<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/tools/lib, branch v6.12.97</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tools lib api: Fix mount_overload() snprintf truncation and toupper range</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:11:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo</name>
<email>acme@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-08T11:10:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=86c72ea5396407e118c9e4976926e7c80eb344de'/>
<id>86c72ea5396407e118c9e4976926e7c80eb344de</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fd1f70776add263f8ef38a87ae593c75303f1dcd ]

mount_overload() builds an environment variable name like
"PERF_SYSFS_ENVIRONMENT" from fs-&gt;name.  Two bugs:

1) snprintf() uses name_len as the buffer size instead of sizeof(upper_name).
   For fs-&gt;name = "sysfs" (len=5), the output is truncated to "PERF" (4
   chars + null), so getenv() never finds the intended variable.

2) mem_toupper() only uppercases name_len bytes, converting just the "PERF"
   prefix rather than the full string including the filesystem name portion.

Fix by using sizeof(upper_name) for snprintf and strlen(upper_name) for
mem_toupper, so the full "PERF_SYSFS_ENVIRONMENT" string is correctly
formatted and uppercased.

Reported-by: sashiko-bot &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 73ca85ad364769ff ("tools lib api fs: Add FSTYPE__mount() method")
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fd1f70776add263f8ef38a87ae593c75303f1dcd ]

mount_overload() builds an environment variable name like
"PERF_SYSFS_ENVIRONMENT" from fs-&gt;name.  Two bugs:

1) snprintf() uses name_len as the buffer size instead of sizeof(upper_name).
   For fs-&gt;name = "sysfs" (len=5), the output is truncated to "PERF" (4
   chars + null), so getenv() never finds the intended variable.

2) mem_toupper() only uppercases name_len bytes, converting just the "PERF"
   prefix rather than the full string including the filesystem name portion.

Fix by using sizeof(upper_name) for snprintf and strlen(upper_name) for
mem_toupper, so the full "PERF_SYSFS_ENVIRONMENT" string is correctly
formatted and uppercased.

Reported-by: sashiko-bot &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 73ca85ad364769ff ("tools lib api fs: Add FSTYPE__mount() method")
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tools lib api: Fix filename__write_int() writing uninitialized stack data</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:11:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo</name>
<email>acme@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-08T10:05:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9d44aaf4c8a3d66ae17abcf32d288affef14bfe7'/>
<id>9d44aaf4c8a3d66ae17abcf32d288affef14bfe7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 438ece06185696e14c63c6113d5e2d34ec0a9680 ]

filename__write_int() formats an integer into a 64-byte buffer with
sprintf() then passes sizeof(buf) (64) as the write length.  This
writes all 64 bytes including uninitialized stack data past the
formatted string.  Most sysfs files reject the oversized write,
making the function always return -1.

Fix by capturing the sprintf() return value and using it as the
write length.

Reported-by: sashiko-bot &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 3b00ea938653d136 ("tools lib api fs: Add sysfs__write_int function")
Cc: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@intel.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 438ece06185696e14c63c6113d5e2d34ec0a9680 ]

filename__write_int() formats an integer into a 64-byte buffer with
sprintf() then passes sizeof(buf) (64) as the write length.  This
writes all 64 bytes including uninitialized stack data past the
formatted string.  Most sysfs files reject the oversized write,
making the function always return -1.

Fix by capturing the sprintf() return value and using it as the
write length.

Reported-by: sashiko-bot &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 3b00ea938653d136 ("tools lib api fs: Add sysfs__write_int function")
Cc: Kan Liang &lt;kan.liang@intel.com&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tools lib api: Fix missing null termination in filename__read_int/ull()</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:11:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo</name>
<email>acme@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-08T00:03:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=089432558a599e39c3bea36471d140a77c3cce59'/>
<id>089432558a599e39c3bea36471d140a77c3cce59</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 52b1f9678499b13b7aeb0186d9c6f486c043283f ]

filename__read_int() passes a stack buffer to read() using the full
sizeof(line) and then hands it to atoi() without null-terminating.
If a sysfs file fills the 64-byte buffer exactly, atoi() reads past
the array into uninitialized stack memory.

filename__read_ull_base() has the same issue with strtoull().

Fix both by reading sizeof(line) - 1 bytes and explicitly
null-terminating after a successful read.

Fixes: 3a351127cbc682c3 ("tools lib fs: Adopt filename__read_int from tools/perf/")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 52b1f9678499b13b7aeb0186d9c6f486c043283f ]

filename__read_int() passes a stack buffer to read() using the full
sizeof(line) and then hands it to atoi() without null-terminating.
If a sysfs file fills the 64-byte buffer exactly, atoi() reads past
the array into uninitialized stack memory.

filename__read_ull_base() has the same issue with strtoull().

Fix both by reading sizeof(line) - 1 bytes and explicitly
null-terminating after a successful read.

Fixes: 3a351127cbc682c3 ("tools lib fs: Adopt filename__read_int from tools/perf/")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot &lt;sashiko-bot@kernel.org&gt;
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>perf: Fix off-by-one stack buffer overflow in kallsyms__parse()</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:11:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Rui Qi</name>
<email>qirui.001@bytedance.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-28T06:23:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d0ac757fc36465623d99d2cf384e19cc150b9257'/>
<id>d0ac757fc36465623d99d2cf384e19cc150b9257</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 68018df3f55eba96a20dd703f5f276a6518f4963 ]

In kallsyms__parse(), the loop reading symbol names iterates with i &lt;
sizeof(symbol_name), which allows i to reach sizeof(symbol_name) upon
loop exit. The subsequent symbol_name[i] = '\0' then writes one byte
past the end of the stack-allocated symbol_name[] array.

Fix this by changing the loop bound to KSYM_NAME_LEN, so the null
terminator always lands within the array. The overflow is triggerable by
a kallsyms entry with a symbol name of KSYM_NAME_LEN+1 or more
characters (e.g., long Rust mangled names or a malicious
/proc/kallsyms).

Fixes: 53df2b9344128984 ("libsymbols kallsyms: Parse using io api")
Signed-off-by: Rui Qi &lt;qirui.001@bytedance.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 68018df3f55eba96a20dd703f5f276a6518f4963 ]

In kallsyms__parse(), the loop reading symbol names iterates with i &lt;
sizeof(symbol_name), which allows i to reach sizeof(symbol_name) upon
loop exit. The subsequent symbol_name[i] = '\0' then writes one byte
past the end of the stack-allocated symbol_name[] array.

Fix this by changing the loop bound to KSYM_NAME_LEN, so the null
terminator always lands within the array. The overflow is triggerable by
a kallsyms entry with a symbol name of KSYM_NAME_LEN+1 or more
characters (e.g., long Rust mangled names or a malicious
/proc/kallsyms).

Fixes: 53df2b9344128984 ("libsymbols kallsyms: Parse using io api")
Signed-off-by: Rui Qi &lt;qirui.001@bytedance.com&gt;
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Fix UAF in strset__add_str()</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:10:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Carlos Llamas</name>
<email>cmllamas@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-23T16:27:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=41855b7c94283083b2550f68c666ed7241c7046b'/>
<id>41855b7c94283083b2550f68c666ed7241c7046b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b23705e6afb6ac4ae6d220dcb35975698667dd76 ]

strset_add_str_mem() might reallocate the strset data buffer in order to
accommodate the provided string 's'. However, if 's' points to a string
already present in the buffer, it becomes dangling after the realloc.
This leads to a use-after-free when attempting to memcpy() the string
into the new buffer.

One scenario that triggers this problematic path is when resolve_btfids
attempts to patch kfunc prototypes using existing BTF parameter names:

 | resolve_btfids: function bpf_list_push_back_impl already exists in BTF
 | Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Compiling resolve_btfids with fsanitize=address generates a detailed
report of the UAF:

 | =================================================================
 | ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4
 | ==1507892==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 at pc 0x55d25155a2a8 bp 0x7ffcef879060 sp 0x7ffcef878818
 | READ of size 5 at 0x7f4c4a500bd4 thread T0
 |     #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7)
 |     #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2
 |     #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8
 |     #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14
 |     #4 0x55d25159f0b5 in process_kfunc_with_implicit_args tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1196:9
 |     #5 0x55d25159e004 in btf2btf tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1229:9
 |     #6 0x55d25159cee7 in main tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1535:6
 |     #7 0x7f4c78e29f76 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
 |     #8 0x7f4c78e2a026 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
 |     #9 0x55d2514bb860 in _start (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0x30860)
 |
 | 0x7f4c4a500bd4 is located 13268 bytes inside of 2829000-byte region [0x7f4c4a4fd800,0x7f4c4a7b02c8)
 | freed by thread T0 here:
 |     #0 0x55d25155b700 in realloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd0700)
 |     #1 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/./libbpf_internal.h:220:9
 |     #2 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:224:13
 |
 | previously allocated by thread T0 here:
 |     #0 0x55d25155b2e3 in malloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd02e3)
 |     #1 0x55d2515d6e7d in strset__new tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:58:20

While resolve_btfids could be refactored to avoid this call path, let's
instead fix this issue at the source in strset__add_str() and avoid
similar scenarios.

Let's check if set-&gt;strs_data was reallocated and whether 's' points to
an internal string within the old strset buffer. In such case, 's' is
reconstructed to point to the new buffer.

While already here, also fix strset__find_str() which suffers from the
same problem by factoring out the common operations into a new helper
function strset_str_append().

Fixes: 90d76d3ececc ("libbpf: Extract internal set-of-strings datastructure APIs")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260523162722.2718940-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b23705e6afb6ac4ae6d220dcb35975698667dd76 ]

strset_add_str_mem() might reallocate the strset data buffer in order to
accommodate the provided string 's'. However, if 's' points to a string
already present in the buffer, it becomes dangling after the realloc.
This leads to a use-after-free when attempting to memcpy() the string
into the new buffer.

One scenario that triggers this problematic path is when resolve_btfids
attempts to patch kfunc prototypes using existing BTF parameter names:

 | resolve_btfids: function bpf_list_push_back_impl already exists in BTF
 | Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Compiling resolve_btfids with fsanitize=address generates a detailed
report of the UAF:

 | =================================================================
 | ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4
 | ==1507892==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 at pc 0x55d25155a2a8 bp 0x7ffcef879060 sp 0x7ffcef878818
 | READ of size 5 at 0x7f4c4a500bd4 thread T0
 |     #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7)
 |     #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2
 |     #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8
 |     #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14
 |     #4 0x55d25159f0b5 in process_kfunc_with_implicit_args tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1196:9
 |     #5 0x55d25159e004 in btf2btf tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1229:9
 |     #6 0x55d25159cee7 in main tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1535:6
 |     #7 0x7f4c78e29f76 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
 |     #8 0x7f4c78e2a026 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
 |     #9 0x55d2514bb860 in _start (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0x30860)
 |
 | 0x7f4c4a500bd4 is located 13268 bytes inside of 2829000-byte region [0x7f4c4a4fd800,0x7f4c4a7b02c8)
 | freed by thread T0 here:
 |     #0 0x55d25155b700 in realloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd0700)
 |     #1 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/./libbpf_internal.h:220:9
 |     #2 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:224:13
 |
 | previously allocated by thread T0 here:
 |     #0 0x55d25155b2e3 in malloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd02e3)
 |     #1 0x55d2515d6e7d in strset__new tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:58:20

While resolve_btfids could be refactored to avoid this call path, let's
instead fix this issue at the source in strset__add_str() and avoid
similar scenarios.

Let's check if set-&gt;strs_data was reallocated and whether 's' points to
an internal string within the old strset buffer. In such case, 's' is
reconstructed to point to the new buffer.

While already here, also fix strset__find_str() which suffers from the
same problem by factoring out the common operations into a new helper
function strset_str_append().

