linux-stable.git/net, branch v6.18.42

SUNRPC: Return an error from xdr_buf_to_bvec() on overflow

2026-08-03T09:22:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 18c1cc69886192e33536498289d26dba6894e3d5 ]

xdr_buf_to_bvec() returns a slot count even when the caller's bvec
budget is exhausted partway through the xdr_buf. Callers feed that
count into iov_iter_bvec() and continue as if the conversion had
succeeded, silently sending or writing fewer bytes than the data
length declares. For an NFS WRITE the server reports the truncated
transfer to the client as full success.

The overflow represents an internal invariant violation: a higher
layer reserved a bvec budget too small for the xdr_buf it then
asked the encoder to convert. That is a server-side fault, not a
media I/O failure and not a malformed client argument.

Change xdr_buf_to_bvec() to return a signed int and have the
overflow label return -ESERVERFAULT. Update the three callers to
detect the negative return and fail the request: nfsd_vfs_write()
folds the error into host_err, which nfserrno() translates to
nfserr_serverfault for the WRITE reply; svc_udp_sendto() and
svc_tcp_sendmsg() propagate the error out of the send path.

Reported-by: Chris Mason 
Fixes: 2eb2b9358181 ("SUNRPC: Convert svc_tcp_sendmsg to use bio_vecs directly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

SUNRPC: Add helpers to convert xdr_buf byte ranges to scatterlists

2026-08-03T09:22:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit e9be933959b581effd426f93b86654f5fbf0c574 ]

The crypto/krb5 library accepts data in scatterlist form, but
the GSS-API layer presents RPC payloads as struct xdr_buf.
Bridge that gap with a pair of helper functions:

  xdr_buf_to_sg()        - populate a caller-supplied scatterlist
                           array from a byte range
  xdr_buf_to_sg_alloc()  - populate a caller-supplied inline
                           scatterlist, chaining to a heap-
                           allocated overflow for large payloads

The inline array (typically stack-allocated at eight entries)
covers the common case of small RPCs with no heap allocation
on the encrypt/decrypt path. Only buffers spanning many pages
incur a kmalloc for the chained extension.

The segment-walking logic follows the same head, page array,
tail traversal as xdr_process_buf(), but populates a
scatterlist directly rather than invoking a per-segment
callback. sg_next() traversal makes the walker safe for
chained scatterlists. Once subsequent patches reroute all
per-message crypto operations through crypto/krb5,
xdr_process_buf() loses its last callers and is removed.

Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton 
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Stable-dep-of: 18c1cc698861 ("SUNRPC: Return an error from xdr_buf_to_bvec() on overflow")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sunrpc: allocate a separate bvec array for socket sends

2026-08-03T09:22:10+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6b3b697d65d46a0f640216a3f6c72856c159c567 ]

svc_tcp_sendmsg() calls xdr_buf_to_bvec() with the second slot of
rq_bvec as the start, but doesn't reduce the array length by one, which
could lead to an array overrun. Also, rq_bvec is always rq_maxpages in
length, which can be too short in some cases, since the TCP record
marker consumes a slot.

Fix both problems by adding a separate bvec array to the svc_sock that
is specifically for sending. For TCP, make this array one slot longer
than rq_maxpages, to account for the record marker. For UDP, only
allocate as large an array as we need since it's limited to 64k of
payload.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton 
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown 
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Stable-dep-of: 18c1cc698861 ("SUNRPC: Return an error from xdr_buf_to_bvec() on overflow")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: validate skb_dst() before accessing it

2026-08-03T09:22:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit e5e24a365a5e024efef63cc49abb345fbd4852c5 ]

tc ingress and openvswitch do not guarantee routing information to be
available. These subsystems use the conntrack helper infrastructure, and
the SIP helper relies on the skb_dst() to be present if
sip_external_media is set to 1 (which is disabled by default as a module
parameter).

This effectively disables the sip_external_media toggle for these
subsystems without resulting in a crash.

Fixes: cae3a2627520 ("openvswitch: Allow attaching helpers to ct action")
Fixes: b57dc7c13ea9 ("net/sched: Introduce action ct")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ren Wei 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: remove net variable shadowing

2026-08-03T09:22:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7970d6aaf710db166de98c5356a260089896fae5 ]

net is already set, derived from nf_conn.
I don't see how the device could be living in a different netns
than the conntrack entry.

Remove the extra variable and re-use existing one.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Stable-dep-of: e5e24a365a5e ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: validate skb_dst() before accessing it")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nft_fib: reject fib expression on the netdev egress hook

2026-08-03T09:22:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit d07955dd34ecae17d35d8c7d0a273a3fba653a8c ]

A fib expression in a netdev egress base chain dereferences nft_in(pkt),
NULL on the transmit path, causing a NULL pointer dereference at eval.
nft_fib_validate() masks the hook with NF_INET_* values, but netdev hook
numbers are a separate enum that aliases them (NF_NETDEV_EGRESS ==
NF_INET_LOCAL_IN), so an egress chain passes validation and then faults.

Add nft_fib_netdev_validate() that limits each result/flag to the netdev
hook where the device it reads exists: the input-device cases (OIF,
OIFNAME, ADDRTYPE with F_IIF) to ingress, the output-device case (ADDRTYPE
with F_OIF) to egress, ADDRTYPE with no device flag to both. Also restrict
nft_fib_validate() to NFPROTO_IPV4/IPV6/INET so its NF_INET_* masks are
not applied to another family's hooks.

Fixes: 42df6e1d221d ("netfilter: Introduce egress hook")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/ajxsjcDOnwllMfoR@strlen.de/
Signed-off-by: Theodor Arsenij Larionov-Trichkine 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: nf_tables: remove register tracking infrastructure

2026-08-03T09:22:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6b94d081f81dd524626f7aab2b98a9de335edb72 ]

This facility was disabled in commit
9e539c5b6d9c ("netfilter: nf_tables: disable expression reduction infra"),
because not all nft_exprs guarantee they will update the destination
register: some may set NFT_BREAK instead to cancel evaluation of the
rule.

This has been dead code ever since.
There are no plans to salvage this at this time, so remove this.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224205048.4718-10-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Stable-dep-of: d07955dd34ec ("netfilter: nft_fib: reject fib expression on the netdev egress hook")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

net: qrtr: ns: Raise node count limit to 512

2026-08-03T09:22:07+00:00

commit ff194cffd586cbd4cc49eccb002c65f2a902a277 upstream.

The current node limit of 64 breaks the functionality for a number of AI200
deployments that have up to 384 nodes. Raise the limit to 512.

Fixes: 27d5e84e810b ("net: qrtr: ns: Limit the total number of nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Youssef Samir 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713145901.212396-1-youssef.abdulrahman@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: Fix same-register dst/src OOB read and pointer leak in sock_ops

2026-08-03T09:22:07+00:00

[ Upstream commit 10f86a2a5c91fc4c4d001960f1c21abe52545ef6 ]

When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.

Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:

 - SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
   as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
   leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
   bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().

 - SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
   verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.

Fix both macros by:
 - Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
   added instruction.
 - Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
   restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
   dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp.

Fixes: fd09af010788 ("bpf: sock_ops ctx access may stomp registers in corner case")
Fixes: 84f44df664e9 ("bpf: sock_ops sk access may stomp registers when dst_reg = src_reg")
Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu 
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei 
Reported-by: Dongliang Mu 
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6fe1243e-149b-4d3b-99c7-fcc9e2f75787@std.uestc.edu.cn/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen 
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407022720.162151-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Jay Wang 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

vsock/virtio: collapse receive queue under memory pressure

2026-08-03T09:22:05+00:00

commit 2a12c05aef213ff304ecc9e2f351de20731946b8 upstream.

When many small packets accumulate in the receive queue, the skb overhead
can exceed buf_alloc even while the payload is within bounds. This causes
virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() to reject packets, leading to connection
resets during large transfers under backpressure.

The issue was reported by Brien, who has a reproducer, but it is also
easily reproducible with iperf-vsock [1] using a small packet size:

  iperf3 --vsock -c $CID -l 129

which fails immediately without this patch but with commit 059b7dbd20a6
("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue").

Inspired by TCP's tcp_collapse() which solves a similar problem, add
virtio_transport_collapse_rx_queue() that walks the receive queue and
re-copies data into compact linear skbs to reduce the overhead.

The collapse is triggered proactively from when the number of skb queued
is close to exceeding the overhead budget.

A pre-scan counts the eligible bytes to size each allocation precisely,
avoiding waste for isolated small packets. Partially consumed skbs are
kept as-is to preserve buf_used/fwd_cnt accounting, EOM-marked skbs to
maintain SEQPACKET message boundaries, and skbs already larger than the
collapse target because they already have a good data-to-overhead ratio.

Walking a large queue may take a significant amount of time and cache
misses, causing traffic burstiness. To limit this, the collapse stops
once enough room is freed for this packet and the next one, but may
opportunistically free more to fill each collapsed skb to capacity.

[1] https://github.com/stefano-garzarella/iperf-vsock

Fixes: 059b7dbd20a6 ("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Brien Oberstein 
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/618701dd023e$063de350$12b9a9f0$@gmail.com/
Tested-by: Brien Oberstein 
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella 
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin 
Reviewed-by: Bobby Eshleman 
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260708102904.50732-2-sgarzare@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman