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commit 3e35142ef99fe6b4fe5d834ad43ee13cca10a2dc upstream.
Since commit d1bcae833b32f1 ("ELF: Don't generate unused section
symbols") [1], binutils (v2.36+) started dropping section symbols that
it thought were unused. This isn't an issue in general, but with
kexec_file.c, gcc is placing kexec_arch_apply_relocations[_add] into a
separate .text.unlikely section and the section symbol ".text.unlikely"
is being dropped. Due to this, recordmcount is unable to find a non-weak
symbol in .text.unlikely to generate a relocation record against.
Address this by dropping the weak attribute from these functions.
Instead, follow the existing pattern of having architectures #define the
name of the function they want to override in their headers.
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=d1bcae833b32f1
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: arch/s390/include/asm/kexec.h needs linux/module.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220519091237.676736-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c01d4d0a82b71857be7449380338bc53dde2da92 upstream.
random.c ratelimits how much it warns about uninitialized urandom reads
using __ratelimit(). When the RNG is finally initialized, it prints the
number of missed messages due to ratelimiting.
It has been this way since that functionality was introduced back in
2018. Recently, cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel
unseeded randomness") put a bit more stress on the urandom ratelimiting,
which teased out a bug in the implementation.
Specifically, when under pressure, __ratelimit() will print its own
message and reset the count back to 0, making the final message at the
end less useful. Secondly, it does so as a pr_warn(), which apparently
is undesirable for people's CI.
Fortunately, __ratelimit() has the RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE flag exactly
for this purpose, so we set the flag.
Fixes: 4e00b339e264 ("random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Reported-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ff2047fb755d4415ec3c70ac799889371151796d upstream.
Drop support for these ioctls:
* PIO_FONT, PIO_FONTX
* GIO_FONT, GIO_FONTX
* PIO_FONTRESET
As was demonstrated by commit 90bfdeef83f1 (tty: make FONTX ioctl use
the tty pointer they were actually passed), these ioctls are not used
from userspace, as:
1) they used to be broken (set up font on current console, not the open
one) and racy (before the commit above)
2) KDFONTOP ioctl is used for years instead
Note that PIO_FONTRESET is defunct on most systems as VGA_CONSOLE is set
on them for ages. That turns on BROKEN_GRAPHICS_PROGRAMS which makes
PIO_FONTRESET just return an error.
We are removing KD_FONT_FLAG_OLD here as it was used only by these
removed ioctls. kd.h header exists both in kernel and uapi headers, so
we can remove the kernel one completely. Everyone includeing kd.h will
now automatically get the uapi one.
There are now unused definitions of the ioctl numbers and "struct
consolefontdesc" in kd.h, but as it is a uapi header, I am not touching
these.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210105120239.28031-8-jslaby@suse.cz
Cc: guodaxing <guodaxing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 901c7280ca0d5e2b4a8929fbe0bfb007ac2a6544 upstream.
Halil Pasic points out [1] that the full revert of that commit (revert
in bddac7c1e02b), and that a partial revert that only reverts the
problematic case, but still keeps some of the cleanups is probably
better. 
And that partial revert [2] had already been verified by Oleksandr
Natalenko to also fix the issue, I had just missed that in the long
discussion.
So let's reinstate the cleanups from commit aa6f8dcbab47 ("swiotlb:
rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE""), and effectively only
revert the part that caused problems.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220328013731.017ae3e3.pasic@linux.ibm.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220324055732.GB12078@lst.de/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4386660.LvFx2qVVIh@natalenko.name/ [3]
Suggested-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[OP: backport to 4.14: apply swiotlb_tbl_map_single() changes in lib/swiotlb.c]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ddbd89deb7d32b1fbb879f48d68fda1a8ac58e8e upstream.
The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
cve-2018-1000204.
A short description of what happens follows:
1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
is not reading from the device.
2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
allocated with GFP_ZERO.
3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
and the buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
(that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
zeros. Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
the user-space buffer.
5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
ain't all zeros and fails.
One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
behaved).
Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
impact of the extra bounce.
Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
[OP: backport to 4.14: apply swiotlb_tbl_map_single() changes in lib/swiotlb.c]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 39e0f991a62ed5efabd20711a7b6e7da92603170 upstream.
add_bootloader_randomness() and the variables it touches are only used
during __init and not after, so mark these as __init. At the same time,
unexport this, since it's only called by other __init code that's
built-in.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5ad7dd882e45d7fe432c32e896e2aaa0b21746ea upstream.
randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains
the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks
just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top().
And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no
need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like
the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct.
So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar
randomize_stack_top() function.
This commit contains no actual code changes.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream.
Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be
used with unsigned values.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7782cfeca7d420e8bb707613d4cfb0f7ff29bb3a upstream.
Accoriding to the kernel style guide, having `extern` on functions in
headers is old school and deprecated, and doesn't add anything. So remove
them from random.h, and tidy up the file a little bit too.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f14062bb14b0fcfcc21e6dc7d5b5c0d25966164 upstream.
Currently, start_kernel() adds latent entropy and the command line to
the entropy bool *after* the RNG has been initialized, deferring when
it's actually used by things like stack canaries until the next time
the pool is seeded. This surely is not intended.
Rather than splitting up which entropy gets added where and when between
start_kernel() and random_init(), just do everything in random_init(),
which should eliminate these kinds of bugs in the future.
While we're at it, rename the awkwardly titled "rand_initialize()" to
the more standard "random_init()" nomenclature.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e73aaae2fa9024832e1f42e30c787c7baf61d014 upstream.
The SipHash family of permutations is currently used in three places:
- siphash.c itself, used in the ordinary way it was intended.
- random32.c, in a construction from an anonymous contributor.
- random.c, as part of its fast_mix function.
Each one of these places reinvents the wheel with the same C code, same
rotation constants, and same symmetry-breaking constants.
This commit tidies things up a bit by placing macros for the
permutations and constants into siphash.h, where each of the three .c
users can access them. It also leaves a note dissuading more users of
them from emerging.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d5767057c9a76a29f073dad66b7fa12a90e8c748 ]
ext2_swab() is defined locally in lib/find_bit.c However it is not
specific to ext2, neither to bitmaps.
There are many potential users of it, so rename it to just swab() and
move to include/uapi/linux/swab.h
ABI guarantees that size of unsigned long corresponds to BITS_PER_LONG,
therefore drop unneeded cast.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103202846.21616-1-yury.norov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Cc: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1366992e16bddd5e2d9a561687f367f9f802e2e4 upstream.
The addition of random_get_entropy_fallback() provides access to
whichever time source has the highest frequency, which is useful for
gathering entropy on platforms without available cycle counters. It's
not necessarily as good as being able to quickly access a cycle counter
that the CPU has, but it's still something, even when it falls back to
being jiffies-based.
In the event that a given arch does not define get_cycles(), falling
back to the get_cycles() default implementation that returns 0 is really
not the best we can do. Instead, at least calling
random_get_entropy_fallback() would be preferable, because that always
needs to return _something_, even falling back to jiffies eventually.
It's not as though random_get_entropy_fallback() is super high precision
or guaranteed to be entropic, but basically anything that's not zero all
the time is better than returning zero all the time.
Finally, since random_get_entropy_fallback() is used during extremely
early boot when randomizing freelists in mm_init(), it can be called
before timekeeping has been initialized. In that case there really is
nothing we can do; jiffies hasn't even started ticking yet. So just give
up and return 0.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b0c3e796f24b588b862b61ce235d3c9417dc8983 upstream.
Some implementations were returning type `unsigned long`, while others
that fell back to get_cycles() were implicitly returning a `cycles_t` or
an untyped constant int literal. That makes for weird and confusing
code, and basically all code in the kernel already handled it like it
was an `unsigned long`. I recently tried to handle it as the largest
type it could be, a `cycles_t`, but doing so doesn't really help with
much.
Instead let's just make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long all
the time. This also matches the commonly used `arch_get_random_long()`
function, so now RDRAND and RDTSC return the same sized integer, which
means one can fallback to the other more gracefully.
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream.
We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only
has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard
atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also
unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional
builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification
handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but
given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this
anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the
simplification we receive here.
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
[Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.]
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 64276a9939ff414f2f0db38036cf4e1a0a703394 upstream.
Rather than hard coding various lengths, we can use the right constants.
Strings should be `char *` while buffers should be `u8 *`. Rather than
have a nonsensical and unused maxlength, just remove it. Finally, use
snprintf instead of sprintf, just out of good hygiene.
As well, remove the old comment about returning a binary UUID via the
binary sysctl syscall. That syscall was removed from the kernel in 5.5,
and actually, the "uuid_strategy" function and related infrastructure
for even serving it via the binary sysctl syscall was removed with
894d2491153a ("sysctl drivers: Remove dead binary sysctl support") back
in 2.6.33.
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3191dd5a1179ef0fad5a050a1702ae98b6251e8f upstream.
For the irq randomness fast pool, rather than having to use expensive
atomics, which were visibly the most expensive thing in the entire irq
handler, simply take care of the extreme edge case of resetting count to
zero in the cpuhp online handler, just after workqueues have been
reenabled. This simplifies the code a bit and lets us use vanilla
variables rather than atomics, and performance should be improved.
As well, very early on when the CPU comes up, while interrupts are still
disabled, we clear out the per-cpu crng and its batches, so that it
always starts with fresh randomness.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b777c38239fec5a528e59f55b379e31b1a187524 upstream.
add_hwgenerator_randomness() is a function implemented and documented
inside of random.c. It is the way that hardware RNGs push data into it.
Therefore, it should be declared in random.h. Otherwise sparse complains
with:
random.c:1137:6: warning: symbol 'add_hwgenerator_randomness' was not declared. Should it be static?
The alternative would be to include hw_random.h into random.c, but that
wouldn't really be good for anything except slowing down compile time.
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fd50d71f94fb1c8614098949db068cd4c8dbb91d upstream.
This patch move the define for hwrng's miscdev minor number to
include/linux/miscdevice.h.
It's better that all minor number are in the same place.
Rename it to HWRNG_MINOR (from RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR) in he process since
no other miscdev define have MISCDEV in their name.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3347fa0928210d96aaa2bd6cd5a8391d5e630873 upstream.
Workqueue is currently initialized in an early init call; however,
there are cases where early boot code has to be split and reordered to
come after workqueue initialization or the same code path which makes
use of workqueues is used both before workqueue initailization and
after. The latter cases have to gate workqueue usages with
keventd_up() tests, which is nasty and easy to get wrong.
Workqueue usages have become widespread and it'd be a lot more
convenient if it can be used very early from boot. This patch splits
workqueue initialization into two steps. workqueue_init_early() which
sets up the basic data structures so that workqueues can be created
and work items queued, and workqueue_init() which actually brings up
workqueues online and starts executing queued work items. The former
step can be done very early during boot once memory allocation,
cpumasks and idr are initialized. The latter right after kthreads
become available.
This allows work item queueing and canceling from very early boot
which is what most of these use cases want.
* As systemd_wq being initialized doesn't indicate that workqueue is
fully online anymore, update keventd_up() to test wq_online instead.
The follow-up patches will get rid of all its usages and the
function itself.
* Flushing doesn't make sense before workqueue is fully initialized.
The flush functions trigger WARN and return immediately before fully
online.
* Work items are never in-flight before fully online. Canceling can
always succeed by skipping the flush step.
* Some code paths can no longer assume to be called with irq enabled
as irq is disabled during early boot. Use irqsave/restore
operations instead.
v2: Watchdog init, which requires timer to be running, moved from
workqueue_init_early() to workqueue_init().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFx0vPuMuxn00rBSM192n-Du5uxy+4AvKa0SBSOVJeuCGg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6071a6c0fba2d747742cadcbb3ba26ed756ed73b upstream.
This really adds nothing at all useful.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 66e4c2b9541503d721e936cc3898c9f25f4591ff upstream.
Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of
crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we
can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a
day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about
various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and
then never again.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 703f7066f40599c290babdb79dd61319264987e9 upstream.
Since commit
ee3e00e9e7101 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter")
the irq_flags argument is no longer used.
Remove unused irq_flags.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 253d3194c2b58152fe830fd27c2fd83ebc6fe5ee upstream.
Some architectures (e.g. arm64) can have heterogeneous CPUs, and the
boot CPU may be able to provide entropy while secondary CPUs cannot. On
such systems, arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long()
will fail unless support for RNG instructions has been detected on all
CPUs. This prevents the boot CPU from being able to provide
(potentially) trusted entropy when seeding the primary CRNG.
To make it possible to seed the primary CRNG from the boot CPU without
adversely affecting the runtime versions of arch_get_random_long() and
arch_get_random_seed_long(), this patch adds new early versions of the
functions used when initializing the primary CRNG.
Default implementations are provided atop of the existing
arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long() so that only
architectures with such constraints need to provide the new helpers.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210130015.17664-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 904caa6413c87aacbf7d0682da617c39ca18cf1a upstream.
We must not use the pointer output without validating the
success of the random read.
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-7-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 66f5ae899ada79c0e9a3d8d954f93a72344cd350 upstream.
Keep the generic fallback versions in sync with the other architecture
specific implementations and use the proper name for false.
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-6-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 647f50d5d9d933b644b29c54f13ac52af1b1774d upstream.
The arm64 version of archrandom.h will need to be able to test for
support and read the random number without preemption, so a separate
query predicate is not practical.
Since this part of the generic interface is unused, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110145422.49141-5-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 9def051018c08e65c532822749e857eb4b2e12e7 upstream.
Deduplicate le32_to_cpu_array() and cpu_to_le32_array() by moving them
to the generic header.
No functional change implied.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 428826f5358c922dc378830a1717b682c0823160 upstream.
Introducing a chosen node, rng-seed, which is an entropy that can be
passed to kernel called very early to increase initial device
randomness. Bootloader should provide this entropy and the value is
read from /chosen/rng-seed in DT.
Obtain of_fdt_crc32 for CRC check after early_init_dt_scan_nodes(),
since early_init_dt_scan_chosen() would modify fdt to erase rng-seed.
Add a new interface add_bootloader_randomness() for rng-seed use case.
Depends on whether the seed is trustworthy, rng seed would be passed to
add_hwgenerator_randomness(). Otherwise it would be passed to
add_device_randomness(). Decision is controlled by kernel config
RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> # drivers/char/random.c
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e756f423af808b6571fed3144747db2ef7fa1c5 upstream.
Some architectures set up CFLAGS for linux decompressor phase from
scratch and do not include GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS. Since "latent_entropy"
variable declaration is generated by the plugin code itself including
linux/random.h in decompressor code then would cause a build
error. E.g. on s390:
In file included from ./include/linux/net.h:22,
from ./include/linux/skbuff.h:29,
from ./include/linux/if_ether.h:23,
from ./arch/s390/include/asm/diag.h:12,
from arch/s390/boot/startup.c:8:
./include/linux/random.h: In function 'add_latent_entropy':
./include/linux/random.h:26:39: error: 'latent_entropy' undeclared
(first use in this function); did you mean 'add_latent_entropy'?
26 | add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| add_latent_entropy
./include/linux/random.h:26:39: note: each undeclared identifier is
reported only once for each function it appears in
The build error is triggered by commit a80313ff91ab ("s390/kernel:
introduce .dma sections") which made it into 5.2 merge window.
To address that avoid using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY in
favour of LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN definition which is defined as a
part of gcc plugins cflags and hence reflect more accurately when gcc
plugin is active. Besides that it is also used for similar purpose in
linux/compiler-gcc.h for latent_entropy attribute definition.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d55535232c3dbde9a523a9d10d68670f5fe5dec3 upstream.
Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
canary initialization here as well.
Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools during setup_arch()),
or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 9a47249d444d344051c7c0e909fad0e88515a5c2 upstream.
It is very useful to be able to know whether or not get_random_bytes_wait
/ wait_for_random_bytes is going to block or not, or whether plain
get_random_bytes is going to return good randomness or bad randomness.
The particular use case is for mitigating certain attacks in WireGuard.
A handshake packet arrives and is queued up. Elsewhere a worker thread
takes items from the queue and processes them. In replying to these
items, it needs to use some random data, and it has to be good random
data. If we simply block until we can have good randomness, then it's
possible for an attacker to fill the queue up with packets waiting to be
processed. Upon realizing the queue is full, WireGuard will detect that
it's under a denial of service attack, and behave accordingly. A better
approach is just to drop incoming handshake packets if the crng is not
yet initialized.
This patch, therefore, makes that information directly accessible.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 753d433b586d1d43c487e3d660f5778c7c8d58ea upstream.
Currently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'.
If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes().
This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG
in the first place.
There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().
Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number
of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.
Acked-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 25e3fca492035a2e1d4ac6e3b1edd9c1acd48897 upstream.
In the unfortunate event that a developer fails to check the return
value of get_random_bytes_wait, or simply wants to make a "best effort"
attempt, for whatever that's worth, it's much better to still fill the
buffer with _something_ rather than catastrophically failing in the case
of an interruption. This is both a defense in depth measure against
inevitable programming bugs, as well as a means of making the API a bit
more useful.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit da9ba564bd683374b8d319756f312821b8265b06 upstream.
These functions are simple convenience wrappers that call
wait_for_random_bytes before calling the respective get_random_*
function.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit e297a783e41560b44e3c14f38e420cba518113b8 upstream.
This enables users of get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long} to wait until
the pool is ready before using this function, in case they actually want
to have reliable randomness.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit c440408cf6901eeb2c09563397e24a9097907078 upstream.
Many times, when a user wants a random number, he wants a random number
of a guaranteed size. So, thinking of get_random_int and get_random_long
in terms of get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 makes it much easier to
achieve this. It also makes the code simpler.
On 32-bit platforms, get_random_int and get_random_long are both aliased
to get_random_u32. On 64-bit platforms, int->u32 and long->u64.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 8d50cdf8b8341770bc6367bce40c0c1bb0e1d5b3 upstream
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 2accfa69050c2a0d6fc6106f609208b3e9622b26 upstream.
0-day is not happy that there is no prototype for cpu_show_srbds():
drivers/base/cpu.c:565:16: error: no previous prototype for 'cpu_show_srbds'
Fixes: 7e5b3c267d25 ("x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200617141410.93338-1-linux@roeck-us.net
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0a8e98305f63deaf0a799d5cf5532cc83af035d1 upstream.
Since commit dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to
check correct value") buffered writes fail on S29GL064N. This is
because, on S29GL064N, reads return 0xFF at the end of DQ polling for
write completion, where as, chip_good() check expects actual data
written to the last location to be returned post DQ polling completion.
Fix is to revert to using chip_good() for S29GL064N which only checks
for DQ lines to settle down to determine write completion.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b687c259-6413-26c9-d4c9-b3afa69ea124@pengutronix.de/
Fixes: dfeae1073583("mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change write buffer to check correct value")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami.t@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20220323170458.5608-3-ikegami.t@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 0dfe54071d7c828a02917b595456bfde1afdddc9 ]
The nodemask routines had mixed return values that provided potentially
signed return values that could never happen. This was leading to the
compiler getting confusing about the range of possible return values
(it was thinking things could be negative where they could not be). Fix
all the nodemask routines that should be returning unsigned
(or bool) values. Silences:
mm/swapfile.c: In function ‘setup_swap_info’:
mm/swapfile.c:2291:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds of ‘struct plist_node[]’ [-Werror=array-bounds]
2291 | p->avail_lists[i].prio = 1;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
In file included from mm/swapfile.c:16:
./include/linux/swap.h:292:27: note: while referencing ‘avail_lists’
292 | struct plist_node avail_lists[]; /*
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220414150855.2407137-3-dinechin@redhat.com/
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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commit 37462a920392cb86541650a6f4121155f11f1199 upstream.
With gcc version 12.0.1 20220401 (Red Hat 12.0.1-0), building with
defconfig results in the following compilation error:
| CC mm/swapfile.o
| mm/swapfile.c: In function `setup_swap_info':
| mm/swapfile.c:2291:47: error: array subscript -1 is below array bounds
| of `struct plist_node[]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
| 2291 | p->avail_lists[i].prio = 1;
| | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~
| In file included from mm/swapfile.c:16:
| ./include/linux/swap.h:292:27: note: while referencing `avail_lists'
| 292 | struct plist_node avail_lists[]; /*
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~
This is due to the compiler detecting that the mask in
node_states[__state] could theoretically be zero, which would lead to
first_node() returning -1 through find_first_bit.
I believe that the warning/error is legitimate. I first tried adding a
test to check that the node mask is not emtpy, since a similar test exists
in the case where MAX_NUMNODES == 1.
However, adding the if statement causes other warnings to appear in
for_each_cpu_node_but, because it introduces a dangling else ambiguity.
And unfortunately, GCC is not smart enough to detect that the added test
makes the case where (node) == -1 impossible, so it still complains with
the same message.
This is why I settled on replacing that with a harmless, but relatively
useless (node) >= 0 test. Based on the warning for the dangling else, I
also decided to fix the case where MAX_NUMNODES == 1 by moving the
condition inside the for loop. It will still only be tested once. This
ensures that the meaning of an else following for_each_node_mask or
derivatives would not silently have a different meaning depending on the
configuration.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414150855.2407137-3-dinechin@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christophe de Dinechin <christophe@dinechin.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe de Dinechin <dinechin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 4a3d2717d140401df7501a95e454180831a0c5af upstream.
xtensa is the last user of the PT_SINGLESTEP flag. Changing tsk->ptrace in
user_enable_single_step and user_disable_single_step without locking could
potentiallly cause problems.
So use a thread info flag instead of a flag in tsk->ptrace. Use TIF_SINGLESTEP
that xtensa already had defined but unused.
Remove the definitions of PT_SINGLESTEP and PT_BLOCKSTEP as they have no more users.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220505182645.497868-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 85db6352fc8a158a893151baa1716463d34a20d0 ]
The find_next_netdev_feature() macro gets the "remaining length",
not bit index.
Passing "bit - 1" for the following iteration is wrong as it skips
the adjacent bit. Pass "bit" instead.
Fixes: 3b89ea9c5902 ("net: Fix for_each_netdev_feature on Big endian")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504080914.1918-1-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
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commit e5be15767e7e284351853cbaba80cde8620341fb upstream.
The function hex2bin is used to load cryptographic keys into device
mapper targets dm-crypt and dm-integrity. It should take constant time
independent on the processed data, so that concurrently running
unprivileged code can't infer any information about the keys via
microarchitectural convert channels.
This patch changes the function hex_to_bin so that it contains no
branches and no memory accesses.
Note that this shouldn't cause performance degradation because the size
of the new function is the same as the size of the old function (on
x86-64) - and the new function causes no branch misprediction penalties.
I compile-tested this function with gcc on aarch64 alpha arm hppa hppa64
i386 ia64 m68k mips32 mips64 powerpc powerpc64 riscv sh4 s390x sparc32
sparc64 x86_64 and with clang on aarch64 arm hexagon i386 mips32 mips64
powerpc powerpc64 s390x sparc32 sparc64 x86_64 to verify that there are
no branches in the generated code.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 2618a0dae09ef37728dab89ff60418cbe25ae6bd upstream.
With GCC 12, -Wstringop-overread was warning about an implicit cast from
char[6] to char[8]. However, the extra 2 bytes are always thrown away,
alignment doesn't matter, and the risk of hitting the edge of unallocated
memory has been accepted, so this prototype can just be converted to a
regular char *. Silences:
net/core/dev.c: In function ‘bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp’: net/core/dev.c:4618:21: warning: ‘ether_addr_equal_64bits’ reading 8 bytes from a region of size 6 [-Wstringop-overread]
4618 | orig_host = ether_addr_equal_64bits(eth->h_dest, > skb->dev->dev_addr);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
net/core/dev.c:4618:21: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘const u8[8]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[8]’}
net/core/dev.c:4618:21: note: referencing argument 2 of type ‘const u8[8]’ {aka ‘const unsigned char[8]’}
In file included from net/core/dev.c:91: include/linux/etherdevice.h:375:20: note: in a call to function ‘ether_addr_equal_64bits’
375 | static inline bool ether_addr_equal_64bits(const u8 addr1[6+2],
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Tested-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220212090811.uuzk6d76agw2vv73@pengutronix.de
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 570b1cac477643cbf01a45fa5d018430a1fddbce upstream.
There are some duplicated codes to validate the block
size in block drivers. This limitation actually comes
from block layer, so this patch tries to add a new block
layer helper for that.
Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026144015.188-2-xieyongji@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b37a466837393af72fe8bcb8f1436410f3f173f3 upstream.
Add the case if dev is NULL in dev_{put, hold}, so the caller doesn't
need to care whether dev is NULL or not.
Signed-off-by: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba2689234be92024e5635d30fe744f4853ad97db upstream.
Some CPUs affected by Spectre-BHB need a sequence of branches, or a
firmware call to be run before any indirect branch. This needs to go
in the vectors. No CPU needs both.
While this can be patched in, it would run on all CPUs as there is a
single set of vectors. If only one part of a big/little combination is
affected, the unaffected CPUs have to run the mitigation too.
Create extra vectors that include the sequence. Subsequent patches will
allow affected CPUs to select this set of vectors. Later patches will
modify the loop count to match what the CPU requires.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ac77998b7ac3044f0509b097da9637184598980d ]
According to HW spec the field "size" should be 16 bits
in bufferx register.
Fixes: e281682bf294 ("net/mlx5_core: HW data structs/types definitions cleanup")
Signed-off-by: Mohammad Kabat <mohammadkab@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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