Fixes: 90d76d3ececc ("libbpf: Extract internal set-of-strings datastructure APIs")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas &lt;cmllamas@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260523162722.2718940-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Harden parse_vma_segs() path parsing</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:10:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Michael Bommarito</name>
<email>michael.bommarito@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-22T20:13:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d57eb8122073455bbe1f14ac7dd6c00a77aa1fff'/>
<id>d57eb8122073455bbe1f14ac7dd6c00a77aa1fff</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fee9a38174f4c6454fb1fbaf2b9b5a1cca9070d0 ]

parse_vma_segs() in tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c parses /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/maps
with two widthless scansets, "%s" into mode[16] and "%[^\n]"
into line[4096]. A VMA name in maps is not limited to that local
buffer; a deeply nested backing path can produce a maps record long
enough to overflow the stack buffer.

Bound both scansets to the declared buffer sizes ("%15s" for mode[16]
and "%4095[^\n]" for line[4096]) and drain any residue past line[4094]
with "%*[^\n]" before the trailing "\n". Without the drain, the residue
of an over-long record would stay in the stream and break the next
"%zx-%zx" parse, so the loop would exit early and silently skip later
maps records.

Also stop using sscanf(..., "%s") to peel the /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/root prefix
from lib_path. Parse the pid and prefix length with "%n", check for the
following slash, and copy the remainder with libbpf_strlcpy(). That
removes a second unbounded stack write and preserves paths containing
spaces.

Fixes: 74cc6311cec9 ("libbpf: Add USDT notes parsing and resolution logic")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260522201353.1454653-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fee9a38174f4c6454fb1fbaf2b9b5a1cca9070d0 ]

parse_vma_segs() in tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c parses /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/maps
with two widthless scansets, "%s" into mode[16] and "%[^\n]"
into line[4096]. A VMA name in maps is not limited to that local
buffer; a deeply nested backing path can produce a maps record long
enough to overflow the stack buffer.

Bound both scansets to the declared buffer sizes ("%15s" for mode[16]
and "%4095[^\n]" for line[4096]) and drain any residue past line[4094]
with "%*[^\n]" before the trailing "\n". Without the drain, the residue
of an over-long record would stay in the stream and break the next
"%zx-%zx" parse, so the loop would exit early and silently skip later
maps records.

Also stop using sscanf(..., "%s") to peel the /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/root prefix
from lib_path. Parse the pid and prefix length with "%n", check for the
following slash, and copy the remainder with libbpf_strlcpy(). That
removes a second unbounded stack write and preserves paths containing
spaces.

Fixes: 74cc6311cec9 ("libbpf: Add USDT notes parsing and resolution logic")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito &lt;michael.bommarito@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260522201353.1454653-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Report error when a negative kprobe offset is specified</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:10:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aaron Tomlin</name>
<email>atomlin@atomlin.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-19T03:09:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7eaaa5f61d390067c2a23b49b45d29b67aa0ab77'/>
<id>7eaaa5f61d390067c2a23b49b45d29b67aa0ab77</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ad35d8018669fd2eea76e3f74eb050fd3d2fb690 ]

In attach_kprobe(), the parsing logic uses sscanf() to extract the
target function name and offset from the section definition. Currently,
if a user specifies a negative offset (e.g., SEC("kprobe/func+-100")),
the input is not explicitly caught and reported as an error.

This commit updates the logic to explicitly notify the user when a
negative integer is provided. To facilitate this check, the offset
variable is changed from unsigned long to long so that sscanf()
can accurately capture a negative input for evaluation.

If a negative offset is detected, the loader will now print an
informative warning stating that the offset must be non-negative,
and return -EINVAL.

Additionally, free(func) is called in this new error path to prevent
a memory leak, as the function name string is dynamically allocated
by sscanf().

Fixes: e3f9bc35ea7e9 ("libbpf: Allow decimal offset for kprobes")
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@atomlin.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260419030944.1423642-1-atomlin@atomlin.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit ad35d8018669fd2eea76e3f74eb050fd3d2fb690 ]

In attach_kprobe(), the parsing logic uses sscanf() to extract the
target function name and offset from the section definition. Currently,
if a user specifies a negative offset (e.g., SEC("kprobe/func+-100")),
the input is not explicitly caught and reported as an error.

This commit updates the logic to explicitly notify the user when a
negative integer is provided. To facilitate this check, the offset
variable is changed from unsigned long to long so that sscanf()
can accurately capture a negative input for evaluation.

If a negative offset is detected, the loader will now print an
informative warning stating that the offset must be non-negative,
and return -EINVAL.

Additionally, free(func) is called in this new error path to prevent
a memory leak, as the function name string is dynamically allocated
by sscanf().

Fixes: e3f9bc35ea7e9 ("libbpf: Allow decimal offset for kprobes")
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin &lt;atomlin@atomlin.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260419030944.1423642-1-atomlin@atomlin.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi &lt;memxor@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: reject negative CO-RE accessor indices in bpf_core_parse_spec()</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T11:04:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-04T16:12:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=36a9012f76ba8d9189ae56a1f8bb7c87c07a1f3a'/>
<id>36a9012f76ba8d9189ae56a1f8bb7c87c07a1f3a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1c22483a2c4bbf747787f328392ca3e68619c4dc ]

CO-RE accessor strings are colon-separated indices that describe a path
from a root BTF type to a target field, e.g. "0:1:2" walks through
nested struct members. bpf_core_parse_spec() parses each component with
sscanf("%d"), so negative values like -1 are silently accepted.  The
subsequent bounds checks (access_idx &gt;= btf_vlen(t)) only guard the
upper bound and always pass for negative values because C integer
promotion converts the __u16 btf_vlen result to int, making the
comparison (int)(-1) &gt;= (int)(N) false for any positive N.

When -1 reaches btf_member_bit_offset() it gets cast to u32 0xffffffff,
producing an out-of-bounds read far past the members array.  A crafted
BPF program with a negative CO-RE accessor on any struct that exists in
vmlinux BTF (e.g. task_struct) crashes the kernel deterministically
during BPF_PROG_LOAD on any system with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y
(default on major distributions).  The bug is reachable with CAP_BPF:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11818b6626
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 85 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #18 PREEMPT(full)
 RIP: 0010:bpf_core_parse_spec (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:354)
 RAX: 00000000ffffffff
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  bpf_core_calc_relo_insn (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:1321)
  bpf_core_apply (kernel/bpf/btf.c:9507)
  check_core_relo (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19475)
  bpf_check (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:26031)
  bpf_prog_load (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3089)
  __sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6228)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

CO-RE accessor indices are inherently non-negative (struct member index,
array element index, or enumerator index), so reject them immediately
after parsing.

Fixes: ddc7c3042614 ("libbpf: implement BPF CO-RE offset relocation algorithm")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260404161221.961828-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1c22483a2c4bbf747787f328392ca3e68619c4dc ]

CO-RE accessor strings are colon-separated indices that describe a path
from a root BTF type to a target field, e.g. "0:1:2" walks through
nested struct members. bpf_core_parse_spec() parses each component with
sscanf("%d"), so negative values like -1 are silently accepted.  The
subsequent bounds checks (access_idx &gt;= btf_vlen(t)) only guard the
upper bound and always pass for negative values because C integer
promotion converts the __u16 btf_vlen result to int, making the
comparison (int)(-1) &gt;= (int)(N) false for any positive N.

When -1 reaches btf_member_bit_offset() it gets cast to u32 0xffffffff,
producing an out-of-bounds read far past the members array.  A crafted
BPF program with a negative CO-RE accessor on any struct that exists in
vmlinux BTF (e.g. task_struct) crashes the kernel deterministically
during BPF_PROG_LOAD on any system with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y
(default on major distributions).  The bug is reachable with CAP_BPF:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11818b6626
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 85 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #18 PREEMPT(full)
 RIP: 0010:bpf_core_parse_spec (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:354)
 RAX: 00000000ffffffff
 Call Trace:
  &lt;TASK&gt;
  bpf_core_calc_relo_insn (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:1321)
  bpf_core_apply (kernel/bpf/btf.c:9507)
  check_core_relo (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19475)
  bpf_check (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:26031)
  bpf_prog_load (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3089)
  __sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6228)
  &lt;/TASK&gt;

CO-RE accessor indices are inherently non-negative (struct member index,
array element index, or enumerator index), so reject them immediately
after parsing.

