linux-stable.git/security/integrity/evm, branch linux-4.15.y

EVM: Only complain about a missing HMAC key once

2017-11-08T20:16:36+00:00

A system can validate EVM digital signatures without requiring an HMAC
key, but every EVM validation will generate a kernel error. Change this
so we only generate an error once.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded

2017-11-08T20:16:36+00:00

EVM will only perform validation once a key has been loaded. This key
may either be a symmetric trusted key (for HMAC validation and creation)
or the public half of an asymmetric key (for digital signature
validation). The /sys/kernel/security/evm interface allows userland to
signal that a symmetric key has been loaded, but does not allow userland
to signal that an asymmetric public key has been loaded.

This patch extends the interface to permit userspace to pass a bitmask
of loaded key types. It also allows userspace to block loading of a
symmetric key in order to avoid a compromised system from being able to
load an additional key type later.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

EVM: Include security.apparmor in EVM measurements

2017-11-08T20:16:36+00:00

Apparmor will be gaining support for security.apparmor labels, and it
would be helpful to include these in EVM validation now so appropriate
signatures can be generated even before full support is merged.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett 
Acked-by: John Johansen 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

fs: switch ->s_uuid to uuid_t

2017-06-05T14:59:12+00:00

For some file systems we still memcpy into it, but in various places this
already allows us to use the proper uuid helpers.  More to come..

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig 
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein 
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar  (Changes to IMA/EVM)
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko

sched/headers: Prepare to remove the include from

2017-03-02T07:42:40+00:00

Update files that depend on the magic.h inclusion.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds 
Cc: Mike Galbraith 
Cc: Peter Zijlstra 
Cc: Thomas Gleixner 
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

2016-12-14T22:09:48+00:00

Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "After a lot of discussion and work we have finally reachanged a basic
  understanding of what is necessary to make unprivileged mounts safe in
  the presence of EVM and IMA xattrs which the last commit in this
  series reflects. While technically it is a revert the comments it adds
  are important for people not getting confused in the future. Clearing
  up that confusion allows us to seriously work on unprivileged mounts
  of fuse in the next development cycle.

  The rest of the fixes in this set are in the intersection of user
  namespaces, ptrace, and exec. I started with the first fix which
  started a feedback cycle of finding additional issues during review
  and fixing them. Culiminating in a fix for a bug that has been present
  since at least Linux v1.0.

  Potentially these fixes were candidates for being merged during the rc
  cycle, and are certainly backport candidates but enough little things
  turned up during review and testing that I decided they should be
  handled as part of the normal development process just to be certain
  there were not any great surprises when it came time to backport some
  of these fixes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"
  exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files
  ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm
  ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP
  mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks

Revert "evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC"

2016-12-03T02:58:41+00:00

This reverts commit 0b3c9761d1e405514a551ed24d3ea89aea26ce14.

Seth Forshee  writes:
> All right, I think 0b3c9761d1e405514a551ed24d3ea89aea26ce14 should be
> reverted then. EVM is a machine-local integrity mechanism, and so it
> makes sense that the signature would be based on the kernel's notion of
> the uid and not the filesystem's.

I added a commment explaining why the EVM hmac needs to be in the
kernel's notion of uid and gid, not the filesystems to prevent
remounting the filesystem and gaining unwaranted trust in files.

Acked-by: Seth Forshee 
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman"

security/integrity: Harden against malformed xattrs

2016-11-14T03:50:11+00:00

In general the handling of IMA/EVM xattrs is good, but I found
a few locations where either the xattr size or the value of the
type field in the xattr are not checked. Add a few simple checks
to these locations to prevent malformed or malicious xattrs from
causing problems.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee 
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

xattr: Add __vfs_{get,set,remove}xattr helpers

2016-10-08T00:10:44+00:00

Right now, various places in the kernel check for the existence of
getxattr, setxattr, and removexattr inode operations and directly call
those operations.  Switch to helper functions and test for the IOP_XATTR
flag instead.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher 
Acked-by: James Morris 
Signed-off-by: Al Viro

evm: Translate user/group ids relative to s_user_ns when computing HMAC

2016-07-05T20:13:10+00:00

The EVM HMAC should be calculated using the on disk user and
group ids, so the k[ug]ids in the inode must be translated
relative to the s_user_ns of the inode's super block.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee 
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman