linux-stable.git/security, branch v6.1.78

lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook

2024-02-01T00:17:00+00:00

commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream.

Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to
other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is
done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*).

However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits
32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are
being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being
routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file
permissions.

This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back -
"/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */".

This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is
called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed
to support this hook.

Reviewing the three places where we are currently using
security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated
compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any
change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"")
Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni 
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley 
[PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"

2024-01-25T23:27:52+00:00

commit 1ed4b563100230ea68821a2b25a3d9f25388a3e6 upstream.

This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882.

New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random
numbers or user-provided decrypted data.  Revert the change requiring
user-provided decrypted data.

Reported-by: Vishal Verma 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty

2024-01-25T23:27:48+00:00

[ Upstream commit 55a8210c9e7d21ff2644809699765796d4bfb200 ]

When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like

 "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}"

a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then
passed to aa_splitn_fqname().

aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace.
Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later
aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0
Call Trace:
 
 ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0
 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230
 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480
 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960
 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0
 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0
 policy_update+0x261/0x370
 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0
 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00
 ksys_write+0x126/0x250
 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
 
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0

It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in
other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there
is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed"
inside.

AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like
":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace.

Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with
EPROTO and an explaining message.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin 
Signed-off-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

selinux: Fix error priority for bind with AF_UNSPEC on PF_INET6 socket

2024-01-25T23:27:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit bbf5a1d0e5d0fb3bdf90205aa872636122692a50 ]

The IPv6 network stack first checks the sockaddr length (-EINVAL error)
before checking the family (-EAFNOSUPPORT error).

This was discovered thanks to commit a549d055a22e ("selftests/landlock:
Add network tests").

Cc: Eric Paris 
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze 
Cc: Paul Moore 
Cc: Stephen Smalley 
Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0584f91c-537c-4188-9e4f-04f192565667@collabora.com
Fixes: 0f8db8cc73df ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün 
Tested-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum 
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep

2024-01-25T23:27:19+00:00

[ Upstream commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882 ]

Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error.

Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
Signed-off-by: Chen Ni 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiry

2024-01-01T12:38:58+00:00

[ Upstream commit 39299bdd2546688d92ed9db4948f6219ca1b9542 ]

If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is
left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by
default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY.  This is a
problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at
that point.

Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type
don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and
turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys.  To make this easier to handle,
key->expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0.

Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry
if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around
indefinitely.  This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call
immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added.

Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code")
Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Tested-by: Markus Suvanto 
cc: Wang Lei 
cc: Jeff Layton 
cc: Steve French 
cc: Marc Dionne 
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen 
cc: "David S. Miller" 
cc: Eric Dumazet 
cc: Jakub Kicinski 
cc: Paolo Abeni 
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file

2023-11-28T17:07:12+00:00

commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 upstream.

Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.

Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata.  Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient.  In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein 
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg 
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings

2023-11-28T17:07:12+00:00

commit e044374a8a0a99e46f4e6d6751d3042b6d9cc12e upstream.

It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it
measures files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to
annotate the iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to
IMA + overlayfs, same as overlayfs annotates the inode mutex.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b42fe626038981fb7bfa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein 
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: Rollback init_trusted() consistently

2023-11-28T17:07:10+00:00

commit 31de287345f41bbfaec36a5c8cbdba035cf76442 upstream.

Do bind neither static calls nor trusted_key_exit() before a successful
init, in order to maintain a consistent state. In addition, depart the
init_trusted() in the case of a real error (i.e. getting back something
else than -ENODEV).

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/CAHk-=whOPoLaWM8S8GgoOPT7a2+nMH5h3TLKtn=R_3w4R1_Uvg@mail.gmail.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: trusted: tee: Refactor register SHM usage

2023-11-28T17:07:10+00:00

commit c745cd1718b7825d69315fe7127e2e289e617598 upstream.

The OP-TEE driver using the old SMC based ABI permits overlapping shared
buffers, but with the new FF-A based ABI each physical page may only
be registered once.

As the key and blob buffer are allocated adjancently, there is no need
for redundant register shared memory invocation. Also, it is incompatibile
with FF-A based ABI limitation. So refactor register shared memory
implementation to use only single invocation to register both key and blob
buffers.

[jarkko: Added cc to stable.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.16+
Fixes: 4615e5a34b95 ("optee: add FF-A support")
Reported-by: Jens Wiklander 
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg 
Tested-by: Jens Wiklander 
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander 
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman