<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/tools/testing, branch v4.14.18</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>bpf: reject stores into ctx via st and xadd</title>
<updated>2018-01-31T13:03:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-28T23:36:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a17536742bb9a5df561cce54c7cc3cd1e2cd480d'/>
<id>a17536742bb9a5df561cce54c7cc3cd1e2cd480d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ]

Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context
via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we
also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.

The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or
BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than
that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add
test cases as well for BPF selftests.

Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ upstream commit f37a8cb84cce18762e8f86a70bd6a49a66ab964c ]

Alexei found that verifier does not reject stores into context
via BPF_ST instead of BPF_STX. And while looking at it, we
also should not allow XADD variant of BPF_STX.

The context rewriter is only assuming either BPF_LDX_MEM- or
BPF_STX_MEM-type operations, thus reject anything other than
that so that assumptions in the rewriter properly hold. Add
test cases as well for BPF selftests.

Fixes: d691f9e8d440 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:45:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-12T01:16:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a6e7a27d01eee812e37030aa083ac7bbba762c5'/>
<id>5a6e7a27d01eee812e37030aa083ac7bbba762c5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 upstream.

This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do.
It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as
expected.

If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling,
running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate,
and vsyscall=native are helpful.

(Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their
 vDSO equivalents.)

Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three
vsyscall modes.  Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure
that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config
option as to which mode you're in.  It's quite easy to mess up
the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates
or vice versa.

Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched
kernels.  It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress
vsyscalls.

CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 352909b49ba0d74929b96af6dfbefc854ab6ebb5 upstream.

This tests that the vsyscall entries do what they're expected to do.
It also confirms that attempts to read the vsyscall page behave as
expected.

If changes are made to the vsyscall code or its memory map handling,
running this test in all three of vsyscall=none, vsyscall=emulate,
and vsyscall=native are helpful.

(Because it's easy, this also compares the vsyscall results to their
 vDSO equivalents.)

Note to KAISER backporters: please test this under all three
vsyscall modes.  Also, in the emulate and native modes, make sure
that test_vsyscall_64 agrees with the command line or config
option as to which mode you're in.  It's quite easy to mess up
the kernel such that native mode accidentally emulates
or vice versa.

Greg, etc: please backport this to all your Meltdown-patched
kernels.  It'll help make sure the patches didn't regress
vsyscalls.

CSigned-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b9c5a174c1d60fd7774461d518aa75598b1d8fd.1515719552.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: arsh is not supported in 32 bit alu thus reject it</title>
<updated>2018-01-17T08:45:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-10T19:04:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a2e0b5db9b581f78155bd4999b5bb2d0d8037eda'/>
<id>a2e0b5db9b581f78155bd4999b5bb2d0d8037eda</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f upstream.

The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:

  0: (18) r0 = 0x0
  2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
  3: (cc) (u32) r0 s&gt;&gt;= (u32) r0
  4: (95) exit

Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 7891a87efc7116590eaba57acc3c422487802c6f upstream.

The following snippet was throwing an 'unknown opcode cc' warning
in BPF interpreter:

  0: (18) r0 = 0x0
  2: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r0
  3: (cc) (u32) r0 s&gt;&gt;= (u32) r0
  4: (95) exit

Although a number of JITs do support BPF_ALU | BPF_ARSH | BPF_{K,X}
generation, not all of them do and interpreter does neither. We can
leave existing ones and implement it later in bpf-next for the
remaining ones, but reject this properly in verifier for the time
being.

Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Reported-by: syzbot+93c4904c5c70348a6890@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ldt: Make the LDT mapping RO</title>
<updated>2018-01-02T19:31:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-15T19:35:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e08acdb9620bcd4c55128cad07e625cd1825e533'/>
<id>e08acdb9620bcd4c55128cad07e625cd1825e533</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9f5cb6b32d9e0a3a7453222baaf15664d92adbf2 upstream.

Now that the LDT mapping is in a known area when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is
enabled its a primary target for attacks, if a user space interface fails
to validate a write address correctly. That can never happen, right?

The SDM states:

    If the segment descriptors in the GDT or an LDT are placed in ROM, the
    processor can enter an indefinite loop if software or the processor
    attempts to update (write to) the ROM-based segment descriptors. To
    prevent this problem, set the accessed bits for all segment descriptors
    placed in a ROM. Also, remove operating-system or executive code that
    attempts to modify segment descriptors located in ROM.

So its a valid approach to set the ACCESS bit when setting up the LDT entry
and to map the table RO. Fixup the selftest so it can handle that new mode.

Remove the manual ACCESS bit setter in set_tls_desc() as this is now
pointless. Folded the patch from Peter Ziljstra.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9f5cb6b32d9e0a3a7453222baaf15664d92adbf2 upstream.

Now that the LDT mapping is in a known area when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is
enabled its a primary target for attacks, if a user space interface fails
to validate a write address correctly. That can never happen, right?

The SDM states:

    If the segment descriptors in the GDT or an LDT are placed in ROM, the
    processor can enter an indefinite loop if software or the processor
    attempts to update (write to) the ROM-based segment descriptors. To
    prevent this problem, set the accessed bits for all segment descriptors
    placed in a ROM. Also, remove operating-system or executive code that
    attempts to modify segment descriptors located in ROM.

So its a valid approach to set the ACCESS bit when setting up the LDT entry
and to map the table RO. Fixup the selftest so it can handle that new mode.

Remove the manual ACCESS bit setter in set_tls_desc() as this is now
pointless. Folded the patch from Peter Ziljstra.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/ldt: Prevent LDT inheritance on exec</title>
<updated>2017-12-29T16:53:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-14T11:27:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2c8e9099aecec2baaac8d34c7b823493f2d0eeed'/>
<id>2c8e9099aecec2baaac8d34c7b823493f2d0eeed</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a4828f81037f491b2cc986595e3a969a6eeb2fb5 upstream.

The LDT is inherited across fork() or exec(), but that makes no sense
at all because exec() is supposed to start the process clean.

The reason why this happens is that init_new_context_ldt() is called from
init_new_context() which obviously needs to be called for both fork() and
exec().

It would be surprising if anything relies on that behaviour, so it seems to
be safe to remove that misfeature.

Split the context initialization into two parts. Clear the LDT pointer and
initialize the mutex from the general context init and move the LDT
duplication to arch_dup_mmap() which is only called on fork().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a4828f81037f491b2cc986595e3a969a6eeb2fb5 upstream.

The LDT is inherited across fork() or exec(), but that makes no sense
at all because exec() is supposed to start the process clean.

The reason why this happens is that init_new_context_ldt() is called from
init_new_context() which obviously needs to be called for both fork() and
exec().

It would be surprising if anything relies on that behaviour, so it seems to
be safe to remove that misfeature.

Split the context initialization into two parts. Clear the LDT pointer and
initialize the mutex from the general context init and move the LDT
duplication to arch_dup_mmap() which is only called on fork().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky &lt;boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@aculab.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Eduardo Valentin &lt;eduval@amazon.com&gt;
Cc: Greg KH &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Juergen Gross &lt;jgross@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/bpf: add tests for recent bugfixes</title>
<updated>2017-12-25T13:26:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-22T15:23:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d605778b613a535d258c1e6a931bc2153aa63185'/>
<id>d605778b613a535d258c1e6a931bc2153aa63185</id>
<content type='text'>
From: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;

[ Upstream commit 2255f8d520b0a318fc6d387d0940854b2f522a7f ]

These tests should cover the following cases:

 - MOV with both zero-extended and sign-extended immediates
 - implicit truncation of register contents via ALU32/MOV32
 - implicit 32-bit truncation of ALU32 output
 - oversized register source operand for ALU32 shift
 - right-shift of a number that could be positive or negative
 - map access where adding the operation size to the offset causes signed
   32-bit overflow
 - direct stack access at a ~4GiB offset

Also remove the F_LOAD_WITH_STRICT_ALIGNMENT flag from a bunch of tests
that should fail independent of what flags userspace passes.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
From: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;

[ Upstream commit 2255f8d520b0a318fc6d387d0940854b2f522a7f ]

These tests should cover the following cases:

 - MOV with both zero-extended and sign-extended immediates
 - implicit truncation of register contents via ALU32/MOV32
 - implicit 32-bit truncation of ALU32 output
 - oversized register source operand for ALU32 shift
 - right-shift of a number that could be positive or negative
 - map access where adding the operation size to the offset causes signed
   32-bit overflow
 - direct stack access at a ~4GiB offset

Also remove the F_LOAD_WITH_STRICT_ALIGNMENT flag from a bunch of tests
that should fail independent of what flags userspace passes.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Run most existing LDT test cases against the GDT as well</title>
<updated>2017-12-25T13:26:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-04T11:19:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4a464a66db6d574dd622b5218ca617da41461149'/>
<id>4a464a66db6d574dd622b5218ca617da41461149</id>
<content type='text'>
commit adedf2893c192dd09b1cc2f2dcfdd7cad99ec49d upstream.

Now that the main test infrastructure supports the GDT, run tests
that will pass the kernel's GDT permission tests against the GDT.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/686a1eda63414da38fcecc2412db8dba1ae40581.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit adedf2893c192dd09b1cc2f2dcfdd7cad99ec49d upstream.

Now that the main test infrastructure supports the GDT, run tests
that will pass the kernel's GDT permission tests against the GDT.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/686a1eda63414da38fcecc2412db8dba1ae40581.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Add infrastructure to test set_thread_area()</title>
<updated>2017-12-25T13:26:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-04T11:19:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=46e6a15b40c99402aedde940f157614e0c927c7e'/>
<id>46e6a15b40c99402aedde940f157614e0c927c7e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d744dcad39094c9187075e274d1cdef79c57c8b5 upstream.

Much of the test design could apply to set_thread_area() (i.e. GDT),
not just modify_ldt().  Add set_thread_area() to the
install_valid_mode() helper.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02c23f8fba5547007f741dc24c3926e5284ede02.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d744dcad39094c9187075e274d1cdef79c57c8b5 upstream.

Much of the test design could apply to set_thread_area() (i.e. GDT),
not just modify_ldt().  Add set_thread_area() to the
install_valid_mode() helper.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02c23f8fba5547007f741dc24c3926e5284ede02.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/mpx/selftests: Fix up weird arrays</title>
<updated>2017-12-14T08:53:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Hansen</name>
<email>dave.hansen@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-11T00:12:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ad7acca17e31d14ceca8824728440e727150ddd0'/>
<id>ad7acca17e31d14ceca8824728440e727150ddd0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a6400120d042397675fcf694060779d21e9e762d ]

The MPX hardware data structurse are defined in a weird way: they define
their size in bytes and then union that with the type with which we want
to access them.

Yes, this is weird, but it does work.  But, new GCC's complain that we
are accessing the array out of bounds.  Just make it a zero-sized array
so gcc will stop complaining.  There was not really a bug here.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171111001229.58A7933D@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a6400120d042397675fcf694060779d21e9e762d ]

The MPX hardware data structurse are defined in a weird way: they define
their size in bytes and then union that with the type with which we want
to access them.

Yes, this is weird, but it does work.  But, new GCC's complain that we
are accessing the array out of bounds.  Just make it a zero-sized array
so gcc will stop complaining.  There was not really a bug here.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen &lt;dave.hansen@linux.intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@alien8.de&gt;
Cc: Brian Gerst &lt;brgerst@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Denys Vlasenko &lt;dvlasenk@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: H. Peter Anvin &lt;hpa@zytor.com&gt;
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf &lt;jpoimboe@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171111001229.58A7933D@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Robustify against set_thread_area() and LAR oddities</title>
<updated>2017-12-10T12:40:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andy Lutomirski</name>
<email>luto@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-04T11:19:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=898fe968f78c45e12fed31aee35a118a4e26e1b4'/>
<id>898fe968f78c45e12fed31aee35a118a4e26e1b4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d60ad744c9741586010d4bea286f09a063a90fbd ]

Bits 19:16 of LAR's result are undefined, and some upcoming
improvements to the test case seem to trigger this.  Mask off those
bits to avoid spurious failures.

commit 5b781c7e317f ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS
segments") adds a valid case in which LAR's output doesn't quite
agree with set_thread_area()'s input.  This isn't triggered in the
test as is, but it will be if we start calling set_thread_area()
with the accessed bit clear.  Work around this discrepency.

I've added a Fixes tag so that -stable can pick this up if neccesary.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 5b781c7e317f ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS segments")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b82f3f89c034b53580970ac865139fd8863f44e2.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d60ad744c9741586010d4bea286f09a063a90fbd ]

Bits 19:16 of LAR's result are undefined, and some upcoming
improvements to the test case seem to trigger this.  Mask off those
bits to avoid spurious failures.

commit 5b781c7e317f ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS
segments") adds a valid case in which LAR's output doesn't quite
agree with set_thread_area()'s input.  This isn't triggered in the
test as is, but it will be if we start calling set_thread_area()
with the accessed bit clear.  Work around this discrepency.

I've added a Fixes tag so that -stable can pick this up if neccesary.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Borislav Petkov &lt;bpetkov@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Fixes: 5b781c7e317f ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS segments")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b82f3f89c034b53580970ac865139fd8863f44e2.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
