<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/integrity, branch v4.19.321</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file</title>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:43:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-18T18:47:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=904f9c14654d3f326ae4c99a842fa5bae3e89a0d'/>
<id>904f9c14654d3f326ae4c99a842fa5bae3e89a0d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 ]

Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.

Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata.  Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient.  In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel &lt;rrangel@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 ]

Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.

Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata.  Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient.  In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel &lt;rrangel@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings</title>
<updated>2023-12-08T07:43:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Amir Goldstein</name>
<email>amir73il@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-05T11:15:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=04e3ec9328b6cbdacc4391b328b2bb6c9e535158'/>
<id>04e3ec9328b6cbdacc4391b328b2bb6c9e535158</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e044374a8a0a99e46f4e6d6751d3042b6d9cc12e ]

It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it
measures files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to
annotate the iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to
IMA + overlayfs, same as overlayfs annotates the inode mutex.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b42fe626038981fb7bfa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e044374a8a0a99e46f4e6d6751d3042b6d9cc12e ]

It is not clear that IMA should be nested at all, but as long is it
measures files both on overlayfs and on underlying fs, we need to
annotate the iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positives related to
IMA + overlayfs, same as overlayfs annotates the inode mutex.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b42fe626038981fb7bfa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: allow/fix UML builds</title>
<updated>2023-08-30T14:31:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Randy Dunlap</name>
<email>rdunlap@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-02-24T03:27:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56804da32a6edef397e9d967b01e82a4b04a8e9d'/>
<id>56804da32a6edef397e9d967b01e82a4b04a8e9d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 644f17412f5acf01a19af9d04a921937a2bc86c6 ]

UML supports HAS_IOMEM since 0bbadafdc49d (um: allow disabling
NO_IOMEM).

Current IMA build on UML fails on allmodconfig (with TCG_TPM=m):

ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.o: in function `ima_add_template_entry':
ima_queue.c:(.text+0x2d9): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_extend'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_init.o: in function `ima_init':
ima_init.c:(.init.text+0x43f): undefined reference to `tpm_default_chip'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.o: in function `ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm':
ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'
ld: ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x10d8): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'

Modify the IMA Kconfig entry so that it selects TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
is set, regardless of the UML Kconfig setting.
This updates TCG_TPM from =m to =y and fixes the linker errors.

Fixes: f4a0391dfa91 ("ima: fix Kconfig dependencies")
Cc: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.14+
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Fabio Estevam &lt;festevam@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Anton Ivanov &lt;anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 644f17412f5acf01a19af9d04a921937a2bc86c6 ]

UML supports HAS_IOMEM since 0bbadafdc49d (um: allow disabling
NO_IOMEM).

Current IMA build on UML fails on allmodconfig (with TCG_TPM=m):

ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.o: in function `ima_add_template_entry':
ima_queue.c:(.text+0x2d9): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_extend'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_init.o: in function `ima_init':
ima_init.c:(.init.text+0x43f): undefined reference to `tpm_default_chip'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.o: in function `ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm':
ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'
ld: ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x10d8): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'

Modify the IMA Kconfig entry so that it selects TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
is set, regardless of the UML Kconfig setting.
This updates TCG_TPM from =m to =y and fixes the linker errors.

Fixes: f4a0391dfa91 ("ima: fix Kconfig dependencies")
Cc: Stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.14+
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
Cc: Fabio Estevam &lt;festevam@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Richard Weinberger &lt;richard@nod.at&gt;
Cc: Anton Ivanov &lt;anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com&gt;
Cc: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes@sipsolutions.net&gt;
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get()</title>
<updated>2023-08-11T09:45:15+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tianjia Zhang</name>
<email>tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-01T06:42:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2a3ff660ccab67d3fde64ecd88caa73c883eb265'/>
<id>2a3ff660ccab67d3fde64ecd88caa73c883eb265</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9df6a4870dc371136e90330cfbbc51464ee66993 upstream.

When integrity_inode_get() is querying and inserting the cache, there
is a conditional race in the concurrent environment.

The race condition is the result of not properly implementing
"double-checked locking". In this case, it first checks to see if the
iint cache record exists before taking the lock, but doesn't check
again after taking the integrity_iint_lock.

Fixes: bf2276d10ce5 ("ima: allocating iint improvements")
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang &lt;tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.10+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9df6a4870dc371136e90330cfbbc51464ee66993 upstream.

