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commit 50b6f2c8297793f7f3315623db78dcff85158e96 upstream.
This reverts commit ca62297b2085b5b3168bd891ca24862242c635a1.
Commit ca62297b2085 ("drm/edid: Fix csync detailed mode parsing") fixed
EDID detailed mode sync parsing. Unfortunately, there are quite a few
displays out there that have bogus (zero) sync field that are broken by
the change. Zero means analog composite sync, which is not right for
digital displays, and the modes get rejected. Regardless, it used to
work, and it needs to continue to work. Revert the change.
Rejecting modes with analog composite sync was the part that fixed the
gitlab issue 8146 [1]. We'll need to get back to the drawing board with
that.
[1] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8146
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8789
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8930
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/9044
Fixes: ca62297b2085 ("drm/edid: Fix csync detailed mode parsing")
Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.4+
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230815101907.2900768-1-jani.nikula@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b616be6b97688f2f2bd7c4a47ab32f27f94fb2a9 ]
One missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed
syzbot to crash kernels again [1]
Do not allow gso_size to be set to GSO_BY_FRAGS (0xffff),
because this magic value is used by the kernel.
[1]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 0 PID: 5039 Comm: syz-executor401 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-next-20230809-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x1a52/0x3ef0 net/core/skbuff.c:4500
Code: 00 00 00 e9 ab eb ff ff e8 6b 96 5d f9 48 8b 84 24 00 01 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ea 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 00 01
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d3f1c8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 000000000001fffe RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff882a3115 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: ffffc90003d3f378 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 5ee4a93e456187d6 R12: 000000000001ffc6
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 000000000000ffff
FS: 00005555563f2380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020020000 CR3: 000000001626d000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
udp6_ufo_fragment+0x9d2/0xd50 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
ipv6_gso_segment+0x5c4/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120
skb_mac_gso_segment+0x292/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53
__skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124
skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
validate_xmit_skb+0x3a5/0xf10 net/core/dev.c:3625
__dev_queue_xmit+0x8f0/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4329
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x24c7/0x5570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd9/0x180 net/socket.c:750
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2496
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2550
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7ff27cdb34d9
Fixes: 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816142158.1779798-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2d0c88e84e483982067a82073f6125490ddf3614 ]
The status of global socket memory pressure is updated when:
a) __sk_mem_raise_allocated():
enter: sk_memory_allocated(sk) > sysctl_mem[1]
leave: sk_memory_allocated(sk) <= sysctl_mem[0]
b) __sk_mem_reduce_allocated():
leave: sk_under_memory_pressure(sk) &&
sk_memory_allocated(sk) < sysctl_mem[0]
So the conditions of leaving global pressure are inconstant, which
may lead to the situation that one pressured net-memcg prevents the
global pressure from being cleared when there is indeed no global
pressure, thus the global constrains are still in effect unexpectedly
on the other sockets.
This patch fixes this by ignoring the net-memcg's pressure when
deciding whether should leave global memory pressure.
Fixes: e1aab161e013 ("socket: initial cgroup code.")
Signed-off-by: Abel Wu <wuyun.abel@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816091226.1542-1-wuyun.abel@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f3ec2b5d879ef5bbcb24678914641343cb6399a2 ]
In destruction flow, the assignment of NULL to xso->dev
caused to skip of xfrm_dev_state_free() call, which was
called in xfrm_state_put(to_put) routine.
Instead of open-coded variant of xfrm_dev_state_delete() and
xfrm_dev_state_free(), let's use them directly.
Fixes: f8a70afafc17 ("xfrm: add TX datapath support for IPsec packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 56b5c3e67b0f9af3f45cf393be048ee8d8a92694 ]
Getting below error when using KCSAN to check the driver. Adding lock to
protect parameter num_rdy when getting the value with function:
v4l2_m2m_num_src_bufs_ready/v4l2_m2m_num_dst_bufs_ready.
kworker/u16:3: [name:report&]BUG: KCSAN: data-race in v4l2_m2m_buf_queue
kworker/u16:3: [name:report&]
kworker/u16:3: [name:report&]read-write to 0xffffff8105f35b94 of 1 bytes by task 20865 on cpu 7:
kworker/u16:3: v4l2_m2m_buf_queue+0xd8/0x10c
Signed-off-by: Pina Chen <pina.chen@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Yunfei Dong <yunfei.dong@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b407460ee99033503993ac7437d593451fcdfe44 ]
It is considered good practice to call cpu_relax() in busy loops, see
Documentation/process/volatile-considered-harmful.rst. This can not
only lower CPU power consumption or yield to a hyperthreaded twin
processor, but also allows an architecture to mitigate hardware issues
(e.g. ARM Erratum 754327 for Cortex-A9 prior to r2p0) in the
architecture-specific cpu_relax() implementation.
In addition, cpu_relax() is also a compiler barrier. It is not
immediately obvious that the @op argument "function" will result in an
actual function call (e.g. in case of inlining).
Where a function call is a C sequence point, this is lost on inlining.
Therefore, with agressive enough optimization it might be possible for
the compiler to hoist the:
(val) = op(args);
"load" out of the loop because it doesn't see the value changing. The
addition of cpu_relax() would inhibit this.
As the iopoll helpers lack calls to cpu_relax(), people are sometimes
reluctant to use them, and may fall back to open-coded polling loops
(including cpu_relax() calls) instead.
Fix this by adding calls to cpu_relax() to the iopoll helpers:
- For the non-atomic case, it is sufficient to call cpu_relax() in
case of a zero sleep-between-reads value, as a call to
usleep_range() is a safe barrier otherwise. However, it doesn't
hurt to add the call regardless, for simplicity, and for similarity
with the atomic case below.
- For the atomic case, cpu_relax() must be called regardless of the
sleep-between-reads value, as there is no guarantee all
architecture-specific implementations of udelay() handle this.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/45c87bec3397fdd704376807f0eec5cc71be440f.1685692810.git.geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2145328515c8fa9b8a9f7889250bc6c032f2a0e6 ]
With RX coalescing, one CQE entry can be used to indicate multiple packets
on the receive queue. This saves processing time and PCI bandwidth over
the CQ.
The MANA Ethernet driver also uses the v2 version of the protocol. It
doesn't use RX coalescing and its behavior is not changed.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1684045095-31228-1-git-send-email-longli@linuxonhyperv.com
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5fb9a9fb71a33be61d7d8e8ba4597bfb18d604d0 upstream.
AP_VLAN interfaces are virtual, so doesn't really exist as a type for
capabilities. When passed in as a type, AP is the one that's really intended.
Fixes: c4cbaf7973a7 ("cfg80211: Add support for HE")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230622165919.46841-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8a70ed9520c5fafaac91053cacdd44625c39e188 upstream.
Before this code is copied, add the missing family, as we did in
commit 3dd344ea84e1 ("net: tracepoint: exposing sk_family in all tcp:tracepoints")
Fixes: 15fcdf6ae116 ("tcp: Add tracepoint for tcp_set_ca_state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ping Gan <jacky_gam_2001@163.com>
Cc: Manjusaka <me@manjusaka.me>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230808084923.2239142-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 809e4dc71a0f2b8d2836035d98603694fff11d5d upstream.
strp_done is only called when psock->progs.stream_parser is not NULL,
but stream_parser was set to NULL by sk_psock_stop_strp(), called
by sk_psock_drop() earlier. So, strp_done can never be called.
Introduce SK_PSOCK_RX_ENABLED to mark whether there is strp on psock.
Change the condition for calling strp_done from judging whether
stream_parser is set to judging whether this flag is set. This flag is
only set once when strp_init() succeeds, and will never be cleared later.
Fixes: c0d95d3380ee ("bpf, sockmap: Re-evaluate proto ops when psock is removed from sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230804073740.194770-3-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5f68718b34a531a556f2f50300ead2862278da26 upstream.
The set types rhashtable and rbtree use a GC worker to reclaim memory.
From system work queue, in periodic intervals, a scan of the table is
done.
The major caveat here is that the nft transaction mutex is not held.
This causes a race between control plane and GC when they attempt to
delete the same element.
We cannot grab the netlink mutex from the work queue, because the
control plane has to wait for the GC work queue in case the set is to be
removed, so we get following deadlock:
cpu 1 cpu2
GC work transaction comes in , lock nft mutex
`acquire nft mutex // BLOCKS
transaction asks to remove the set
set destruction calls cancel_work_sync()
cancel_work_sync will now block forever, because it is waiting for the
mutex the caller already owns.
This patch adds a new API that deals with garbage collection in two
steps:
1) Lockless GC of expired elements sets on the NFT_SET_ELEM_DEAD_BIT
so they are not visible via lookup. Annotate current GC sequence in
the GC transaction. Enqueue GC transaction work as soon as it is
full. If ruleset is updated, then GC transaction is aborted and
retried later.
2) GC work grabs the mutex. If GC sequence has changed then this GC
transaction lost race with control plane, abort it as it contains
stale references to objects and let GC try again later. If the
ruleset is intact, then this GC transaction deactivates and removes
the elements and it uses call_rcu() to destroy elements.
Note that no elements are removed from GC lockless path, the _DEAD bit
is set and pointers are collected. GC catchall does not remove the
elements anymore too. There is a new set->dead flag that is set on to
abort the GC transaction to deal with set->ops->destroy() path which
removes the remaining elements in the set from commit_release, where no
mutex is held.
To deal with GC when mutex is held, which allows safe deactivate and
removal, add sync GC API which releases the set element object via
call_rcu(). This is used by rbtree and pipapo backends which also
perform garbage collection from control plane path.
Since element removal from sets can happen from control plane and
element garbage collection/timeout, it is necessary to keep the set
structure alive until all elements have been deactivated and destroyed.
We cannot do a cancel_work_sync or flush_work in nft_set_destroy because
its called with the transaction mutex held, but the aforementioned async
work queue might be blocked on the very mutex that nft_set_destroy()
callchain is sitting on.
This gives us the choice of ABBA deadlock or UaF.
To avoid both, add set->refs refcount_t member. The GC API can then
increment the set refcount and release it once the elements have been
free'd.
Set backends are adapted to use the GC transaction API in a follow up
patch entitled:
("netfilter: nf_tables: use gc transaction API in set backends")
This is joint work with Florian Westphal.
Fixes: cfed7e1b1f8e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set garbage collection helpers")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a57c27c7ad85c420b7de44c6ee56692d51709dda upstream.
The newly added function has two definitions but no prototypes:
drivers/base/cpu.c:605:16: error: no previous prototype for 'cpu_show_gds' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Add a declaration next to the other ones for this file to avoid the
warning.
Fixes: 8974eb588283b ("x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230809130530.1913368-1-arnd%40kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 554b841d470338a3b1d6335b14ee1cd0c8f5d754 upstream.
The TPM RNG functionality is not necessary for entropy when the CPU
already supports the RDRAND instruction. The TPM RNG functionality
was previously disabled on a subset of AMD fTPM series, but reports
continue to show problems on some systems causing stutter root caused
to TPM RNG functionality.
Expand disabling TPM RNG use for all AMD fTPMs whether they have versions
that claim to have fixed or not. To accomplish this, move the detection
into part of the TPM CRB registration and add a flag indicating that
the TPM should opt-out of registration to hwrng.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1.y+
Fixes: b006c439d58d ("hwrng: core - start hwrng kthread also for untrusted sources")
Fixes: f1324bbc4011 ("tpm: disable hwrng for fTPM on some AMD designs")
Reported-by: daniil.stas@posteo.net
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217719
Reported-by: bitlord0xff@gmail.com
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217212
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 71c8f9cf2623d0db79665f876b95afcdd8214aec ]
gcc gets confused when -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern is used on sparse
bit fields such as 'struct spi_mem_op', which caused the previous false
positive warning about an uninitialized variable:
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/spansion.c: error: 'op' is used uninitialized [-Werror=uninitialized]
In fact, the variable is fully initialized and gcc does not see it being
used, so the warning is entirely bogus. The problem appears to be
a misoptimization in the initialization of single bit fields when the
rest of the bytes are not initialized.
A previous workaround added another initialization, which ended up
shutting up the warning in spansion.c, though it apparently still happens
in other files as reported by Peter Foley in the gcc bugzilla. The
workaround of adding a fake initialization seems particularly bad
because it would set values that can never be correct but prevent the
compiler from warning about actually missing initializations.
