linux-stable.git/security, branch v5.16.9 Linux kernel stable tree selinux: fix double free of cond_list on error paths 2022-02-08T17:35:07+00:00 Vratislav Bendel vbendel@redhat.com 2022-02-02T11:25:11+00:00 7ed9cbf7ac0d4ed86b356e1b944304ae9ee450d4 commit 186edf7e368c40d06cf727a1ad14698ea67b74ad upstream. On error path from cond_read_list() and duplicate_policydb_cond_list() the cond_list_destroy() gets called a second time in caller functions, resulting in NULL pointer deref. Fix this by resetting the cond_list_len to 0 in cond_list_destroy(), making subsequent calls a noop. Also consistently reset the cond_list pointer to NULL after freeing. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vratislav Bendel <vbendel@redhat.com> [PM: fix line lengths in the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 186edf7e368c40d06cf727a1ad14698ea67b74ad upstream.

On error path from cond_read_list() and duplicate_policydb_cond_list()
the cond_list_destroy() gets called a second time in caller functions,
resulting in NULL pointer deref.  Fix this by resetting the
cond_list_len to 0 in cond_list_destroy(), making subsequent calls a
noop.

Also consistently reset the cond_list pointer to NULL after freeing.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vratislav Bendel <vbendel@redhat.com>
[PM: fix line lengths in the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
security, lsm: dentry_init_security() Handle multi LSM registration 2022-02-01T16:29:05+00:00 Vivek Goyal vgoyal@redhat.com 2022-01-26T20:35:14+00:00 b830fd118fddf4af0a41027dfc2a3dfb85b62e25 commit 7f5056b9e7b71149bf11073f00a57fa1ac2921a9 upstream. A ceph user has reported that ceph is crashing with kernel NULL pointer dereference. Following is the backtrace. /proc/version: Linux version 5.16.2-arch1-1 (linux@archlinux) (gcc (GCC) 11.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.36.1) #1 SMP PREEMPT Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:18:29 +0000 distro / arch: Arch Linux / x86_64 SELinux is not enabled ceph cluster version: 16.2.7 (dd0603118f56ab514f133c8d2e3adfc983942503) relevant dmesg output: [ 30.947129] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947206] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 30.947258] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 30.947310] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 30.947342] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 30.947388] CPU: 5 PID: 778 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.16.2-arch1-1 #1 86fbf2c313cc37a553d65deb81d98e9dcc2a3659 [ 30.947486] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B365M DS3H/B365M DS3H, BIOS F5 08/13/2019 [ 30.947569] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20 [ 30.947616] Code: b6 07 38 d0 74 16 48 83 c7 01 84 c0 74 05 48 39 f7 75 ec 31 c0 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 48 89 f8 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 0 f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 12 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 31 ff [ 30.947782] RSP: 0018:ffffa4ed80ffbbb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 30.947836] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947904] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 30.947971] RBP: ffff94b0d15c0ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948040] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948106] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 30.948174] FS: 00007fc7520f0740(0000) GS:ffff94b7ced40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 30.948252] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 30.948308] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104a40001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 30.948376] Call Trace: [ 30.948404] <TASK> [ 30.948431] ceph_security_init_secctx+0x7b/0x240 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948582] ceph_atomic_open+0x51e/0x8a0 [ceph 49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b] [ 30.948708] ? get_cached_acl+0x4d/0xa0 [ 30.948759] path_openat+0x60d/0x1030 [ 30.948809] do_filp_open+0xa5/0x150 [ 30.948859] do_sys_openat2+0xc4/0x190 [ 30.948904] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 30.948948] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 30.948989] ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x180 [ 30.949034] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 30.949091] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7521e25bb [ 30.950849] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 0 0 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 Core of the problem is that ceph checks for return code from security_dentry_init_security() and if return code is 0, it assumes everything is fine and continues to call strlen(name), which crashes. Typically SELinux LSM returns 0 and sets name to "security.selinux" and it is not a problem. Or if selinux is not compiled in or disabled, it returns -EOPNOTSUP and ceph deals with it. But somehow in this configuration, 0 is being returned and "name" is not being initialized and that's creating the problem. Our suspicion is that BPF LSM is registering a hook for dentry_init_security() and returns hook default of 0. LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry,...) I have not been able to reproduce it just by doing CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y. Stephen has tested the patch though and confirms it solves the problem for him. dentry_init_security() is written in such a way that it expects only one LSM to register the hook. Atleast that's the expectation with current code. If another LSM returns a hook and returns default, it will simply return 0 as of now and that will break ceph. Hence, suggestion is that change semantics of this hook a bit. If there are no LSMs or no LSM is taking ownership and initializing security context, then return -EOPNOTSUP. Also allow at max one LSM to initialize security context. This hook can't deal with multiple LSMs trying to init security context. This patch implements this new behavior. Reported-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com> Tested-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.16.0 Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 7f5056b9e7b71149bf11073f00a57fa1ac2921a9 upstream.

A ceph user has reported that ceph is crashing with kernel NULL pointer
dereference. Following is the backtrace.

/proc/version: Linux version 5.16.2-arch1-1 (linux@archlinux) (gcc (GCC)
11.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.36.1) #1 SMP PREEMPT Thu, 20 Jan 2022
16:18:29 +0000
distro / arch: Arch Linux / x86_64
SELinux is not enabled
ceph cluster version: 16.2.7 (dd0603118f56ab514f133c8d2e3adfc983942503)

relevant dmesg output:
[   30.947129] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
0000000000000000
[   30.947206] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   30.947258] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   30.947310] PGD 0 P4D 0
[   30.947342] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[   30.947388] CPU: 5 PID: 778 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.16.2-arch1-1 #1
86fbf2c313cc37a553d65deb81d98e9dcc2a3659
[   30.947486] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B365M
DS3H/B365M DS3H, BIOS F5 08/13/2019
[   30.947569] RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20
[   30.947616] Code: b6 07 38 d0 74 16 48 83 c7 01 84 c0 74 05 48 39 f7 75
ec 31 c0 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 48 89 f8 31 d2 89 d6 89 d7 c3 0
f 1f 40 00 <80> 3f 00 74 12 48 89 f8 48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 31
ff
[   30.947782] RSP: 0018:ffffa4ed80ffbbb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   30.947836] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 RCX:
0000000000000000
[   30.947904] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI:
0000000000000000
[   30.947971] RBP: ffff94b0d15c0ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000000
[   30.948040] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
0000000000000000
[   30.948106] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffa4ed80ffbc60 R15:
0000000000000000
[   30.948174] FS:  00007fc7520f0740(0000) GS:ffff94b7ced40000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[   30.948252] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   30.948308] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000104a40001 CR4:
00000000003706e0
[   30.948376] Call Trace:
[   30.948404]  <TASK>
[   30.948431]  ceph_security_init_secctx+0x7b/0x240 [ceph
49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b]
[   30.948582]  ceph_atomic_open+0x51e/0x8a0 [ceph
49f9c4b9bf5be8760f19f1747e26da33920bce4b]
[   30.948708]  ? get_cached_acl+0x4d/0xa0
[   30.948759]  path_openat+0x60d/0x1030
[   30.948809]  do_filp_open+0xa5/0x150
[   30.948859]  do_sys_openat2+0xc4/0x190
[   30.948904]  __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   30.948948]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[   30.948989]  ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x180
[   30.949034]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[   30.949091] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7521e25bb
[   30.950849] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00
00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 0
0 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14
25

Core of the problem is that ceph checks for return code from
security_dentry_init_security() and if return code is 0, it assumes
everything is fine and continues to call strlen(name), which crashes.

Typically SELinux LSM returns 0 and sets name to "security.selinux" and
it is not a problem. Or if selinux is not compiled in or disabled, it
returns -EOPNOTSUP and ceph deals with it.

But somehow in this configuration, 0 is being returned and "name" is
not being initialized and that's creating the problem.

Our suspicion is that BPF LSM is registering a hook for
dentry_init_security() and returns hook default of 0.

LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry,...)

I have not been able to reproduce it just by doing CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y.
Stephen has tested the patch though and confirms it solves the problem
for him.

dentry_init_security() is written in such a way that it expects only one
LSM to register the hook. Atleast that's the expectation with current code.

If another LSM returns a hook and returns default, it will simply return
0 as of now and that will break ceph.

