<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/integrity/ima, branch linux-6.5.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file</title>
<updated>2023-11-28T17:15:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-10-18T18:47:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=0d29174959bc829db091f09505ec7981cb8a7717'/>
<id>0d29174959bc829db091f09505ec7981cb8a7717</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 upstream.

Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.

Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata.  Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient.  In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel &lt;rrangel@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b836c4d29f2744200b2af41e14bf50758dddc818 upstream.

Commit 18b44bc5a672 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.

Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata.  Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient.  In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel &lt;rrangel@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: rework CONFIG_IMA dependency block</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-27T07:22:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=98bd9c02c2b5cb579efb160faf33cc1ff379192b'/>
<id>98bd9c02c2b5cb579efb160faf33cc1ff379192b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91e326563ee34509c35267808a4b1b3ea3db62a8 ]

Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and
IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a
a configuration without IMA results in link failures:

arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys':
iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509'

aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring'

Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable
way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block.
This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies.

Fixes: be210c6d3597f ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 91e326563ee34509c35267808a4b1b3ea3db62a8 ]

Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and
IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a
a configuration without IMA results in link failures:

arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys':
iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509'

aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring'

Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable
way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block.
This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies.

Fixes: be210c6d3597f ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig</title>
<updated>2023-10-10T20:03:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oleksandr Tymoshenko</name>
<email>ovt@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-21T06:45:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=acf11f64c29f8005068d0292df0ba14b0e7461e3'/>
<id>acf11f64c29f8005068d0292df0ba14b0e7461e3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit be210c6d3597faf330cb9af33b9f1591d7b2a983 ]

The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509
and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter
two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was
deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it
as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the
deprecation.

Fixes: 5087fd9e80e5 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko &lt;ovt@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit be210c6d3597faf330cb9af33b9f1591d7b2a983 ]

The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509
and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter
two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was
deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it
as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the
deprecation.

Fixes: 5087fd9e80e5 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko &lt;ovt@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:53:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-07-11T16:44:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a0b247ba37a2a27a4a251eb45114920b0bbb534b'/>
<id>a0b247ba37a2a27a4a251eb45114920b0bbb534b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5087fd9e80e539d2163accd045b73da64de7de95 ]

Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING".

Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5087fd9e80e539d2163accd045b73da64de7de95 ]

Time to remove "IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING".

Fixes: f4dc37785e9b ("integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring") # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2023-06-28T00:32:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-28T00:32:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b4c7f2e6ef40f545054a902e4708ed908d562318'/>
<id>b4c7f2e6ef40f545054a902e4708ed908d562318</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "An i_version change, one bug fix, and three kernel doc fixes:

   - instead of IMA detecting file change by directly accesssing
     i_version, it now calls vfs_getattr_nosec().

   - fix a race condition when inserting a new node in the iint rb-tree"

* tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Fix build warnings
  evm: Fix build warnings
  evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr()
  integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get()
  IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "An i_version change, one bug fix, and three kernel doc fixes:

   - instead of IMA detecting file change by directly accesssing
     i_version, it now calls vfs_getattr_nosec().

   - fix a race condition when inserting a new node in the iint rb-tree"

* tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Fix build warnings
  evm: Fix build warnings
  evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr()
  integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get()
  IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fsverity: rework fsverity_get_digest() again</title>
<updated>2023-06-14T17:41:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-12T19:00:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=74836ecbc5c7565d24a770917644e96af3e98d25'/>
<id>74836ecbc5c7565d24a770917644e96af3e98d25</id>
<content type='text'>
Address several issues with the calling convention and documentation of
fsverity_get_digest():

- Make it provide the hash algorithm as either a FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_*
  value or HASH_ALGO_* value, at the caller's choice, rather than only a
  HASH_ALGO_* value as it did before.  This allows callers to work with
  the fsverity native algorithm numbers if they want to.  HASH_ALGO_* is
  what IMA uses, but other users (e.g. overlayfs) should use
  FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* to match fsverity-utils and the fsverity UAPI.

- Make it return the digest size so that it doesn't need to be looked up
  separately.  Use the return value for this, since 0 works nicely for
  the "file doesn't have fsverity enabled" case.  This also makes it
  clear that no other errors are possible.

- Rename the 'digest' parameter to 'raw_digest' and clearly document
  that it is only useful in combination with the algorithm ID.  This
  hopefully clears up a point of confusion.

- Export it to modules, since overlayfs will need it for checking the
  fsverity digests of lowerdata files
  (https://lore.kernel.org/r/dd294a44e8f401e6b5140029d8355f88748cd8fd.1686565330.git.alexl@redhat.com).

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt; # for the IMA piece
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612190047.59755-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Address several issues with the calling convention and documentation of
fsverity_get_digest():

- Make it provide the hash algorithm as either a FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_*
  value or HASH_ALGO_* value, at the caller's choice, rather than only a
  HASH_ALGO_* value as it did before.  This allows callers to work with
  the fsverity native algorithm numbers if they want to.  HASH_ALGO_* is
  what IMA uses, but other users (e.g. overlayfs) should use
  FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* to match fsverity-utils and the fsverity UAPI.

- Make it return the digest size so that it doesn't need to be looked up
  separately.  Use the return value for this, since 0 works nicely for
  the "file doesn't have fsverity enabled" case.  This also makes it
  clear that no other errors are possible.

- Rename the 'digest' parameter to 'raw_digest' and clearly document
  that it is only useful in combination with the algorithm ID.  This
  hopefully clears up a point of confusion.

- Export it to modules, since overlayfs will need it for checking the
  fsverity digests of lowerdata files
  (https://lore.kernel.org/r/dd294a44e8f401e6b5140029d8355f88748cd8fd.1686565330.git.alexl@redhat.com).

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt; # for the IMA piece
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612190047.59755-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix build warnings</title>
<updated>2023-06-06T13:37:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-06-06T07:41:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=95526d13038c2bbddd567a4d8e39fac42484e182'/>
<id>95526d13038c2bbddd567a4d8e39fac42484e182</id>
<content type='text'>
Fix build warnings (function parameters description) for
ima_collect_modsig(), ima_match_policy() and ima_parse_add_rule().

Fixes: 15588227e086 ("ima: Collect modsig") # v5.4+
Fixes: 2fe5d6def167 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") # v5.14+
Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") # v3.2+
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Fix build warnings (function parameters description) for
ima_collect_modsig(), ima_match_policy() and ima_parse_add_rule().

Fixes: 15588227e086 ("ima: Collect modsig") # v5.4+
Fixes: 2fe5d6def167 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension") # v5.14+
Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") # v3.2+
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version</title>
<updated>2023-05-23T22:07:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-17T16:55:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=db1d1e8b9867aae5c3e61ad7859abfcc4a6fd6c7'/>
<id>db1d1e8b9867aae5c3e61ad7859abfcc4a6fd6c7</id>
<content type='text'>
IMA currently accesses the i_version out of the inode directly when it
does a measurement. This is fine for most simple filesystems, but can be
problematic with more complex setups (e.g. overlayfs).

Make IMA instead call vfs_getattr_nosec to get this info. This allows
the filesystem to determine whether and how to report the i_version, and
should allow IMA to work properly with a broader class of filesystems in
the future.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
IMA currently accesses the i_version out of the inode directly when it
does a measurement. This is fine for most simple filesystems, but can be
problematic with more complex setups (e.g. overlayfs).

Make IMA instead call vfs_getattr_nosec to get this info. This allows
the filesystem to determine whether and how to report the i_version, and
should allow IMA to work properly with a broader class of filesystems in
the future.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'integrity-v6.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity</title>
<updated>2023-04-29T17:11:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-04-29T17:11:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=febf9ee3d2f37a772802fffb6e17c0e35a52e1f1'/>
<id>febf9ee3d2f37a772802fffb6e17c0e35a52e1f1</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just one one bug fix. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed via
  the tpm and lsm trees"

* tag 'integrity-v6.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  IMA: allow/fix UML builds
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just one one bug fix. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed via
  the tpm and lsm trees"

* tag 'integrity-v6.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  IMA: allow/fix UML builds
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, treewide: redefine MAX_ORDER sanely</title>
<updated>2023-04-06T02:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kirill A. Shutemov</name>
<email>kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-15T11:31:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=23baf831a32c04f9a968812511540b1b3e648bf5'/>
<id>23baf831a32c04f9a968812511540b1b3e648bf5</id>
<content type='text'>
MAX_ORDER currently defined as number of orders page allocator supports:
user can ask buddy allocator for page order between 0 and MAX_ORDER-1.

This definition is counter-intuitive and lead to number of bugs all over
the kernel.

Change the definition of MAX_ORDER to be inclusive: the range of orders
user can ask from buddy allocator is 0..MAX_ORDER now.

[kirill@shutemov.name: fix min() warning]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230315153800.32wib3n5rickolvh@box
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix another min_t warning]
[kirill@shutemov.name: fixups per Zi Yan]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230316232144.b7ic4cif4kjiabws@box.shutemov.name
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix underlining in docs]
  Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303191025.VRCTk6mP-lkp@intel.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230315113133.11326-11-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;	[powerpc]
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Zi Yan &lt;ziy@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
MAX_ORDER currently defined as number of orders page allocator supports:
user can ask buddy allocator for page order between 0 and MAX_ORDER-1.

This definition is counter-intuitive and lead to number of bugs all over
the kernel.

Change the definition of MAX_ORDER to be inclusive: the range of orders
user can ask from buddy allocator is 0..MAX_ORDER now.

[kirill@shutemov.name: fix min() warning]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230315153800.32wib3n5rickolvh@box
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix another min_t warning]
[kirill@shutemov.name: fixups per Zi Yan]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230316232144.b7ic4cif4kjiabws@box.shutemov.name
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix underlining in docs]
  Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303191025.VRCTk6mP-lkp@intel.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230315113133.11326-11-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;	[powerpc]
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" &lt;kirill@shutemov.name&gt;
Cc: Zi Yan &lt;ziy@nvidia.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</pre>
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