<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch v5.4.92</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: check if atf has been disabled in __ieee80211_schedule_txq</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:58:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Bianconi</name>
<email>lorenzo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-26T09:39:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d04c7938d0f897dcc30c533d038937891c8d6054'/>
<id>d04c7938d0f897dcc30c533d038937891c8d6054</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c13cf5c159660451c8fbdc37efb998b198e1d305 upstream.

Check if atf has been disabled in __ieee80211_schedule_txq() in order to
avoid a given sta is always put to the beginning of the active_txqs list
and never moved to the end since deficit is not decremented in
ieee80211_sta_register_airtime()

Fixes: b4809e9484da1 ("mac80211: Add airtime accounting and scheduling to TXQs")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi &lt;lorenzo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@toke.dk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/93889406c50f1416214c079ca0b8c9faecc5143e.1608975195.git.lorenzo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c13cf5c159660451c8fbdc37efb998b198e1d305 upstream.

Check if atf has been disabled in __ieee80211_schedule_txq() in order to
avoid a given sta is always put to the beginning of the active_txqs list
and never moved to the end since deficit is not decremented in
ieee80211_sta_register_airtime()

Fixes: b4809e9484da1 ("mac80211: Add airtime accounting and scheduling to TXQs")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi &lt;lorenzo@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen &lt;toke@toke.dk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/93889406c50f1416214c079ca0b8c9faecc5143e.1608975195.git.lorenzo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mac80211: do not drop tx nulldata packets on encrypted links</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:58:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Felix Fietkau</name>
<email>nbd@nbd.name</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-18T19:15:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d46996cb4b168f19f40154b83f6a22024a909cb3'/>
<id>d46996cb4b168f19f40154b83f6a22024a909cb3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 2463ec86cd0338a2c2edbfb0b9d50c52ff76ff43 upstream.

ieee80211_tx_h_select_key drops any non-mgmt packets without a key when
encryption is used. This is wrong for nulldata packets that can't be
encrypted and are sent out for probing clients and indicating 4-address
mode.

Reported-by: Sebastian Gottschall &lt;s.gottschall@dd-wrt.com&gt;
Fixes: a0761a301746 ("mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@nbd.name&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201218191525.1168-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 2463ec86cd0338a2c2edbfb0b9d50c52ff76ff43 upstream.

ieee80211_tx_h_select_key drops any non-mgmt packets without a key when
encryption is used. This is wrong for nulldata packets that can't be
encrypted and are sent out for probing clients and indicating 4-address
mode.

Reported-by: Sebastian Gottschall &lt;s.gottschall@dd-wrt.com&gt;
Fixes: a0761a301746 ("mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links")
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau &lt;nbd@nbd.name&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201218191525.1168-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tipc: fix NULL deref in tipc_link_xmit()</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:58:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hoang Le</name>
<email>hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-08T07:13:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=56e8947bcf814d195eb4954b4821868803d3dd67'/>
<id>56e8947bcf814d195eb4954b4821868803d3dd67</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b77413446408fdd256599daf00d5be72b5f3e7c6 ]

The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()-&gt;tipc_node_xmit()-&gt;tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &amp;sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028e270fd ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jmaloy@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108071337.3598-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit b77413446408fdd256599daf00d5be72b5f3e7c6 ]

The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()-&gt;tipc_node_xmit()-&gt;tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &amp;sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028e270fd ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jmaloy@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108071337.3598-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net, sctp, filter: remap copy_from_user failure error</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:58:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-22T00:08:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=55bac51762c39ef033b488dd09b60d48908d317f'/>
<id>55bac51762c39ef033b488dd09b60d48908d317f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ no upstream commit ]

Fix a potential kernel address leakage for the prerequisite where there is
a BPF program attached to the cgroup/setsockopt hook. The latter can only
be attached under root, however, if the attached program returns 1 to then
run the related kernel handler, an unprivileged program could probe for
kernel addresses that way. The reason this is possible is that we're under
set_fs(KERNEL_DS) when running the kernel setsockopt handler. Aside from
old cBPF there is also SCTP's struct sctp_getaddrs_old which contains
pointers in the uapi struct that further need copy_from_user() inside the
handler. In the normal case this would just return -EFAULT, but under a
temporary KERNEL_DS setting the memory would be copied and we'd end up at
a different error code, that is, -EINVAL, for both cases given subsequent
validations fail, which then allows the app to distinguish and make use of
this fact for probing the address space. In case of later kernel versions
this issue won't work anymore thanks to Christoph Hellwig's work that got
rid of the various temporary set_fs() address space overrides altogether.
One potential option for 5.4 as the only affected stable kernel with the
least complexity would be to remap those affected -EFAULT copy_from_user()
error codes with -EINVAL such that they cannot be probed anymore. Risk of
breakage should be rather low for this particular error case.

Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
Reported-by: Ryota Shiga (Flatt Security)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ no upstream commit ]

Fix a potential kernel address leakage for the prerequisite where there is
a BPF program attached to the cgroup/setsockopt hook. The latter can only
be attached under root, however, if the attached program returns 1 to then
run the related kernel handler, an unprivileged program could probe for
kernel addresses that way. The reason this is possible is that we're under
set_fs(KERNEL_DS) when running the kernel setsockopt handler. Aside from
old cBPF there is also SCTP's struct sctp_getaddrs_old which contains
pointers in the uapi struct that further need copy_from_user() inside the
handler. In the normal case this would just return -EFAULT, but under a
temporary KERNEL_DS setting the memory would be copied and we'd end up at
a different error code, that is, -EINVAL, for both cases given subsequent
validations fail, which then allows the app to distinguish and make use of
this fact for probing the address space. In case of later kernel versions
this issue won't work anymore thanks to Christoph Hellwig's work that got
rid of the various temporary set_fs() address space overrides altogether.
One potential option for 5.4 as the only affected stable kernel with the
least complexity would be to remap those affected -EFAULT copy_from_user()
error codes with -EINVAL such that they cannot be probed anymore. Risk of
breakage should be rather low for this particular error case.

Fixes: 0d01da6afc54 ("bpf: implement getsockopt and setsockopt hooks")
Reported-by: Ryota Shiga (Flatt Security)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Cc: Stanislav Fomichev &lt;sdf@google.com&gt;
Cc: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix handling of an unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:58:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-12T15:23:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=52e0b20c8c5751d90ef1f02f9270ac561d37a079'/>
<id>52e0b20c8c5751d90ef1f02f9270ac561d37a079</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d52e419ac8b50c8bef41b398ed13528e75d7ad48 ]

Clang static analysis reports the following:

net/rxrpc/key.c:657:11: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined
                toksize = toksizes[tok++];
                        ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

rxrpc_read() contains two consecutive loops.  The first loop calculates the
token sizes and stores the results in toksizes[] and the second one uses
the array.  When there is an error in identifying the token in the first
loop, the token is skipped, no change is made to the toksizes[] array.
When the same error happens in the second loop, the token is not skipped.
This will cause the toksizes[] array to be out of step and will overrun
past the calculated sizes.

Fix this by making both loops log a message and return an error in this
case.  This should only happen if a new token type is incompletely
implemented, so it should normally be impossible to trigger this.

Fixes: 9a059cd5ca7d ("rxrpc: Downgrade the BUG() for unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()")
Reported-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046503122.2445787.16714129930607546635.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d52e419ac8b50c8bef41b398ed13528e75d7ad48 ]

Clang static analysis reports the following:

net/rxrpc/key.c:657:11: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined
                toksize = toksizes[tok++];
                        ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

rxrpc_read() contains two consecutive loops.  The first loop calculates the
token sizes and stores the results in toksizes[] and the second one uses
the array.  When there is an error in identifying the token in the first
loop, the token is skipped, no change is made to the toksizes[] array.
When the same error happens in the second loop, the token is not skipped.
This will cause the toksizes[] array to be out of step and will overrun
past the calculated sizes.

Fix this by making both loops log a message and return an error in this
case.  This should only happen if a new token type is incompletely
implemented, so it should normally be impossible to trigger this.

Fixes: 9a059cd5ca7d ("rxrpc: Downgrade the BUG() for unsupported token type in rxrpc_read()")
Reported-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046503122.2445787.16714129930607546635.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: avoid 32 x truesize under-estimation for tiny skbs</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:57:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-13T16:18:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5c466480d7d4bbf1c9eaade9201febab3adc70b0'/>
<id>5c466480d7d4bbf1c9eaade9201febab3adc70b0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3226b158e67cfaa677fd180152bfb28989cb2fac ]

Both virtio net and napi_get_frags() allocate skbs
with a very small skb-&gt;head

While using page fragments instead of a kmalloc backed skb-&gt;head might give
a small performance improvement in some cases, there is a huge risk of
under estimating memory usage.

For both GOOD_COPY_LEN and GRO_MAX_HEAD, we can fit at least 32 allocations
per page (order-3 page in x86), or even 64 on PowerPC

We have been tracking OOM issues on GKE hosts hitting tcp_mem limits
but consuming far more memory for TCP buffers than instructed in tcp_mem[2]

Even if we force napi_alloc_skb() to only use order-0 pages, the issue
would still be there on arches with PAGE_SIZE &gt;= 32768

This patch makes sure that small skb head are kmalloc backed, so that
other objects in the slab page can be reused instead of being held as long
as skbs are sitting in socket queues.

Note that we might in the future use the sk_buff napi cache,
instead of going through a more expensive __alloc_skb()

Another idea would be to use separate page sizes depending
on the allocated length (to never have more than 4 frags per page)

I would like to thank Greg Thelen for his precious help on this matter,
analysing crash dumps is always a time consuming task.

Fixes: fd11a83dd363 ("net: Pull out core bits of __netdev_alloc_skb and add __napi_alloc_skb")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210113161819.1155526-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3226b158e67cfaa677fd180152bfb28989cb2fac ]

Both virtio net and napi_get_frags() allocate skbs
with a very small skb-&gt;head

While using page fragments instead of a kmalloc backed skb-&gt;head might give
a small performance improvement in some cases, there is a huge risk of
under estimating memory usage.

For both GOOD_COPY_LEN and GRO_MAX_HEAD, we can fit at least 32 allocations
per page (order-3 page in x86), or even 64 on PowerPC

We have been tracking OOM issues on GKE hosts hitting tcp_mem limits
but consuming far more memory for TCP buffers than instructed in tcp_mem[2]

Even if we force napi_alloc_skb() to only use order-0 pages, the issue
would still be there on arches with PAGE_SIZE &gt;= 32768

This patch makes sure that small skb head are kmalloc backed, so that
other objects in the slab page can be reused instead of being held as long
as skbs are sitting in socket queues.

Note that we might in the future use the sk_buff napi cache,
instead of going through a more expensive __alloc_skb()

Another idea would be to use separate page sizes depending
on the allocated length (to never have more than 4 frags per page)

I would like to thank Greg Thelen for his precious help on this matter,
analysing crash dumps is always a time consuming task.

Fixes: fd11a83dd363 ("net: Pull out core bits of __netdev_alloc_skb and add __napi_alloc_skb")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Greg Thelen &lt;gthelen@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin &lt;mst@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210113161819.1155526-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: sit: unregister_netdevice on newlink's error path</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:57:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jakub Kicinski</name>
<email>kuba@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-14T01:29:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f6499a78e581e6ae71ed73ee57a844ee14b2d387'/>
<id>f6499a78e581e6ae71ed73ee57a844ee14b2d387</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 47e4bb147a96f1c9b4e7691e7e994e53838bfff8 ]

We need to unregister the netdevice if config failed.
.ndo_uninit takes care of most of the heavy lifting.

This was uncovered by recent commit c269a24ce057 ("net: make
free_netdev() more lenient with unregistering devices").
Previously the partially-initialized device would be left
in the system.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2393580080a2da190f04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e2f1f072db8d ("sit: allow to configure 6rd tunnels via netlink")
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114012947.2515313-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 47e4bb147a96f1c9b4e7691e7e994e53838bfff8 ]

We need to unregister the netdevice if config failed.
.ndo_uninit takes care of most of the heavy lifting.

This was uncovered by recent commit c269a24ce057 ("net: make
free_netdev() more lenient with unregistering devices").
Previously the partially-initialized device would be left
in the system.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2393580080a2da190f04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e2f1f072db8d ("sit: allow to configure 6rd tunnels via netlink")
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel &lt;nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114012947.2515313-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Call state should be read with READ_ONCE() under some circumstances</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:57:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baptiste Lepers</name>
<email>baptiste.lepers@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-12T15:59:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c213d85cae390bdb9f6a6e9f95009ba8dc356fc1'/>
<id>c213d85cae390bdb9f6a6e9f95009ba8dc356fc1</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a95d25dd7b94a5ba18246da09b4218f132fed60e ]

The call state may be changed at any time by the data-ready routine in
response to received packets, so if the call state is to be read and acted
upon several times in a function, READ_ONCE() must be used unless the call
state lock is held.

As it happens, we used READ_ONCE() to read the state a few lines above the
unmarked read in rxrpc_input_data(), so use that value rather than
re-reading it.

Fixes: a158bdd3247b ("rxrpc: Fix call timeouts")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers &lt;baptiste.lepers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046715522.2450566.488819910256264150.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit a95d25dd7b94a5ba18246da09b4218f132fed60e ]

The call state may be changed at any time by the data-ready routine in
response to received packets, so if the call state is to be read and acted
upon several times in a function, READ_ONCE() must be used unless the call
state lock is held.

As it happens, we used READ_ONCE() to read the state a few lines above the
unmarked read in rxrpc_input_data(), so use that value rather than
re-reading it.

Fixes: a158bdd3247b ("rxrpc: Fix call timeouts")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers &lt;baptiste.lepers@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161046715522.2450566.488819910256264150.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dcb: Accept RTM_GETDCB messages carrying set-like DCB commands</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:57:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Machata</name>
<email>petrm@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-11T17:07:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=6d57b582fb35d321ea42fe6a75f7251451a55569'/>
<id>6d57b582fb35d321ea42fe6a75f7251451a55569</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit df85bc140a4d6cbaa78d8e9c35154e1a2f0622c7 ]

In commit 826f328e2b7e ("net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB
handler"), Linux started rejecting RTM_GETDCB netlink messages if they
contained a set-like DCB_CMD_ command.

The reason was that privileges were only verified for RTM_SETDCB messages,
but the value that determined the action to be taken is the command, not
the message type. And validation of message type against the DCB command
was the obvious missing piece.

Unfortunately it turns out that mlnx_qos, a somewhat widely deployed tool
for configuration of DCB, accesses the DCB set-like APIs through
RTM_GETDCB.

Therefore do not bounce the discrepancy between message type and command.
Instead, in addition to validating privileges based on the actual message
type, validate them also based on the expected message type. This closes
the loophole of allowing DCB configuration on non-admin accounts, while
maintaining backward compatibility.

Fixes: 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver")
Fixes: 826f328e2b7e ("net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB handler")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata &lt;petrm@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a3edcfda0825f2aa2591801c5232f2bbf2d8a554.1610384801.git.me@pmachata.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit df85bc140a4d6cbaa78d8e9c35154e1a2f0622c7 ]

In commit 826f328e2b7e ("net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB
handler"), Linux started rejecting RTM_GETDCB netlink messages if they
contained a set-like DCB_CMD_ command.

The reason was that privileges were only verified for RTM_SETDCB messages,
but the value that determined the action to be taken is the command, not
the message type. And validation of message type against the DCB command
was the obvious missing piece.

Unfortunately it turns out that mlnx_qos, a somewhat widely deployed tool
for configuration of DCB, accesses the DCB set-like APIs through
RTM_GETDCB.

Therefore do not bounce the discrepancy between message type and command.
Instead, in addition to validating privileges based on the actual message
type, validate them also based on the expected message type. This closes
the loophole of allowing DCB configuration on non-admin accounts, while
maintaining backward compatibility.

Fixes: 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver")
Fixes: 826f328e2b7e ("net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB handler")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata &lt;petrm@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a3edcfda0825f2aa2591801c5232f2bbf2d8a554.1610384801.git.me@pmachata.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dcb: Validate netlink message in DCB handler</title>
<updated>2021-01-23T14:57:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Machata</name>
<email>me@pmachata.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-22T21:49:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d52f5929d9970f5e22ba38da67ce174a8484b228'/>
<id>d52f5929d9970f5e22ba38da67ce174a8484b228</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 826f328e2b7e8854dd42ea44e6519cd75018e7b1 ]

DCB uses the same handler function for both RTM_GETDCB and RTM_SETDCB
messages. dcb_doit() bounces RTM_SETDCB mesasges if the user does not have
the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.

However, the operation to be performed is not decided from the DCB message
type, but from the DCB command. Thus DCB_CMD_*_GET commands are used for
reading DCB objects, the corresponding SET and DEL commands are used for
manipulation.

The assumption is that set-like commands will be sent via an RTM_SETDCB
message, and get-like ones via RTM_GETDCB. However, this assumption is not
enforced.

It is therefore possible to manipulate DCB objects without CAP_NET_ADMIN
capability by sending the corresponding command in an RTM_GETDCB message.
That is a bug. Fix it by validating the type of the request message against
the type used for the response.

Fixes: 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata &lt;me@pmachata.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a2a9b88418f3a58ef211b718f2970128ef9e3793.1608673640.git.me@pmachata.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 826f328e2b7e8854dd42ea44e6519cd75018e7b1 ]

DCB uses the same handler function for both RTM_GETDCB and RTM_SETDCB
messages. dcb_doit() bounces RTM_SETDCB mesasges if the user does not have
the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability.

However, the operation to be performed is not decided from the DCB message
type, but from the DCB command. Thus DCB_CMD_*_GET commands are used for
reading DCB objects, the corresponding SET and DEL commands are used for
manipulation.

The assumption is that set-like commands will be sent via an RTM_SETDCB
message, and get-like ones via RTM_GETDCB. However, this assumption is not
enforced.

It is therefore possible to manipulate DCB objects without CAP_NET_ADMIN
capability by sending the corresponding command in an RTM_GETDCB message.
That is a bug. Fix it by validating the type of the request message against
the type used for the response.

Fixes: 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver")
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata &lt;me@pmachata.org&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a2a9b88418f3a58ef211b718f2970128ef9e3793.1608673640.git.me@pmachata.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
