<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security, branch v3.12.52</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring</title>
<updated>2015-11-18T09:27:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-15T16:21:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd6e04696299ce030e8650a96151fe383c431dce'/>
<id>bd6e04696299ce030e8650a96151fe383c431dce</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f05819df10d7b09f6d1eb6f8534a8f68e5a4fe61 upstream.

The following sequence of commands:

    i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
    keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
    keyctl unlink $i @s

tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set.  However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring-&gt;type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code.  When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring-&gt;type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
	IP: [&lt;ffffffff8126e051&gt;] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	...
	Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
	...
	RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8126e051&gt;] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30  EFLAGS: 00010203
	RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
	RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
	R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
	R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
	...
	CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [&lt;ffffffff8126c756&gt;] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
	 [&lt;ffffffff8126ca71&gt;] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
	 [&lt;ffffffff8105ec9b&gt;] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
	 [&lt;ffffffff8105fd17&gt;] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
	 [&lt;ffffffff8105faa9&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
	 [&lt;ffffffff810648ad&gt;] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
	 [&lt;ffffffff810647ba&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
	 [&lt;ffffffff815f2ccf&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
	 [&lt;ffffffff810647ba&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2

Note the value in RAX.  This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.

The solution is to only call -&gt;destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f05819df10d7b09f6d1eb6f8534a8f68e5a4fe61 upstream.

The following sequence of commands:

    i=`keyctl add user a a @s`
    keyctl request2 keyring foo bar @t
    keyctl unlink $i @s

tries to invoke an upcall to instantiate a keyring if one doesn't already
exist by that name within the user's keyring set.  However, if the upcall
fails, the code sets keyring-&gt;type_data.reject_error to -ENOKEY or some
other error code.  When the key is garbage collected, the key destroy
function is called unconditionally and keyring_destroy() uses list_empty()
on keyring-&gt;type_data.link - which is in a union with reject_error.
Subsequently, the kernel tries to unlink the keyring from the keyring names
list - which oopses like this:

	BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
	IP: [&lt;ffffffff8126e051&gt;] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	...
	Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
	...
	RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff8126e051&gt;] keyring_destroy+0x3d/0x88
	RSP: 0018:ffff88003e2f3d30  EFLAGS: 00010203
	RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: ffff88003bf1a900 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000003bfc6901 RDI: ffffffff81a73a40
	RBP: ffff88003e2f3d38 R08: 0000000000000152 R09: 0000000000000000
	R10: ffff88003e2f3c18 R11: 000000000000865b R12: ffff88003bf1a900
	R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88003bf1a908 R15: ffff88003e2f4000
	...
	CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000003e3ec000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
	...
	Call Trace:
	 [&lt;ffffffff8126c756&gt;] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.1+0x5d/0x10f
	 [&lt;ffffffff8126ca71&gt;] key_garbage_collector+0x1fa/0x351
	 [&lt;ffffffff8105ec9b&gt;] process_one_work+0x28e/0x547
	 [&lt;ffffffff8105fd17&gt;] worker_thread+0x26e/0x361
	 [&lt;ffffffff8105faa9&gt;] ? rescuer_thread+0x2a8/0x2a8
	 [&lt;ffffffff810648ad&gt;] kthread+0xf3/0xfb
	 [&lt;ffffffff810647ba&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2
	 [&lt;ffffffff815f2ccf&gt;] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
	 [&lt;ffffffff810647ba&gt;] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x1c2/0x1c2

Note the value in RAX.  This is a 32-bit representation of -ENOKEY.

The solution is to only call -&gt;destroy() if the key was successfully
instantiated.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix race between key destruction and finding a keyring by name</title>
<updated>2015-11-18T09:27:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-25T15:30:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f4562591c143cc272eab0d95be01dcca528627b9'/>
<id>f4562591c143cc272eab0d95be01dcca528627b9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 94c4554ba07adbdde396748ee7ae01e86cf2d8d7 upstream.

There appears to be a race between:

 (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key-&gt;security and then calls
     keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list

 (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
     key-&gt;security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
     (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).

Fix this by calling -&gt;destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key-&gt;security.

Reported-by: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 94c4554ba07adbdde396748ee7ae01e86cf2d8d7 upstream.

