<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/integrity, branch v5.4.185</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ima: Do not print policy rule with inactive LSM labels</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-01T20:37:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=8a9511fd10ea599a477ff8aad6df6a58890fcc49'/>
<id>8a9511fd10ea599a477ff8aad6df6a58890fcc49</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 89677197ae709eb1ab3646952c44f6a171c9e74c upstream.

Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy
rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and
rule == NULL.

Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.6+
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 89677197ae709eb1ab3646952c44f6a171c9e74c upstream.

Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy
rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and
rule == NULL.

Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.6+
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Allow template selection with ima_template[_fmt]= after ima_hash=</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-31T17:11:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=89e51f2ab81cb04ec9c0a00941fcb899c3d02b63'/>
<id>89e51f2ab81cb04ec9c0a00941fcb899c3d02b63</id>
<content type='text'>
commit bb8e52e4906f148c2faf6656b5106cf7233e9301 upstream.

Commit c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter
ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template
variable to avoid multiple template selection.

Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the
ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes
attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with
ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored.

Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable
template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash=
are not ignored.

Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize
the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called.

Reported-by: Guo Zihua &lt;guozihua@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit bb8e52e4906f148c2faf6656b5106cf7233e9301 upstream.

Commit c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter
ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template
variable to avoid multiple template selection.

Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the
ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes
attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with
ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored.

Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable
template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash=
are not ignored.

Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize
the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called.

Reported-by: Guo Zihua &lt;guozihua@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Remove ima_policy file before directory</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-25T22:46:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0939988b16a4434a10ba9ed10bee144ba05c8442'/>
<id>0939988b16a4434a10ba9ed10bee144ba05c8442</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f7333b9572d0559e00352a926c92f29f061b4569 upstream.

The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so
remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory.

Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f7333b9572d0559e00352a926c92f29f061b4569 upstream.

The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so
remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory.

Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: check the return value of audit_log_start()</title>
<updated>2022-02-16T11:52:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiaoke Wang</name>
<email>xkernel.wang@foxmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-15T01:11:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ea58704f06f17b2111c35fe1d1dab6f3a2b46f81'/>
<id>ea58704f06f17b2111c35fe1d1dab6f3a2b46f81</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 83230351c523b04ff8a029a4bdf97d881ecb96fc upstream.

audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on
error, so it is better to check the return value of it.

Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang &lt;xkernel.wang@foxmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 83230351c523b04ff8a029a4bdf97d881ecb96fc upstream.

audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on
error, so it is better to check the return value of it.

Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang &lt;xkernel.wang@foxmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: mark evm_fixmode as __ro_after_init</title>
<updated>2021-11-17T08:48:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Austin Kim</name>
<email>austin.kim@lge.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-28T11:26:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=301d33c95441b1846c57b75bb93b4fd57f6835a8'/>
<id>301d33c95441b1846c57b75bb93b4fd57f6835a8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32ba540f3c2a7ef61ed5a577ce25069a3d714fc9 upstream.

The evm_fixmode is only configurable by command-line option and it is never
modified outside initcalls, so declaring it with __ro_after_init is better.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austin.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 32ba540f3c2a7ef61ed5a577ce25069a3d714fc9 upstream.

The evm_fixmode is only configurable by command-line option and it is never
modified outside initcalls, so declaring it with __ro_after_init is better.

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austin.kim@lge.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5</title>
<updated>2021-09-15T07:47:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>THOBY Simon</name>
<email>Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr</email>
</author>
<published>2021-08-16T08:10:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4a95b04afab55ecac3f4b71a61e7ef6dcbfb892f'/>
<id>4a95b04afab55ecac3f4b71a61e7ef6dcbfb892f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8510505d55e194d3f6c9644c9f9d12c4f6b0395a upstream.

MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic
operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit
the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima.
MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there.

The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting
the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5'
parameter on the command line.  With commit ab60368ab6a4 ("ima: Fallback
to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully
when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set:
	ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2)
	ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256

Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA.

Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon &lt;Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for
stable.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 8510505d55e194d3f6c9644c9f9d12c4f6b0395a upstream.

MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic
operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit
the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima.
MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there.

The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting
the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5'
parameter on the command line.  With commit ab60368ab6a4 ("ima: Fallback
to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully
when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set:
	ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2)
	ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256

Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA.

Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon &lt;Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr&gt;
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for
stable.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warning</title>
<updated>2021-09-15T07:47:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Austin Kim</name>
<email>austin.kim@lge.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-29T13:50:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c69935f0b0aa763fd2095e9a65945f5527059757'/>
<id>c69935f0b0aa763fd2095e9a65945f5527059757</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a32ad90426a9c8eb3915eed26e08ce133bd9e0da upstream.

With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below:

   security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning:
   no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
       __init int ima_mok_init(void)

Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init().

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austin.kim@lge.com&gt;
Fixes: 41c89b64d718 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a32ad90426a9c8eb3915eed26e08ce133bd9e0da upstream.

With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below:

   security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning:
   no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
       __init int ima_mok_init(void)

Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init().

Signed-off-by: Austin Kim &lt;austin.kim@lge.com&gt;
Fixes: 41c89b64d718 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: fix writing &lt;securityfs&gt;/evm overflow</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-26T22:13:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4020615bd733c491a51e00b1e5292bfea3184877'/>
<id>4020615bd733c491a51e00b1e5292bfea3184877</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]

EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete.  Define and read an unsigned
int.

Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ]

EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX.
The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling
EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete.  Define and read an unsigned
int.

Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74e9d920f25ce511f5458ae9d8c5ccd506649367'/>
<id>74e9d920f25ce511f5458ae9d8c5ccd506649367</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream.

EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.

Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.

Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream.

EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to
temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary
to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is
cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is
calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs.

Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized
with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust
xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation.

Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded</title>
<updated>2021-07-14T14:53:08+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-14T15:27:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d7dfaf13d24efb39914a53eaed3ebba4599e6141'/>
<id>d7dfaf13d24efb39914a53eaed3ebba4599e6141</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 upstream.

evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.

Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.

More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.

This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.

Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 upstream.

evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on
initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a
key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as
public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC.

Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a
possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to
switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should
have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files.

More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the
kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a
legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error
when no HMAC key has been loaded.

This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with
a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized.

Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

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