<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch v6.1.53</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>dccp: Fix out of bounds access in DCCP error handler</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:43:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-25T13:32:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f8a7f10a1dccf9868ff09342a73dce27501b86df'/>
<id>f8a7f10a1dccf9868ff09342a73dce27501b86df</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 977ad86c2a1bcaf58f01ab98df5cc145083c489c upstream.

There was a previous attempt to fix an out-of-bounds access in the DCCP
error handlers, but that fix assumed that the error handlers only want
to access the first 8 bytes of the DCCP header. Actually, they also look
at the DCCP sequence number, which is stored beyond 8 bytes, so an
explicit pskb_may_pull() is required.

Fixes: 6706a97fec96 ("dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v4_err()")
Fixes: 1aa9d1a0e7ee ("ipv6: dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v6_err()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 977ad86c2a1bcaf58f01ab98df5cc145083c489c upstream.

There was a previous attempt to fix an out-of-bounds access in the DCCP
error handlers, but that fix assumed that the error handlers only want
to access the first 8 bytes of the DCCP header. Actually, they also look
at the DCCP sequence number, which is stored beyond 8 bytes, so an
explicit pskb_may_pull() is required.

Fixes: 6706a97fec96 ("dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v4_err()")
Fixes: 1aa9d1a0e7ee ("ipv6: dccp: fix out of bound access in dccp_v6_err()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>skbuff: skb_segment, Call zero copy functions before using skbuff frags</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mohamed Khalfella</name>
<email>mkhalfella@purestorage.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-31T08:17:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=04c3eee4e13f60bf6f9a366ad39f88a01a57166e'/>
<id>04c3eee4e13f60bf6f9a366ad39f88a01a57166e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2ea35288c83b3d501a88bc17f2df8f176b5cc96f upstream.

Commit bf5c25d60861 ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions
once per nskb") added the call to zero copy functions in skb_segment().
The change introduced a bug in skb_segment() because skb_orphan_frags()
may possibly change the number of fragments or allocate new fragments
altogether leaving nrfrags and frag to point to the old values. This can
cause a panic with stacktrace like the one below.

[  193.894380] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000bc
[  193.895273] CPU: 13 PID: 18164 Comm: vh-net-17428 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           O      5.15.123+ #26
[  193.903919] RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xb0e/0x12f0
[  194.021892] Call Trace:
[  194.027422]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  194.072861]  tcp_gso_segment+0x107/0x540
[  194.082031]  inet_gso_segment+0x15c/0x3d0
[  194.090783]  skb_mac_gso_segment+0x9f/0x110
[  194.095016]  __skb_gso_segment+0xc1/0x190
[  194.103131]  netem_enqueue+0x290/0xb10 [sch_netem]
[  194.107071]  dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x16/0x70
[  194.110884]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x63b/0xb30
[  194.121670]  bond_start_xmit+0x159/0x380 [bonding]
[  194.128506]  dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0
[  194.131787]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x8a0/0xb30
[  194.138225]  macvlan_start_xmit+0x4f/0x100 [macvlan]
[  194.141477]  dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0
[  194.144622]  sch_direct_xmit+0xe3/0x280
[  194.147748]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x54a/0xb30
[  194.154131]  tap_get_user+0x2a8/0x9c0 [tap]
[  194.157358]  tap_sendmsg+0x52/0x8e0 [tap]
[  194.167049]  handle_tx_zerocopy+0x14e/0x4c0 [vhost_net]
[  194.173631]  handle_tx+0xcd/0xe0 [vhost_net]
[  194.176959]  vhost_worker+0x76/0xb0 [vhost]
[  194.183667]  kthread+0x118/0x140
[  194.190358]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  194.193670]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

In this case calling skb_orphan_frags() updated nr_frags leaving nrfrags
local variable in skb_segment() stale. This resulted in the code hitting
i &gt;= nrfrags prematurely and trying to move to next frag_skb using
list_skb pointer, which was NULL, and caused kernel panic. Move the call
to zero copy functions before using frags and nr_frags.

Fixes: bf5c25d60861 ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella &lt;mkhalfella@purestorage.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Goyal &lt;agoyal@purestorage.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2ea35288c83b3d501a88bc17f2df8f176b5cc96f upstream.

Commit bf5c25d60861 ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions
once per nskb") added the call to zero copy functions in skb_segment().
The change introduced a bug in skb_segment() because skb_orphan_frags()
may possibly change the number of fragments or allocate new fragments
altogether leaving nrfrags and frag to point to the old values. This can
cause a panic with stacktrace like the one below.

[  193.894380] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000bc
[  193.895273] CPU: 13 PID: 18164 Comm: vh-net-17428 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           O      5.15.123+ #26
[  193.903919] RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xb0e/0x12f0
[  194.021892] Call Trace:
[  194.027422]  &lt;TASK&gt;
[  194.072861]  tcp_gso_segment+0x107/0x540
[  194.082031]  inet_gso_segment+0x15c/0x3d0
[  194.090783]  skb_mac_gso_segment+0x9f/0x110
[  194.095016]  __skb_gso_segment+0xc1/0x190
[  194.103131]  netem_enqueue+0x290/0xb10 [sch_netem]
[  194.107071]  dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x16/0x70
[  194.110884]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x63b/0xb30
[  194.121670]  bond_start_xmit+0x159/0x380 [bonding]
[  194.128506]  dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0
[  194.131787]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x8a0/0xb30
[  194.138225]  macvlan_start_xmit+0x4f/0x100 [macvlan]
[  194.141477]  dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0
[  194.144622]  sch_direct_xmit+0xe3/0x280
[  194.147748]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x54a/0xb30
[  194.154131]  tap_get_user+0x2a8/0x9c0 [tap]
[  194.157358]  tap_sendmsg+0x52/0x8e0 [tap]
[  194.167049]  handle_tx_zerocopy+0x14e/0x4c0 [vhost_net]
[  194.173631]  handle_tx+0xcd/0xe0 [vhost_net]
[  194.176959]  vhost_worker+0x76/0xb0 [vhost]
[  194.183667]  kthread+0x118/0x140
[  194.190358]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  194.193670]  &lt;/TASK&gt;

In this case calling skb_orphan_frags() updated nr_frags leaving nrfrags
local variable in skb_segment() stale. This resulted in the code hitting
i &gt;= nrfrags prematurely and trying to move to next frag_skb using
list_skb pointer, which was NULL, and caused kernel panic. Move the call
to zero copy functions before using frags and nr_frags.

Fixes: bf5c25d60861 ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella &lt;mkhalfella@purestorage.com&gt;
Reported-by: Amit Goyal &lt;agoyal@purestorage.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wander Lairson Costa</name>
<email>wander@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-28T22:12:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4921f9349b66da7c5a2b6418fe45e9ae0ae72924'/>
<id>4921f9349b66da7c5a2b6418fe45e9ae0ae72924</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream.

sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can
take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory
information.

Add the field validation in the checkentry function.

Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lucas Leong &lt;wmliang@infosec.exchange&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa &lt;wander@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream.

sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can
take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory
information.

Add the field validation in the checkentry function.

Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lucas Leong &lt;wmliang@infosec.exchange&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa &lt;wander@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wander Lairson Costa</name>
<email>wander@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-28T13:21:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=1c164c1e9e93b0a72a03a7edb754e3857d4e4302'/>
<id>1c164c1e9e93b0a72a03a7edb754e3857d4e4302</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 upstream.

The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure.
An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting
the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.

Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.

This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).

Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa &lt;wander@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 upstream.

The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure.
An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting
the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.

Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.

This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).

Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa &lt;wander@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: nft_exthdr: Fix non-linear header modification</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiao Liang</name>
<email>shaw.leon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-25T05:33:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bcdb4a5c42b09f7cc00bbdafece7eae177b959e9'/>
<id>bcdb4a5c42b09f7cc00bbdafece7eae177b959e9</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 28427f368f0e08d504ed06e74bc7cc79d6d06511 upstream.

Fix skb_ensure_writable() size. Don't use nft_tcp_header_pointer() to
make it explicit that pointers point to the packet (not local buffer).

Fixes: 99d1712bc41c ("netfilter: exthdr: tcp option set support")
Fixes: 7890cbea66e7 ("netfilter: exthdr: add support for tcp option removal")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang &lt;shaw.leon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 28427f368f0e08d504ed06e74bc7cc79d6d06511 upstream.

Fix skb_ensure_writable() size. Don't use nft_tcp_header_pointer() to
make it explicit that pointers point to the packet (not local buffer).

Fixes: 99d1712bc41c ("netfilter: exthdr: tcp option set support")
Fixes: 7890cbea66e7 ("netfilter: exthdr: add support for tcp option removal")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang &lt;shaw.leon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: ipset: add the missing IP_SET_HASH_WITH_NET0 macro for ip_set_hash_netportnet.c</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle Zeng</name>
<email>zengyhkyle@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-05T22:04:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7ca0706c68adadf86a36b60dca090f5e9481e808'/>
<id>7ca0706c68adadf86a36b60dca090f5e9481e808</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 050d91c03b28ca479df13dfb02bcd2c60dd6a878 upstream.

The missing IP_SET_HASH_WITH_NET0 macro in ip_set_hash_netportnet can
lead to the use of wrong `CIDR_POS(c)` for calculating array offsets,
which can lead to integer underflow. As a result, it leads to slab
out-of-bound access.
This patch adds back the IP_SET_HASH_WITH_NET0 macro to
ip_set_hash_netportnet to address the issue.

Fixes: 886503f34d63 ("netfilter: ipset: actually allow allowable CIDR 0 in hash:net,port,net")
Suggested-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 050d91c03b28ca479df13dfb02bcd2c60dd6a878 upstream.

The missing IP_SET_HASH_WITH_NET0 macro in ip_set_hash_netportnet can
lead to the use of wrong `CIDR_POS(c)` for calculating array offsets,
which can lead to integer underflow. As a result, it leads to slab
out-of-bound access.
This patch adds back the IP_SET_HASH_WITH_NET0 macro to
ip_set_hash_netportnet to address the issue.

Fixes: 886503f34d63 ("netfilter: ipset: actually allow allowable CIDR 0 in hash:net,port,net")
Suggested-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik &lt;kadlec@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>igmp: limit igmpv3_newpack() packet size to IP_MAX_MTU</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-09-05T04:23:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6678912b4df1bfac6f7c80642d56dc22e23419e4'/>
<id>6678912b4df1bfac6f7c80642d56dc22e23419e4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c3b704d4a4a265660e665df51b129e8425216ed1 upstream.

This is a follow up of commit 915d975b2ffa ("net: deal with integer
overflows in kmalloc_reserve()") based on David Laight feedback.

Back in 2010, I failed to realize malicious users could set dev-&gt;mtu
to arbitrary values. This mtu has been since limited to 0x7fffffff but
regardless of how big dev-&gt;mtu is, it makes no sense for igmpv3_newpack()
to allocate more than IP_MAX_MTU and risk various skb fields overflows.

Fixes: 57e1ab6eaddc ("igmp: refine skb allocations")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d273628df80f45428e739274ab9ecb72@AcuMS.aculab.com/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@ACULAB.COM&gt;
Cc: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c3b704d4a4a265660e665df51b129e8425216ed1 upstream.

This is a follow up of commit 915d975b2ffa ("net: deal with integer
overflows in kmalloc_reserve()") based on David Laight feedback.

Back in 2010, I failed to realize malicious users could set dev-&gt;mtu
to arbitrary values. This mtu has been since limited to 0x7fffffff but
regardless of how big dev-&gt;mtu is, it makes no sense for igmpv3_newpack()
to allocate more than IP_MAX_MTU and risk various skb fields overflows.

Fixes: 57e1ab6eaddc ("igmp: refine skb allocations")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d273628df80f45428e739274ab9ecb72@AcuMS.aculab.com/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: David Laight &lt;David.Laight@ACULAB.COM&gt;
Cc: Kyle Zeng &lt;zengyhkyle@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netrom: Deny concurrent connect().</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-24T16:50:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=45107f9ca8633b4475c17e8a767067a880a92ab2'/>
<id>45107f9ca8633b4475c17e8a767067a880a92ab2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c2f8fd7949603efb03908e05abbf7726748c8de3 ]

syzkaller reported null-ptr-deref [0] related to AF_NETROM.
This is another self-accept issue from the strace log. [1]

syz-executor creates an AF_NETROM socket and calls connect(), which
is blocked at that time.  Then, sk-&gt;sk_state is TCP_SYN_SENT and
sock-&gt;state is SS_CONNECTING.

  [pid  5059] socket(AF_NETROM, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0) = 4
  [pid  5059] connect(4, {sa_family=AF_NETROM, sa_data="..." &lt;unfinished ...&gt;

Another thread calls connect() concurrently, which finally fails
with -EINVAL.  However, the problem here is the socket state is
reset even while the first connect() is blocked.

  [pid  5060] connect(4, NULL, 0 &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5060] &lt;... connect resumed&gt;)      = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

As sk-&gt;state is TCP_CLOSE and sock-&gt;state is SS_UNCONNECTED, the
following listen() succeeds.  Then, the first connect() looks up
itself as a listener and puts skb into the queue with skb-&gt;sk itself.
As a result, the next accept() gets another FD of itself as 3, and
the first connect() finishes.

  [pid  5060] listen(4, 0 &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5060] &lt;... listen resumed&gt;)       = 0
  [pid  5060] accept(4, NULL, NULL &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5060] &lt;... accept resumed&gt;)       = 3
  [pid  5059] &lt;... connect resumed&gt;)      = 0

Then, accept4() is called but blocked, which causes the general protection
fault later.

  [pid  5059] accept4(4, NULL, 0x20000400, SOCK_NONBLOCK &lt;unfinished ...&gt;

After that, another self-accept occurs by accept() and writev().

  [pid  5060] accept(4, NULL, NULL &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5061] writev(3, [{iov_base=...}] &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5061] &lt;... writev resumed&gt;)       = 99
  [pid  5060] &lt;... accept resumed&gt;)       = 6

Finally, the leader thread close()s all FDs.  Since the three FDs
reference the same socket, nr_release() does the cleanup for it
three times, and the remaining accept4() causes the following fault.

  [pid  5058] close(3)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] close(4)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] close(5)                    = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
  [pid  5058] close(6)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] &lt;... exit_group resumed&gt;)   = ?
  [   83.456055][ T5059] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN

To avoid the issue, we need to return an error for connect() if
another connect() is in progress, as done in __inet_stream_connect().

[0]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5059 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00194-gace0ab3a4b54 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x109/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012
Code: 45 85 c9 0f 84 cc 0e 00 00 44 8b 05 11 6e 23 0b 45 85 c0 0f 84 be 0d 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 11 00 0f 85 e8 40 00 00 49 81 3a a0 69 48 90 0f 84 96 0d 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d6f9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8880244c8000 RBX: 1ffff920007adf6c RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f51d519a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f51d5158d58 CR3: 000000002943f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
 prepare_to_wait+0x47/0x380 kernel/sched/wait.c:269
 nr_accept+0x20d/0x650 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:798
 do_accept+0x3a6/0x570 net/socket.c:1872
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x99/0x120 net/socket.c:1943
 __do_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1954 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1951 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept4+0x96/0x100 net/socket.c:1951
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f51d447cae9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f51d519a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000120
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f51d459bf80 RCX: 00007f51d447cae9
RDX: 0000000020000400 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f51d44c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f51d459bf80 R15: 00007ffc25c34e48
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&amp;x=152cdb63a80000 [1]
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+666c97e4686410e79649@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=666c97e4686410e79649
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c2f8fd7949603efb03908e05abbf7726748c8de3 ]

syzkaller reported null-ptr-deref [0] related to AF_NETROM.
This is another self-accept issue from the strace log. [1]

syz-executor creates an AF_NETROM socket and calls connect(), which
is blocked at that time.  Then, sk-&gt;sk_state is TCP_SYN_SENT and
sock-&gt;state is SS_CONNECTING.

  [pid  5059] socket(AF_NETROM, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0) = 4
  [pid  5059] connect(4, {sa_family=AF_NETROM, sa_data="..." &lt;unfinished ...&gt;

Another thread calls connect() concurrently, which finally fails
with -EINVAL.  However, the problem here is the socket state is
reset even while the first connect() is blocked.

  [pid  5060] connect(4, NULL, 0 &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5060] &lt;... connect resumed&gt;)      = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

As sk-&gt;state is TCP_CLOSE and sock-&gt;state is SS_UNCONNECTED, the
following listen() succeeds.  Then, the first connect() looks up
itself as a listener and puts skb into the queue with skb-&gt;sk itself.
As a result, the next accept() gets another FD of itself as 3, and
the first connect() finishes.

  [pid  5060] listen(4, 0 &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5060] &lt;... listen resumed&gt;)       = 0
  [pid  5060] accept(4, NULL, NULL &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5060] &lt;... accept resumed&gt;)       = 3
  [pid  5059] &lt;... connect resumed&gt;)      = 0

Then, accept4() is called but blocked, which causes the general protection
fault later.

  [pid  5059] accept4(4, NULL, 0x20000400, SOCK_NONBLOCK &lt;unfinished ...&gt;

After that, another self-accept occurs by accept() and writev().

  [pid  5060] accept(4, NULL, NULL &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5061] writev(3, [{iov_base=...}] &lt;unfinished ...&gt;
  [pid  5061] &lt;... writev resumed&gt;)       = 99
  [pid  5060] &lt;... accept resumed&gt;)       = 6

Finally, the leader thread close()s all FDs.  Since the three FDs
reference the same socket, nr_release() does the cleanup for it
three times, and the remaining accept4() causes the following fault.

  [pid  5058] close(3)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] close(4)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] close(5)                    = -1 EBADF (Bad file descriptor)
  [pid  5058] close(6)                    = 0
  [pid  5058] &lt;... exit_group resumed&gt;)   = ?
  [   83.456055][ T5059] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN

To avoid the issue, we need to return an error for connect() if
another connect() is in progress, as done in __inet_stream_connect().

[0]:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5059 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00194-gace0ab3a4b54 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x109/0x5de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5012
Code: 45 85 c9 0f 84 cc 0e 00 00 44 8b 05 11 6e 23 0b 45 85 c0 0f 84 be 0d 00 00 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 &lt;80&gt; 3c 11 00 0f 85 e8 40 00 00 49 81 3a a0 69 48 90 0f 84 96 0d 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d6f9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ffff8880244c8000 RBX: 1ffff920007adf6c RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000018 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f51d519a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f51d5158d58 CR3: 000000002943f000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 [inline]
 lock_acquire+0x1ae/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5726
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
 prepare_to_wait+0x47/0x380 kernel/sched/wait.c:269
 nr_accept+0x20d/0x650 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:798
 do_accept+0x3a6/0x570 net/socket.c:1872
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1913 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x99/0x120 net/socket.c:1943
 __do_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1954 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept4 net/socket.c:1951 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept4+0x96/0x100 net/socket.c:1951
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f51d447cae9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f51d519a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000120
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f51d459bf80 RCX: 00007f51d447cae9
RDX: 0000000020000400 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f51d44c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f51d459bf80 R15: 00007ffc25c34e48
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=CrashLog&amp;x=152cdb63a80000 [1]
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+666c97e4686410e79649@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=666c97e4686410e79649
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/sched: sch_hfsc: Ensure inner classes have fsc curve</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Budimir Markovic</name>
<email>markovicbudimir@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-24T08:49:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a1e820fc7808e42b990d224f40e9b4895503ac40'/>
<id>a1e820fc7808e42b990d224f40e9b4895503ac40</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b3d26c5702c7d6c45456326e56d2ccf3f103e60f ]

HFSC assumes that inner classes have an fsc curve, but it is currently
possible for classes without an fsc curve to become parents. This leads
to bugs including a use-after-free.

Don't allow non-root classes without HFSC_FSC to become parents.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Budimir Markovic &lt;markovicbudimir@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Budimir Markovic &lt;markovicbudimir@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824084905.422-1-markovicbudimir@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b3d26c5702c7d6c45456326e56d2ccf3f103e60f ]

HFSC assumes that inner classes have an fsc curve, but it is currently
possible for classes without an fsc curve to become parents. This leads
to bugs including a use-after-free.

Don't allow non-root classes without HFSC_FSC to become parents.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Budimir Markovic &lt;markovicbudimir@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Budimir Markovic &lt;markovicbudimir@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230824084905.422-1-markovicbudimir@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>wifi: nl80211/cfg80211: add forgotten nla_policy for BSS color attribute</title>
<updated>2023-09-13T07:42:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lin Ma</name>
<email>linma@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2023-08-09T03:31:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4381d6083254bdef420a660dc8c41dea7f7d3f88'/>
<id>4381d6083254bdef420a660dc8c41dea7f7d3f88</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 218d690c49b7e9c94ad0d317adbdd4af846ea0dc ]

The previous commit dd3e4fc75b4a ("nl80211/cfg80211: add BSS color to
NDP ranging parameters") adds a parameter for NDP ranging by introducing
a new attribute type named NL80211_PMSR_FTM_REQ_ATTR_BSS_COLOR.

However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
nl80211_pmsr_ftm_req_attr_policy (net/wireless/nl80211.c). Just
complement it to avoid malformed attribute that causes out-of-attribute
access.

Fixes: dd3e4fc75b4a ("nl80211/cfg80211: add BSS color to NDP ranging parameters")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809033151.768910-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 218d690c49b7e9c94ad0d317adbdd4af846ea0dc ]

The previous commit dd3e4fc75b4a ("nl80211/cfg80211: add BSS color to
NDP ranging parameters") adds a parameter for NDP ranging by introducing
a new attribute type named NL80211_PMSR_FTM_REQ_ATTR_BSS_COLOR.

However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at
nl80211_pmsr_ftm_req_attr_policy (net/wireless/nl80211.c). Just
complement it to avoid malformed attribute that causes out-of-attribute
access.

Fixes: dd3e4fc75b4a ("nl80211/cfg80211: add BSS color to NDP ranging parameters")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma &lt;linma@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809033151.768910-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