Hence, suggestion is that change semantics of this hook a bit. If there
are no LSMs or no LSM is taking ownership and initializing security context,
then return -EOPNOTSUP. Also allow at max one LSM to initialize security
context. This hook can't deal with multiple LSMs trying to init security
context. This patch implements this new behavior.

Reported-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Muth <smuth4@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.16.0
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
selinux: fix potential memleak in selinux_add_opt() 2022-01-27T11:01:51+00:00 Bernard Zhao bernard@vivo.com 2021-12-10T12:03:58+00:00 5e09744d90bfdf37a6215a7b1f56ceda6b38ed50 [ Upstream commit 2e08df3c7c4e4e74e3dd5104c100f0bf6288aaa8 ] This patch try to fix potential memleak in error branch. Fixes: ba6418623385 ("selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()") Signed-off-by: Bernard Zhao <bernard@vivo.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, add Fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> 
[ Upstream commit 2e08df3c7c4e4e74e3dd5104c100f0bf6288aaa8 ]

This patch try to fix potential memleak in error branch.

Fixes: ba6418623385 ("selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()")
Signed-off-by: Bernard Zhao <bernard@vivo.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, add Fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211228' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux 2021-12-28T21:33:06+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2021-12-28T21:33:06+00:00 e7c124bd04631973a3cc0df19ab881b56d8a2d50 Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore: "One more small SELinux patch to address an uninitialized stack variable" * tag 'selinux-pr-20211228' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: initialize proto variable in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() 
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
 "One more small SELinux patch to address an uninitialized stack
  variable"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20211228' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: initialize proto variable in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
selinux: initialize proto variable in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() 2021-12-27T15:41:20+00:00 Tom Rix trix@redhat.com 2021-12-24T15:07:39+00:00 732bc2ff080c447f8524f40c970c481f5da6eed3 Clang static analysis reports this warning hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized value if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto. The later call to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can return ok if the garbage proto value matches. So initialize proto. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eef9b41622f2 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> [PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
Clang static analysis reports this warning

hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized
                value
        if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
            ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto.  The later call
to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can
return ok if the garbage proto value matches.  So initialize proto.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eef9b41622f2 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
[PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Merge tag 'tomoyo-pr-20211222' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1 2021-12-22T18:06:32+00:00 Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org 2021-12-22T18:06:32+00:00 c9ea870c6e33fcc242f7c3b421fb3d4cf04e5788 Pull tomoyo fixes from Tetsuo Handa: "Two overhead reduction patches for testing/fuzzing environment" * tag 'tomoyo-pr-20211222' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1: tomoyo: use hweight16() in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok() tomoyo: Check exceeded quota early in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(). 
Pull tomoyo fixes from Tetsuo Handa:
 "Two overhead reduction patches for testing/fuzzing environment"

* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20211222' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1:
  tomoyo: use hweight16() in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok()
  tomoyo: Check exceeded quota early in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok().
selinux: fix sleeping function called from invalid context 2021-12-16T22:47:39+00:00 Scott Mayhew smayhew@redhat.com 2021-12-15T21:28:40+00:00 cc274ae7763d9700a56659f3228641d7069e7a3f selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() is called via sget_fc() under the sb_lock spinlock, so it can't use GFP_KERNEL allocations: [ 868.565200] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:230 [ 868.568246] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 4914, name: mount.nfs [ 868.569626] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 [ 868.570215] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 [ 868.570809] Preemption disabled at: [ 868.570810] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [ 868.571848] CPU: 1 PID: 4914 Comm: mount.nfs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.16.0-rc5.2585cf9dfa #1 [ 868.573273] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 [ 868.574478] Call Trace: [ 868.574844] <TASK> [ 868.575156] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 [ 868.575692] __might_resched.cold+0xd6/0x10f [ 868.576308] slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x89/0xf0 [ 868.577046] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x72/0x420 [ 868.577684] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x48/0x2b0 [ 868.578569] kmemdup_nul+0x22/0x50 [ 868.579108] security_context_to_sid_core+0x48/0x2b0 [ 868.579854] ? _nfs4_proc_pathconf+0xff/0x110 [nfsv4] [ 868.580742] ? nfs_reconfigure+0x80/0x80 [nfs] [ 868.581355] security_context_str_to_sid+0x36/0x40 [ 868.581960] selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat+0xb5/0x1e0 [ 868.582550] ? nfs_reconfigure+0x80/0x80 [nfs] [ 868.583098] security_sb_mnt_opts_compat+0x2a/0x40 [ 868.583676] nfs_compare_super+0x113/0x220 [nfs] [ 868.584249] ? nfs_try_mount_request+0x210/0x210 [nfs] [ 868.584879] sget_fc+0xb5/0x2f0 [ 868.585267] nfs_get_tree_common+0x91/0x4a0 [nfs] [ 868.585834] vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0 [ 868.586241] fc_mount+0xe/0x30 [ 868.586605] do_nfs4_mount+0x130/0x380 [nfsv4] [ 868.587160] nfs4_try_get_tree+0x47/0xb0 [nfsv4] [ 868.587724] vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0 [ 868.588193] do_new_mount+0x176/0x310 [ 868.588782] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 868.589388] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 868.589935] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 868.590699] RIP: 0033:0x7f2b371c6c4e [ 868.591239] Code: 48 8b 0d dd 71 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d aa 71 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 868.593810] RSP: 002b:00007ffc83775d88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 868.594691] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc83775f10 RCX: 00007f2b371c6c4e [ 868.595504] RDX: 0000555d517247a0 RSI: 0000555d51724700 RDI: 0000555d51724540 [ 868.596317] RBP: 00007ffc83775f10 R08: 0000555d51726890 R09: 0000555d51726890 [ 868.597162] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000555d51726890 [ 868.598005] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000555d517246e0 R15: 0000555d511ac925 [ 868.598826] </TASK> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 69c4a42d72eb ("lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount") Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> [PM: cleanup/line-wrap the backtrace] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat() is called via sget_fc() under the sb_lock
spinlock, so it can't use GFP_KERNEL allocations:

[  868.565200] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
               include/linux/sched/mm.h:230
[  868.568246] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0,
               non_block: 0, pid: 4914, name: mount.nfs
[  868.569626] preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
[  868.570215] RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
[  868.570809] Preemption disabled at:
[  868.570810] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[  868.571848] CPU: 1 PID: 4914 Comm: mount.nfs Kdump: loaded
               Tainted: G        W         5.16.0-rc5.2585cf9dfa #1
[  868.573273] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009),
               BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014
[  868.574478] Call Trace:
[  868.574844]  <TASK>
[  868.575156]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  868.575692]  __might_resched.cold+0xd6/0x10f
[  868.576308]  slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x89/0xf0
[  868.577046]  __kmalloc_track_caller+0x72/0x420
[  868.577684]  ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x48/0x2b0
[  868.578569]  kmemdup_nul+0x22/0x50
[  868.579108]  security_context_to_sid_core+0x48/0x2b0
[  868.579854]  ? _nfs4_proc_pathconf+0xff/0x110 [nfsv4]
[  868.580742]  ? nfs_reconfigure+0x80/0x80 [nfs]
[  868.581355]  security_context_str_to_sid+0x36/0x40
[  868.581960]  selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat+0xb5/0x1e0
[  868.582550]  ? nfs_reconfigure+0x80/0x80 [nfs]
[  868.583098]  security_sb_mnt_opts_compat+0x2a/0x40
[  868.583676]  nfs_compare_super+0x113/0x220 [nfs]
[  868.584249]  ? nfs_try_mount_request+0x210/0x210 [nfs]
[  868.584879]  sget_fc+0xb5/0x2f0
[  868.585267]  nfs_get_tree_common+0x91/0x4a0 [nfs]
[  868.585834]  vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0
[  868.586241]  fc_mount+0xe/0x30
[  868.586605]  do_nfs4_mount+0x130/0x380 [nfsv4]
[  868.587160]  nfs4_try_get_tree+0x47/0xb0 [nfsv4]
[  868.587724]  vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xb0
[  868.588193]  do_new_mount+0x176/0x310
[  868.588782]  __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140
[  868.589388]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[  868.589935]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  868.590699] RIP: 0033:0x7f2b371c6c4e
[  868.591239] Code: 48 8b 0d dd 71 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e
                     0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00
                     00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d aa 71
                     0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  868.593810] RSP: 002b:00007ffc83775d88 EFLAGS: 00000246
               ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[  868.594691] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc83775f10 RCX: 00007f2b371c6c4e
[  868.595504] RDX: 0000555d517247a0 RSI: 0000555d51724700 RDI: 0000555d51724540
[  868.596317] RBP: 00007ffc83775f10 R08: 0000555d51726890 R09: 0000555d51726890
[  868.597162] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000555d51726890
[  868.598005] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000555d517246e0 R15: 0000555d511ac925
[  868.598826]  </TASK>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 69c4a42d72eb ("lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount")
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
[PM: cleanup/line-wrap the backtrace]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
tomoyo: use hwight16() in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok() 2021-12-15T11:13:55+00:00 Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp 2021-12-15T11:13:55+00:00 f702e1107601230eec707739038a89018ea3468d hwight16() is much faster. While we are at it, no need to include "perm =" part into data_race() macro, for perm is a local variable that cannot be accessed by other threads. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> 
hwight16() is much faster. While we are at it, no need to include
"perm =" part into data_race() macro, for perm is a local variable
that cannot be accessed by other threads.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
tomoyo: Check exceeded quota early in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(). 2021-12-15T11:11:07+00:00 Dmitry Vyukov dvyukov@google.com 2021-12-14T09:45:26+00:00 04e57a2d952bbd34bc45744e72be3eecdc344294 If tomoyo is used in a testing/fuzzing environment in learning mode, for lots of domains the quota will be exceeded and stay exceeded for prolonged periods of time. In such cases it's pointless (and slow) to walk the whole acl list again and again just to rediscover that the quota is exceeded. We already have the TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag that notes the overflow condition. Check it early to avoid the slowdown. [penguin-kernel] This patch causes a user visible change that the learning mode will not be automatically resumed after the quota is increased. To resume the learning mode, administrator will need to explicitly clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag after increasing the quota. But I think that this change is generally preferable, for administrator likely wants to optimize the acl list for that domain before increasing the quota, or that domain likely hits the quota again. Therefore, don't try to care to clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag automatically when the quota for that domain changed. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> 
If tomoyo is used in a testing/fuzzing environment in learning mode,
for lots of domains the quota will be exceeded and stay exceeded
for prolonged periods of time. In such cases it's pointless (and slow)
to walk the whole acl list again and again just to rediscover that
the quota is exceeded. We already have the TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag
that notes the overflow condition. Check it early to avoid the slowdown.

[penguin-kernel]
This patch causes a user visible change that the learning mode will not be
automatically resumed after the quota is increased. To resume the learning
mode, administrator will need to explicitly clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED
flag after increasing the quota. But I think that this change is generally
preferable, for administrator likely wants to optimize the acl list for
that domain before increasing the quota, or that domain likely hits the
quota again. Therefore, don't try to care to clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED
flag automatically when the quota for that domain changed.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
selinux: fix NULL-pointer dereference when hashtab allocation fails 2021-11-19T21:11:39+00:00 Ondrej Mosnacek omosnace@redhat.com 2021-11-19T13:45:20+00:00 dc27f3c5d10c58069672215787a96b4fae01818b When the hash table slot array allocation fails in hashtab_init(), h->size is left initialized with a non-zero value, but the h->htable pointer is NULL. This may then cause a NULL pointer dereference, since the policydb code relies on the assumption that even after a failed hashtab_init(), hashtab_map() and hashtab_destroy() can be safely called on it. Yet, these detect an empty hashtab only by looking at the size. Fix this by making sure that hashtab_init() always leaves behind a valid empty hashtab when the allocation fails. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 03414a49ad5f ("selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> 
When the hash table slot array allocation fails in hashtab_init(),
h->size is left initialized with a non-zero value, but the h->htable
pointer is NULL. This may then cause a NULL pointer dereference, since
the policydb code relies on the assumption that even after a failed
hashtab_init(), hashtab_map() and hashtab_destroy() can be safely called
on it. Yet, these detect an empty hashtab only by looking at the size.

Fix this by making sure that hashtab_init() always leaves behind a valid
empty hashtab when the allocation fails.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03414a49ad5f ("selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>