linux-stable.git/security, branch v3.0.70

selinux: use GFP_ATOMIC under spin_lock

2013-03-20T19:58:52+00:00

commit 4502403dcf8f5c76abd4dbab8726c8e4ecb5cd34 upstream.

The call tree here is:

sk_clone_lock()              <- takes bh_lock_sock(newsk);
xfrm_sk_clone_policy()
__xfrm_sk_clone_policy()
clone_policy()               <- uses GFP_ATOMIC for allocations
security_xfrm_policy_clone()
security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security()
selinux_xfrm_policy_clone()

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()

2013-03-14T18:32:06+00:00

commit 0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2013-1792.

There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created.  It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.

Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.

	THREAD A			THREAD B
	===============================	===============================
					==>call install_user_keyrings();
	if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
	==>call install_user_keyrings()
					...
					user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
	if (user->uid_keyring)
		return 0;
	<==
	key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
					user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
	atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]

At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.

The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.

This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel.  However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.

Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: fix sel_netnode_insert() suspicious rcu dereference

2012-11-26T19:34:56+00:00

commit 88a693b5c1287be4da937699cb82068ce9db0135 upstream.

===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
3.5.0-rc1+ #63 Not tainted
-------------------------------
security/selinux/netnode.c:178 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by trinity-child1/8750:
 #0:  (sel_netnode_lock){+.....}, at: [] sel_netnode_sid+0x16a/0x3e0

stack backtrace:
Pid: 8750, comm: trinity-child1 Not tainted 3.5.0-rc1+ #63
Call Trace:
 [] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130
 [] sel_netnode_sid+0x3b1/0x3e0
 [] ? sel_netnode_find+0x1a0/0x1a0
 [] selinux_socket_bind+0xf6/0x2c0
 [] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
 [] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.9+0x15/0x1a0
 [] ? lock_hrtimer_base+0x31/0x60
 [] security_socket_bind+0x16/0x20
 [] sys_bind+0x7a/0x100
 [] ? sysret_check+0x22/0x5d
 [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x10d/0x1a0
 [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

This patch below does what Paul McKenney suggested in the previous thread.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones 
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Cc: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

SELinux: if sel_make_bools errors don't leave inconsistent state

2012-06-01T07:12:54+00:00

commit 154c50ca4eb9ae472f50b6a481213e21ead4457d upstream.

We reset the bool names and values array to NULL, but do not reset the
number of entries in these arrays to 0.  If we error out and then get back
into this function we will walk these NULL pointers based on the belief
that they are non-zero length.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

security: fix compile error in commoncap.c

2012-04-22T23:21:43+00:00

commit 51b79bee627d526199b2f6a6bef8ee0c0739b6d1 upstream.

Add missing "personality.h"
security/commoncap.c: In function 'cap_bprm_set_creds':
security/commoncap.c:510: error: 'PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/commoncap.c:510: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
security/commoncap.c:510: error: for each function it appears in.)

Signed-off-by: Jonghwan Choi 
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Cc: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used

2012-04-22T23:21:41+00:00

commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream.

If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris 
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.

2012-04-13T15:14:08+00:00

commit df91e49477a9be15921cb2854e1d12a3bdb5e425 upstream.

Userspace can pass in arbitrary combinations of MS_* flags to mount().

If both MS_BIND and one of MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE are
passed, device name which should be checked for MS_BIND was not checked because
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE had higher priority than MS_BIND.

If both one of MS_BIND/MS_MOVE and MS_REMOUNT are passed, device name which
should not be checked for MS_REMOUNT was checked because MS_BIND/MS_MOVE had
higher priority than MS_REMOUNT.

Fix these bugs by changing priority to MS_REMOUNT -> MS_BIND ->
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE -> MS_MOVE as with do_mount() does.

Also, unconditionally return -EINVAL if more than one of
MS_SHARED/MS_PRIVATE/MS_SLAVE/MS_UNBINDABLE is passed so that TOMOYO will not
generate inaccurate audit logs, for commit 7a2e8a8f "VFS: Sanity check mount
flags passed to change_mnt_propagation()" clarified that these flags must be
exclusively passed.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: fix invalid memory reference

2012-01-26T01:24:41+00:00

commit 7b7e5916aa2f46e57f8bd8cb89c34620ebfda5da upstream.

Don't free a valid measurement entry on TPM PCR extend failure.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: free duplicate measurement memory

2012-01-26T01:24:41+00:00

commit 45fae7493970d7c45626ccd96d4a74f5f1eea5a9 upstream.

Info about new measurements are cached in the iint for performance.  When
the inode is flushed from cache, the associated iint is flushed as well.
Subsequent access to the inode will cause the inode to be re-measured and
will attempt to add a duplicate entry to the measurement list.

This patch frees the duplicate measurement memory, fixing a memory leak.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()

2012-01-06T22:13:52+00:00

commit 50345f1ea9cda4618d9c26e590a97ecd4bc7ac75 upstream.

Fix the following bug in sel_netport_insert() where rcu_dereference() should
be rcu_dereference_protected() as sel_netport_lock is held.

===================================================
[ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
---------------------------------------------------
security/selinux/netport.c:127 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by ossec-rootcheck/3323:
 #0:  (sel_netport_lock){+.....}, at: [] sel_netport_sid+0xbb/0x226

stack backtrace:
Pid: 3323, comm: ossec-rootcheck Not tainted 3.1.0-rc8-fsdevel+ #1095
Call Trace:
 [] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xa7/0xb0
 [] sel_netport_sid+0x1b7/0x226
 [] ? sel_netport_avc_callback+0xbc/0xbc
 [] selinux_socket_bind+0x115/0x230
 [] ? might_fault+0x4e/0x9e
 [] ? might_fault+0x97/0x9e
 [] security_socket_bind+0x11/0x13
 [] sys_bind+0x56/0x95
 [] ? sysret_check+0x27/0x62
 [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11e/0x155
 [] ? audit_syscall_entry+0x17b/0x1ae
 [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: David Howells 
Acked-by: Paul Moore 
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet 
Signed-off-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman