<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/integrity/ima, branch linux-3.14.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend "mask" policy matching support</title>
<updated>2015-08-17T03:51:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:53:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=747cadeb108665b0474624a374aa9e13f12c9274'/>
<id>747cadeb108665b0474624a374aa9e13f12c9274</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream.

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream.

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition</title>
<updated>2015-08-17T03:51:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:48:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d2ee21f97888a72878ec79028d349efe54a6f210'/>
<id>d2ee21f97888a72878ec79028d349efe54a6f210</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 upstream.

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 upstream.

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()</title>
<updated>2015-08-03T16:29:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-11T15:54:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=735ad0d67f7363a2b9e7c182a0f1655597e9fa16'/>
<id>735ad0d67f7363a2b9e7c182a0f1655597e9fa16</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 45b26133b97871896b8c5241d59f4ff7839db7b2 upstream.

This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".

Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;rsassu@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 45b26133b97871896b8c5241d59f4ff7839db7b2 upstream.

This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".

Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;rsassu@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: provide flag to identify new empty files</title>
<updated>2014-10-30T16:38:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-27T15:04:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4e9c74a3333fbb7ce5fd575ae2649bf4e1130775'/>
<id>4e9c74a3333fbb7ce5fd575ae2649bf4e1130775</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b151d6b00bbb798c58f2f21305e7d43fa763f34f upstream.

On ima_file_free(), newly created empty files are not labeled with
an initial security.ima value, because the iversion did not change.
Commit dff6efc "fs: fix iversion handling" introduced a change in
iversion behavior.  To verify this change use the shell command:

  $ (exec &gt;foo)
  $ getfattr -h -e hex -d -m security foo

This patch defines the IMA_NEW_FILE flag.  The flag is initially
set, when IMA detects that a new file is created, and subsequently
checked on the ima_file_free() hook to set the initial security.ima
value.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit b151d6b00bbb798c58f2f21305e7d43fa763f34f upstream.

On ima_file_free(), newly created empty files are not labeled with
an initial security.ima value, because the iversion did not change.
Commit dff6efc "fs: fix iversion handling" introduced a change in
iversion behavior.  To verify this change use the shell command:

  $ (exec &gt;foo)
  $ getfattr -h -e hex -d -m security foo

This patch defines the IMA_NEW_FILE flag.  The flag is initially
set, when IMA detects that a new file is created, and subsequently
checked on the ima_file_free() hook to set the initial security.ima
value.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:15:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-08T11:03:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a3af538e0c6af0b6d1ab8da37b1b6796300b6c2e'/>
<id>a3af538e0c6af0b6d1ab8da37b1b6796300b6c2e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad upstream.

Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
[  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[  106.750221] IP: [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750241] PGD 0
[  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
[  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[  106.750962] Stack:
[  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[  106.751149] Call Trace:
[  106.751172]  [&lt;ffffffff813434eb&gt;] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[  106.751199]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b9b9&gt;] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[  106.751225]  [&lt;ffffffff8134a68d&gt;] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[  106.751250]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b945&gt;] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[  106.751276]  [&lt;ffffffff8134aa73&gt;] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[  106.751301]  [&lt;ffffffff81348c5e&gt;] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[  106.751327]  [&lt;ffffffff81348d78&gt;] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[  106.751355]  [&lt;ffffffff8130c853&gt;] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[  106.751382]  [&lt;ffffffff811c77a2&gt;] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[  106.751407]  [&lt;ffffffff811c789d&gt;] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[  106.751432]  [&lt;ffffffff811cda31&gt;] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[  106.751457]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fd45&gt;] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[  106.751483]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fb52&gt;] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[  106.751509]  [&lt;ffffffff8135022d&gt;] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[  106.751536]  [&lt;ffffffff810b552d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  106.751562]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f07c&gt;] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[  106.751587]  [&lt;ffffffff81352824&gt;] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[  106.751612]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f0d0&gt;] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[  106.751637]  [&lt;ffffffff811c9635&gt;] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[  106.751662]  [&lt;ffffffff811c98ae&gt;] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  106.751687]  [&lt;ffffffff81086774&gt;] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[  106.751712]  [&lt;ffffffff81066fad&gt;] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[  106.751738]  [&lt;ffffffff8173c958&gt;] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[  106.751763]  [&lt;ffffffff8106780c&gt;] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[  106.751788]  [&lt;ffffffff81067894&gt;] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[  106.751814]  [&lt;ffffffff8174522d&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d &lt;48&gt; 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  106.752185] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.752214]  RSP &lt;ffff880400fcba60&gt;
[  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current-&gt;nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.

Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.

This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad upstream.

Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
[  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[  106.750221] IP: [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750241] PGD 0
[  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
[  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[  106.750962] Stack:
[  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[  106.751149] Call Trace:
[  106.751172]  [&lt;ffffffff813434eb&gt;] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[  106.751199]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b9b9&gt;] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[  106.751225]  [&lt;ffffffff8134a68d&gt;] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[  106.751250]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b945&gt;] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[  106.751276]  [&lt;ffffffff8134aa73&gt;] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[  106.751301]  [&lt;ffffffff81348c5e&gt;] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[  106.751327]  [&lt;ffffffff81348d78&gt;] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[  106.751355]  [&lt;ffffffff8130c853&gt;] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[  106.751382]  [&lt;ffffffff811c77a2&gt;] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[  106.751407]  [&lt;ffffffff811c789d&gt;] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[  106.751432]  [&lt;ffffffff811cda31&gt;] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[  106.751457]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fd45&gt;] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[  106.751483]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fb52&gt;] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[  106.751509]  [&lt;ffffffff8135022d&gt;] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[  106.751536]  [&lt;ffffffff810b552d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  106.751562]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f07c&gt;] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[  106.751587]  [&lt;ffffffff81352824&gt;] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[  106.751612]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f0d0&gt;] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[  106.751637]  [&lt;ffffffff811c9635&gt;] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[  106.751662]  [&lt;ffffffff811c98ae&gt;] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  106.751687]  [&lt;ffffffff81086774&gt;] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[  106.751712]  [&lt;ffffffff81066fad&gt;] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[  106.751738]  [&lt;ffffffff8173c958&gt;] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[  106.751763]  [&lt;ffffffff8106780c&gt;] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[  106.751788]  [&lt;ffffffff81067894&gt;] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[  106.751814]  [&lt;ffffffff8174522d&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d &lt;48&gt; 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  106.752185] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.752214]  RSP &lt;ffff880400fcba60&gt;
[  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current-&gt;nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.

Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.

This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag</title>
<updated>2014-06-26T19:15:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-12T13:28:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=ca7919db0c6dd616f2d1102f40fe7aacfd730121'/>
<id>ca7919db0c6dd616f2d1102f40fe7aacfd730121</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c upstream.

Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.

The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.

Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.

Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c upstream.

Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.

The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.

Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.

Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template</title>
<updated>2014-04-27T00:19:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@polito.it</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-03T12:56:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e5cf61cfe83f493f118d93853d4bad367367e2b8'/>
<id>e5cf61cfe83f493f118d93853d4bad367367e2b8</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c019e307ad82a8ee652b8ccbacf69ae94263b07b upstream.

With the new template mechanism introduced in IMA since kernel 3.13,
the format of data sent through the binary_runtime_measurements interface
is slightly changed. Now, for a generic measurement, the format of
template data (after the template name) is:

template_len | field1_len | field1 | ... | fieldN_len | fieldN

In addition, fields containing a string now include the '\0' termination
character.

Instead, the format for the 'ima' template should be:

SHA1 digest | event name length | event name

It must be noted that while in the IMA 3.13 code 'event name length' is
'IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1' (256 bytes), so that the template digest
is calculated correctly, and 'event name' contains '\0', in the pre 3.13
code 'event name length' is exactly the string length and 'event name'
does not contain the termination character.

The patch restores the behavior of the IMA code pre 3.13 for the 'ima'
template so that legacy userspace tools obtain a consistent behavior
when receiving data from the binary_runtime_measurements interface
regardless of which kernel version is used.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c019e307ad82a8ee652b8ccbacf69ae94263b07b upstream.

With the new template mechanism introduced in IMA since kernel 3.13,
the format of data sent through the binary_runtime_measurements interface
is slightly changed. Now, for a generic measurement, the format of
template data (after the template name) is:

template_len | field1_len | field1 | ... | fieldN_len | fieldN

In addition, fields containing a string now include the '\0' termination
character.

Instead, the format for the 'ima' template should be:

SHA1 digest | event name length | event name

It must be noted that while in the IMA 3.13 code 'event name length' is
'IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1' (256 bytes), so that the template digest
is calculated correctly, and 'event name' contains '\0', in the pre 3.13
code 'event name length' is exactly the string length and 'event name'
does not contain the termination character.

The patch restores the behavior of the IMA code pre 3.13 for the 'ima'
template so that legacy userspace tools obtain a consistent behavior
when receiving data from the binary_runtime_measurements interface
regardless of which kernel version is used.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge to v3.13-rc7 for prerequisite changes in the Xen code for TPM</title>
<updated>2014-01-06T11:23:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-01-06T11:23:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=38fd2c202a3d82bc12430bce5789fa2c2a406f71'/>
<id>38fd2c202a3d82bc12430bce5789fa2c2a406f71</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()</title>
<updated>2014-01-03T12:43:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@polito.it</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-08T18:21:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dcf4e392867bf98d50ad108ed7c2bfb941e8c33d'/>
<id>dcf4e392867bf98d50ad108ed7c2bfb941e8c33d</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from
ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include
the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can
use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified
function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite
in the second).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from
ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include
the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can
use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified
function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite
in the second).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()</title>
<updated>2014-01-03T12:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@polito.it</email>
</author>
<published>2013-11-08T18:21:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=712a49bd7d00d567edd5235e6e9034c55052446b'/>
<id>712a49bd7d00d567edd5235e6e9034c55052446b</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init()
as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned
char.

Fix commit:
  4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init()
as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned
char.

Fix commit:
  4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