There appears to be a race between:

 (1) key_gc_unused_keys() which frees key-&gt;security and then calls
     keyring_destroy() to unlink the name from the name list

 (2) find_keyring_by_name() which calls key_permission(), thus accessing
     key-&gt;security, on a key before checking to see whether the key usage is 0
     (ie. the key is dead and might be cleaned up).

Fix this by calling -&gt;destroy() before cleaning up the core key data -
including key-&gt;security.

Reported-by: Petr Matousek &lt;pmatouse@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend "mask" policy matching support</title>
<updated>2015-08-19T06:36:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a5423d5eede5d13f8102b3129f8cd7a0e717bd3e'/>
<id>a5423d5eede5d13f8102b3129f8cd7a0e717bd3e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream.

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream.

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition</title>
<updated>2015-08-19T06:36:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:48:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cee24cef75f5f5cbfce1160b9d8f7bd08466324f'/>
<id>cee24cef75f5f5cbfce1160b9d8f7bd08466324f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 upstream.

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 upstream.

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing</title>
<updated>2015-06-10T13:20:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Guy Briggs</name>
<email>rgb@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-14T15:01:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=44fa042f532c7f8ac3421456eaae4255297092e0'/>
<id>44fa042f532c7f8ac3421456eaae4255297092e0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 5deeb5cece3f9b30c8129786726b9d02c412c8ca upstream.

When task-&gt;comm is passed directly to audit_log_untrustedstring() without
getting a copy or using the task_lock, there is a race that could happen that
would output a NULL (\0) in the middle of the output string that would
effectively truncate the rest of the report text after the comm= field in the
audit log message, losing fields.

Using get_task_comm() to get a copy while acquiring the task_lock to prevent
this and to prevent the result from being a mixture of old and new values of
comm would incur potentially unacceptable overhead, considering that the value
can be influenced by userspace and therefore untrusted anyways.

Copy the value before passing it to audit_log_untrustedstring() ensures that a
local copy is used to calculate the length *and* subsequently printed.  Even if
this value contains a mix of old and new values, it will only calculate and
copy up to the first NULL, preventing the rest of the audit log message being
truncated.

Use a second local copy of comm to avoid a race between the first and second
calls to audit_log_untrustedstring() with comm.

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 5deeb5cece3f9b30c8129786726b9d02c412c8ca upstream.

When task-&gt;comm is passed directly to audit_log_untrustedstring() without
getting a copy or using the task_lock, there is a race that could happen that
would output a NULL (\0) in the middle of the output string that would
effectively truncate the rest of the report text after the comm= field in the
audit log message, losing fields.

Using get_task_comm() to get a copy while acquiring the task_lock to prevent
this and to prevent the result from being a mixture of old and new values of
comm would incur potentially unacceptable overhead, considering that the value
can be influenced by userspace and therefore untrusted anyways.

Copy the value before passing it to audit_log_untrustedstring() ensures that a
local copy is used to calculate the length *and* subsequently printed.  Even if
this value contains a mix of old and new values, it will only calculate and
copy up to the first NULL, preventing the rest of the audit log message being
truncated.

Use a second local copy of comm to avoid a race between the first and second
calls to audit_log_untrustedstring() with comm.

Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs &lt;rgb@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nick kvfree() from apparmor</title>
<updated>2015-04-27T17:59:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-06T18:02:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fb6a2a8ebe2741cd15d9f4c613c6b40cf0e40ea5'/>
<id>fb6a2a8ebe2741cd15d9f4c613c6b40cf0e40ea5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 39f1f78d53b9bcbca91967380c5f0f2305a5c55f upstream.

too many places open-code it

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 39f1f78d53b9bcbca91967380c5f0f2305a5c55f upstream.

too many places open-code it

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix sel_write_enforce broken return value</title>
<updated>2015-04-22T06:58:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joe Perches</name>
<email>joe@perches.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-03-24T01:01:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9647fcfbcad58f58edfa9f94aa691106ec29ff9a'/>
<id>9647fcfbcad58f58edfa9f94aa691106ec29ff9a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6436a123a147db51a0b06024a8350f4c230e73ff upstream.

Return a negative error value like the rest of the entries in this function.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6436a123a147db51a0b06024a8350f4c230e73ff upstream.

Return a negative error value like the rest of the entries in this function.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches &lt;joe@perches.com&gt;
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: tweaked subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Don't leak a key reference if request_key() tries to use a revoked keyring</title>
<updated>2015-04-09T11:14:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Jeffery</name>
<email>djeffery@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-02-12T16:45:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=da95a0de5c59732c942e9753ecc9c03c3783d33d'/>
<id>da95a0de5c59732c942e9753ecc9c03c3783d33d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 upstream.

If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.

key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.

Signed-off-by: David Jeffery &lt;djeffery@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d0709f1e66e8066c4ac6a54620ec116aa41937c0 upstream.

If a request_key() call to allocate and fill out a key attempts to insert the
key structure into a revoked keyring, the key will leak, using memory and part
of the user's key quota until the system reboots. This is from a failure of
construct_alloc_key() to decrement the key's reference count after the attempt
to insert into the requested keyring is rejected.

key_put() needs to be called in the link_prealloc_failed callpath to ensure
the unused key is released.

Signed-off-by: David Jeffery &lt;djeffery@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: fix selinuxfs policy file on big endian systems</title>
<updated>2015-02-16T15:10:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-23T21:38:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ebf1059f4bc4e12a6878c44137f95fafc1fe55b3'/>
<id>ebf1059f4bc4e12a6878c44137f95fafc1fe55b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b138004ea0382bdc6d02599c39392651b4f63889 upstream.

The /sys/fs/selinux/policy file is not valid on big endian systems like
ppc64 or s390.  Let's see why:

static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
	int *cnt = ptr;
	*cnt = *cnt + 1;

	return 0;
}

static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
	size_t nel;
[...]
	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
	nel = 0;
	rc = hashtab_map(p-&gt;range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &amp;nel);
	if (rc)
		return rc;
	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);

So size_t is 64 bits.  But then we pass a pointer to it as we do to
hashtab_cnt.  hashtab_cnt thinks it is a 32 bit int and only deals with
the first 4 bytes.  On x86_64 which is little endian, those first 4
bytes and the least significant, so this works out fine.  On ppc64/s390
those first 4 bytes of memory are the high order bits.  So at the end of
the call to hashtab_map nel has a HUGE number.  But the least
significant 32 bits are all 0's.

We then pass that 64 bit number to cpu_to_le32() which happily truncates
it to a 32 bit number and does endian swapping.  But the low 32 bits are
all 0's.  So no matter how many entries are in the hashtab, big endian
systems always say there are 0 entries because I screwed up the
counting.

The fix is easy.  Use a 32 bit int, as the hashtab_cnt expects, for nel.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b138004ea0382bdc6d02599c39392651b4f63889 upstream.

The /sys/fs/selinux/policy file is not valid on big endian systems like
ppc64 or s390.  Let's see why:

static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
	int *cnt = ptr;
	*cnt = *cnt + 1;

	return 0;
}

static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
	size_t nel;
[...]
	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
	nel = 0;
	rc = hashtab_map(p-&gt;range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &amp;nel);
	if (rc)
		return rc;
	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);

So size_t is 64 bits.  But then we pass a pointer to it as we do to
hashtab_cnt.  hashtab_cnt thinks it is a 32 bit int and only deals with
the first 4 bytes.  On x86_64 which is little endian, those first 4
bytes and the least significant, so this works out fine.  On ppc64/s390
those first 4 bytes of memory are the high order bits.  So at the end of
the call to hashtab_map nel has a HUGE number.  But the least
significant 32 bits are all 0's.

We then pass that 64 bit number to cpu_to_le32() which happily truncates
it to a 32 bit number and does endian swapping.  But the low 32 bits are
all 0's.  So no matter how many entries are in the hashtab, big endian
systems always say there are 0 entries because I screwed up the
counting.

The fix is easy.  Use a 32 bit int, as the hashtab_cnt expects, for nel.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;pmoore@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>move d_rcu from overlapping d_child to overlapping d_alias</title>
<updated>2015-01-29T14:45:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-26T23:19:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4b2f6663ebde6bed50209a05041b34c203116253'/>
<id>4b2f6663ebde6bed50209a05041b34c203116253</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 946e51f2bf37f1656916eb75bd0742ba33983c28 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 946e51f2bf37f1656916eb75bd0742ba33983c28 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby &lt;jslaby@suse.cz&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
