<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/security/Kconfig, branch v3.16.78</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KPTI: Rename to PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION</title>
<updated>2018-01-09T00:35:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-04T01:14:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=88c38c3fedd878e608e0eb6a90a74d3ee11ae696'/>
<id>88c38c3fedd878e608e0eb6a90a74d3ee11ae696</id>
<content type='text'>
This renames CONFIG_KAISER to CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This renames CONFIG_KAISER to CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/kaiser: Reenable PARAVIRT</title>
<updated>2018-01-09T00:35:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Borislav Petkov</name>
<email>bp@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-02T13:19:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1f30b9849d6a59834d7f9f11e232e52958a1fbb7'/>
<id>1f30b9849d6a59834d7f9f11e232e52958a1fbb7</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that the required bits have been addressed, reenable
PARAVIRT.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Now that the required bits have been addressed, reenable
PARAVIRT.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov &lt;bp@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Cc: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KAISER: Kernel Address Isolation</title>
<updated>2018-01-09T00:35:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Richard Fellner</name>
<email>richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at</email>
</author>
<published>2017-05-04T12:26:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f9a1666f97b32836058839ab03f49daef0528ca0'/>
<id>f9a1666f97b32836058839ab03f49daef0528ca0</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
From: Daniel Gruss &lt;daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=149390087310405&amp;w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: &lt;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
To: &lt;kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: &lt;moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Michael Schwarz &lt;michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de&gt;

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

(cherry picked from Change-Id: I0eb000c33290af01fc4454ca0c701d00f1d30b1d)

Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
arch/x86/mm/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
init/main.c

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
[bwh: Folded in the follow-up patches from Hugh:
 - kaiser: merged update
 - kaiser: do not set _PAGE_NX on pgd_none
 - kaiser: stack map PAGE_SIZE at THREAD_SIZE-PAGE_SIZE
 - kaiser: fix build and FIXME in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: KAISER depends on SMP
 - kaiser: fix regs to do_nmi() ifndef CONFIG_KAISER
 - kaiser: fix perf crashes
 - kaiser: ENOMEM if kaiser_pagetable_walk() NULL
 - kaiser: tidied up asm/kaiser.h somewhat
 - kaiser: tidied up kaiser_add/remove_mapping slightly
 - kaiser: kaiser_remove_mapping() move along the pgd
 - kaiser: align addition to x86/mm/Makefile
 - kaiser: cleanups while trying for gold link
 - kaiser: name that 0x1000 KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET
 - kaiser: delete KAISER_REAL_SWITCH option
 - kaiser: vmstat show NR_KAISERTABLE as nr_overhead
 - kaiser: enhanced by kernel and user PCIDs
 - kaiser: load_new_mm_cr3() let SWITCH_USER_CR3 flush user
 - kaiser: PCID 0 for kernel and 128 for user
 - kaiser: x86_cr3_pcid_noflush and x86_cr3_pcid_user
 - kaiser: paranoid_entry pass cr3 need to paranoid_exit
 - kaiser: _pgd_alloc() without __GFP_REPEAT to avoid stalls
 - kaiser: fix unlikely error in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: drop is_atomic arg to kaiser_pagetable_walk()
 Backported to 3.16:
 - Add missing #include in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
 - Use variable PEBS buffer size since we have "perf/x86/intel: Use PAGE_SIZE
   for PEBS buffer size on Core2"
 - Renumber X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE to avoid collision
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This patch introduces our implementation of KAISER (Kernel Address Isolation to
have Side-channels Efficiently Removed), a kernel isolation technique to close
hardware side channels on kernel address information.

