<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security, branch v5.4.18</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: Use atomic_t for statistics counter</title>
<updated>2020-02-05T21:22:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-02T03:53:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=99652ee9c51669706216af7b6a32b4b792263c95'/>
<id>99652ee9c51669706216af7b6a32b4b792263c95</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a8772fad0172aeae339144598b809fd8d4823331 upstream.

syzbot is reporting that there is a race at tomoyo_stat_update() [1].
Although it is acceptable to fail to track exact number of times policy
was updated, convert to atomic_t because this is not a hot path.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4d7b973972eeed410596e6604580e0133b0fc04

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+efea72d4a0a1d03596cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a8772fad0172aeae339144598b809fd8d4823331 upstream.

syzbot is reporting that there is a race at tomoyo_stat_update() [1].
Although it is acceptable to fail to track exact number of times policy
was updated, convert to atomic_t because this is not a hot path.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a4d7b973972eeed410596e6604580e0133b0fc04

Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+efea72d4a0a1d03596cd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: Suppress RCU warning at list_for_each_entry_rcu().</title>
<updated>2020-01-17T18:49:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-16T10:16:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1b32e6ea73782d52b1d92dc805f6f00e19c05803'/>
<id>1b32e6ea73782d52b1d92dc805f6f00e19c05803</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6bd5ce6089b561f5392460bfb654dea89356ab1b ]

John Garry has reported that allmodconfig kernel on arm64 causes flood of
"RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!" warning. I don't know what
change caused this warning, but this warning is safe because TOMOYO uses
SRCU lock instead. Let's suppress this warning by explicitly telling that
the caller is holding SRCU lock.

Reported-and-tested-by: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 6bd5ce6089b561f5392460bfb654dea89356ab1b ]

John Garry has reported that allmodconfig kernel on arm64 causes flood of
"RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!" warning. I don't know what
change caused this warning, but this warning is safe because TOMOYO uses
SRCU lock instead. Let's suppress this warning by explicitly telling that
the caller is holding SRCU lock.

Reported-and-tested-by: John Garry &lt;john.garry@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix aa_xattrs_match() may sleep while holding a RCU lock</title>
<updated>2020-01-09T09:20:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-02T13:31:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e0d2bf5a012974c2f718ce41dbff185666eae11f'/>
<id>e0d2bf5a012974c2f718ce41dbff185666eae11f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8c62ed27a12c00e3db1c9f04bc0f272bdbb06734 upstream.

aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a
context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as
vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being
passed to it.

Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the
xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy
changes occur.

Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8c62ed27a12c00e3db1c9f04bc0f272bdbb06734 upstream.

aa_xattrs_match() is unfortunately calling vfs_getxattr_alloc() from a
context protected by an rcu_read_lock. This can not be done as
vfs_getxattr_alloc() may sleep regardles of the gfp_t value being
passed to it.

Fix this by breaking the rcu_read_lock on the policy search when the
xattr match feature is requested and restarting the search if a policy
changes occur.

Fixes: 8e51f9087f40 ("apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value")
Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: Don't use nifty names on sockets.</title>
<updated>2020-01-04T18:18:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-25T01:46:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9c24cc6a9d9570d1312af1b379ab1764face8cd8'/>
<id>9c24cc6a9d9570d1312af1b379ab1764face8cd8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6f7c41374b62fd80bbd8aae3536c43688c54d95e upstream.

syzbot is reporting that use of SOCKET_I()-&gt;sk from open() can result in
use after free problem [1], for socket's inode is still reachable via
/proc/pid/fd/n despite destruction of SOCKET_I()-&gt;sk already completed.

At first I thought that this race condition applies to only open/getattr
permission checks. But James Morris has pointed out that there are more
permission checks where this race condition applies to. Thus, get rid of
tomoyo_get_socket_name() instead of conditionally bypassing permission
checks on sockets. As a side effect of this patch,
"socket:[family=\$:type=\$:protocol=\$]" in the policy files has to be
rewritten to "socket:[\$]".

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=73d590010454403d55164cca23bd0565b1eb3b74

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+0341f6a4d729d4e0acf1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6f7c41374b62fd80bbd8aae3536c43688c54d95e upstream.

syzbot is reporting that use of SOCKET_I()-&gt;sk from open() can result in
use after free problem [1], for socket's inode is still reachable via
/proc/pid/fd/n despite destruction of SOCKET_I()-&gt;sk already completed.

At first I thought that this race condition applies to only open/getattr
permission checks. But James Morris has pointed out that there are more
permission checks where this race condition applies to. Thus, get rid of
tomoyo_get_socket_name() instead of conditionally bypassing permission
checks on sockets. As a side effect of this patch,
"socket:[family=\$:type=\$:protocol=\$]" in the policy files has to be
rewritten to "socket:[\$]".

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=73d590010454403d55164cca23bd0565b1eb3b74

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+0341f6a4d729d4e0acf1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix unsigned len comparison with less than zero</title>
<updated>2020-01-04T18:18:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-06-27T13:09:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4f13232aa6370e09616563514ed7ef9d81c69f0e'/>
<id>4f13232aa6370e09616563514ed7ef9d81c69f0e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 00e0590dbaec6f1bcaa36a85467d7e3497ced522 ]

The sanity check in macro update_for_len checks to see if len
is less than zero, however, len is a size_t so it can never be
less than zero, so this sanity check is a no-op.  Fix this by
making len a ssize_t so the comparison will work and add ulen
that is a size_t copy of len so that the min() macro won't
throw warnings about comparing different types.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Macro compares unsigned to 0")
Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 00e0590dbaec6f1bcaa36a85467d7e3497ced522 ]

The sanity check in macro update_for_len checks to see if len
is less than zero, however, len is a size_t so it can never be
less than zero, so this sanity check is a no-op.  Fix this by
making len a ssize_t so the comparison will work and add ulen
that is a size_t copy of len so that the min() macro won't
throw warnings about comparing different types.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Macro compares unsigned to 0")
Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi/efi_test: Lock down /dev/efi_test and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN</title>
<updated>2019-10-31T08:40:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Javier Martinez Canillas</name>
<email>javierm@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-29T17:37:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=359efcc2c910117d2faf704ce154e91fc976d37f'/>
<id>359efcc2c910117d2faf704ce154e91fc976d37f</id>
<content type='text'>
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
using the efivar API.

Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.

Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
chardev file mode bits for this.

The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
cause any regression to this tool.

[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas &lt;javierm@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The driver exposes EFI runtime services to user-space through an IOCTL
interface, calling the EFI services function pointers directly without
using the efivar API.

Disallow access to the /dev/efi_test character device when the kernel is
locked down to prevent arbitrary user-space to call EFI runtime services.

Also require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to open the chardev to prevent unprivileged
users to call the EFI runtime services, instead of just relying on the
chardev file mode bits for this.

The main user of this driver is the fwts [0] tool that already checks if
the effective user ID is 0 and fails otherwise. So this change shouldn't
cause any regression to this tool.

[0]: https://wiki.ubuntu.com/FirmwareTestSuite/Reference/uefivarinfo

Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas &lt;javierm@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel &lt;ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org&gt;
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek &lt;lersek@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Cc: Peter Zijlstra &lt;peterz@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029173755.27149-7-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2019-10-08T17:51:37+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-08T17:51:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2ef459167adb5d7cf76df403b4fcf79347056824'/>
<id>2ef459167adb5d7cf76df403b4fcf79347056824</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
 "One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
 "One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove pointless subdir-$(CONFIG_...)</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T06:29:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-26T02:10:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7a8beb7ad51551babd17331f3c0f58af25916f67'/>
<id>7a8beb7ad51551babd17331f3c0f58af25916f67</id>
<content type='text'>
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.

subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.

subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove unneeded, broken attempt to add -fshort-wchar</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T06:29:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-26T02:10:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6b190d3ce0a693750517256ba67011a9fa04a12a'/>
<id>6b190d3ce0a693750517256ba67011a9fa04a12a</id>
<content type='text'>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e18 ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.

load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:

  $(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar

But, you do not need to fix it.

Commit 8c97023cf051 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e18 ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.

load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:

  $(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar

But, you do not need to fix it.

Commit 8c97023cf051 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()</title>
<updated>2019-10-03T18:13:36+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-03T13:59:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2a5243937c700ffe6a28e6557a4562a9ab0a17a4'/>
<id>2a5243937c700ffe6a28e6557a4562a9ab0a17a4</id>
<content type='text'>
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.

Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).

How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
    # dnf install -y memcached
    # systemctl start memcached
    # semodule -d memcached
    # load_policy
    # load_policy
    # systemctl stop memcached
    # ausearch -m AVC
    type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc:  denied  { signal } for  pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik &lt;mmalik@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.

Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).

How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
    # dnf install -y memcached
    # systemctl start memcached
    # semodule -d memcached
    # load_policy
    # load_policy
    # systemctl stop memcached
    # ausearch -m AVC
    type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc:  denied  { signal } for  pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik &lt;mmalik@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
