef upstream.
Currently, __srcu_read_lock() cannot be invoked from restricted
environments because it contains calls to preempt_disable() and
preempt_enable(), both of which can invoke lockdep, which is a bad
idea in some restricted execution modes. This commit therefore moves
the preempt_disable() and preempt_enable() from __srcu_read_lock()
to srcu_read_lock(). It also inserts the preempt_disable() and
preempt_enable() around the call to __srcu_read_lock() in do_exit().
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop changes in do_exit()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit ff86bf0c65f14346bf2440534f9ba5ac232c39a0 upstream.
The alarmtimer code has another source of potentially rearming itself too
fast. Interval timers with a very samll interval have a similar CPU hog
effect as the previously fixed overflow issue.
The reason is that alarmtimers do not implement the normal protection
against this kind of problem which the other posix timer use:
timer expires -> queue signal -> deliver signal -> rearm timer
This scheme brings the rearming under scheduler control and prevents
permanently firing timers which hog the CPU.
Bringing this scheme to the alarm timer code is a major overhaul because it
lacks all the necessary mechanisms completely.
So for a quick fix limit the interval to one jiffie. This is not
problematic in practice as alarmtimers are usually backed by an RTC for
suspend which have 1 second resolution. It could be therefor argued that
the resolution of this clock should be set to 1 second in general, but
that's outside the scope of this fix.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530211655.896767100@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Use ktime_to_ns()/ktime_set() as ktime_t is not scalar
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit f4781e76f90df7aec400635d73ea4c35ee1d4765 upstream.
Andrey reported a alartimer related RCU stall while fuzzing the kernel with
syzkaller.
The reason for this is an overflow in ktime_add() which brings the
resulting time into negative space and causes immediate expiry of the
timer. The following rearm with a small interval does not bring the timer
back into positive space due to the same issue.
This results in a permanent firing alarmtimer which hogs the CPU.
Use ktime_add_safe() instead which detects the overflow and clamps the
result to KTIME_SEC_MAX.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530211655.802921648@linutronix.de
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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commit 30e7d894c1478c88d50ce94ddcdbd7f9763d9cdd upstream.
Enabling the tracer selftest triggers occasionally the warning in
text_poke(), which warns when the to be modified page is not marked
reserved.
The reason is that the tracer selftest installs kprobes on functions marked
__init for testing. These probes are removed after the tests, but that
removal schedules the delayed kprobes_optimizer work, which will do the
actual text poke. If the work is executed after the init text is freed,
then the warning triggers. The bug can be reproduced reliably when the work
delay is increased.
Flush the optimizer work and wait for the optimizing/unoptimizing lists to
become empty before returning from the kprobes tracer selftest. That
ensures that all operations which were queued due to the probes removal
have completed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170516094802.76a468bb@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 6274de498 ("kprobes: Support delayed unoptimizing")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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