More information about the patch can be found on:

        https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER

From: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
From: Daniel Gruss &lt;daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Subject: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map kernel in user mode
Date: Thu, 4 May 2017 14:26:50 +0200
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&amp;m=149390087310405&amp;w=2
Kaiser-4.10-SHA1: c4b1831d44c6144d3762ccc72f0c4e71a0c713e5

To: &lt;linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org&gt;
To: &lt;kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;clementine.maurice@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: &lt;moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Michael Schwarz &lt;michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Richard Fellner &lt;richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at&gt;
Cc: Ingo Molnar &lt;mingo@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: &lt;kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;anders.fogh@gdata-adan.de&gt;

After several recent works [1,2,3] KASLR on x86_64 was basically
considered dead by many researchers. We have been working on an
efficient but effective fix for this problem and found that not mapping
the kernel space when running in user mode is the solution to this
problem [4] (the corresponding paper [5] will be presented at ESSoS17).

With this RFC patch we allow anybody to configure their kernel with the
flag CONFIG_KAISER to add our defense mechanism.

If there are any questions we would love to answer them.
We also appreciate any comments!

Cheers,
Daniel (+ the KAISER team from Graz University of Technology)

[1] http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a191.pdf
[2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Fogh-Using-Undocumented-CPU-Behaviour-To-See-Into-Kernel-Mode-And-Break-KASLR-In-The-Process.pdf
[3] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Jang-Breaking-Kernel-Address-Space-Layout-Randomization-KASLR-With-Intel-TSX.pdf
[4] https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER
[5] https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf

(cherry picked from Change-Id: I0eb000c33290af01fc4454ca0c701d00f1d30b1d)

Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S (not in this tree)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S (patched instead of that)
arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
arch/x86/kernel/process.c
arch/x86/mm/Makefile
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
init/main.c

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins &lt;hughd@google.com&gt;
[bwh: Folded in the follow-up patches from Hugh:
 - kaiser: merged update
 - kaiser: do not set _PAGE_NX on pgd_none
 - kaiser: stack map PAGE_SIZE at THREAD_SIZE-PAGE_SIZE
 - kaiser: fix build and FIXME in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: KAISER depends on SMP
 - kaiser: fix regs to do_nmi() ifndef CONFIG_KAISER
 - kaiser: fix perf crashes
 - kaiser: ENOMEM if kaiser_pagetable_walk() NULL
 - kaiser: tidied up asm/kaiser.h somewhat
 - kaiser: tidied up kaiser_add/remove_mapping slightly
 - kaiser: kaiser_remove_mapping() move along the pgd
 - kaiser: align addition to x86/mm/Makefile
 - kaiser: cleanups while trying for gold link
 - kaiser: name that 0x1000 KAISER_SHADOW_PGD_OFFSET
 - kaiser: delete KAISER_REAL_SWITCH option
 - kaiser: vmstat show NR_KAISERTABLE as nr_overhead
 - kaiser: enhanced by kernel and user PCIDs
 - kaiser: load_new_mm_cr3() let SWITCH_USER_CR3 flush user
 - kaiser: PCID 0 for kernel and 128 for user
 - kaiser: x86_cr3_pcid_noflush and x86_cr3_pcid_user
 - kaiser: paranoid_entry pass cr3 need to paranoid_exit
 - kaiser: _pgd_alloc() without __GFP_REPEAT to avoid stalls
 - kaiser: fix unlikely error in alloc_ldt_struct()
 - kaiser: drop is_atomic arg to kaiser_pagetable_walk()
 Backported to 3.16:
 - Add missing #include in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
 - Use variable PEBS buffer size since we have "perf/x86/intel: Use PAGE_SIZE
   for PEBS buffer size on Core2"
 - Renumber X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE to avoid collision
 - Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64</title>
<updated>2014-02-05T14:59:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Cross</name>
<email>ccross@android.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-04T02:15:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=530b099dfe8499d639e7fbcad28c4199e2a720c7'/>
<id>530b099dfe8499d639e7fbcad28c4199e2a720c7</id>
<content type='text'>
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected.  Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 &amp;&amp; COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.

Signed-off-by: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected.  Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 &amp;&amp; COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.

Signed-off-by: Colin Cross &lt;ccross@android.com&gt;
Acked-by: Will Deacon &lt;will.deacon@arm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas &lt;catalin.marinas@arm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig</title>
<updated>2012-05-11T09:56:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-11T09:56:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f0894940aed13b21f363a411c7ec57358827ad87'/>
<id>f0894940aed13b21f363a411c7ec57358827ad87</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig as there are going to be a lot
of key-related options.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Yama LSM</title>
<updated>2012-02-09T22:18:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-21T20:17:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=2d514487faf188938a4ee4fb3464eeecfbdcf8eb'/>
<id>2d514487faf188938a4ee4fb3464eeecfbdcf8eb</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security
improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have
existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the
mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependency</title>
<updated>2011-09-14T19:23:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-08-28T02:21:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=982e617a313b57abee3bcfa53381c356d00fd64a'/>
<id>982e617a313b57abee3bcfa53381c356d00fd64a</id>
<content type='text'>
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or,
for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key.  This patch
removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or,
for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key.  This patch
removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: move ima inode integrity data management</title>
<updated>2011-07-18T16:29:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-09T19:13:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f381c272224f5f158f5cff64f8f3481fa0eee8b3'/>
<id>f381c272224f5f158f5cff64f8f3481fa0eee8b3</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.

Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
  locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static

There should be no other functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.

Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
  locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static

There should be no other functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on ARM.</title>
<updated>2011-03-21T22:35:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Gortmaker</name>
<email>paul.gortmaker@windriver.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-14T23:32:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5806896019ceaa0a1e808182afb4bba33c948ad6'/>
<id>5806896019ceaa0a1e808182afb4bba33c948ad6</id>
<content type='text'>
The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says:

   For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
   a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
   On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.

The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets
that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map.
So select the right value if we know we are building ARM.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The default for this is universally set to 64k, but the help says:

   For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
   a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
   On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.

The text is right, in that we are seeing selinux-enabled ARM targets
that fail to launch /sbin/init because selinux blocks a memory map.
So select the right value if we know we are building ARM.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker &lt;paul.gortmaker@windriver.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: add new key-type encrypted</title>
<updated>2010-11-28T21:55:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-11-23T23:55:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7e70cb4978507cf31d76b90e4cfb4c28cad87f0c'/>
<id>7e70cb4978507cf31d76b90e4cfb4c28cad87f0c</id>
<content type='text'>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.

Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
  (reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
  one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
  Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
  (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
  (fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
  remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Safford &lt;safford@watson.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
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<pre>
Define a new kernel key-type called 'encrypted'. Encrypted keys are kernel
generated random numbers, which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'trusted'
symmetric key. Encrypted keys are created/encrypted/decrypted in the kernel.
Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs.

Changelog:
- bug fix: replaced master-key rcu based locking with semaphore
  (reported by David Howells)
- Removed memset of crypto_shash_digest() digest output
- Replaced verification of 'key-type:key-desc' using strcspn(), with
  one based on string constants.
- Moved documentation to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
- Replace hash with shash (based on comments by David Howells)
- Make lengths/counts size_t where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
  Could not convert most lengths, as crypto expects 'unsigned int'
  (size_t: on 32 bit is defined as unsigned int, but on 64 bit is unsigned long)
- Add 'const' where possible (based on comments by David Howells)
- allocate derived_buf dynamically to support arbitrary length master key
  (fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- wait until late_initcall for crypto libraries to be registered
- cleanup security/Kconfig
- Add missing 'update' keyword (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Free epayload on failure to create key (reported/fixed by Roberto Sassu)
- Increase the data size limit (requested by Roberto Sassu)
- Crypto return codes are always 0 on success and negative on failure,
  remove unnecessary tests.
- Replaced kzalloc() with kmalloc()

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Safford &lt;safford@watson.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@polito.it&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</pre>
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