Revert the broken workaround and instead pad the structure to only
have bitfields that add up to full bytes, which should avoid this
behavior in all drivers.
I also filed a new bug against gcc with what I found, so this can
hopefully be addressed in future gcc releases. At the moment, only
gcc-12 and gcc-13 are affected.
Cc: Peter Foley <pefoley2@pefoley.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=110743
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=108402
Link: https://godbolt.org/z/efMMsG1Kx
Fixes: 420c4495b5e56 ("mtd: spi-nor: spansion: make sure local struct does not contain garbage")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20230719190045.4007391-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a6ec83786ab9f13f25fb18166dee908845713a95 upstream.
syzbot reports below bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802a25c000 by task syz-executor148/5000
CPU: 1 PID: 5000 Comm: syz-executor148 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-syzkaller-00041-ge660abd551f1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351
print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline]
kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572
f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range+0x122a/0x14c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:574
truncate_dnode+0x229/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/node.c:944
f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks+0x64b/0xde0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1154
f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x4ac/0xf30 fs/f2fs/file.c:721
f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x7b/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:749
f2fs_truncate.part.0+0x4a5/0x630 fs/f2fs/file.c:799
f2fs_truncate include/linux/fs.h:825 [inline]
f2fs_setattr+0x1738/0x2090 fs/f2fs/file.c:1006
notify_change+0xb2c/0x1180 fs/attr.c:483
do_truncate+0x143/0x200 fs/open.c:66
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3295 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3640 [inline]
path_openat+0x2083/0x2750 fs/namei.c:3791
do_filp_open+0x1ba/0x410 fs/namei.c:3818
do_sys_openat2+0x16d/0x4c0 fs/open.c:1356
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1372 [inline]
__do_sys_creat fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__se_sys_creat fs/open.c:1442 [inline]
__x64_sys_creat+0xcd/0x120 fs/open.c:1442
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause is, inodeA references inodeB via inodeB's ino, once inodeA
is truncated, it calls truncate_dnode() to truncate data blocks in inodeB's
node page, it traverse mapping data from node->i.i_addr[0] to
node->i.i_addr[ADDRS_PER_BLOCK() - 1], result in out-of-boundary access.
This patch fixes to add sanity check on dnode page in truncate_dnode(),
so that, it can help to avoid triggering such issue, and once it encounters
such issue, it will record newly introduced ERROR_INVALID_NODE_REFERENCE
error into superblock, later fsck can detect such issue and try repairing.
Also, it removes f2fs_truncate_data_blocks() for cleanup due to the
function has only one caller, and uses f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range()
instead.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+12cb4425b22169b52036@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/000000000000f3038a05fef867f8@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0756384fb1bd38adb2ebcfd1307422f433a1d772 ]
The nexthop code expects a 31 bit hash, such as what is returned by
fib_multipath_hash() and rt6_multipath_hash(). Passing the 32 bit hash
returned by skb_get_hash() can lead to problems related to the fact that
'int hash' is a negative number when the MSB is set.
In the case of hash threshold nexthop groups, nexthop_select_path_hthr()
will disproportionately select the first nexthop group entry. In the case
of resilient nexthop groups, nexthop_select_path_res() may do an out of
bounds access in nh_buckets[], for example:
hash = -912054133
num_nh_buckets = 2
bucket_index = 65535
which leads to the following panic:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900025910c8
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10026b067 PMD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 4 PID: 856 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2+ #34
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
Code: c1 e4 05 be 08 00 00 00 4c 8b 35 a4 14 7e 01 4e 8d 6c 25 00 4a 8d 7c 25 08 48 01 dd e8 c2 25 15 ff 49 8d 7d 08 e8 39 13 15 ff <4d> 89 75 08 48 89 ef e8 7d 12 15 ff 48 8b 5d 00 e8 14 55 2f 00 85
RSP: 0018:ffff88810c36f260 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000002000c0 RCX: ffffffffaf02dd77
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc900025910c8
RBP: ffffc900025910c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520004b2219
R10: ffffc900025910cf R11: 31392d2068736168 R12: 00000000002000c0
R13: ffffc900025910c0 R14: 00000000fffef608 R15: ffff88811840e900
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc900025910c8 CR3: 0000000129d00000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x1ee/0x5c0
? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10
? search_bpf_extables+0xfe/0x1c0
? fixup_exception+0x3b/0x470
? exc_page_fault+0xf6/0x110
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
? nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
? lock_is_held_type+0xe7/0x140
vxlan_xmit+0x5b2/0x2340
? __lock_acquire+0x92b/0x3370
? __pfx_vxlan_xmit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_register_lock_class+0x10/0x10
? skb_network_protocol+0xce/0x2d0
? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xca/0x350
? __pfx_vxlan_xmit+0x10/0x10
dev_hard_start_xmit+0xca/0x350
__dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1e20
? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x44/0x90
? skb_push+0x4c/0x80
? eth_header+0x81/0xe0
? __pfx_eth_header+0x10/0x10
? neigh_resolve_output+0x215/0x310
? ip6_finish_output2+0x2ba/0xc90
ip6_finish_output2+0x2ba/0xc90
? lock_release+0x236/0x3e0
? ip6_mtu+0xbb/0x240
? __pfx_ip6_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
? find_held_lock+0x83/0xa0
? lock_is_held_type+0xe7/0x140
ip6_finish_output+0x1ee/0x780
ip6_output+0x138/0x460
? __pfx_ip6_output+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ip6_finish_output+0x10/0x10
NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xc0/0x420
? __pfx_NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? ndisc_send_skb+0x2c0/0x960
? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x93/0x110
? lock_is_held_type+0xe7/0x140
ndisc_send_skb+0x4be/0x960
? __pfx_ndisc_send_skb+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x65/0x90
? find_held_lock+0x83/0xa0
ndisc_send_ns+0xb0/0x110
? __pfx_ndisc_send_ns+0x10/0x10
addrconf_dad_work+0x631/0x8e0
? lock_acquire+0x180/0x3f0
? __pfx_addrconf_dad_work+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
process_one_work+0x582/0x9c0
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x24/0x90
worker_thread+0x93/0x630
? __kthread_parkme+0xdc/0x100
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x1a5/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
RIP: 0000:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0000:0000000000000000 EFLAGS: 00000000 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: ffffc900025910c8
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:nexthop_select_path+0x197/0xbf0
Code: c1 e4 05 be 08 00 00 00 4c 8b 35 a4 14 7e 01 4e 8d 6c 25 00 4a 8d 7c 25 08 48 01 dd e8 c2 25 15 ff 49 8d 7d 08 e8 39 13 15 ff <4d> 89 75 08 48 89 ef e8 7d 12 15 ff 48 8b 5d 00 e8 14 55 2f 00 85
RSP: 0018:ffff88810c36f260 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000002000c0 RCX: ffffffffaf02dd77
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc900025910c8
RBP: ffffc900025910c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520004b2219
R10: ffffc900025910cf R11: 31392d2068736168 R12: 00000000002000c0
R13: ffffc900025910c0 R14: 00000000fffef608 R15: ffff88811840e900
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000129d00000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Kernel Offset: 0x2ca00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
Fix this problem by ensuring the MSB of hash is 0 using a right shift - the
same approach used in fib_multipath_hash() and rt6_multipath_hash().