Fixes: ddc7c3042614 ("libbpf: implement BPF CO-RE offset relocation algorithm")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260404161221.961828-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libperf build: Always place libperf includes first</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ian Rogers</name>
<email>irogers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-03T06:09:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=70a69f675b9f6ec3f1de472ac68bd393f0b5b580'/>
<id>70a69f675b9f6ec3f1de472ac68bd393f0b5b580</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8c5b40678c63be6b85f1c2dc8c8b89d632faf988 ]

When building tools/perf the CFLAGS can contain a directory for the
installed headers.

As the headers may be being installed while building libperf.a this can
cause headers to be partially installed and found in the include path
while building an object file for libperf.a.

The installed header may reference other installed headers that are
missing given the partial nature of the install and then the build fails
with a missing header file.

Avoid this by ensuring the libperf source headers are always first in
the CFLAGS.

Fixes: 3143504918105156 ("libperf: Make libperf.a part of the perf build")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8c5b40678c63be6b85f1c2dc8c8b89d632faf988 ]

When building tools/perf the CFLAGS can contain a directory for the
installed headers.

As the headers may be being installed while building libperf.a this can
cause headers to be partially installed and found in the include path
while building an object file for libperf.a.

The installed header may reference other installed headers that are
missing given the partial nature of the install and then the build fails
with a missing header file.

Avoid this by ensuring the libperf source headers are always first in
the CFLAGS.

Fixes: 3143504918105156 ("libperf: Make libperf.a part of the perf build")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Cc: Adrian Hunter &lt;adrian.hunter@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Shishkin &lt;alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Cc: Jiri Olsa &lt;jolsa@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo &lt;acme@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libperf: Don't remove -g when EXTRA_CFLAGS are used</title>
<updated>2026-03-04T12:20:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Clark</name>
<email>james.clark@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-03-19T11:40:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f15fa06dccb6034777aaefd8ccfb2993fb9d9bf'/>
<id>5f15fa06dccb6034777aaefd8ccfb2993fb9d9bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f5b07010c13c77541e8ade167d05bef3b8a63739 ]

When using EXTRA_CFLAGS, for example "EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DREFCNT_CHECKING=1",
this construct stops setting -g which you'd expect would not be affected
by adding extra flags. Additionally, EXTRA_CFLAGS should be the last
thing to be appended so that it can be used to undo any defaults. And no
condition is required, just += appends to any existing CFLAGS and also
appends or doesn't append EXTRA_CFLAGS if they are or aren't set.

It's not clear why DEBUG=1 is required for -g in Perf when in libperf
it's always on, but I don't think we need to change that behavior now
because someone may be depending on it.

Signed-off-by: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319114009.417865-1-james.clark@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8c5b40678c63 ("libperf build: Always place libperf includes first")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit f5b07010c13c77541e8ade167d05bef3b8a63739 ]

When using EXTRA_CFLAGS, for example "EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DREFCNT_CHECKING=1",
this construct stops setting -g which you'd expect would not be affected
by adding extra flags. Additionally, EXTRA_CFLAGS should be the last
thing to be appended so that it can be used to undo any defaults. And no
condition is required, just += appends to any existing CFLAGS and also
appends or doesn't append EXTRA_CFLAGS if they are or aren't set.

It's not clear why DEBUG=1 is required for -g in Perf when in libperf
it's always on, but I don't think we need to change that behavior now
because someone may be depending on it.

Signed-off-by: James Clark &lt;james.clark@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers &lt;irogers@google.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319114009.417865-1-james.clark@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim &lt;namhyung@kernel.org&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 8c5b40678c63 ("libperf build: Always place libperf includes first")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