When integrity_inode_get() is querying and inserting the cache, there
is a conditional race in the concurrent environment.

The race condition is the result of not properly implementing
"double-checked locking". In this case, it first checks to see if the
iint cache record exists before taking the lock, but doesn't check
again after taking the integrity_iint_lock.

Fixes: bf2276d10ce5 ("ima: allocating iint improvements")
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang &lt;tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v3.10+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr()</title>
<updated>2023-08-11T09:45:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-06T10:40:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=63f27d49f235c34c543cab0d208c6998ebfd4cc8'/>
<id>63f27d49f235c34c543cab0d208c6998ebfd4cc8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b1de86d4248b273cb12c4cd7d20c08d459519f7d ]

Add the description for missing parameters of evm_inode_setattr() to
avoid the warning arising with W=n compile option.

Fixes: 817b54aa45db ("evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm") # v3.2+
Fixes: c1632a0f1120 ("fs: port -&gt;setattr() to pass mnt_idmap") # v6.3+
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b1de86d4248b273cb12c4cd7d20c08d459519f7d ]

Add the description for missing parameters of evm_inode_setattr() to
avoid the warning arising with W=n compile option.

Fixes: 817b54aa45db ("evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm") # v3.2+
Fixes: c1632a0f1120 ("fs: port -&gt;setattr() to pass mnt_idmap") # v6.3+
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook</title>
<updated>2023-03-11T15:31:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-01-31T17:42:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0b1a3d41378f71be4989a5d9c1d1270524de170e'/>
<id>0b1a3d41378f71be4989a5d9c1d1270524de170e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4971c268b85e1c7a734a61622fc0813c86e2362e upstream.

Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be
the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called
mmap_prot().

However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated
prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which
contains the protections requested by the application.

A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls
mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition,
that application would have access to executable memory without having this
event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for
example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system
call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.

Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so
that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the
requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final
protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores
the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4971c268b85e1c7a734a61622fc0813c86e2362e upstream.

Commit 98de59bfe4b2f ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be
the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called
mmap_prot().

However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated
prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which
contains the protections requested by the application.

A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls
mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition,
that application would have access to executable memory without having this
event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for
example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system
call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.

Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so
that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the
requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final
protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores
the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:30:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Huaxin Lu</name>
<email>luhuaxin1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-02T16:09:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c3572fb4002fdd36ebb9e707f8c397a0e2830c9e'/>
<id>c3572fb4002fdd36ebb9e707f8c397a0e2830c9e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 11220db412edae8dba58853238f53258268bdb88 upstream.

In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be
returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields.

Fixes: c7d09367702e ("ima: support restoring multiple template formats")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jiaming Li &lt;lijiaming30@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiaming Li &lt;lijiaming30@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu &lt;luhuaxin1@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 11220db412edae8dba58853238f53258268bdb88 upstream.

In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be
returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields.

Fixes: c7d09367702e ("ima: support restoring multiple template formats")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jiaming Li &lt;lijiaming30@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jiaming Li &lt;lijiaming30@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Huaxin Lu &lt;luhuaxin1@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()</title>
<updated>2023-01-18T10:30:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiu Jianfeng</name>
<email>xiujianfeng@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-12T09:27:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9ca76b0b46fdb02e46558db5464988b4e18375eb'/>
<id>9ca76b0b46fdb02e46558db5464988b4e18375eb</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 25369175ce84813dd99d6604e710dc2491f68523 ]

The input parameter @fields is type of struct ima_template_field ***, so
when allocates array memory for @fields, the size of element should be
sizeof(**field) instead of sizeof(*field).

Actually the original code would not cause any runtime error, but it's
better to make it logically right.

Fixes: adf53a778a0a ("ima: new templates management mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 25369175ce84813dd99d6604e710dc2491f68523 ]

The input parameter @fields is type of struct ima_template_field ***, so
when allocates array memory for @fields, the size of element should be
sizeof(**field) instead of sizeof(*field).

Actually the original code would not cause any runtime error, but it's
better to make it logically right.

Fixes: adf53a778a0a ("ima: new templates management mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng &lt;xiujianfeng@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T08:36:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-30T07:49:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f039564c36ee609bc5327a52895dfee05c8f0f7c'/>
<id>f039564c36ee609bc5327a52895dfee05c8f0f7c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2bdd737c5687d6dec30e205953146ede8a87dbdd upstream.

Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry
members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered
during rule parsing.

Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of
ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an
additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an
invalid conditional:

 # echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" &gt; /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
   comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
   hex dump (first 8 bytes):
     74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5                          tmpfs.k.
   backtrace:
     [&lt;00000000abab7413&gt;] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [&lt;00000000f11ede32&gt;] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [&lt;00000000f883dd7a&gt;] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [&lt;00000000b17cf753&gt;] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [&lt;00000000b8ddfdea&gt;] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [&lt;00000000b8e21e87&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [&lt;0000000089ea7b98&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Gou Hao &lt;gouhao@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2bdd737c5687d6dec30e205953146ede8a87dbdd upstream.

Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry
members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered
during rule parsing.

Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of
ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an
additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an
invalid conditional:

 # echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" &gt; /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
   comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
   hex dump (first 8 bytes):
     74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5                          tmpfs.k.
   backtrace:
     [&lt;00000000abab7413&gt;] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [&lt;00000000f11ede32&gt;] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [&lt;00000000f883dd7a&gt;] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [&lt;00000000b17cf753&gt;] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [&lt;00000000b8ddfdea&gt;] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [&lt;00000000b8e21e87&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [&lt;0000000089ea7b98&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Gou Hao &lt;gouhao@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules</title>
<updated>2022-10-05T08:36:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tyler Hicks</name>
<email>tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-30T07:49:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3d55a948aaec1ffd4ea329bc6e1a7ecd4f10e64f'/>
<id>3d55a948aaec1ffd4ea329bc6e1a7ecd4f10e64f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 465aee77aae857b5fcde56ee192b33dc369fba04 upstream.

Create a function, ima_free_rule(), to free all memory associated with
an ima_rule_entry. Use the new function to fix memory leaks of allocated
ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when deleting a
list of rules.

Make the existing ima_lsm_free_rule() function specific to the LSM
audit rule array of an ima_rule_entry and require that callers make an
additional call to kfree to free the ima_rule_entry itself.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading by a valid rule that contains
an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by
an invalid rule that triggers a policy load failure:

 # echo -e "dont_measure fsname=securityfs\nbad syntax" &gt; \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff9bab67ca12c0 (size 16):
   comm "bash", pid 684, jiffies 4295212803 (age 252.344s)
   hex dump (first 16 bytes):
     73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 73 00 6b 6b 6b 6b a5  securityfs.kkkk.
   backtrace:
     [&lt;00000000adc80b1b&gt;] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [&lt;00000000d504cb0d&gt;] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [&lt;00000000444825ac&gt;] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [&lt;000000002b7f0d6c&gt;] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [&lt;0000000096feedcf&gt;] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [&lt;0000000052b544a2&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [&lt;000000007ead1ba7&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Gou Hao &lt;gouhao@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 465aee77aae857b5fcde56ee192b33dc369fba04 upstream.

Create a function, ima_free_rule(), to free all memory associated with
an ima_rule_entry. Use the new function to fix memory leaks of allocated
ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when deleting a
list of rules.

Make the existing ima_lsm_free_rule() function specific to the LSM
audit rule array of an ima_rule_entry and require that callers make an
additional call to kfree to free the ima_rule_entry itself.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading by a valid rule that contains
an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by
an invalid rule that triggers a policy load failure:

 # echo -e "dont_measure fsname=securityfs\nbad syntax" &gt; \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan &gt; /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff9bab67ca12c0 (size 16):
   comm "bash", pid 684, jiffies 4295212803 (age 252.344s)
   hex dump (first 16 bytes):
     73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 73 00 6b 6b 6b 6b a5  securityfs.kkkk.
   backtrace:
     [&lt;00000000adc80b1b&gt;] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [&lt;00000000d504cb0d&gt;] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [&lt;00000000444825ac&gt;] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [&lt;000000002b7f0d6c&gt;] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [&lt;0000000096feedcf&gt;] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [&lt;0000000052b544a2&gt;] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [&lt;000000007ead1ba7&gt;] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Gou Hao &lt;gouhao@uniontech.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
