linux-stable.git/security/smack, branch v2.6.39

SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules

2011-04-22T23:17:29+00:00

Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.

Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen 
Acked-by: Eric Paris 
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

Fix common misspellings

2011-03-31T14:26:23+00:00

Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi

Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next

2011-03-08T00:38:10+00:00

Smack: correct final mmap check comparison

2011-02-10T03:58:42+00:00

The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

security:smack: kill unused SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITE

2011-02-10T03:58:11+00:00

Kill unused macros of SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITE.
v2: As Casey Schaufler's advice, also remove MAY_ANY.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei 
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Smack: correct behavior in the mmap hook

2011-02-09T07:50:23+00:00

The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
  interaction between the global and local rule lists.
  Instead of going through one and then the other, which
  missed the important case where a rule specified that
  there should be no access, combine the access limitations
  where there is a rule in each list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler 
Signed-off-by: James Morris

fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creation

2011-02-01T16:12:29+00:00

SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes.  We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process.  This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label.  This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.

This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations.  We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly.  This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook.  If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment

2011-01-17T16:05:27+00:00

  In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler

Merge branch 'master' into next

2011-01-09T22:46:24+00:00

Conflicts:
	security/smack/smack_lsm.c

Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell 
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler 

Signed-off-by: James Morris

af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.

2011-01-05T23:38:53+00:00

unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.

However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().

Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.

Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge 
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller