<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch v6.12.85</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix missing validation of ticket length in non-XDR key preparsing</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:24:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Anderson Nascimento</name>
<email>anderson@allelesecurity.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-22T16:14:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4458757c020592a3094366e0fb20457383b42f92'/>
<id>4458757c020592a3094366e0fb20457383b42f92</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 upstream.

In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads &lt;= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.

This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().

[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]

Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.

Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Fixes: 84924aac08a4 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 upstream.

In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads &lt;= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.

This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().

[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]

Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.

Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Fixes: 84924aac08a4 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:24:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bingquan Chen</name>
<email>patzilla007@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-18T11:20:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3a1bf9116ea31470b89692585c3910dfe830dcdd'/>
<id>3a1bf9116ea31470b89692585c3910dfe830dcdd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5 upstream.

In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.

The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.

Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.

Fixes: 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")
Signed-off-by: Bingquan Chen &lt;patzilla007@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418112006.78823-1-patzilla007@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5 upstream.

In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.

The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.

Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.

Fixes: 1d036d25e560 ("packet: tpacket_snd gso and checksum offload")
Signed-off-by: Bingquan Chen &lt;patzilla007@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418112006.78823-1-patzilla007@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:24:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Jie</name>
<email>jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-14T11:21:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=29b44d904dceb832be880def08b8cb17a0aba91c'/>
<id>29b44d904dceb832be880def08b8cb17a0aba91c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c ]

Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang &lt;jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ adapted spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq calls to spin_lock/spin_unlock ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c ]

Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.

Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu &lt;yifanwucs@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: Juefei Pu &lt;tomapufckgml@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan &lt;yuantan098@gmail.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Xin Liu &lt;bird@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang &lt;jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang &lt;n05ec@lzu.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ adapted spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq calls to spin_lock/spin_unlock ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wifi: mac80211: always free skb on ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() failure</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T13:24:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Felix Fietkau</name>
<email>nbd@nbd.name</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-21T02:42:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3b4d27acafaeab478fd24f79ad6e593a892828b9'/>
<id>3b4d27acafaeab478fd24f79ad6e593a892828b9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d5ad6ab61cbd89afdb60881f6274f74328af3ee9 ]

ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() has three error paths, but only two of them
free the skb. The first error path (ieee80211_tx_prepare() returning
TX_DROP) does not free it, while invoke_tx_handlers() failure and the
fragmentation check both do.

Add kfree_skb() to the first error path so all three are consistent,
and remove the now-redundant frees in callers (ath9k, mt76,
mac80211_hwsim) to avoid double-free.

Document the skb ownership guarantee in the function's kdoc.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@nbd.name&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314065455.2462900-1-nbd@nbd.name
Fixes: 06be6b149f7e ("mac80211: add ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() helper function")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
[ Exclude changes to drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/scan.c as this file is first
 introduced by commit 31083e38548f("wifi: mt76: add code for emulating hardware scanning")
 after linux-6.14.]
Signed-off-by: Li hongliang &lt;1468888505@139.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d5ad6ab61cbd89afdb60881f6274f74328af3ee9 ]

ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() has three error paths, but only two of them
free the skb. The first error path (ieee80211_tx_prepare() returning
TX_DROP) does not free it, while invoke_tx_handlers() failure and the
fragmentation check both do.

Add kfree_skb() to the first error path so all three are consistent,
and remove the now-redundant frees in callers (ath9k, mt76,
mac80211_hwsim) to avoid double-free.

Document the skb ownership guarantee in the function's kdoc.

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@nbd.name&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314065455.2462900-1-nbd@nbd.name
Fixes: 06be6b149f7e ("mac80211: add ieee80211_tx_prepare_skb() helper function")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
[ Exclude changes to drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/scan.c as this file is first
 introduced by commit 31083e38548f("wifi: mt76: add code for emulating hardware scanning")
 after linux-6.14.]
Signed-off-by: Li hongliang &lt;1468888505@139.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: add NULL checks for idev in SRv6 paths</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T11:19:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Minhong He</name>
<email>heminhong@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-20T05:42:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bc9843c39f9932a8b36efd1d362ea00bb88e4e78'/>
<id>bc9843c39f9932a8b36efd1d362ea00bb88e4e78</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 06413793526251870e20402c39930804f14d59c0 ]

__in6_dev_get() can return NULL when the device has no IPv6 configuration
(e.g. MTU &lt; IPV6_MIN_MTU or after NETDEV_UNREGISTER).

Add NULL checks for idev returned by __in6_dev_get() in both
seg6_hmac_validate_skb() and ipv6_srh_rcv() to prevent potential NULL
pointer dereferences.

Fixes: 1ababeba4a21 ("ipv6: implement dataplane support for rthdr type 4 (Segment Routing Header)")
Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Signed-off-by: Minhong He &lt;heminhong@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer &lt;andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260316073301.106643-1-heminhong@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Li hongliang &lt;1468888505@139.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 06413793526251870e20402c39930804f14d59c0 ]

__in6_dev_get() can return NULL when the device has no IPv6 configuration
(e.g. MTU &lt; IPV6_MIN_MTU or after NETDEV_UNREGISTER).

Add NULL checks for idev returned by __in6_dev_get() in both
seg6_hmac_validate_skb() and ipv6_srh_rcv() to prevent potential NULL
pointer dereferences.

Fixes: 1ababeba4a21 ("ipv6: implement dataplane support for rthdr type 4 (Segment Routing Header)")
Fixes: bf355b8d2c30 ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Signed-off-by: Minhong He &lt;heminhong@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrea Mayer &lt;andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260316073301.106643-1-heminhong@kylinos.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Li hongliang &lt;1468888505@139.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T11:19:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-13T22:18:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=29f05b91d8da00112e4756a2acd4143aa67d6f25'/>
<id>29f05b91d8da00112e4756a2acd4143aa67d6f25</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit bdbfead6d38979475df0c2f4bad2b19394fe9bdc ]

In the rxrpc key preparsing, every token extracted sets the proposed quota
value, but for multitoken keys, this will overwrite the previous proposed
quota, losing it.

Fix this by adding to the proposed quota instead.

Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ dropped hunk for rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit bdbfead6d38979475df0c2f4bad2b19394fe9bdc ]

In the rxrpc key preparsing, every token extracted sets the proposed quota
value, but for multitoken keys, this will overwrite the previous proposed
quota, losing it.

Fix this by adding to the proposed quota instead.

Fixes: 8a7a3eb4ddbe ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Jeffrey Altman &lt;jaltman@auristor.com&gt;
cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
[ dropped hunk for rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sched: fix TCF_LAYER_TRANSPORT handling in tcf_get_base_ptr()</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T11:19:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-15T21:43:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=af2648ee5847fcfd245673873f8e876bae5e6adb'/>
<id>af2648ee5847fcfd245673873f8e876bae5e6adb</id>
<content type='text'>
[Upstream commit 4fe5a00ec70717a7f1002d8913ec6143582b3c8e]

syzbot reported that tcf_get_base_ptr() can be called while transport
header is not set [1].

Instead of returning a dangling pointer, return NULL.

Fix tcf_get_base_ptr() callers to handle this NULL value.

[1]
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6019 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 [inline]
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6019 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 tcf_get_base_ptr include/net/pkt_cls.h:539 [inline]
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6019 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 em_nbyte_match+0x2d8/0x3f0 net/sched/em_nbyte.c:43
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6019 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  tcf_em_match net/sched/ematch.c:494 [inline]
  __tcf_em_tree_match+0x1ac/0x770 net/sched/ematch.c:520
  tcf_em_tree_match include/net/pkt_cls.h:512 [inline]
  basic_classify+0x115/0x2d0 net/sched/cls_basic.c:50
  tc_classify include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 [inline]
  __tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 [inline]
  tcf_classify+0x4cf/0x1140 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860
  multiq_classify net/sched/sch_multiq.c:39 [inline]
  multiq_enqueue+0xfd/0x4c0 net/sched/sch_multiq.c:66
  dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x4e/0x260 net/core/dev.c:4118
  __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4214 [inline]
  __dev_queue_xmit+0xe83/0x3b50 net/core/dev.c:4729
  packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3076 [inline]
  packet_sendmsg+0x3e33/0x5080 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2630

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+f3a497f02c389d86ef16@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6920855a.a70a0220.2ea503.0058.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251121154100.1616228-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chelsy Ratnawat &lt;chelsyratnawat2001@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[Upstream commit 4fe5a00ec70717a7f1002d8913ec6143582b3c8e]

syzbot reported that tcf_get_base_ptr() can be called while transport
header is not set [1].

Instead of returning a dangling pointer, return NULL.

Fix tcf_get_base_ptr() callers to handle this NULL value.

[1]
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6019 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 skb_transport_header include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 [inline]
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6019 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 tcf_get_base_ptr include/net/pkt_cls.h:539 [inline]
 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6019 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 em_nbyte_match+0x2d8/0x3f0 net/sched/em_nbyte.c:43
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6019 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
  tcf_em_match net/sched/ematch.c:494 [inline]
  __tcf_em_tree_match+0x1ac/0x770 net/sched/ematch.c:520
  tcf_em_tree_match include/net/pkt_cls.h:512 [inline]
  basic_classify+0x115/0x2d0 net/sched/cls_basic.c:50
  tc_classify include/net/tc_wrapper.h:197 [inline]
  __tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1764 [inline]
  tcf_classify+0x4cf/0x1140 net/sched/cls_api.c:1860
  multiq_classify net/sched/sch_multiq.c:39 [inline]
  multiq_enqueue+0xfd/0x4c0 net/sched/sch_multiq.c:66
  dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x4e/0x260 net/core/dev.c:4118
  __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4214 [inline]
  __dev_queue_xmit+0xe83/0x3b50 net/core/dev.c:4729
  packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3076 [inline]
  packet_sendmsg+0x3e33/0x5080 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2630

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+f3a497f02c389d86ef16@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6920855a.a70a0220.2ea503.0058.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251121154100.1616228-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chelsy Ratnawat &lt;chelsyratnawat2001@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T11:18:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-09T15:18:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1bec5698b55aa2be5c3b983dba657c01d0fd3dbc'/>
<id>1bec5698b55aa2be5c3b983dba657c01d0fd3dbc</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46ce8be2ced389bccd84bcc04a12cf2f4d0c22d1 upstream.

The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target-&gt;nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device.  The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).

ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target-&gt;nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this.  This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.

Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.

Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.

Cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thierry Escande &lt;thierry.escande@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Samuel Ortiz &lt;sameo@linux.intel.com&gt;
Fixes: 2c66daecc409 ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-A technology support")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040913-figure-seducing-bd3f@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 46ce8be2ced389bccd84bcc04a12cf2f4d0c22d1 upstream.

The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target-&gt;nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device.  The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).

ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target-&gt;nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this.  This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.

Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.

Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.

Cc: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Kees Cook &lt;kees@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Thierry Escande &lt;thierry.escande@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: Samuel Ortiz &lt;sameo@linux.intel.com&gt;
Fixes: 2c66daecc409 ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-A technology support")
Cc: stable &lt;stable@kernel.org&gt;
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040913-figure-seducing-bd3f@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: raw: fix ro-&gt;uniq use-after-free in raw_rcv()</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T11:18:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Samuel Page</name>
<email>sam@bynar.io</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T14:30:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=572f0bf536ebc14f6e7da3d21a85cf076de8358e'/>
<id>572f0bf536ebc14f6e7da3d21a85cf076de8358e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a535a9217ca3f2fccedaafb2fddb4c48f27d36dc upstream.

raw_release() unregisters raw CAN receive filters via can_rx_unregister(),
but receiver deletion is deferred with call_rcu(). This leaves a window
where raw_rcv() may still be running in an RCU read-side critical section
after raw_release() frees ro-&gt;uniq, leading to a use-after-free of the
percpu uniq storage.

Move free_percpu(ro-&gt;uniq) out of raw_release() and into a raw-specific
socket destructor. can_rx_unregister() takes an extra reference to the
socket and only drops it from the RCU callback, so freeing uniq from
sk_destruct ensures the percpu area is not released until the relevant
callbacks have drained.

Fixes: 514ac99c64b2 ("can: fix multiple delivery of a single CAN frame for overlapping CAN filters")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page &lt;sam@bynar.io&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/26ec626d-cae7-4418-9782-7198864d070c@bynar.io
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
[mkl: applied manually]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a535a9217ca3f2fccedaafb2fddb4c48f27d36dc upstream.

raw_release() unregisters raw CAN receive filters via can_rx_unregister(),
but receiver deletion is deferred with call_rcu(). This leaves a window
where raw_rcv() may still be running in an RCU read-side critical section
after raw_release() frees ro-&gt;uniq, leading to a use-after-free of the
percpu uniq storage.

Move free_percpu(ro-&gt;uniq) out of raw_release() and into a raw-specific
socket destructor. can_rx_unregister() takes an extra reference to the
socket and only drops it from the RCU callback, so freeing uniq from
sk_destruct ensures the percpu area is not released until the relevant
callbacks have drained.

Fixes: 514ac99c64b2 ("can: fix multiple delivery of a single CAN frame for overlapping CAN filters")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page &lt;sam@bynar.io&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/26ec626d-cae7-4418-9782-7198864d070c@bynar.io
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
[mkl: applied manually]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nfc: llcp: add missing return after LLCP_CLOSED checks</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T11:18:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junxi Qian</name>
<email>qjx1298677004@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-08T08:10:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=796e0cac058252d0ad34ebe288e6f7979b5fc9b2'/>
<id>796e0cac058252d0ad34ebe288e6f7979b5fc9b2</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2b5dd4632966c39da6ba74dbc8689b309065e82c upstream.

In nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() and nfc_llcp_recv_disc(), when the socket
state is LLCP_CLOSED, the code correctly calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() but fails to return. Execution falls through to
the remainder of the function, which calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() again. This results in a double release_sock()
and a refcount underflow via double nfc_llcp_sock_put(), leading to
a use-after-free.

Add the missing return statements after the LLCP_CLOSED branches
in both functions to prevent the fall-through.

Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: Junxi Qian &lt;qjx1298677004@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408081006.3723-1-qjx1298677004@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2b5dd4632966c39da6ba74dbc8689b309065e82c upstream.

In nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() and nfc_llcp_recv_disc(), when the socket
state is LLCP_CLOSED, the code correctly calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() but fails to return. Execution falls through to
the remainder of the function, which calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() again. This results in a double release_sock()
and a refcount underflow via double nfc_llcp_sock_put(), leading to
a use-after-free.

Add the missing return statements after the LLCP_CLOSED branches
in both functions to prevent the fall-through.

Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: Junxi Qian &lt;qjx1298677004@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408081006.3723-1-qjx1298677004@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
