<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security, branch v6.6.148</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tristan Madani</name>
<email>tristan@talencesecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-23T14:19:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5d4d93f9bfbc997ffbb03cd6107e8f6979dbb9b4'/>
<id>5d4d93f9bfbc997ffbb03cd6107e8f6979dbb9b4</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 56acfeb10019e200ab6787d01f8d7cbe0f01526f ]

selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk-&gt;sk_socket to pass a
struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and
selinux_socket_connect_helper().  However, when the hook is invoked
from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file
reference guaranteeing that sk-&gt;sk_socket is non-NULL.  The setsockopt
callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file
reference and are not affected.

Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper()
immediately resolve sock-&gt;sk, never using the struct socket * for
anything else.  Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a
struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs
to touch sk-&gt;sk_socket at all.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani &lt;tristan@talencesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 56acfeb10019e200ab6787d01f8d7cbe0f01526f ]

selinux_sctp_bind_connect() dereferences sk-&gt;sk_socket to pass a
struct socket * to selinux_socket_bind() and
selinux_socket_connect_helper().  However, when the hook is invoked
from the ASCONF softirq path (sctp_process_asconf), there is no file
reference guaranteeing that sk-&gt;sk_socket is non-NULL.  The setsockopt
callers (bindx, connectx, set_primary, sendmsg connect) hold a file
reference and are not affected.

Both selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper()
immediately resolve sock-&gt;sk, never using the struct socket * for
anything else.  Refactor the inner logic into helpers that take a
struct sock * directly so that selinux_sctp_bind_connect() never needs
to touch sk-&gt;sk_socket at all.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani &lt;tristan@talencesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: infrastructure management of the sock security</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-23T14:19:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d787e4c3acdf7fe192bab68447713bc364d8645f'/>
<id>d787e4c3acdf7fe192bab68447713bc364d8645f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 2aff9d20d50ac45dd13a013ef5231f4fb8912356 ]

Move management of the sock-&gt;sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 56acfeb10019 ("selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 2aff9d20d50ac45dd13a013ef5231f4fb8912356 ]

Move management of the sock-&gt;sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Stable-dep-of: 56acfeb10019 ("selinux: avoid sk_socket dereference in selinux_sctp_bind_connect()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized</title>
<updated>2026-08-03T09:15:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Bobrowski</name>
<email>mattbobrowski@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-21T15:48:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5337eebdf8c5d4810b1913047f078d2815d5645f'/>
<id>5337eebdf8c5d4810b1913047f078d2815d5645f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4 ]

When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps
(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However,
if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted
from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for
the BPF LSM.

Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset
(bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at
its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a
valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes
or more).

When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE
map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode-&gt;i_security + 8. This erroneously
aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning
of the inode-&gt;i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup
or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued
RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued
callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering
an immediate kernel panic.

Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag
marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init()
when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map
allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning
-EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized.

This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode
storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent,
avoiding zombie map states.

Fixes: 8ea636848aca ("bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes")
Reported-by: oxsignal &lt;awo@kakao.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski &lt;mattbobrowski@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung &lt;ameryhung@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260628201103.3624525-1-mattbobrowski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4 ]

When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps
(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However,
if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted
from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for
the BPF LSM.

Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset
(bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at
its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a
valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes
or more).

When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE
map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode-&gt;i_security + 8. This erroneously
aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning
of the inode-&gt;i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup
or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued
RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued
callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering
an immediate kernel panic.

Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag
marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init()
when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map
allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning
-EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized.

This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode
storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent,
avoiding zombie map states.

Fixes: 8ea636848aca ("bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes")
Reported-by: oxsignal &lt;awo@kakao.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski &lt;mattbobrowski@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis &lt;emil@etsalapatis.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung &lt;ameryhung@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260628201103.3624525-1-mattbobrowski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-14T12:57:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30500acfc43ef8c26d6ac2df679b62269ff8d301'/>
<id>30500acfc43ef8c26d6ac2df679b62269ff8d301</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9fe595fad54d4ac6a402edb3f60bec859d52cea6 upstream.

The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case
where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be
performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling
mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but
rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable
memory mapping in general.

The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an
overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to
the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further
file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not
used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the
mounter credentials would be incorrect.

Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and
selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter
check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean
also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the
subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and
determine it based on the boolean and the file struct.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9fe595fad54d4ac6a402edb3f60bec859d52cea6 upstream.

The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case
where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be
performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling
mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but
rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable
memory mapping in general.

The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an
overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to
the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further
file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not
used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the
mounter credentials would be incorrect.

Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and
selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter
check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean
also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the
subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and
determine it based on the boolean and the file struct.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: check connect-related permissions on TCP Fast Open</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Smalley</name>
<email>stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-18T17:55:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e507633bf76bccf1a6af27771fb0d6e2862b7eac'/>
<id>e507633bf76bccf1a6af27771fb0d6e2862b7eac</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 44c74d27d1b9aaa99fa8a83640c1223575262b80 upstream.

Similar to Landlock, SELinux was not updated when TCP Fast Open
support was introduced to ensure connect-related permissions are
checked when using TCP Fast Open. Update its socket_sendmsg() hook to
call selinux_socket_connect() when MSG_FASTOPEN is passed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260616201615.275032-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260617180526.15627-2-matthieu@buffet.re/
Reported-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Reported-by: Matthieu Buffet &lt;matthieu@buffet.re&gt;
Reported-by: Mikhail Ivanov &lt;ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 44c74d27d1b9aaa99fa8a83640c1223575262b80 upstream.

Similar to Landlock, SELinux was not updated when TCP Fast Open
support was introduced to ensure connect-related permissions are
checked when using TCP Fast Open. Update its socket_sendmsg() hook to
call selinux_socket_connect() when MSG_FASTOPEN is passed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260616201615.275032-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260617180526.15627-2-matthieu@buffet.re/
Reported-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Reported-by: Matthieu Buffet &lt;matthieu@buffet.re&gt;
Reported-by: Mikhail Ivanov &lt;ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix label can not be immediately before a declaration</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-14T23:16:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5feaaa1d34b29f9e86388585b54f85b480d62a3c'/>
<id>5feaaa1d34b29f9e86388585b54f85b480d62a3c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1ed40bd525c00d22af666016af9aef7167f8085f ]

Fix error reported by kernel test robot

security/apparmor/policy.c:1381:2: error: a label can only be part of
a statement and a declaration is not a statement

All errors (new ones prefixed by &gt;&gt;):

   security/apparmor/policy.c: In function 'aa_replace_profiles':
&gt;&gt; security/apparmor/policy.c:1381:2: error: a label can only be part
   of a statement and a declaration is not a statement
     ssize_t udata_sz = udata-&gt;size;
     ^~~~~

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202606150525.npax8WiH-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: 7b42f95813dc9 ("apparmor: fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profiles")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1ed40bd525c00d22af666016af9aef7167f8085f ]

Fix error reported by kernel test robot

security/apparmor/policy.c:1381:2: error: a label can only be part of
a statement and a declaration is not a statement

All errors (new ones prefixed by &gt;&gt;):

   security/apparmor/policy.c: In function 'aa_replace_profiles':
&gt;&gt; security/apparmor/policy.c:1381:2: error: a label can only be part
   of a statement and a declaration is not a statement
     ssize_t udata_sz = udata-&gt;size;
     ^~~~~

Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;lkp@intel.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202606150525.npax8WiH-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: 7b42f95813dc9 ("apparmor: fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profiles")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: put secmark label after secid lookup</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zygmunt Krynicki</name>
<email>me@zygoon.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-05T03:40:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=07fea242a894293fd02185722ddebe134582a590'/>
<id>07fea242a894293fd02185722ddebe134582a590</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 340372688bb87da45ff8d4e2f82ccfd1b64c65ff ]

apparmor_secmark_init() parses a configured secmark label to obtain its
secid.  aa_label_strn_parse() returns a refcounted label, but the success
path kept that reference after copying the secid.

Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki &lt;me@zygoon.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 340372688bb87da45ff8d4e2f82ccfd1b64c65ff ]

apparmor_secmark_init() parses a configured secmark label to obtain its
secid.  aa_label_strn_parse() returns a refcounted label, but the success
path kept that reference after copying the secid.

Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki &lt;me@zygoon.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: aa_getprocattr free procattr leak on format failure</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zygmunt Krynicki</name>
<email>me@zygoon.pl</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-02T11:37:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=58817bf37ccc4a3c6001834dbdec9f1aa972e67f'/>
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[ Upstream commit fea23bf73f0cae8ccb1d0684e4a3003874771f41 ]

aa_getprocattr() allocates the output string before rendering the label
into it. If the second aa_label_snxprint() call fails, the function
returned without freeing that allocation.

Free and clear the output pointer on the uncommon formatting failure path
before dropping the namespace reference.

Fixes: 76a1d263aba3 ("apparmor: switch getprocattr to using label_print fns()")
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;code@thicks.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki &lt;me@zygoon.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
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<pre>
[ Upstream commit fea23bf73f0cae8ccb1d0684e4a3003874771f41 ]

aa_getprocattr() allocates the output string before rendering the label
into it. If the second aa_label_snxprint() call fails, the function
returned without freeing that allocation.

Free and clear the output pointer on the uncommon formatting failure path
before dropping the namespace reference.

Fixes: 76a1d263aba3 ("apparmor: switch getprocattr to using label_print fns()")
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;code@thicks.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zygmunt Krynicki &lt;me@zygoon.pl&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix potential UAF in aa_replace_profiles</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Maxime Bélair</name>
<email>maxime.belair@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-18T09:27:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5cba148eae6e8550c2889f5c0f94d72bed864321'/>
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[ Upstream commit 7b42f95813dc9ceb6bda35afcf914630909a19f9 ]

The function aa_replace_profiles was accessing udata-&gt;size after calling
aa_put_loaddata(udata), causing a potential UAF.

Fixed this by saving the size to a local variable before dropping the
reference.

Fixes: 5ac8c355ae001 ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7b42f95813dc9ceb6bda35afcf914630909a19f9 ]

The function aa_replace_profiles was accessing udata-&gt;size after calling
aa_put_loaddata(udata), causing a potential UAF.

Fixed this by saving the size to a local variable before dropping the
reference.

Fixes: 5ac8c355ae001 ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair &lt;maxime.belair@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: grab ns lock and refresh when looking up changehat child profiles</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T14:03:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Lee</name>
<email>ryan.lee@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-13T19:29:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5acb878db41328dae4d3249bc87b9ee4f290a663'/>
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<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 32e92764d6f8d251c1bca62be33793287b453a81 ]

There was a race condition involving change_hat and profile replacement in
which replacement of the parent profile during a changehat operation could
result in the list of children becoming empty and the changehat operation
failing. To prevent this:
 - grab the namespace lock until we've built the hat transition, and
 - use aa_get_newest_profile to avoid using stale profile objects.

Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2139664
Fixes: 89dbf1962aa63 ("apparmor: move change_hat mediation to using labels")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 32e92764d6f8d251c1bca62be33793287b453a81 ]

There was a race condition involving change_hat and profile replacement in
which replacement of the parent profile during a changehat operation could
result in the list of children becoming empty and the changehat operation
failing. To prevent this:
 - grab the namespace lock until we've built the hat transition, and
 - use aa_get_newest_profile to avoid using stale profile objects.

Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2139664
Fixes: 89dbf1962aa63 ("apparmor: move change_hat mediation to using labels")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee &lt;ryan.lee@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
