<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/integrity/evm, branch linux-6.9.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509</title>
<updated>2024-07-05T07:38:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stefan Berger</name>
<email>stefanb@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-23T17:25:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c1a964bb90e702b0ead68cb0561a079946fd979a'/>
<id>c1a964bb90e702b0ead68cb0561a079946fd979a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 47add87ad181473e5ef2438918669540ba5016a6 ]

Unsupported filesystems currently do not enforce any signatures. Add
support for signature enforcement of the "original" and "portable &amp;
immutable" signatures when EVM_INIT_X509 is enabled.

The "original" signature type contains filesystem specific metadata.
Thus it cannot be copied up and verified. However with EVM_INIT_X509
and EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES enabled, the "original" file signature
may be written.

When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is not set or once it is removed from
/sys/kernel/security/evm by setting EVM_INIT_HMAC for example, it is not
possible to write or remove xattrs on the overlay filesystem.

This change still prevents EVM from writing HMAC signatures on
unsupported filesystem when EVM_INIT_HMAC is enabled.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 47add87ad181473e5ef2438918669540ba5016a6 ]

Unsupported filesystems currently do not enforce any signatures. Add
support for signature enforcement of the "original" and "portable &amp;
immutable" signatures when EVM_INIT_X509 is enabled.

The "original" signature type contains filesystem specific metadata.
Thus it cannot be copied up and verified. However with EVM_INIT_X509
and EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES enabled, the "original" file signature
may be written.

When EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is not set or once it is removed from
/sys/kernel/security/evm by setting EVM_INIT_HMAC for example, it is not
possible to write or remove xattrs on the overlay filesystem.

This change still prevents EVM from writing HMAC signatures on
unsupported filesystem when EVM_INIT_HMAC is enabled.

Co-developed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=75a323e604fc77c50c7ef2af6f0eeef221637642'/>
<id>75a323e604fc77c50c7ef2af6f0eeef221637642</id>
<content type='text'>
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).

Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.

Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).

Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.

Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().

Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.

Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Define a new structure for EVM-specific metadata, called evm_iint_cache,
and embed it in the inode security blob. Introduce evm_iint_inode() to
retrieve metadata, and register evm_inode_alloc_security() for the
inode_alloc_security LSM hook, to initialize the structure (before
splitting metadata, this task was done by iint_init_always()).

Keep the non-NULL checks after calling evm_iint_inode() except in
evm_inode_alloc_security(), to take into account inodes for which
security_inode_alloc() was not called. When using shared metadata,
obtaining a NULL pointer from integrity_iint_find() meant that the file
wasn't in the IMA policy. Now, because IMA and EVM use disjoint metadata,
the EVM status has to be stored for every inode regardless of the IMA
policy.

Given that from now on EVM relies on its own metadata, remove the iint
parameter from evm_verifyxattr(). Also, directly retrieve the iint in
evm_verify_hmac(), called by both evm_verifyxattr() and
evm_verify_current_integrity(), since now there is no performance penalty
in retrieving EVM metadata (constant time).

Replicate the management of the IMA_NEW_FILE flag, by introducing
evm_post_path_mknod() and evm_file_release() to respectively set and clear
the newly introduced flag EVM_NEW_FILE, at the same time IMA does. Like for
IMA, select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when EVM is enabled, to ensure that files
are marked as new.

Unlike ima_post_path_mknod(), evm_post_path_mknod() cannot check if a file
must be appraised. Thus, it marks all affected files. Also, it does not
clear EVM_NEW_FILE depending on i_version, but that is not a problem
because IMA_NEW_FILE is always cleared when set in ima_check_last_writer().

Move the EVM-specific flag EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG to
security/integrity/evm/evm.h, since that definition is now unnecessary in
the common integrity layer.

Finally, switch to the LSM reservation mechanism for the EVM xattr, and
consequently decrement by one the number of xattrs to allocate in
security_inode_init_security().

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Move to LSM infrastructure</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:31:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9238311176115aac1b1a86e8e968c04ebec747a1'/>
<id>9238311176115aac1b1a86e8e968c04ebec747a1</id>
<content type='text'>
As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.

Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.

Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.

Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.

Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.

Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.

Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:30:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=779cb1947e270504c66a96fc0b7e6e31c748b1e1'/>
<id>779cb1947e270504c66a96fc0b7e6e31c748b1e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Change evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered
as implementation of the inode_post_setxattr hook.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Change evm_inode_post_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered
as implementation of the inode_post_setxattr hook.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() definition with LSM infrastructure</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:30:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2b6a4054f8c2758cf5c1d78f6ba7006a940b31ce'/>
<id>2b6a4054f8c2758cf5c1d78f6ba7006a940b31ce</id>
<content type='text'>
Change evm_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_setxattr hook.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Change evm_inode_setxattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_setxattr hook.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() definition with LSM infrastructure</title>
<updated>2024-02-16T04:43:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-02-15T10:30:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=784111d0093e007950cc20033daf3d74ac388821'/>
<id>784111d0093e007950cc20033daf3d74ac388821</id>
<content type='text'>
Change evm_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Change evm_inode_post_setattr() definition, so that it can be registered as
implementation of the inode_post_setattr hook (to be introduced).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger &lt;stefanb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T12:40:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-18T13:06:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cd708c938f055c9eb5a366ec1c8edcefa28afc28'/>
<id>cd708c938f055c9eb5a366ec1c8edcefa28afc28</id>
<content type='text'>
Identify EVM unsupported filesystems by defining a new flag
SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED.

Don't verify, write, remove or update 'security.evm' on unsupported
filesystems.

Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Identify EVM unsupported filesystems by defining a new flag
SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED.

Don't verify, write, remove or update 'security.evm' on unsupported
filesystems.

Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr</title>
<updated>2023-12-20T12:39:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-12-12T11:12:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=40ca4ee3136d2d09977d1cab8c0c0e1582c3359d'/>
<id>40ca4ee3136d2d09977d1cab8c0c0e1582c3359d</id>
<content type='text'>
The security.evm HMAC and the original file signatures contain
filesystem specific data.  As a result, the HMAC and signature
are not the same on the stacked and backing filesystems.

Don't copy up 'security.evm'.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The security.evm HMAC and the original file signatures contain
filesystem specific data.  As a result, the HMAC and signature
are not the same on the stacked and backing filesystems.

Don't copy up 'security.evm'.

Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Do not include crypto/algapi.h</title>
<updated>2023-09-15T10:30:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Herbert Xu</name>
<email>herbert@gondor.apana.org.au</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-22T09:37:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aa7c98b1243773ea4a1a107d3a6b7df51ece180f'/>
<id>aa7c98b1243773ea4a1a107d3a6b7df51ece180f</id>
<content type='text'>
The header file crypto/algapi.h is for internal use only.  Use the
header file crypto/utils.h instead.

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The header file crypto/algapi.h is for internal use only.  Use the
header file crypto/utils.h instead.

Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm</title>
<updated>2023-08-30T16:07:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-30T16:07:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1086eeac9c333b6db6c98594f02996c8261c60c5'/>
<id>1086eeac9c333b6db6c98594f02996c8261c60c5</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add proper multi-LSM support for xattrs in the
   security_inode_init_security() hook

   Historically the LSM layer has only allowed a single LSM to add an
   xattr to an inode, with IMA/EVM measuring that and adding its own as
   well. As we work towards promoting IMA/EVM to a "proper LSM" instead
   of the special case that it is now, we need to better support the
   case of multiple LSMs each adding xattrs to an inode and after
   several attempts we now appear to have something that is working
   well. It is worth noting that in the process of making this change we
   uncovered a problem with Smack's SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr which is also
   fixed in this pull request.

 - Additional LSM hook constification

   Two patches to constify parameters to security_capget() and
   security_binder_transfer_file(). While I generally don't make a
   special note of who submitted these patches, these were the work of
   an Outreachy intern, Khadija Kamran, and that makes me happy;
   hopefully it does the same for all of you reading this.

 - LSM hook comment header fixes

   One patch to add a missing hook comment header, one to fix a minor
   typo.

 - Remove an old, unused credential function declaration

   It wasn't clear to me who should pick this up, but it was trivial,
   obviously correct, and arguably the LSM layer has a vested interest
   in credentials so I merged it. Sadly I'm now noticing that despite my
   subject line cleanup I didn't cleanup the "unsued" misspelling, sigh

* tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
  lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
  lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook
  security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security()
  cred: remove unsued extern declaration change_create_files_as()
  evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr
  evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
  smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()
  security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
  lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header
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Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:

 - Add proper multi-LSM support for xattrs in the
   security_inode_init_security() hook

   Historically the LSM layer has only allowed a single LSM to add an
   xattr to an inode, with IMA/EVM measuring that and adding its own as
   well. As we work towards promoting IMA/EVM to a "proper LSM" instead
   of the special case that it is now, we need to better support the
   case of multiple LSMs each adding xattrs to an inode and after
   several attempts we now appear to have something that is working
   well. It is worth noting that in the process of making this change we
   uncovered a problem with Smack's SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr which is also
   fixed in this pull request.

 - Additional LSM hook constification

   Two patches to constify parameters to security_capget() and
   security_binder_transfer_file(). While I generally don't make a
   special note of who submitted these patches, these were the work of
   an Outreachy intern, Khadija Kamran, and that makes me happy;
   hopefully it does the same for all of you reading this.

 - LSM hook comment header fixes

   One patch to add a missing hook comment header, one to fix a minor
   typo.

 - Remove an old, unused credential function declaration

   It wasn't clear to me who should pick this up, but it was trivial,
   obviously correct, and arguably the LSM layer has a vested interest
   in credentials so I merged it. Sadly I'm now noticing that despite my
   subject line cleanup I didn't cleanup the "unsued" misspelling, sigh

* tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()
  lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget()
  lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook
  security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security()
  cred: remove unsued extern declaration change_create_files_as()
  evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr
  evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
  smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()
  security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook
  lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header
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