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There is a race condition/UAF in padata_reorder that goes back
to the initial commit. A reference count is taken at the start
of the process in padata_do_parallel, and released at the end in
padata_serial_worker.
This reference count is (and only is) required for padata_replace
to function correctly. If padata_replace is never called then
there is no issue.
In the function padata_reorder which serves as the core of padata,
as soon as padata is added to queue->serial.list, and the associated
spin lock released, that padata may be processed and the reference
count on pd would go away.
Fix this by getting the next padata before the squeue->serial lock
is released.
In order to make this possible, simplify padata_reorder by only
calling it once the next padata arrives.
Fixes: 16295bec6398 ("padata: Generic parallelization/serialization interface")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Dma-fence objects currently suffer from a potential use after free problem
where fences exported to userspace and other drivers can outlive the
exporting driver, or the associated data structures.
The discussion on how to address this concluded that adding reference
counting to all the involved objects is not desirable, since it would need
to be very wide reaching and could cause unloadable drivers if another
entity would be holding onto a signaled fence reference potentially
indefinitely.
This patch enables the safe access by introducing and documenting a
contract between fence exporters and users. It documents a set of
contraints and adds helpers which a) drivers with potential to suffer from
the use after free must use and b) users of the dma-fence API must use as
well.
Premise of the design has multiple sides:
1. Drivers (fence exporters) MUST ensure a RCU grace period between
signalling a fence and freeing the driver private data associated with it.
The grace period does not have to follow the signalling immediately but
HAS to happen before data is freed.
2. Users of the dma-fence API marked with such requirement MUST contain
the complete access to the data within a single code block guarded by
rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock().
The combination of the two ensures that whoever sees the
DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT not set is guaranteed to have access to a
valid fence->lock and valid data potentially accessed by the fence->ops
virtual functions, until the call to rcu_read_unlock().
3. Module unload (fence->ops) disappearing is for now explicitly not
handled. That would required a more complex protection, possibly needing
SRCU instead of RCU to handle callers such as dma_fence_release() and
dma_fence_wait_timeout(), where race between
dma_fence_enable_sw_signaling, signalling, and dereference of
fence->ops->wait() would need a sleeping SRCU context.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@igalia.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610164226.10817-4-tvrtko.ursulin@igalia.com
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Simplify the scheduler making CONFIG_SMP=y sched_exec()
code unconditional.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250528080924.2273858-27-mingo@kernel.org
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Simplify the scheduler by making the CONFIG_SMP=y primitives
of is_percpu_thread() and scheduler_ipi() unconditional.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250528080924.2273858-22-mingo@kernel.org
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Simplify the scheduler by making CONFIG_SMP=y primitives and data
structures unconditional.
Introduce transitory wrappers for functionality not yet converted to SMP.
Note that this patch is pretty large, because there's no clear separation
between various aspects of the SMP scheduler, it's basically a huge block
of #ifdef CONFIG_SMP. A fair amount of it has to be switched on for it to
boot and work on UP systems.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250528080924.2273858-21-mingo@kernel.org
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def_root_domain and sched_domains_mutex
Simplify the scheduler by making CONFIG_SMP=y primitives and data
structures unconditional.
Unconditionally build kernel/sched/topology.c and the main sched-domains
locking primitives.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250528080924.2273858-20-mingo@kernel.org
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Nested file systems, that is those which invoke call_mmap() within their
own f_op->mmap() handlers, may encounter underlying file systems which
provide the f_op->mmap_prepare() hook introduced by commit c84bf6dd2b83
("mm: introduce new .mmap_prepare() file callback").
We have a chicken-and-egg scenario here - until all file systems are
converted to using .mmap_prepare(), we cannot convert these nested
handlers, as we can't call f_op->mmap from an .mmap_prepare() hook.
So we have to do it the other way round - invoke the .mmap_prepare() hook
from an .mmap() one.
in order to do so, we need to convert VMA state into a struct vm_area_desc
descriptor, invoking the underlying file system's f_op->mmap_prepare()
callback passing a pointer to this, and then setting VMA state accordingly
and safely.
This patch achieves this via the compat_vma_mmap_prepare() function, which
we invoke from call_mmap() if f_op->mmap_prepare() is specified in the
passed in file pointer.
We place the fundamental logic into mm/vma.h where VMA manipulation
belongs. We also update the VMA userland tests to accommodate the
changes.
The compat_vma_mmap_prepare() function and its associated machinery is
temporary, and will be removed once the conversion of file systems is
complete.
We carefully place this code so it can be used with CONFIG_MMU and also
with cutting edge nommu silicon.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export compat_vma_mmap_prepare tp fix build]
[lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com: remove unused declarations]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ac3ae324-4c65-432a-8c6d-2af988b18ac8@lucifer.local
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250609165749.344976-1-lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com
Fixes: c84bf6dd2b83 ("mm: introduce new .mmap_prepare() file callback").
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAG48ez04yOEVx1ekzOChARDDBZzAKwet8PEoPM4Ln3_rk91AzQ@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Simplify the arguments passed to phy_get_internal_delay() - the "dev"
argument is always &phydev->mdio.dev, and as the phydev is passed in,
there's no need to also pass in the struct device, especially when this
function is the only reason for the caller to have a local "dev"
variable.
Remove the redundant "dev" argument, and update the callers.
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/E1uPLwB-003VzR-4C@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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genphy_c45_read_status() is exported, so we can move definition of
genphy_c45_driver to phy_device.c and make it static. This helps
to clean up phy.h a little.
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ead3ab17-22d0-4cd3-901c-3d493ab851e6@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Make mdio_device_bus_match() the default match function for non-PHY
MDIO devices. Benefit is that we don't have to export this function
any longer. As long as mdiodev->modalias isn't set, there's no change
in behavior. mdiobus_create_device() is the only place where
mdiodev->modalias gets set, but this function sets
mdio_device_bus_match() as match function anyway.
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/6c94e3d3-bfb0-4ddc-a518-6fddbc64e1d0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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We mux multiple calls to the drivers via the .get_nfc and .set_nfc
callbacks. This is slightly inconvenient to the drivers as they
have to de-mux them back. It will also be awkward for netlink code
to construct struct ethtool_rxnfc when it wants to get info about
RX Flow Hash, from the RSS module.
Add dedicated driver callbacks. Create struct ethtool_rxfh_fields
which contains only data relevant to RXFH. Maintain the names of
the fields to avoid having to heavily modify the drivers.
For now support both callbacks, once all drivers are converted
ethtool_*et_rxfh_fields() will stop using the rxnfc callbacks.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611145949.2674086-5-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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RX Flow Hashing supports using different configuration for different
RSS contexts. Only two drivers seem to support it. Make sure we
uniformly error out for drivers which don't.
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <joe@dama.to>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250611145949.2674086-4-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Count states accumulated in bpf_scc_visit->backedges in
env->peak_states.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-10-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The previous patch switched read and precision tracking for
iterator-based loops from state-graph-based loop tracking to
control-flow-graph-based loop tracking.
This patch removes the now-unused `update_loop_entry()` and
`get_loop_entry()` functions, which were part of the state-graph-based
logic.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-9-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Current loop_entry-based exact states comparison logic does not handle
the following case:
.-> A --. Assume the states are visited in the order A, B, C.
| | | Assume that state B reaches a state equivalent to state A.
| v v At this point, state C is not processed yet, so state A
'-- B C has not received any read or precision marks from C.
As a result, these marks won't be propagated to B.
If B has incomplete marks, it is unsafe to use it in states_equal()
checks.
This commit replaces the existing logic with the following:
- Strongly connected components (SCCs) are computed over the program's
control flow graph (intraprocedurally).
- When a verifier state enters an SCC, that state is recorded as the
SCC entry point.
- When a verifier state is found equivalent to another (e.g., B to A
in the example), it is recorded as a states graph backedge.
Backedges are accumulated per SCC.
- When an SCC entry state reaches `branches == 0`, read and precision
marks are propagated through the backedges (e.g., from A to B, from
C to A, and then again from A to B).
To support nested subprogram calls, the entry state and backedge list
are associated not with the SCC itself but with an object called
`bpf_scc_callchain`. A callchain is a tuple `(callsite*, scc_id)`,
where `callsite` is the index of a call instruction for each frame
except the last.
See the comments added in `is_state_visited()` and
`compute_scc_callchain()` for more details.
Fixes: 2a0992829ea3 ("bpf: correct loop detection for iterators convergence")
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-8-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Compute strongly connected components in the program CFG.
Assign an SCC number to each instruction, recorded in
env->insn_aux[*].scc. Use Tarjan's algorithm for SCC computation
adapted to run non-recursively.
For debug purposes print out computed SCCs as a part of full program
dump in compute_live_registers() at log level 2, e.g.:
func#0 @0
Live regs before insn:
0: .......... (b4) w6 = 10
2 1: ......6... (18) r1 = 0xffff88810bbb5565
2 3: .1....6... (b4) w2 = 2
2 4: .12...6... (85) call bpf_trace_printk#6
2 5: ......6... (04) w6 += -1
2 6: ......6... (56) if w6 != 0x0 goto pc-6
7: .......... (b4) w6 = 5
1 8: ......6... (18) r1 = 0xffff88810bbb5567
1 10: .1....6... (b4) w2 = 2
1 11: .12...6... (85) call bpf_trace_printk#6
1 12: ......6... (04) w6 += -1
1 13: ......6... (56) if w6 != 0x0 goto pc-6
14: .......... (b4) w0 = 0
15: 0......... (95) exit
^^^
SCC number for the instruction
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 96a30e469ca1d2b8cc7811b40911f8614b558241.
Next patches in the series modify propagate_precision() to allow
arbitrary starting state. Precision propagation requires access to
jump history, and arbitrary states represent history not belonging to
`env->cur_state`.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250611200836.4135542-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.16-rc2).
No conflicts or adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Using "@argname@" in kernel-doc produces "argname****" (with "argname" in
bold) in the generated html output, so use the expected kernel-doc
notation of just "@argname" instead.
"Fixes:" lines are added in case Matthew's patch [1] is backported.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605002337.2842659-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/3bc4e779-7a79-42c1-8867-024f643a22fc@infradead.org/T/#m5d2bd9d21fb34f297aa4e7db069f09bc27b89007 [1]
Fixes: 0db9299f48eb ("SG: Move functions to lib/scatterlist.c and add sg chaining allocator helpers")
Fixes: 8d1d4b538bb1 ("scatterlist: inline sg_next()")
Fixes: 18dabf473e15 ("Change table chaining layout")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The fbnic driver reports up-to 11 ranges resulting in the drop of the
last range. This patch increment the value of ETHTOOL_RMON_HIST_MAX to
address this limitation.
Signed-off-by: Mohsin Bashir <mohsin.bashr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610171109.1481229-2-mohsin.bashr@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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... and fix the mount leak when anything's mounted there.
securityfs_recursive_remove becomes an alias for securityfs_remove -
we'll probably need to remove it in a cycle or two.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Invert the FINAL_PUT bit so that test_bit_acquire and clear_bit_unlock
can be used instead of smp_mb.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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No users left and anything that wants it would be better off just
setting DCACHE_DONTCACHE in their ->s_d_flags.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Convert the last user (d_alloc_pseudo()) and be done with that.
Any out-of-tree filesystem using it should switch to d_splice_alias_ops()
or, better yet, check whether it really needs to have ->d_op vary among
its dentries.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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... and store it in ->s_d_flags, to be used by __d_alloc()
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Make sure all values are covered.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250610140020.2227932-1-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Apart from the network and mount namespace all other namespaces expose a
stable inode number and userspace has been relying on that for a very
long time now. It's very much heavily used API. Align the mount
namespace and use a stable inode number from the reserved procfs inode
number space so this is consistent across all namespaces.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250606-work-nsfs-v1-3-b8749c9a8844@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Apart from the network and mount namespace all other namespaces expose a
stable inode number and userspace has been relying on that for a very
long time now. It's very much heavily used API. Align the network
namespace and use a stable inode number from the reserved procfs inode
number space so this is consistent across all namespaces.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250606-work-nsfs-v1-2-b8749c9a8844@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Userspace relies on the root inode numbers to identify the initial
namespaces. That's already a hard dependency. So we cannot change that
anymore. Move the initial inode numbers to a public header.
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/d293fade24b34ccc2f5716b0ff5513e9533cf0c4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250606-work-nsfs-v1-1-b8749c9a8844@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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The commit d6d1e3e6580c ("mm/execmem: Unify early execmem_cache
behaviour") changed early behaviour of execemem ROX cache to allow its
usage in early x86 code that allocates text pages when
CONFIG_MITGATION_ITS is enabled.
The permission management of the pages allocated from execmem for ITS
mitigation is now completely contained in arch/x86/kernel/alternatives.c
and therefore there is no need to special case early allocations in
execmem.
This reverts commit d6d1e3e6580ca35071ad474381f053cbf1fb6414.
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250603111446.2609381-6-rppt@kernel.org
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The of pages with ITS thunks allocated for modules are tracked by an
array in 'struct module'.
Since this is very architecture specific data structure, move it to
'struct mod_arch_specific'.
No functional changes.
Fixes: 872df34d7c51 ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250603111446.2609381-4-rppt@kernel.org
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Backmerging to forward to v6.16-rc1
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
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Some drivers cannot have a fallback, e.g., because the key is held
in hardware. Allow these to be used with ahash by adding the bit
CRYPTO_ALG_NO_FALLBACK.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
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... to be used instead of manually assigning to ->s_d_op.
All in-tree filesystem converted (and field itself is renamed,
so any out-of-tree ones in need of conversion will be caught
by compiler).
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Uses of d_set_d_op() on live dentry can be very dangerous; it is going
to be withdrawn and replaced with saner things.
The best way for a filesystem is to have the default dentry_operations
set at mount time and be done with that - __d_alloc() will use that.
Currently there are two cases when d_set_d_op() is used on a live dentry -
one is procfs, which has several genuinely different dentry_operations
instances (different ->d_revalidate(), etc.) and another is
simple_lookup(), where we would be better off without overriding ->d_op.
For procfs we have d_set_d_op() calls followed by d_splice_alias();
provide a new helper (d_splice_alias_ops(inode, dentry, d_ops)) that would
combine those two, and do the d_set_d_op() part while under ->d_lock.
That eliminates one of the places where ->d_flags had been modified
without holding ->d_lock; current behaviour is not racy, but the reasons
for that are far too brittle. Better move to uniform locking rules and
simpler proof of correctness...
The next commit will convert procfs to use of that helper; it is not
exported and won't be until somebody comes up with convincing modular
user for it.
Again, the best approach is to have default ->d_op and let __d_alloc()
do the right thing; filesystem _may_ need non-uniform ->d_op (procfs
does), but there'd better be good reasons for that.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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It has two possible values - one for "forced lookup" entries, another
for the normal ones. We'd be better off with that as an explicit
flag anyway and in addition to that it opens some fun possibilities
with ->d_op and ->d_flags handling.
[moved PROC_ENTRY_FORCE_LOOKUP to include/linux/proc_fs.h, switched it
to an unused bit - there was a conflict]
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can-next
Marc Kleine-Budde says:
====================
pull-request: can-next 2025-06-10
The first 4 patches are by Vincent Mailhol and prepare the CAN netlink
interface for the introduction of CAN XL configuration.
Geert Uytterhoeven's patch updates the CAN networking documentation.
The last 2 patched are by Davide Caratti and introduce skb drop
reasons in the receive path of several CAN protocols.
* tag 'linux-can-next-for-6.17-20250610' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can-next:
can: add drop reasons in CAN protocols receive path
can: add drop reasons in the receive path of AF_CAN
documentation: networking: can: Document alloc_candev_mqs()
can: netlink: can_changelink(): rename tdc_mask into fd_tdc_flag_provided
can: bittiming: rename can_tdc_is_enabled() into can_fd_tdc_is_enabled()
can: bittiming: rename CAN_CTRLMODE_TDC_MASK into CAN_CTRLMODE_FD_TDC_MASK
can: netlink: replace tabulation by space in assignment
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250610094933.1593081-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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On at least an ASRock 990FX Extreme 4 with a VIA VT6330, the devices
have not yet been enabled by the first time ata_acpi_cbl_80wire() is
called. This means that the ata_for_each_dev loop is never entered,
and a 40 wire cable is assumed.
The VIA controller on this board does not report the cable in the PCI
config space, thus having to fall back to ACPI even though no SATA
bridge is present.
The _GTM values are correctly reported by the firmware through ACPI,
which has already set up faster transfer modes, but due to the above
the controller is forced down to a maximum of UDMA/33.
Resolve this by modifying ata_acpi_cbl_80wire() to directly return the
cable type. First, an unknown cable is assumed which preserves the mode
set by the firmware, and then on subsequent calls when the devices have
been enabled, an 80 wire cable is correctly detected.
Since the function now directly returns the cable type, it is renamed
to ata_acpi_cbl_pata_type().
Signed-off-by: Tasos Sahanidis <tasos@tasossah.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250519085945.1399466-1-tasos@tasossah.com
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
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Currently the function that does this takes a struct file_lock, but
__locks_wake_up_blocks() deals with both locks and leases. Currently
this works because both file_lock and file_lease have the file_lock_core
at the beginning of the struct, but it's fragile to rely on that.
Add a new locks_wake_up_waiter() function and call that from
__locks_wake_up_blocks().
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250602-filelock-6-16-v1-1-7da5b2c930fd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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There is no need to export GPIO_DYNAMIC_* constants, especially via
legacy header which is subject to remove. Move the mentioned constants
to its only user, i.e. gpiolib.c.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250531195801.3632110-3-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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There is no user for the legacy 'struct gpio', remove it for good.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250531195801.3632110-2-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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Remove devm_gpio_request() due to lack of users.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250531212331.3635269-3-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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With the introduction of CAN XL, a new can_xl_tdc_is_enabled() helper
function will be introduced later on. Rename can_tdc_is_enabled() into
can_fd_tdc_is_enabled() to make it more explicit that this helper is
meant for CAN FD.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241112165118.586613-11-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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With the introduction of CAN XL, a new CAN_CTRLMODE_XL_TDC_MASK will
be introduced later on. Because CAN_CTRLMODE_TDC_MASK is not part of
the uapi, rename it to CAN_CTRLMODE_FD_TDC_MASK to make it more
explicit that this mask is meant for CAN FD.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241112165118.586613-10-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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This implements the core of the series and causes the verifier to fall
back to mitigating Spectre v1 using speculation barriers. The approach
was presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].
If we find any forbidden behavior on a speculative path, we insert a
nospec (e.g., lfence speculation barrier on x86) before the instruction
and stop verifying the path. While verifying a speculative path, we can
furthermore stop verification of that path whenever we encounter a
nospec instruction.
A minimal example program would look as follows:
A = true
B = true
if A goto e
f()
if B goto e
unsafe()
e: exit
There are the following speculative and non-speculative paths
(`cur->speculative` and `speculative` referring to the value of the
push_stack() parameters):
- A = true
- B = true
- if A goto e
- A && !cur->speculative && !speculative
- exit
- !A && !cur->speculative && speculative
- f()
- if B goto e
- B && cur->speculative && !speculative
- exit
- !B && cur->speculative && speculative
- unsafe()
If f() contains any unsafe behavior under Spectre v1 and the unsafe
behavior matches `state->speculative &&
error_recoverable_with_nospec(err)`, do_check() will now add a nospec
before f() instead of rejecting the program:
A = true
B = true
if A goto e
nospec
f()
if B goto e
unsafe()
e: exit
Alternatively, the algorithm also takes advantage of nospec instructions
inserted for other reasons (e.g., Spectre v4). Taking the program above
as an example, speculative path exploration can stop before f() if a
nospec was inserted there because of Spectre v4 sanitization.
In this example, all instructions after the nospec are dead code (and
with the nospec they are also dead code speculatively).
For this, it relies on the fact that speculation barriers generally
prevent all later instructions from executing if the speculation was not
correct:
* On Intel x86_64, lfence acts as full speculation barrier, not only as
a load fence [3]:
An LFENCE instruction or a serializing instruction will ensure that
no later instructions execute, even speculatively, until all prior
instructions complete locally. [...] Inserting an LFENCE instruction
after a bounds check prevents later operations from executing before
the bound check completes.
This was experimentally confirmed in [4].
* On AMD x86_64, lfence is dispatch-serializing [5] (requires MSR
C001_1029[1] to be set if the MSR is supported, this happens in
init_amd()). AMD further specifies "A dispatch serializing instruction
forces the processor to retire the serializing instruction and all
previous instructions before the next instruction is executed" [8]. As
dispatch is not specific to memory loads or branches, lfence therefore
also affects all instructions there. Also, if retiring a branch means
it's PC change becomes architectural (should be), this means any
"wrong" speculation is aborted as required for this series.
* ARM's SB speculation barrier instruction also affects "any instruction
that appears later in the program order than the barrier" [6].
* PowerPC's barrier also affects all subsequent instructions [7]:
[...] executing an ori R31,R31,0 instruction ensures that all
instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have completed
before the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes, and that no
subsequent instructions are initiated, even out-of-order, until
after the ori R31,R31,0 instruction completes. The ori R31,R31,0
instruction may complete before storage accesses associated with
instructions preceding the ori R31,R31,0 instruction have been
performed
Regarding the example, this implies that `if B goto e` will not execute
before `if A goto e` completes. Once `if A goto e` completes, the CPU
should find that the speculation was wrong and continue with `exit`.
If there is any other path that leads to `if B goto e` (and therefore
`unsafe()`) without going through `if A goto e`, then a nospec will
still be needed there. However, this patch assumes this other path will
be explored separately and therefore be discovered by the verifier even
if the exploration discussed here stops at the nospec.
This patch furthermore has the unfortunate consequence that Spectre v1
mitigations now only support architectures which implement BPF_NOSPEC.
Before this commit, Spectre v1 mitigations prevented exploits by
rejecting the programs on all architectures. Because some JITs do not
implement BPF_NOSPEC, this patch therefore may regress unpriv BPF's
security to a limited extent:
* The regression is limited to systems vulnerable to Spectre v1, have
unprivileged BPF enabled, and do NOT emit insns for BPF_NOSPEC. The
latter is not the case for x86 64- and 32-bit, arm64, and powerpc
64-bit and they are therefore not affected by the regression.
According to commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip
speculation barrier opcode"), LoongArch is not vulnerable to Spectre
v1 and therefore also not affected by the regression.
* To the best of my knowledge this regression may therefore only affect
MIPS. This is deemed acceptable because unpriv BPF is still disabled
there by default. As stated in a previous commit, BPF_NOSPEC could be
implemented for MIPS based on GCC's speculation_barrier
implementation.
* It is unclear which other architectures (besides x86 64- and 32-bit,
ARM64, PowerPC 64-bit, LoongArch, and MIPS) supported by the kernel
are vulnerable to Spectre v1. Also, it is not clear if barriers are
available on these architectures. Implementing BPF_NOSPEC on these
architectures therefore is non-trivial. Searching GCC and the kernel
for speculation barrier implementations for these architectures
yielded no result.
* If any of those regressed systems is also vulnerable to Spectre v4,
the system was already vulnerable to Spectre v4 attacks based on
unpriv BPF before this patch and the impact is therefore further
limited.
As an alternative to regressing security, one could still reject
programs if the architecture does not emit BPF_NOSPEC (e.g., by removing
the empty BPF_NOSPEC-case from all JITs except for LoongArch where it
appears justified). However, this will cause rejections on these archs
that are likely unfounded in the vast majority of cases.
In the tests, some are now successful where we previously had a
false-positive (i.e., rejection). Change them to reflect where the
nospec should be inserted (using __xlated_unpriv) and modify the error
message if the nospec is able to mitigate a problem that previously
shadowed another problem (in that case __xlated_unpriv does not work,
therefore just add a comment).
Define SPEC_V1 to avoid duplicating this ifdef whenever we check for
nospec insns using __xlated_unpriv, define it here once. This also
improves readability. PowerPC can probably also be added here. However,
omit it for now because the BPF CI currently does not include a test.
Limit it to EPERM, EACCES, and EINVAL (and not everything except for
EFAULT and ENOMEM) as it already has the desired effect for most
real-world programs. Briefly went through all the occurrences of EPERM,
EINVAL, and EACCESS in verifier.c to validate that catching them like
this makes sense.
Thanks to Dustin for their help in checking the vendor documentation.
[1] https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1954/ ("Mitigating
Spectre-PHT using Speculation Barriers in Linux eBPF")
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.00078 ("VeriFence: Lightweight and
Precise Spectre Defenses for Untrusted Linux Kernel Extensions")
[3] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/runtime-speculative-side-channel-mitigations.html
("Managed Runtime Speculative Execution Side Channel Mitigations")
[4] https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3359789.3359837 ("Speculator: a
tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations" -
Section 4.6 "Stopping Speculative Execution")
[5] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/software-techniques-for-managing-speculation.pdf
("White Paper - SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING SPECULATION ON AMD
PROCESSORS - REVISION 5.09.23")
[6] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0597/2020-12/Base-Instructions/SB--Speculation-Barrier-
("SB - Speculation Barrier - Arm Armv8-A A32/T32 Instruction Set
Architecture (2020-12)")
[7] https://wiki.raptorcs.com/w/images/5/5f/OPF_PowerISA_v3.1C.pdf
("Power ISA™ - Version 3.1C - May 26, 2024 - Section 9.2.1 of Book
III")
[8] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/40332.pdf
("AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual Volumes 1–5 - Revision 4.08
- April 2024 - 7.6.4 Serializing Instructions")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Dustin Nguyen <nguyen@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212428.338473-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This is made to clarify that this flag will cause a nospec to be added
after this insn and can therefore be relied upon to reduce speculative
path analysis.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603212024.338154-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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This changes the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC (previously a v4-only barrier)
to always emit a speculation barrier that works against both Spectre v1
AND v4. If mitigation is not needed on an architecture, the backend
should set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4/v1().
As of now, this commit only has the user-visible implication that unpriv
BPF's performance on PowerPC is reduced. This is the case because we
have to emit additional v1 barrier instructions for BPF_NOSPEC now.
This commit is required for a future commit to allow us to rely on
BPF_NOSPEC for Spectre v1 mitigation. As of this commit, the feature
that nospec acts as a v1 barrier is unused.
Commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for
mitigating Spectre v4") noted that mitigation instructions for v1 and v4
might be different on some archs. While this would potentially offer
improved performance on PowerPC, it was dismissed after the following
considerations:
* Only having one barrier simplifies the verifier and allows us to
easily rely on v4-induced barriers for reducing the complexity of
v1-induced speculative path verification.
* For the architectures that implemented BPF_NOSPEC, only PowerPC has
distinct instructions for v1 and v4. Even there, some insns may be
shared between the barriers for v1 and v4 (e.g., 'ori 31,31,0' and
'sync'). If this is still found to impact performance in an
unacceptable way, BPF_NOSPEC can be split into BPF_NOSPEC_V1 and
BPF_NOSPEC_V4 later. As an optimization, we can already skip v1/v4
insns from being emitted for PowerPC with this setup if
bypass_spec_v1/v4 is set.
Vulnerability-status for BPF_NOSPEC-based Spectre mitigations (v4 as of
this commit, v1 in the future) is therefore:
* x86 (32-bit and 64-bit), ARM64, and PowerPC (64-bit): Mitigated - This
patch implements BPF_NOSPEC for these architectures. The previous
v4-only version was supported since commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf:
Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4") and
commit b7540d625094 ("powerpc/bpf: Emit stf barrier instruction
sequences for BPF_NOSPEC").
* LoongArch: Not Vulnerable - Commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix
jit to skip speculation barrier opcode") is the only other past commit
related to BPF_NOSPEC and indicates that the insn is not required
there.
* MIPS: Vulnerable (if unprivileged BPF is enabled) -
Commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode") indicates that it is not vulnerable, but this
contradicts the kernel and Debian documentation. Therefore, I assume
that there exist vulnerable MIPS CPUs (but maybe not from Loongson?).
In the future, BPF_NOSPEC could be implemented for MIPS based on the
GCC speculation_barrier [1]. For now, we rely on unprivileged BPF
being disabled by default.
* Other: Unknown - To the best of my knowledge there is no definitive
information available that indicates that any other arch is
vulnerable. They are therefore left untouched (BPF_NOSPEC is not
implemented, but bypass_spec_v1/v4 is also not set).
I did the following testing to ensure the insn encoding is correct:
* ARM64:
* 'dsb nsh; isb' was successfully tested with the BPF CI in [2]
* 'sb' locally using QEMU v7.2.15 -cpu max (emitted sb insn is
executed for example with './test_progs -t verifier_array_access')
* PowerPC: The following configs were tested locally with ppc64le QEMU
v8.2 '-machine pseries -cpu POWER9':
* STF_BARRIER_EIEIO + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
* STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
* STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on) + CONFIG_PPC_BOOK32_64
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_EIEIO
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_SYNC_ORI (forced on)
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_FALLBACK (forced on)
* CONFIG_PPC_E500 (forced on) + STF_BARRIER_NONE (forced on)
Most of those cobinations should not occur in practice, but I was not
able to get an PPC e6500 rootfs (for testing PPC_E500 without forcing
it on). In any case, this should ensure that there are no unexpected
conflicts between the insns when combined like this. Individual v1/v4
barriers were already emitted elsewhere.
Hari's ack is for the PowerPC changes only.
[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commit;h=29b74545531f6afbee9fc38c267524326dbfbedf
("MIPS: Add speculation_barrier support")
[2] https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/pull/8576
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211703.337860-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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JITs can set bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() if they want the verifier to
skip analysis/patching for the respective vulnerability. For v4, this
will reduce the number of barriers the verifier inserts. For v1, it
allows more programs to be accepted.
The primary motivation for this is to not regress unpriv BPF's
performance on ARM64 in a future commit where BPF_NOSPEC is also used
against Spectre v1.
This has the user-visible change that v1-induced rejections on
non-vulnerable PowerPC CPUs are avoided.
For now, this does not change the semantics of BPF_NOSPEC. It is still a
v4-only barrier and must not be implemented if bypass_spec_v4 is always
true for the arch. Changing it to a v1 AND v4-barrier is done in a
future commit.
As an alternative to bypass_spec_v1/v4, one could introduce NOSPEC_V1
AND NOSPEC_V4 instructions and allow backends to skip their lowering as
suggested by commit f5e81d111750 ("bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction
for mitigating Spectre v4"). Adding bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1/v4() was
found to be preferable for the following reason:
* bypass_spec_v1/v4 benefits non-vulnerable CPUs: Always performing the
same analysis (not taking into account whether the current CPU is
vulnerable), needlessly restricts users of CPUs that are not
vulnerable. The only use case for this would be portability-testing,
but this can later be added easily when needed by allowing users to
force bypass_spec_v1/v4 to false.
* Portability is still acceptable: Directly disabling the analysis
instead of skipping the lowering of BPF_NOSPEC(_V1/V4) might allow
programs on non-vulnerable CPUs to be accepted while the program will
be rejected on vulnerable CPUs. With the fallback to speculation
barriers for Spectre v1 implemented in a future commit, this will only
affect programs that do variable stack-accesses or are very complex.
For PowerPC, the SEC_FTR checking in bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v4() is based
on the check that was previously located in the BPF_NOSPEC case.
For LoongArch, it would likely be safe to set both
bpf_jit_bypass_spec_v1() and _v4() according to
commit a6f6a95f2580 ("LoongArch, bpf: Fix jit to skip speculation
barrier opcode"). This is omitted here as I am unable to do any testing
for LoongArch.
Hari's ack concerns the PowerPC part only.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@fau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603211318.337474-1-luis.gerhorst@fau.de
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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One of key items in mprog API is revision for prog list. The revision
number will be increased if the prog list changed, e.g., attach, detach
or replace.
Add 'revisions' field to struct cgroup_bpf, representing revisions for
all cgroup related attachment types. The initial revision value is
set to 1, the same as kernel mprog implementations.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250606163136.2428732-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
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The Intel i40e, iavf, and ice drivers all include a definition of the
packet classifier filter types used to program RSS hash enable bits. For
i40e, these bits are used for both the PF and VF to configure the PFQF_HENA
and VFQF_HENA registers.
For ice and iAVF, these bits are used to communicate the desired hash
enable filter over virtchnl via its struct virtchnl_rss_hashena. The
virtchnl.h header makes no mention of where the bit definitions reside.
Maintaining a separate copy of these bits across three drivers is
cumbersome. Move the definition to libie as a new pctype.h header file.
Each driver can include this, and drop its own definition.
The ice implementation also defined a ICE_AVF_FLOW_FIELD_INVALID, intending
to use this to indicate when there were no hash enable bits set. This is
confusing, since the enumeration is using bit positions. A value of 0
*should* indicate the first bit. Instead, rewrite the code that uses
ICE_AVF_FLOW_FIELD_INVALID to just check if the avf_hash is zero. From
context this should be clear that we're checking if none of the bits are
set.
The values are kept as bit positions instead of encoding the BIT_ULL
directly into their value. While most users will simply use BIT_ULL
immediately, i40e uses the macros both with BIT_ULL and test_bit/set_bit
calls.
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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