Fixes: 1274e1cc4226 ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3c5b4d69c358a9275a8de98f87caf6eda644b086 ]
sk->sk_mark is often read while another thread could change the value.
Fixes: 4a19ec5800fc ("[NET]: Introducing socket mark socket option.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7938cd15436873f649f31cb867bac2d88ca564d0 ]
This patch fixes a misuse of IP{6}CB(skb) in GRO, while calling to
`udp6_lib_lookup2` when handling udp tunnels. `udp6_lib_lookup2` fetch the
device from CB. The fix changes it to fetch the device from `skb->dev`.
l3mdev case requires special attention since it has a master and a slave
device.
Fixes: a6024562ffd7 ("udp: Add GRO functions to UDP socket")
Reported-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Gobert <richardbgobert@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d457a0e329b0bfd3a1450e0b1a18cd2b47a25a08 ]
Move declarations into include/net/gso.h and code into net/core/gso.c
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230608191738.3947077-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 7938cd154368 ("net: gro: fix misuse of CB in udp socket lookup")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 79e8328e5acbe691bbde029a52c89d70dcbc22f3 ]
Compiling big-endian targets with Clang produces the diagnostic:
fs/namei.c:2173:13: warning: use of bitwise '|' with boolean operands [-Wbitwise-instead-of-logical]
} while (!(has_zero(a, &adata, &constants) | has_zero(b, &bdata, &constants)));
~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
||
fs/namei.c:2173:13: note: cast one or both operands to int to silence this warning
It appears that when has_zero was introduced, two definitions were
produced with different signatures (in particular different return
types).
Looking at the usage in hash_name() in fs/namei.c, I suspect that
has_zero() is meant to be invoked twice per while loop iteration; using
logical-or would not update `bdata` when `a` did not have zeros. So I
think it's preferred to always return an unsigned long rather than a
bool than update the while loop in hash_name() to use a logical-or
rather than bitwise-or.
[ Also changed powerpc version to do the same - Linus ]
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1832
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230801-bitwise-v1-1-799bec468dc4@google.com/
Fixes: 36126f8f2ed8 ("word-at-a-time: make the interfaces truly generic")
Debugged-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 61235b24b9cb37c13fcad5b9596d59a1afdcec30 upstream
Everything is converted over to arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Remove the
check_bugs() leftovers including the empty stubs in asm-generic, alpha,
parisc, powerpc and xtensa.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.553215951@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7725acaa4f0c04fbefb0e0d342635b967bb7d414 upstream
check_bugs() has become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities to
finalize the CPU initialization before running the rest of the init code.
Most are empty, a few do actual bug checks, some do alternative patching
and some cobble a CPU advertisement string together....
Aside of that the current implementation requires duplicated function
declaration and mostly empty header files for them.
Provide a new function arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Provide a generic
declaration if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT is selected and a stub
inline otherwise.
This requires a temporary #ifdef in start_kernel() which will be removed
along with check_bugs() once the architectures are converted over.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224544.957805717@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f781f661e8c99b0cb34129f2e374234d61864e77 upstream.
Some Android CTS is testing if the signaling time keeps consistent
during merges.
v2: use the current time if the fence is still in the signaling path and
the timestamp not yet available.
v3: improve comment, fix one more case to use the correct timestamp
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230630120041.109216-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
Cc: Jindong Yue <jindong.yue@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1f02b95758d05b799731d939e76a0bd6da312db upstream.
mm->mm_lock_seq effectively functions as a read/write lock; therefore it
must be used with acquire/release semantics.
A specific example is the interaction between userfaultfd_register() and
lock_vma_under_rcu().
userfaultfd_register() does the following from the point where it changes
a VMA's flags to the point where concurrent readers are permitted again
(in a simple scenario where only a single private VMA is accessed and no
merging/splitting is involved):
userfaultfd_register
userfaultfd_set_vm_flags
vm_flags_reset
vma_start_write
down_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock)
vma->vm_lock_seq = mm_lock_seq [marks VMA as busy]
up_write(&vma->vm_lock->lock)
vm_flags_init
[sets VM_UFFD_* in __vm_flags]
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx = ctx
mmap_write_unlock
vma_end_write_all
WRITE_ONCE(mm->mm_lock_seq, mm->mm_lock_seq + 1) [unlocks VMA]
There are no memory barriers in between the __vm_flags update and the
mm->mm_lock_seq update that unlocks the VMA, so the unlock can be
reordered to above the `vm_flags_init()` call, which means from the
perspective of a concurrent reader, a VMA can be marked as a userfaultfd
VMA while it is not VMA-locked. That's bad, we definitely need a
store-release for the unlock operation.
The non-atomic write to vma->vm_lock_seq in vma_start_write() is mostly
fine because all accesses to vma->vm_lock_seq that matter are always
protected by the VMA lock. There is a racy read in vma_start_read()
though that can tolerate false-positives, so we should be using
WRITE_ONCE() to keep things tidy and data-race-free (including for KCSAN).
On the other side, lock_vma_under_rcu() works as follows in the relevant
region for locking and userfaultfd check:
lock_vma_under_rcu
vma_start_read
vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq) [early bailout]
down_read_trylock(&vma->vm_lock->lock)
vma->vm_lock_seq == READ_ONCE(vma->vm_mm->mm_lock_seq) [main check]
userfaultfd_armed
checks vma->vm_flags & __VM_UFFD_FLAGS
Here, the interesting aspect is how far down the mm->mm_lock_seq read can
be reordered - if this read is reordered down below the vma->vm_flags
access, this could cause lock_vma_under_rcu() to partly operate on
information that was read while the VMA was supposed to be locked. To
prevent this kind of downwards bleeding of the mm->mm_lock_seq read, we
need to read it with a load-acquire.
Some of the comment wording is based on suggestions by Suren.
BACKPORT WARNING: One of the functions changed by this patch (which I've
written against Linus' tree) is vma_try_start_write(), but this function
no longer exists in mm/mm-everything. I don't know whether the merged
version of this patch will be ordered before or after the patch that
removes vma_try_start_write(). If you're backporting this patch to a tree
with vma_try_start_write(), make sure this patch changes that function.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230721225107.942336-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 5e31275cc997 ("mm: add per-VMA lock and helper functions to control it")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e0933b526fbfd937c4a8f4e35fcdd49f0e22d411 ]
Fix the symbolic names for zone conditions in the blkzoned.h header
file.
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Fixes: 6a0cb1bc106f ("block: Implement support for zoned block devices")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230706201422.3987341-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ]
For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash
table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports.
However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of
collisions.
The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the
fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to
ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the
bucket, which is slow.
We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in
__ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure
version.
While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs
means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios.
In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing
code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9
on Nehalem (base of ~173).
In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash")
netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster
hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary
testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to
ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN.
In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the
connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have
not found any measurable performance impact.
Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp")
Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas@amazon.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 94d166c5318c6edd1e079df8552233443e909c33 ]
VXLAN-GPE does not add an extra inner Ethernet header. Take that into
account when calculating header length.
This causes problems in skb_tunnel_check_pmtu, where incorrect PMTU is
cached.
In the collect_md mode (which is the only mode that VXLAN-GPE
supports), there's no magic auto-setting of the tunnel interface MTU.
It can't be, since the destination and thus the underlying interface
may be different for each packet.
So, the administrator is responsible for setting the correct tunnel
interface MTU. Apparently, the administrators are capable enough to
calculate that the maximum MTU for VXLAN-GPE is (their_lower_MTU - 36).
They set the tunnel interface MTU to 1464. If you run a TCP stream over
such interface, it's then segmented according to the MTU 1464, i.e.
producing 1514 bytes frames. Which is okay, this still fits the lower
MTU.
However, skb_tunnel_check_pmtu (called from vxlan_xmit_one) uses 50 as
the header size and thus incorrectly calculates the frame size to be
1528. This leads to ICMP too big message being generated (locally),
PMTU of 1450 to be cached and the TCP stream to be resegmented.
The fix is to use the correct actual header size, especially for
skb_tunnel_check_pmtu calculation.
Fixes: e1e5314de08ba ("vxlan: implement GPE")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 70f360dd7042cb843635ece9d28335a4addff9eb ]
This field can be read locklessly.
Fixes: 1536e2857bd3 ("tcp: Add a TCP_FASTOPEN socket option to get a max backlog on its listner")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719212857.3943972-12-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1aeb87bc1440c5447a7fa2d6e3c2cca52cbd206b ]
tp->notsent_lowat can be read locklessly from do_tcp_getsockopt()
and tcp_poll().
Fixes: c9bee3b7fdec ("tcp: TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT socket option")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719212857.3943972-10-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6e5e1de616bf5f3df1769abc9292191dfad9110a ]
do_tcp_getsockopt() reads tp->keepalive_probes while another cpu
might change its value.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719212857.3943972-6-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5ecf9d4f52ff2f1d4d44c9b68bc75688e82f13b4 ]
do_tcp_getsockopt() reads tp->keepalive_intvl while another cpu
might change its value.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719212857.3943972-5-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4164245c76ff906c9086758e1c3f87082a7f5ef5 ]
do_tcp_getsockopt() reads tp->keepalive_time while another cpu
might change its value.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719212857.3943972-4-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 195ef75e19287b4bc413da3e3e3722b030ac881e ]
hci_update_accept_list_sync iterates over hdev->pend_le_conns and
hdev->pend_le_reports, and waits for controller events in the loop body,
without holding hdev lock.
Meanwhile, these lists and the items may be modified e.g. by
le_scan_cleanup. This can invalidate the list cursor or any other item
in the list, resulting to invalid behavior (eg use-after-free).
Use RCU for the hci_conn_params action lists. Since the loop bodies in
hci_sync block and we cannot use RCU or hdev->lock for the whole loop,
copy list items first and then iterate on the copy. Only the flags field
is written from elsewhere, so READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE should guarantee we
read valid values.
Free params everywhere with hci_conn_params_free so the cleanup is
guaranteed to be done properly.
This fixes the following, which can be triggered e.g. by BlueZ new
mgmt-tester case "Add + Remove Device Nowait - Success", or by changing
hci_le_set_cig_params to always return false, and running iso-tester:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_update_passive_scan_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2536 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2723 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2841)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888001265018 by task kworker/u3:0/32
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:134 lib/dump_stack.c:107)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:320 mm/kasan/report.c:430)
? __virt_addr_valid (./include/linux/mmzone.h:1915 ./include/linux/mmzone.h:2011 arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:65)
? hci_update_passive_scan_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2536 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2723 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2841)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:538)
? hci_update_passive_scan_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2536 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2723 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2841)
hci_update_passive_scan_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2536 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2723 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2841)
? __pfx_hci_update_passive_scan_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2780)
? mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:282)
? __pfx_mutex_lock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:282)
? __pfx_mutex_unlock (kernel/locking/mutex.c:538)
? __pfx_update_passive_scan_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:2861)
hci_cmd_sync_work (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:306)
process_one_work (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:27 kernel/workqueue.c:2399)
worker_thread (./include/linux/list.h:292 kernel/workqueue.c:2538)
? __pfx_worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:2480)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:376)
? __pfx_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:331)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314)
</TASK>
Allocated by task 31:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:46)
kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52)
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:374 mm/kasan/common.c:383)
hci_conn_params_add (./include/linux/slab.h:580 ./include/linux/slab.h:720 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2277)
hci_connect_le_scan (net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1419 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1589)
hci_connect_cis (net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2266)
iso_connect_cis (net/bluetooth/iso.c:390)
iso_sock_connect (net/bluetooth/iso.c:899)
__sys_connect (net/socket.c:2003 net/socket.c:2020)
__x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2027)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
Freed by task 15:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:46)
kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:523)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:238 mm/kasan/common.c:200 mm/kasan/common.c:244)
__kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:1807 mm/slub.c:3787 mm/slub.c:3800)
hci_conn_params_del (net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2323)
le_scan_cleanup (net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:202)
process_one_work (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:27 kernel/workqueue.c:2399)
worker_thread (./include/linux/list.h:292 kernel/workqueue.c:2538)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:376)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314)
==================================================================
Fixes: e8907f76544f ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Make use of hci_cmd_sync_queue set 3")
Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c0a8966e2bc7d31f77a7246947ebc09c1ff06066 ]
When using IPv4/TCP, skb->hash comes from sk->sk_txhash except in
TIME_WAIT and SYN_RECV where it's not set in the reply skb from
ip_send_unicast_reply. Those packets will have a mismatched hash with
others from the same flow as their hashes will be 0. IPv6 does not have
the same issue as the hash is set from the socket txhash in those cases.
This commits sets the hash in the reply skb from ip_send_unicast_reply,
which makes the IPv4 code behaving like IPv6.
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 5e5265522a9a ("tcp: annotate data-races around tcp_rsk(req)->txhash")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit aff037078ecaecf34a7c2afab1341815f90fba5e ]
Destroying psi trigger in cgroup_file_release causes UAF issues when
a cgroup is removed from under a polling process. This is happening
because cgroup removal causes a call to cgroup_file_release while the
actual file is still alive. Destroying the trigger at this point would
also destroy its waitqueue head and if there is still a polling process
on that file accessing the waitqueue, it will step on the freed pointer:
do_select
vfs_poll
do_rmdir
cgroup_rmdir
kernfs_drain_open_files
cgroup_file_release
cgroup_pressure_release
psi_trigger_destroy
wake_up_pollfree(&t->event_wait)
// vfs_poll is unblocked
synchronize_rcu
kfree(t)
poll_freewait -> UAF access to the trigger's waitqueue head
Patch [1] fixed this issue for epoll() case using wake_up_pollfree(),
however the same issue exists for synchronous poll() case.
The root cause of this issue is that the lifecycles of the psi trigger's
waitqueue and of the file associated with the trigger are different. Fix
this by using kernfs_generic_poll function when polling on cgroup-specific
psi triggers. It internally uses kernfs_open_node->poll waitqueue head
with its lifecycle tied to the file's lifecycle. This also renders the
fix in [1] obsolete, so revert it.
[1] commit c2dbe32d5db5 ("sched/psi: Fix use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue()")
Fixes: 0e94682b73bf ("psi: introduce psi monitor")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613062306.101831-1-lujialin4@huawei.com/
Reported-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230630005612.1014540-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8ce8849dd1e78dadcee0ec9acbd259d239b7069f ]
posix_timer_add() tries to allocate a posix timer ID by starting from the
cached ID which was stored by the last successful allocation.
This is done in a loop searching the ID space for a free slot one by
one. The loop has to terminate when the search wrapped around to the
starting point.
But that's racy vs. establishing the starting point. That is read out
lockless, which leads to the following problem:
CPU0 CPU1
posix_timer_add()
start = sig->posix_timer_id;
lock(hash_lock);
... posix_timer_add()
if (++sig->posix_timer_id < 0)
start = sig->posix_timer_id;
sig->posix_timer_id = 0;
So CPU1 can observe a negative start value, i.e. -1, and the loop break
never happens because the condition can never be true:
if (sig->posix_timer_id == start)
break;
While this is unlikely to ever turn into an endless loop as the ID space is
huge (INT_MAX), the racy read of the start value caught the attention of
KCSAN and Dmitry unearthed that incorrectness.
Rewrite it so that all id operations are under the hash lock.
Reported-by: syzbot+5c54bd3eb218bb595aa9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87bkhzdn6g.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit b321c31c9b7b309dcde5e8854b741c8e6a9a05f0 upstream.
Xiang reports that VMs occasionally fail to boot on GICv4.1 systems when
running a preemptible kernel, as it is possible that a vCPU is blocked
without requesting a doorbell interrupt.
The issue is that any preemption that occurs between vgic_v4_put() and
schedule() on the block path will mark the vPE as nonresident and *not*
request a doorbell irq. This occurs because when the vcpu thread is
resumed on its way to block, vcpu_load() will make the vPE resident
again. Once the vcpu actually blocks, we don't request a doorbell
anymore, and the vcpu won't be woken up on interrupt delivery.
Fix it by tracking that we're entering WFI, and key the doorbell
request on that flag. This allows us not to make the vPE resident
when going through a preempt/schedule cycle, meaning we don't lose
any state.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8e01d9a396e6 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-v4: Move the GICv4 residency flow to be driven by vcpu_load/put")
Reported-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Suggested-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Co-developed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230713070657.3873244-1-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5cadfbd5a11e5495cac217534c5f788168b1afd7 upstream.
Add an init flag idicating whether the FUSE_EXPIRE_ONLY flag of
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY is effective.
This is needed for backports of this feature, otherwise the server could
just check the protocol version.
Fixes: 4f8d37020e1f ("fuse: add "expire only" mode to FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.2
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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rethook_free()
commit 195b9cb5b288fec1c871ef89f78cc9a7461aad3a upstream.
Ensure running fprobe_exit_handler() has finished before
calling rethook_free() in the unregister_fprobe() so that caller can free
the fprobe right after unregister_fprobe().
unregister_fprobe() ensured that all running fprobe_entry/exit_handler()
have finished by calling unregister_ftrace_function() which synchronizes
RCU. But commit 5f81018753df ("fprobe: Release rethook after the ftrace_ops
is unregistered") changed to call rethook_free() after
unregister_ftrace_function(). So call rethook_stop() to make rethook
disabled before unregister_ftrace_function() and ensure it again.
Here is the possible code flow that can call the exit handler after
unregister_fprobe().
------
CPU1 CPU2
call unregister_fprobe(fp)
...
__fprobe_handler()
rethook_hook() on probed function
unregister_ftrace_function()
return from probed function
rethook hooks
find rh->handler == fprobe_exit_handler
call fprobe_exit_handler()
rethook_free():
set rh->handler = NULL;
return from unreigster_fprobe;
call fp->exit_handler() <- (*)
------
(*) At this point, the exit handler is called after returning from
unregister_fprobe().
This fixes it as following;
------
CPU1 CPU2
call unregister_fprobe()
...
rethook_stop():
set rh->handler = NULL;
__fprobe_handler()
rethook_hook() on probed function
unregister_ftrace_function()
return from probed function
rethook hooks
find rh->handler == NULL
return from rethook
rethook_free()
return from unreigster_fprobe;
------
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/168873859949.156157.13039240432299335849.stgit@devnote2/
Fixes: 5f81018753df ("fprobe: Release rethook after the ftrace_ops is unregistered")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a82d62f708545d22859584e0e0620da8e3759bbc upstream.
This reverts commit eb26dfe8aa7eeb5a5aa0b7574550125f8aa4c3b3.
Commit eb26dfe8aa7e ("8250: add support for ASIX devices with a FIFO
bug") merged on Jul 13, 2012 adds a quirk for PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASIX
(0x9710). But that ID is the same as PCI_VENDOR_ID_NETMOS defined in
1f8b061050c7 ("[PATCH] Netmos parallel/serial/combo support") merged
on Mar 28, 2005. In pci_serial_quirks array, the NetMos entry always
takes precedence over the ASIX entry even since it was initially
merged, code in that commit is always unreachable.
In my tests, adding the FIFO workaround to pci_netmos_init() makes no
difference, and the vendor driver also does not have such workaround.
Given that the code was never used for over a decade, it's safe to
revert it.
Also, the real PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASIX should be 0x125b, which is used on
their newer AX99100 PCIe serial controllers released on 2016. The FIFO
workaround should not be intended for these newer controllers, and it
was never implemented in vendor driver.
Fixes: eb26dfe8aa7e ("8250: add support for ASIX devices with a FIFO bug")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiaqing Zhao <jiaqing.zhao@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230619155743.827859-1-jiaqing.zhao@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 72f1de49ffb90b29748284f27f1d6b829ab1de95 upstream.
[Why]
The sequence for collecting down_reply from source perspective should
be:
Request_n->repeat (get partial reply of Request_n->clear message ready
flag to ack DPRX that the message is received) till all partial
replies for Request_n are received->new Request_n+1.
Now there is chance that drm_dp_mst_hpd_irq() will fire new down
request in the tx queue when the down reply is incomplete. Source is
restricted to generate interveleaved message transactions so we should
avoid it.
Also, while assembling partial reply packets, reading out DPCD DOWN_REP
Sideband MSG buffer + clearing DOWN_REP_MSG_RDY flag should be
wrapped up as a complete operation for reading out a reply packet.
Kicking off a new request before clearing DOWN_REP_MSG_RDY flag might
be risky. e.g. If the reply of the new request has overwritten the
DPRX DOWN_REP Sideband MSG buffer before source writing one to clear
DOWN_REP_MSG_RDY flag, source then unintentionally flushes the reply
for the new request. Should handle the up request in the same way.
[How]
Separete drm_dp_mst_hpd_irq() into 2 steps. After acking the MST IRQ
event, driver calls drm_dp_mst_hpd_irq_send_new_request() and might
trigger drm_dp_mst_kick_tx() only when there is no on going message
transaction.
Changes since v1:
* Reworked on review comments received
-> Adjust the fix to let driver explicitly kick off new down request
when mst irq event is handled and acked
-> Adjust the commit message
Changes since v2:
* Adjust the commit message
* Adjust the naming of the divided 2 functions and add a new input
parameter "ack".
* Adjust code flow as per review comments.
Changes since v3:
* Update the function description of drm_dp_mst_hpd_irq_handle_event
Changes since v4:
* Change ack of drm_dp_mst_hpd_irq_handle_event() to be an array align
the size of esi[]
Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit bb6e04a173f06e51819a4bb512e127dfbc50dcfa upstream.
gcc-13 warns about function definitions for builtin interfaces that have a
different prototype, e.g.:
In file included from kasan_test.c:31:
kasan.h:574:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_register_globals'; expected 'void(void *, long int)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch]
574 | void __asan_register_globals(struct kasan_global *globals, size_t size);
kasan.h:577:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_alloca_poison'; expected 'void(void *, long int)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch]
577 | void __asan_alloca_poison(unsigned long addr, size_t size);
kasan.h:580:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_load1'; expected 'void(void *)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch]
580 | void __asan_load1(unsigned long addr);
kasan.h:581:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__asan_store1'; expected 'void(void *)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch]
581 | void __asan_store1(unsigned long addr);
kasan.h:643:6: error: conflicting types for built-in function '__hwasan_tag_memory'; expected 'void(void *, unsigned char, long int)' [-Werror=builtin-declaration-mismatch]
643 | void __hwasan_tag_memory(unsigned long addr, u8 tag, unsigned long size);
The two problems are:
- Addresses are passes as 'unsigned long' in the kernel, but gcc-13
expects a 'void *'.
- sizes meant to use a signed ssize_t rather than size_t.
Change all the prototypes to match these. Using 'void *' consistently for
addresses gets rid of a couple of type casts, so push that down to the
leaf functions where possible.
This now passes all randconfig builds on arm, arm64 and x86, but I have
not tested it on the other architectures that support kasan, since they
tend to fail randconfig builds in other ways. This might fail if any of
the 32-bit architectures expect a 'long' instead of 'int' for the size
argument.
The __asan_allocas_unpoison() function prototype is somewhat weird, since
it uses a pointer for 'stack_top' and an size_t for 'stack_bottom'. This
looks like it is meant to be 'addr' and 'size' like the others, but the
implementation clearly treats them as 'top' and 'bottom'.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230509145735.9263-2-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 150e33e62c1fa4af5aaab02776b6c3812711d478 ]
Eric Dumazet says[1]:
-------
Speaking of psched_mtu(), I see that net/sched/sch_pie.c is using it
without holding RTNL, so dev->mtu can be changed underneath.
KCSAN could issue a warning.
-------
Annotate dev->mtu with READ_ONCE() so KCSAN don't issue a warning.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iJoJO5VtaJ-2=_d2aOQhb0Xw8iBT_Cxqp2HyuS-zj6azw@mail.gmail.com/
v1 -> v2: Fix commit message
Fixes: d4b36210c2e6 ("net: pkt_sched: PIE AQM scheme")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230711021634.561598-1-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b938e6603660652dc3db66d3c915fbfed3bce21d ]
As per NVMe command set specification 1.0c Storage tag size is 7 bits.
Fixes: 4020aad85c67 ("nvme: add support for enhanced metadata")
Signed-off-by: Ankit Kumar <ankit.kumar@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2d800bc500fb3fb07a0fb42e2d0a1356fb9e1e8f ]
Inspired from struct flow_cls_offload :: cmd, in order for taprio to be
able to report statistics (which is future work), it seems that we need
to drill one step further with the ndo_setup_tc(TC_SETUP_QDISC_TAPRIO)
multiplexing, and pass the command as part of the common portion of the
muxed structure.
Since we already have an "enable" variable in tc_taprio_qopt_offload,
refactor all drivers to check for "cmd" instead of "enable", and reject
every other command except "replace" and "destroy" - to be future proof.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> # for lan966x
Acked-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt@linutronix.de> # hellcreek
Reviewed-by: Muhammad Husaini Zulkifli <muhammad.husaini.zulkifli@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerhard Engleder <gerhard@engleder-embedded.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 8046063df887 ("igc: Rename qbv_enable to taprio_offload_enable")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 76631ffa2fd2d45bae5ad717eef716b94144e0e7 ]
Previously the clients_lock was protecting the clients array against
concurrent addition/removal of clients but was also accessed from IRQ
context. This meant that it had to be a spinlock and that the add() and
remove() callbacks in which clients need to do allocation and take
mutexes can't be called under the clients_lock. To work around this these
callbacks were moved to workqueues. This not only introduced significant
complexity but is also subtly broken in at least one way.
In ism_dev_init() and ism_dev_exit() clients[i]->tgt_ism is used to
communicate the added/removed ISM device to the work function. While
write access to client[i]->tgt_ism is protected by the clients_lock and
the code waits that there is no pending add/remove work before and after
setting clients[i]->tgt_ism this is not enough. The problem is that the
wait happens based on per ISM device counters. Thus a concurrent
ism_dev_init()/ism_dev_exit() for a different ISM device may overwrite
a clients[i]->tgt_ism between unlocking the clients_lock and the
subsequent wait for the work to finnish.
Thankfully with the clients_lock no longer held in IRQ context it can be
turned into a mutex which can be held during the calls to add()/remove()
completely removing the need for the workqueues and the associated
broken housekeeping including the per ISM device counters and the
clients[i]->tgt_ism.
Fixes: 89e7d2ba61b7 ("net/ism: Add new API for client registration")
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b5c13b591d753c6022fbd12f8c0c0a9a07fc065 ]
The clients array references all registered clients and is protected by
the clients_lock. Besides its use as general list of clients the clients
array is accessed in ism_handle_irq() to forward ISM device events to
clients.
While the clients_lock is taken in the IRQ handler when calling
handle_event() it is however incorrectly not held during the
client->handle_irq() call and for the preceding clients[] access leaving
it unprotected against concurrent client (un-)registration.
Furthermore the accesses to ism->sba_client_arr[] in ism_register_dmb()
and ism_unregister_dmb() are not protected by any lock. This is
especially problematic as the client ID from the ism->sba_client_arr[]
is not checked against NO_CLIENT and neither is the client pointer
checked.
Instead of expanding the use of the clients_lock further add a separate
array in struct ism_dev which references clients subscribed to the
device's events and IRQs. This array is protected by ism->lock which is
already taken in ism_handle_irq() and can be taken outside the IRQ
handler when adding/removing subscribers or the accessing
ism->sba_client_arr[]. This also means that the clients_lock is no
longer taken in IRQ context.
Fixes: 89e7d2ba61b7 ("net/ism: Add new API for client registration")
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c60819149b637d0f9f7f66e110d2a0d90a3993ea ]
In a future change we will need to make
ocelot_port_update_active_preemptible_tcs() call
vsc9959_tas_guard_bands_update(), but that is currently not possible,
since the ocelot switch lib does not have access to functions private to
the DSA wrapper.
Move the pointer to vsc9959_tas_guard_bands_update() from felix->info
(which is private to the DSA driver) to ocelot->ops (which is also
visible to the ocelot switch lib).
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Message-ID: <20230705104422.49025-3-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: c6efb4ae387c ("net: mscc: ocelot: fix oversize frame dropping for preemptible TCs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2fb48d88e77f29bf9d278f25bcfe82cf59a0e09b ]
When a device-mapper device is passing through the inline encryption
support of an underlying device, calls to blk_crypto_evict_key() take
the blk_crypto_profile::lock of the device-mapper device, then take the
blk_crypto_profile::lock of the underlying device (nested). This isn't
a real deadlock, but it causes a lockdep report because there is only
one lock class for all instances of this lock.
Lockdep subclasses don't really work here because the hierarchy of block
devices is dynamic and could have more than 2 levels.
Instead, register a dynamic lock class for each blk_crypto_profile, and
associate that with the lock.
This avoids false-positive lockdep reports like the following:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.4.0-rc5 #2 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
fscryptctl/1421 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffff80829ca418 (&profile->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __blk_crypto_evict_key+0x44/0x1c0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffff8086b68ca8 (&profile->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __blk_crypto_evict_key+0xc8/0x1c0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&profile->lock);
lock(&profile->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
Fixes: 1b2628397058 ("block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption")
Reported-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230610061139.212085-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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