linux-stable.git/security, branch v6.12.89

selinux: prune /sys/fs/selinux/disable

2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00

commit 19cfa0099024bb9cd40f6d950caa7f47ff8e77f6 upstream.

Commit f22f9aaf6c3d ("selinux: remove the runtime disable
functionality") removed the underlying SELinux runtime disable
functionality but left everything else intact and started logging an
error message to warn any residual users.

Prune it to just log an error message once and to return count
(i.e. all bytes written successfully) to avoid breaking
userspace. This also fixes a local DoS from logspam.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: shrink critical section in sel_write_load()

2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00

commit 868f31e4061eca8c3cd607d79d954d5e54f204aa upstream.

Currently sel_write_load() takes the policy mutex earlier than
necessary. Move the taking of the mutex later. This avoids
holding it unnecessarily across the vmalloc() and copy_from_user()
of the policy data.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: don't reserve xattr slot when we won't fill it

2026-05-14T13:29:20+00:00

commit 1e5a8eed7821e7a43a31b4c1b3675a91be6bc6f6 upstream.

Move lsm_get_xattr_slot() below the SBLABEL_MNT check so we don't leave
a NULL-named slot in the array when returning -EOPNOTSUPP; filesystem
initxattrs() callbacks stop iterating at the first NULL ->name, silently
dropping xattrs installed by later LSMs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Windsor 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: use target task's context in apparmor_getprocattr()

2026-05-07T04:09:40+00:00

commit 4afc61702bdcc3b9b519749ef966cf762a6e7051 upstream.

apparmor_getprocattr() incorrectly calls task_ctx(current) instead of
task_ctx(task) when retrieving prev and exec attributes, returning the
caller's labels rather than the target's.

Fix by passing task to task_ctx().

The issue can be reproduced when a process with an onexec transition
(e.g., configured by a container runtime) is inspected via
/proc//attr/apparmor/exec. The reader's own value is returned
instead of the target's.

Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory 
Fixes: 3b529a7600d8 ("apparmor: move task domain change info to task security")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Cengiz Can 
Signed-off-by: Cengiz Can 
Co-developed-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: do not copy measurement list to kdump kernel

2026-04-27T13:24:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit fe3aebf27dc1875b2a0d13431e2e8cf3cf350cca ]

Kdump kernel doesn't need IMA to do integrity measurement.
Hence the measurement list in 1st kernel doesn't need to be copied to
kdump kernel.

Here skip allocating buffer for measurement list copying if loading
kdump kernel. Then there won't be the later handling related to
ima_kexec_buffer.

Signed-off-by: Steven Chen 
Tested-by: Baoquan He 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: verify if the segment size has changed

2026-04-27T13:24:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit d0a00ce470e3ea19ba3b9f1c390aee739570a44a ]

kexec 'load' may be called multiple times. Free and realloc the buffer
only if the segment_size is changed from the previous kexec 'load' call.

Signed-off-by: Steven Chen 
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger 
Acked-by: Baoquan He 
Tested-by: Stefan Berger  # ppc64/kvm
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories

2026-04-02T11:09:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit 49c9e09d961025b22e61ef9ad56aa1c21b6ce2f1 ]

Disconnected files or directories can appear when they are visible and
opened from a bind mount, but have been renamed or moved from the source
of the bind mount in a way that makes them inaccessible from the mount
point (i.e. out of scope).

Previously, access rights tied to files or directories opened through a
disconnected directory were collected by walking the related hierarchy
down to the root of the filesystem, without taking into account the
mount point because it couldn't be found. This could lead to
inconsistent access results, potential access right widening, and
hard-to-debug renames, especially since such paths cannot be printed.

For a sandboxed task to create a disconnected directory, it needs to
have write access (i.e. FS_MAKE_REG, FS_REMOVE_FILE, and FS_REFER) to
the underlying source of the bind mount, and read access to the related
mount point.   Because a sandboxed task cannot acquire more access
rights than those defined by its Landlock domain, this could lead to
inconsistent access rights due to missing permissions that should be
inherited from the mount point hierarchy, while inheriting permissions
from the filesystem hierarchy hidden by this mount point instead.

Landlock now handles files and directories opened from disconnected
directories by taking into account the filesystem hierarchy when the
mount point is not found in the hierarchy walk, and also always taking
into account the mount point from which these disconnected directories
were opened.  This ensures that a rename is not allowed if it would
widen access rights [1].

The rationale is that, even if disconnected hierarchies might not be
visible or accessible to a sandboxed task, relying on the collected
access rights from them improves the guarantee that access rights will
not be widened during a rename because of the access right comparison
between the source and the destination (see LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER).
It may look like this would grant more access on disconnected files and
directories, but the security policies are always enforced for all the
evaluated hierarchies.  This new behavior should be less surprising to
users and safer from an access control perspective.

Remove a wrong WARN_ON_ONCE() canary in collect_domain_accesses() and
fix the related comment.

Because opened files have their access rights stored in the related file
security properties, there is no impact for disconnected or unlinked
files.

Cc: Christian Brauner 
Cc: Günther Noack 
Cc: Song Liu 
Reported-by: Tingmao Wang 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/027d5190-b37a-40a8-84e9-4ccbc352bcdf@maowtm.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/09b24128f86973a6022e6aa8338945fcfb9a33e4.1749925391.git.m@maowtm.org
Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER")
Fixes: cb2c7d1a1776 ("landlock: Support filesystem access-control")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b0f46246-f2c5-42ca-93ce-0d629702a987@maowtm.org [1]
Reviewed-by: Tingmao Wang 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251128172200.760753-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün 
(cherry picked from commit 49c9e09d961025b22e61ef9ad56aa1c21b6ce2f1)
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support

2026-04-02T11:09:51+00:00

[ Upstream commit d617f0d72d8041c7099fd04a62db0f0fa5331c1a ]

Always synchronize access_masked_parent* with access_request_parent*
according to allowed_parent*.  This is required for audit support to be
able to get back to the reason of denial.

In a rename/link action, instead of always checking a rule two times for
the same parent directory of the source and the destination files, only
check it when an action on a child was not already allowed.  This also
enables us to keep consistent allowed_parent* status, which is required
to get back to the reason of denial.

For internal mount points, only upgrade allowed_parent* to true but do
not wrongfully set both of them to false otherwise.  This is also
required to get back to the reason of denial.

This does not impact the current behavior but slightly optimize code and
prepare for audit support that needs to know the exact reason why an
access was denied.

Cc: Günther Noack 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün 
(cherry picked from commit d617f0d72d8041c7099fd04a62db0f0fa5331c1a)
Stable-dep-of: 49c9e09d9610 ("landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories")
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU

2026-03-25T10:08:57+00:00

commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream.

When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver
is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for
which the current domU is acting as a device model.

Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the
hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other
guests).

Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started
using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself
might result in violating the secure boot functionality.

This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be
tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option.

This is part of XSA-482

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it

2026-03-13T16:20:48+00:00

commit 8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3 upstream.

AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after
removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode
can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of
the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has
been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and
accessing it through the fs.

While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the
race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be
possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.

Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct
place which is during inode eviction.

Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory 
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia 
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair 
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can 
Signed-off-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman