<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/keys/process_keys.c, branch v3.18.129</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() fails</title>
<updated>2018-11-10T15:39:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-08T13:48:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7938ba3f9260bfc992762733f37153d6412e3300'/>
<id>7938ba3f9260bfc992762733f37153d6412e3300</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d636bd9f12a66ea3775c9fabbf3f8e118253467a ]

In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to
fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by
commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in
join_session_keyring()").  Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but
we really should be more careful.  Do this by adding and using a new
error label at which the keyring reference is dropped.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d636bd9f12a66ea3775c9fabbf3f8e118253467a ]

In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to
fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by
commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in
join_session_keyring()").  Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but
we really should be more careful.  Do this by adding and using a new
error label at which the keyring reference is dropped.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings</title>
<updated>2017-10-05T07:35:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-18T18:37:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e3b663ba2ddd8f30ba92d4e6898637bb526dba70'/>
<id>e3b663ba2ddd8f30ba92d4e6898637bb526dba70</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.

It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &amp;
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 upstream.

It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user.  For example:

    sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
                           keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
                           sleep 15' &amp;
    sleep 1
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
    sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us

This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions.  In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:

    -4: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid.4000
    -5: alswrv-----v------------  3000     0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000

Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING.  Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.

Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings</title>
<updated>2017-04-30T03:49:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-04-18T14:31:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6efda2501976288f10895834ba2782d0df093441'/>
<id>6efda2501976288f10895834ba2782d0df093441</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()</title>
<updated>2016-01-25T11:52:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yevgeny Pats</name>
<email>yevgeny@perception-point.io</email>
</author>
<published>2016-01-19T22:09:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d25b4531a808bd0faae3dcd0553421d0570373d1'/>
<id>d25b4531a808bd0faae3dcd0553421d0570373d1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 ]

This fixes CVE-2016-0728.

If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include &lt;stddef.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
	#include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

	int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
	{
		int i = 0;
		key_serial_t serial;

		serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
				"leaked-keyring");
		if (serial &lt; 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
			   KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) &lt; 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		for (i = 0; i &lt; 100; i++) {
			serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
					"leaked-keyring");
			if (serial &lt; 0) {
				perror("keyctl");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		return 0;
	}

If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:

3f3d898f I--Q---   100 perm 3f3f0000     0     0 keyring   leaked-keyring: empty

with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning.  If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.

Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats &lt;yevgeny@perception-point.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 ]

This fixes CVE-2016-0728.

If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include &lt;stddef.h&gt;
	#include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
	#include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
	#include &lt;keyutils.h&gt;

	int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
	{
		int i = 0;
		key_serial_t serial;

		serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
				"leaked-keyring");
		if (serial &lt; 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
			   KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) &lt; 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		for (i = 0; i &lt; 100; i++) {
			serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
					"leaked-keyring");
			if (serial &lt; 0) {
				perror("keyctl");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		return 0;
	}

If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:

3f3d898f I--Q---   100 perm 3f3f0000     0     0 keyring   leaked-keyring: empty

with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning.  If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.

Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats &lt;yevgeny@perception-point.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Don Zickus &lt;dzickus@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava &lt;prarit@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson &lt;jarod@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Make the key matching functions return bool</title>
<updated>2014-09-16T16:36:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-16T16:36:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0c903ab64feb0fe83eac9f67a06e2f5b9508de16'/>
<id>0c903ab64feb0fe83eac9f67a06e2f5b9508de16</id>
<content type='text'>
Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool
rather than int.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Make the key matching functions pointed to by key_match_data::cmp return bool
rather than int.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Preparse match data</title>
<updated>2014-09-16T16:36:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-09-16T16:36:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=462919591a1791e76042dc5c1e0148715df59beb'/>
<id>462919591a1791e76042dc5c1e0148715df59beb</id>
<content type='text'>
Preparse the match data.  This provides several advantages:

 (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.

 (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
     asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).

 (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed.  This means
     that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.

 (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Preparse the match data.  This provides several advantages:

 (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front.

 (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the
     asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs).

 (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed.  This means
     that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type.

 (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal &lt;vgoyal@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: initialize root uid and session keyrings early</title>
<updated>2013-09-25T16:17:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-04T12:26:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c124bde28bce41f9e46e32d03d134a81e116d38c'/>
<id>c124bde28bce41f9e46e32d03d134a81e116d38c</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to create the integrity keyrings (eg. _evm, _ima), root's
uid and session keyrings need to be initialized early.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
In order to create the integrity keyrings (eg. _evm, _ima), root's
uid and session keyrings need to be initialized early.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc()</title>
<updated>2013-09-24T09:35:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-24T09:35:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ccc3e6d9c9aea07a0b60b2b0bfc5b05a704b66d5'/>
<id>ccc3e6d9c9aea07a0b60b2b0bfc5b05a704b66d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Define a __key_get() wrapper to use rather than atomic_inc() on the key usage
count as this makes it easier to hook in refcount error debugging.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Introduce a search context structure</title>
<updated>2013-09-24T09:35:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-24T09:35:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4bdf0bc300314141e5475e145acb8b5ad846f00d'/>
<id>4bdf0bc300314141e5475e145acb8b5ad846f00d</id>
<content type='text'>
Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied
with each call.  Introduce a search context structure to hold these.

Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search
should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all
keys looking for a non-description match.

This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic
routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed
through to the iterator callback function.

Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is
separated from the description pointer in the search context.  This makes it
clear which is being supplied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Search functions pass around a bunch of arguments, each of which gets copied
with each call.  Introduce a search context structure to hold these.

Whilst we're at it, create a search flag that indicates whether the search
should be directly to the description or whether it should iterate through all
keys looking for a non-description match.

This will be useful when keyrings use a generic data struct with generic
routines to manage their content as the search terms can just be passed
through to the iterator callback function.

Also, for future use, the data to be supplied to the match function is
separated from the description pointer in the search context.  This makes it
clear which is being supplied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession</title>
<updated>2013-09-24T09:35:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-09-24T09:35:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=61ea0c0ba904a55f55317d850c1072ff7835ac92'/>
<id>61ea0c0ba904a55f55317d850c1072ff7835ac92</id>
<content type='text'>
Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
for possession.  Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.

This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 reduced the
initial permissions granted to a key.

The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Skip key state checks (invalidation, revocation and expiration) when checking
for possession.  Without this, keys that have been marked invalid, revoked
keys and expired keys are not given a possession attribute - which means the
possessor is not granted any possession permits and cannot do anything with
them unless they also have one a user, group or other permit.

This causes failures in the keyutils test suite's revocation and expiration
tests now that commit 96b5c8fea6c0861621051290d705ec2e971963f1 reduced the
initial permissions granted to a key.

The failures are due to accesses to revoked and expired keys being given
EACCES instead of EKEYREVOKED or EKEYEXPIRED.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
