Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov:
 "These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got
  fixed in the meantime.

  EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel:

   - Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor

   - Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode

   - Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64

   - Some fixes for the capsule loader

   - Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module

   - Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM

  with a few followup fixes:

   - fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader
     changes

   - suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
     EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM"

* tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN
  efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader
  efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
  efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported
  efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel
  efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache
  efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings
  efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper
  arm64/ima: add ima_arch support
  ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures
  efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot
  efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes
  efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel()
  efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()

Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
  via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
  BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).

  The three patches included here:

   - bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
     read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.

   - defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
     avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
     boot flag is available on arm.

   - defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
     preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"

* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
  ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
  ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time

Commit a408e4a86b36b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
to open a new one.

Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8ec0 ima: Set file->f_mode
Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.

An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.

Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org

The default IMA template used for all policy rules is the value set
for CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE if the policy rule does not specify
a template. The default IMA template for buffer measurements should be
'ima-buf' - so that the measured buffer is correctly included in the IMA
measurement log entry.

With the default template format, buffer measurements are added to
the measurement list, but do not include the buffer data, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to validate. Including 'ima-buf'
template records in the measurement list by default, should not impact
existing attestation servers without 'ima-buf' template support.

Initialize a global 'ima-buf' template and select that template,
by default, for buffer measurements.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

Move the x86 IMA arch code into security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c,
so that we will be able to wire it up for arm64 in a future patch.

Co-developed-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.

However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.

So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.

Cc: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.9-rc1/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for
  measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error
  messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug
  fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and
  NULL pointer checking)"

* tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
  evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
  ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
  ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
  ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
  integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
  ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
  integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
  ima: add check for enforced appraise option
  integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
  ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
  ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule

To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.

Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>