linux-stable.git/tools/lib/bpf, branch v6.18.41

libbpf: Skip max_entries override on signed loaders

2026-07-24T14:15:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 60214435b365ecdd40b2f96d4e54564b5c927645 ]

bpf_gen__map_create() lets the host-supplied loader ctx override a
map's max_entries at runtime (map_desc[idx].max_entries, when non-zero).
This is how the light skeleton sizes maps to the target machine, but
it happens after emit_signature_match() and is covered by neither the
signed loader instructions nor the hashed blob.

For a signed loader this means an untrusted host can re-dimension the
program's maps, outside what the signature attests to. Gate the override
on gen_hash so signed loaders use the signer-provided max_entries baked
into the blob.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-6-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Skip initial_value override on signed loaders

2026-07-24T14:15:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 61e084152328867fe2279cc790573aae39959cd5 ]

bpf_gen__map_update_elem() emits code that, when the host-supplied
loader ctx provides a non-NULL map_desc[idx].initial_value, overwrites
the blob value with bytes read from the host (bpf_copy_from_user /
bpf_probe_read_kernel) before the BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM that populates
the program's .data/.rodata/.bss maps.

This override runs after emit_signature_match() has validated map->sha[],
and initial_value is part of neither the signed loader instructions nor
the hashed data blob. For a signed loader this lets an untrusted host
substitute global-variable contents into a program whose code carries
a valid signature, thus weakening what the signature attests to.

The blob already contains the signer-provided value (added via add_data()
and covered by the embedded, signed hash), so simply skip emitting the
override for signed loaders (gen_hash). Runtime initialization stays
available for the unsigned light-skeleton path as before. The jump
offsets within the override block are internal to it, so guarding the
whole block leaves them unchanged.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader

2026-07-24T14:15:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0fb6c9ed6493b4af01be8bb0a384574eba7df636 ]

The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.

While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.

With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.

Fixes: fb2b0e290147 ("libbpf: Update light skeleton for signing")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh 
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Skip endianness swap when loader generation failed

2026-07-24T14:15:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 41300d032a1b1d91a3ed996ad21905463e344beb ]

bpf_gen__prog_load() byte-swaps the program insns and the {func,line}_info
and CO-RE relo blobs in place for cross-endian targets. The blob offsets
come from add_data(), which returns 0 on failure: realloc_data_buf() either
frees and NULLs gen->data_start (realloc OOM) or returns early on an
already-latched gen->error, leaving a stale, possibly too-small buffer.

Neither bswap site checked for this. With gen->swapped_endian set and a
failed generation, "gen->data_start + off" becomes NULL + 0. Guard the
same way via !gen->error so they are skipped once generation has failed.

Fixes: 8ca3323dce43 ("libbpf: Support creating light skeleton of either endianness")
Reported-by: sashiko 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529162829.315921-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Skip hash computation when loader generation failed

2026-07-24T14:15:57+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3c5e2f1a85844abbb65df4694f5ebad0a13e219c ]

bpf_gen__finish() calls compute_sha_update_offsets() gated only on
the gen_hash option, without first consulting gen->error. On a failed
generation this is buggy: a failed realloc_data_buf() sets gen->data_start
to NULL (leaving gen->data_cur dangling), so compute_sha_update_offsets()
runs libbpf_sha256() over a NULL buffer with a bogus length; a failed
realloc_insn_buf() likewise sets gen->insn_start to NULL and the hash
immediates get patched through that NULL base.

The computed program is discarded in either case, since the following
"if (!gen->error)" block does not publish opts->insns once an error is
set. Thus, skip the hash pass when generation has already failed.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Reported-by: sashiko 
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529094119.307264-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Fix UAF in strset__add_str()

2026-07-24T14:15:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit b23705e6afb6ac4ae6d220dcb35975698667dd76 ]

strset_add_str_mem() might reallocate the strset data buffer in order to
accommodate the provided string 's'. However, if 's' points to a string
already present in the buffer, it becomes dangling after the realloc.
This leads to a use-after-free when attempting to memcpy() the string
into the new buffer.

One scenario that triggers this problematic path is when resolve_btfids
attempts to patch kfunc prototypes using existing BTF parameter names:

 | resolve_btfids: function bpf_list_push_back_impl already exists in BTF
 | Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Compiling resolve_btfids with fsanitize=address generates a detailed
report of the UAF:

 | =================================================================
 | ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4
 | ==1507892==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x7f4c4a500bd4 at pc 0x55d25155a2a8 bp 0x7ffcef879060 sp 0x7ffcef878818
 | READ of size 5 at 0x7f4c4a500bd4 thread T0
 |     #0 0x55d25155a2a7 in memcpy (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xcf2a7)
 |     #1 0x55d2515d708e in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:162:2
 |     #2 0x55d2515c730b in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2109:8
 |     #3 0x55d2515c9020 in btf__add_func_param tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:3108:14
 |     #4 0x55d25159f0b5 in process_kfunc_with_implicit_args tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1196:9
 |     #5 0x55d25159e004 in btf2btf tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1229:9
 |     #6 0x55d25159cee7 in main tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/main.c:1535:6
 |     #7 0x7f4c78e29f76 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
 |     #8 0x7f4c78e2a026 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
 |     #9 0x55d2514bb860 in _start (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0x30860)
 |
 | 0x7f4c4a500bd4 is located 13268 bytes inside of 2829000-byte region [0x7f4c4a4fd800,0x7f4c4a7b02c8)
 | freed by thread T0 here:
 |     #0 0x55d25155b700 in realloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd0700)
 |     #1 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/./libbpf_internal.h:220:9
 |     #2 0x55d2515c426c in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:224:13
 |
 | previously allocated by thread T0 here:
 |     #0 0x55d25155b2e3 in malloc (tools/bpf/resolve_btfids/resolve_btfids+0xd02e3)
 |     #1 0x55d2515d6e7d in strset__new tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:58:20

While resolve_btfids could be refactored to avoid this call path, let's
instead fix this issue at the source in strset__add_str() and avoid
similar scenarios.

Let's check if set->strs_data was reallocated and whether 's' points to
an internal string within the old strset buffer. In such case, 's' is
reconstructed to point to the new buffer.

While already here, also fix strset__find_str() which suffers from the
same problem by factoring out the common operations into a new helper
function strset_str_append().

Fixes: 90d76d3ececc ("libbpf: Extract internal set-of-strings datastructure APIs")
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Suggested-by: Mykyta Yatsenko 
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260523162722.2718940-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Harden parse_vma_segs() path parsing

2026-07-24T14:15:55+00:00

[ Upstream commit fee9a38174f4c6454fb1fbaf2b9b5a1cca9070d0 ]

parse_vma_segs() in tools/lib/bpf/usdt.c parses /proc//maps
with two widthless scansets, "%s" into mode[16] and "%[^\n]"
into line[4096]. A VMA name in maps is not limited to that local
buffer; a deeply nested backing path can produce a maps record long
enough to overflow the stack buffer.

Bound both scansets to the declared buffer sizes ("%15s" for mode[16]
and "%4095[^\n]" for line[4096]) and drain any residue past line[4094]
with "%*[^\n]" before the trailing "\n". Without the drain, the residue
of an over-long record would stay in the stream and break the next
"%zx-%zx" parse, so the loop would exit early and silently skip later
maps records.

Also stop using sscanf(..., "%s") to peel the /proc//root prefix
from lib_path. Parse the pid and prefix length with "%n", check for the
following slash, and copy the remainder with libbpf_strlcpy(). That
removes a second unbounded stack write and preserves paths containing
spaces.

Fixes: 74cc6311cec9 ("libbpf: Add USDT notes parsing and resolution logic")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito 
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko 
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260522201353.1454653-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Report error when a negative kprobe offset is specified

2026-07-24T14:15:43+00:00

[ Upstream commit ad35d8018669fd2eea76e3f74eb050fd3d2fb690 ]

In attach_kprobe(), the parsing logic uses sscanf() to extract the
target function name and offset from the section definition. Currently,
if a user specifies a negative offset (e.g., SEC("kprobe/func+-100")),
the input is not explicitly caught and reported as an error.

This commit updates the logic to explicitly notify the user when a
negative integer is provided. To facilitate this check, the offset
variable is changed from unsigned long to long so that sscanf()
can accurately capture a negative input for evaluation.

If a negative offset is detected, the loader will now print an
informative warning stating that the offset must be non-negative,
and return -EINVAL.

Additionally, free(func) is called in this new error path to prevent
a memory leak, as the function name string is dynamically allocated
by sscanf().

Fixes: e3f9bc35ea7e9 ("libbpf: Allow decimal offset for kprobes")
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin 
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260419030944.1423642-1-atomlin@atomlin.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

libbpf: Prevent double close and leak of btf objects

2026-05-23T11:06:52+00:00

[ Upstream commit 380044c40b1636a72fd8f188b5806be6ae564279 ]

Sashiko found possible double close of btf object fd [1],
which happens when strdup in load_module_btfs fails at which
point the obj->btf_module_cnt is already incremented.

The error path close btf fd and so does later cleanup code in
bpf_object_post_load_cleanup function.

Also libbpf_ensure_mem failure leaves btf object not assigned
and it's leaked.

Replacing the err_out label with break to make the error path
less confusing as suggested by Alan.

Incrementing obj->btf_module_cnt only if there's no failure
and releasing btf object in error path.

Fixes: 91abb4a6d79d ("libbpf: Support attachment of BPF tracing programs to kernel modules")
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324081846.2334094-1-jolsa%40kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260416100034.1610852-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: reject negative CO-RE accessor indices in bpf_core_parse_spec()

2026-05-23T11:06:30+00:00

[ Upstream commit 1c22483a2c4bbf747787f328392ca3e68619c4dc ]

CO-RE accessor strings are colon-separated indices that describe a path
from a root BTF type to a target field, e.g. "0:1:2" walks through
nested struct members. bpf_core_parse_spec() parses each component with
sscanf("%d"), so negative values like -1 are silently accepted.  The
subsequent bounds checks (access_idx >= btf_vlen(t)) only guard the
upper bound and always pass for negative values because C integer
promotion converts the __u16 btf_vlen result to int, making the
comparison (int)(-1) >= (int)(N) false for any positive N.

When -1 reaches btf_member_bit_offset() it gets cast to u32 0xffffffff,
producing an out-of-bounds read far past the members array.  A crafted
BPF program with a negative CO-RE accessor on any struct that exists in
vmlinux BTF (e.g. task_struct) crashes the kernel deterministically
during BPF_PROG_LOAD on any system with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y
(default on major distributions).  The bug is reachable with CAP_BPF:

 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11818b6626
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 85 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #18 PREEMPT(full)
 RIP: 0010:bpf_core_parse_spec (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:354)
 RAX: 00000000ffffffff
 Call Trace:
  
  bpf_core_calc_relo_insn (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:1321)
  bpf_core_apply (kernel/bpf/btf.c:9507)
  check_core_relo (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19475)
  bpf_check (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:26031)
  bpf_prog_load (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3089)
  __sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6228)
  

CO-RE accessor indices are inherently non-negative (struct member index,
array element index, or enumerator index), so reject them immediately
after parsing.

Fixes: ddc7c3042614 ("libbpf: implement BPF CO-RE offset relocation algorithm")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei 
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi 
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis 
Acked-by: Paul Chaignon 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260404161221.961828-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin