<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/tools/lib/bpf/gen_loader.c, branch linux-rolling-stable</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Skip max_entries override on signed loaders</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:19:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-01T15:02:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0777038191f8dcd154611cc13ab5d56313ccf96a'/>
<id>0777038191f8dcd154611cc13ab5d56313ccf96a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 60214435b365ecdd40b2f96d4e54564b5c927645 ]

bpf_gen__map_create() lets the host-supplied loader ctx override a
map's max_entries at runtime (map_desc[idx].max_entries, when non-zero).
This is how the light skeleton sizes maps to the target machine, but
it happens after emit_signature_match() and is covered by neither the
signed loader instructions nor the hashed blob.

For a signed loader this means an untrusted host can re-dimension the
program's maps, outside what the signature attests to. Gate the override
on gen_hash so signed loaders use the signer-provided max_entries baked
into the blob.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-6-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 60214435b365ecdd40b2f96d4e54564b5c927645 ]

bpf_gen__map_create() lets the host-supplied loader ctx override a
map's max_entries at runtime (map_desc[idx].max_entries, when non-zero).
This is how the light skeleton sizes maps to the target machine, but
it happens after emit_signature_match() and is covered by neither the
signed loader instructions nor the hashed blob.

For a signed loader this means an untrusted host can re-dimension the
program's maps, outside what the signature attests to. Gate the override
on gen_hash so signed loaders use the signer-provided max_entries baked
into the blob.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-6-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Skip initial_value override on signed loaders</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:19:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-01T15:02:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b544115380a052d45ffc345f07c91755506b7a21'/>
<id>b544115380a052d45ffc345f07c91755506b7a21</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 61e084152328867fe2279cc790573aae39959cd5 ]

bpf_gen__map_update_elem() emits code that, when the host-supplied
loader ctx provides a non-NULL map_desc[idx].initial_value, overwrites
the blob value with bytes read from the host (bpf_copy_from_user /
bpf_probe_read_kernel) before the BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM that populates
the program's .data/.rodata/.bss maps.

This override runs after emit_signature_match() has validated map-&gt;sha[],
and initial_value is part of neither the signed loader instructions nor
the hashed data blob. For a signed loader this lets an untrusted host
substitute global-variable contents into a program whose code carries
a valid signature, thus weakening what the signature attests to.

The blob already contains the signer-provided value (added via add_data()
and covered by the embedded, signed hash), so simply skip emitting the
override for signed loaders (gen_hash). Runtime initialization stays
available for the unsigned light-skeleton path as before. The jump
offsets within the override block are internal to it, so guarding the
whole block leaves them unchanged.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 61e084152328867fe2279cc790573aae39959cd5 ]

bpf_gen__map_update_elem() emits code that, when the host-supplied
loader ctx provides a non-NULL map_desc[idx].initial_value, overwrites
the blob value with bytes read from the host (bpf_copy_from_user /
bpf_probe_read_kernel) before the BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM that populates
the program's .data/.rodata/.bss maps.

This override runs after emit_signature_match() has validated map-&gt;sha[],
and initial_value is part of neither the signed loader instructions nor
the hashed data blob. For a signed loader this lets an untrusted host
substitute global-variable contents into a program whose code carries
a valid signature, thus weakening what the signature attests to.

The blob already contains the signer-provided value (added via add_data()
and covered by the embedded, signed hash), so simply skip emitting the
override for signed loaders (gen_hash). Runtime initialization stays
available for the unsigned light-skeleton path as before. The jump
offsets within the override block are internal to it, so guarding the
whole block leaves them unchanged.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Reject non-exclusive metadata maps in the signed loader</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:19:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>KP Singh</name>
<email>kpsingh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-01T15:02:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0dad5adeb34b6f78a883e8faa6a1c947a240e7c9'/>
<id>0dad5adeb34b6f78a883e8faa6a1c947a240e7c9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0fb6c9ed6493b4af01be8bb0a384574eba7df636 ]

The loader verifies map-&gt;sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map-&gt;sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.

While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.

With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map-&gt;sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.

Fixes: fb2b0e290147 ("libbpf: Update light skeleton for signing")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0fb6c9ed6493b4af01be8bb0a384574eba7df636 ]

The loader verifies map-&gt;sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map-&gt;sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.

While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.

With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map-&gt;sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.

Fixes: fb2b0e290147 ("libbpf: Update light skeleton for signing")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Skip endianness swap when loader generation failed</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:19:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-29T16:28:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61d0ebb5a0457fcac19c95519909db6207034cfd'/>
<id>61d0ebb5a0457fcac19c95519909db6207034cfd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 41300d032a1b1d91a3ed996ad21905463e344beb ]

bpf_gen__prog_load() byte-swaps the program insns and the {func,line}_info
and CO-RE relo blobs in place for cross-endian targets. The blob offsets
come from add_data(), which returns 0 on failure: realloc_data_buf() either
frees and NULLs gen-&gt;data_start (realloc OOM) or returns early on an
already-latched gen-&gt;error, leaving a stale, possibly too-small buffer.

Neither bswap site checked for this. With gen-&gt;swapped_endian set and a
failed generation, "gen-&gt;data_start + off" becomes NULL + 0. Guard the
same way via !gen-&gt;error so they are skipped once generation has failed.

Fixes: 8ca3323dce43 ("libbpf: Support creating light skeleton of either endianness")
Reported-by: sashiko &lt;sashiko@sashiko.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529162829.315921-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 41300d032a1b1d91a3ed996ad21905463e344beb ]

bpf_gen__prog_load() byte-swaps the program insns and the {func,line}_info
and CO-RE relo blobs in place for cross-endian targets. The blob offsets
come from add_data(), which returns 0 on failure: realloc_data_buf() either
frees and NULLs gen-&gt;data_start (realloc OOM) or returns early on an
already-latched gen-&gt;error, leaving a stale, possibly too-small buffer.

Neither bswap site checked for this. With gen-&gt;swapped_endian set and a
failed generation, "gen-&gt;data_start + off" becomes NULL + 0. Guard the
same way via !gen-&gt;error so they are skipped once generation has failed.

Fixes: 8ca3323dce43 ("libbpf: Support creating light skeleton of either endianness")
Reported-by: sashiko &lt;sashiko@sashiko.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529162829.315921-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Skip hash computation when loader generation failed</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:19:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-29T09:41:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a8f448943e1a9c8e1f2fb4aa2302309cf5eeefdd'/>
<id>a8f448943e1a9c8e1f2fb4aa2302309cf5eeefdd</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3c5e2f1a85844abbb65df4694f5ebad0a13e219c ]

bpf_gen__finish() calls compute_sha_update_offsets() gated only on
the gen_hash option, without first consulting gen-&gt;error. On a failed
generation this is buggy: a failed realloc_data_buf() sets gen-&gt;data_start
to NULL (leaving gen-&gt;data_cur dangling), so compute_sha_update_offsets()
runs libbpf_sha256() over a NULL buffer with a bogus length; a failed
realloc_insn_buf() likewise sets gen-&gt;insn_start to NULL and the hash
immediates get patched through that NULL base.

The computed program is discarded in either case, since the following
"if (!gen-&gt;error)" block does not publish opts-&gt;insns once an error is
set. Thus, skip the hash pass when generation has already failed.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Reported-by: sashiko &lt;sashiko@sashiko.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529094119.307264-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3c5e2f1a85844abbb65df4694f5ebad0a13e219c ]

bpf_gen__finish() calls compute_sha_update_offsets() gated only on
the gen_hash option, without first consulting gen-&gt;error. On a failed
generation this is buggy: a failed realloc_data_buf() sets gen-&gt;data_start
to NULL (leaving gen-&gt;data_cur dangling), so compute_sha_update_offsets()
runs libbpf_sha256() over a NULL buffer with a bogus length; a failed
realloc_insn_buf() likewise sets gen-&gt;insn_start to NULL and the hash
immediates get patched through that NULL base.

The computed program is discarded in either case, since the following
"if (!gen-&gt;error)" block does not publish opts-&gt;insns once an error is
set. Thus, skip the hash pass when generation has already failed.

Fixes: ea923080c145 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Reported-by: sashiko &lt;sashiko@sashiko.dev&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529094119.307264-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: fix off-by-one in emit_signature_match jump offset</title>
<updated>2026-05-23T14:49:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>KP Singh</name>
<email>kpsingh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-22T21:53:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7dd62566e0d108d29034bcff8503b827f8763320'/>
<id>7dd62566e0d108d29034bcff8503b827f8763320</id>
<content type='text'>
The offset for the cleanup-label jump is computed before the MOV R7
instruction is emitted, but the JMP lands after it. Account for the
extra insn in the offset calculation (-2 instead of -1). Drop the
redundant self-loop in the else branch; gen-&gt;error = -ERANGE already
marks the generation as failed.

Fixes: fb2b0e290147 ("libbpf: Update light skeleton for signing")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260522215337.662271-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The offset for the cleanup-label jump is computed before the MOV R7
instruction is emitted, but the JMP lands after it. Account for the
extra insn in the offset calculation (-2 instead of -1). Drop the
redundant self-loop in the else branch; gen-&gt;error = -ERANGE already
marks the generation as failed.

Fixes: fb2b0e290147 ("libbpf: Update light skeleton for signing")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260522215337.662271-2-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: move libbpf_errstr() into libbpf_utils.c</title>
<updated>2025-10-01T22:27:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrii Nakryiko</name>
<email>andrii@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-10-01T17:13:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c68b6fdc3600466e3c265bad34d099eb8c5280f1'/>
<id>c68b6fdc3600466e3c265bad34d099eb8c5280f1</id>
<content type='text'>
Get rid of str_err.{c,h} by moving implementation of libbpf_errstr()
into libbpf_utils.c and declarations into libbpf_internal.h.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251001171326.3883055-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Get rid of str_err.{c,h} by moving implementation of libbpf_errstr()
into libbpf_utils.c and declarations into libbpf_internal.h.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251001171326.3883055-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman &lt;eddyz87@gmail.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Replace AF_ALG with open coded SHA-256</title>
<updated>2025-09-28T11:25:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-28T00:38:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4ef77dd584cfd915526328f516fec59e3a54d66e'/>
<id>4ef77dd584cfd915526328f516fec59e3a54d66e</id>
<content type='text'>
Reimplement libbpf_sha256() using some basic SHA-256 C code.  This
eliminates the newly-added dependency on AF_ALG, which is a problematic
UAPI that is not supported by all kernels.

Make libbpf_sha256() return void, since it can no longer fail.  This
simplifies some callers.  Also drop the unnecessary 'sha_out_sz'
parameter.  Finally, also fix the typo in "compute_sha_udpate_offsets".

Fixes: c297fe3e9f99 ("libbpf: Implement SHA256 internal helper")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250928003833.138407-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Reimplement libbpf_sha256() using some basic SHA-256 C code.  This
eliminates the newly-added dependency on AF_ALG, which is a problematic
UAPI that is not supported by all kernels.

Make libbpf_sha256() return void, since it can no longer fail.  This
simplifies some callers.  Also drop the unnecessary 'sha_out_sz'
parameter.  Finally, also fix the typo in "compute_sha_udpate_offsets".

Fixes: c297fe3e9f99 ("libbpf: Implement SHA256 internal helper")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250928003833.138407-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader</title>
<updated>2025-09-23T02:17:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>KP Singh</name>
<email>kpsingh@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2025-09-21T16:01:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ea923080c14578504c2e142760d9de547e38e87c'/>
<id>ea923080c14578504c2e142760d9de547e38e87c</id>
<content type='text'>
To fulfill the BPF signing contract, represented as Sig(I_loader ||
H_meta), the generated trusted loader program must verify the integrity
of the metadata. This signature cryptographically binds the loader's
instructions (I_loader) to a hash of the metadata (H_meta).

The verification process is embedded directly into the loader program.
Upon execution, the loader loads the runtime hash from struct bpf_map
i.e. BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX and compares this runtime hash against an
expected hash value that has been hardcoded directly by
bpf_obj__gen_loader.

The load from bpf_map can be improved by calling
BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD from the kernel context after BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
has been updated for being called from the kernel context.

The following instructions are generated:

    ld_imm64 r1, const_ptr_to_map // insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX
    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part1 // constant precomputed by
bpftool (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part2 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 16);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part3 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 24);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part4 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;
    ...

Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250921160120.9711-4-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
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<pre>
To fulfill the BPF signing contract, represented as Sig(I_loader ||
H_meta), the generated trusted loader program must verify the integrity
of the metadata. This signature cryptographically binds the loader's
instructions (I_loader) to a hash of the metadata (H_meta).

The verification process is embedded directly into the loader program.
Upon execution, the loader loads the runtime hash from struct bpf_map
i.e. BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX and compares this runtime hash against an
expected hash value that has been hardcoded directly by
bpf_obj__gen_loader.

The load from bpf_map can be improved by calling
BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD from the kernel context after BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD
has been updated for being called from the kernel context.

The following instructions are generated:

    ld_imm64 r1, const_ptr_to_map // insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX
    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part1 // constant precomputed by
bpftool (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part2 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 16);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part3 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;

    r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 24);
    ld_imm64 r3, sha256_of_map_part4 // (part of H_meta)
    if r2 != r3 goto out;
    ...

Signed-off-by: KP Singh &lt;kpsingh@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250921160120.9711-4-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov &lt;ast@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libbpf: Stringify errno in log messages in the remaining code</title>
<updated>2024-11-12T04:29:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mykyta Yatsenko</name>
<email>yatsenko@meta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-11-11T21:29:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4ce16ddd71054b1e47a65f8af5e3af6b64908e46'/>
<id>4ce16ddd71054b1e47a65f8af5e3af6b64908e46</id>
<content type='text'>
Convert numeric error codes into the string representations in log
messages in the rest of libbpf source files.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241111212919.368971-5-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Convert numeric error codes into the string representations in log
messages in the rest of libbpf source files.

Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko &lt;yatsenko@meta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko &lt;andrii@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241111212919.368971-5-mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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