<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch v5.4.58</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>nfsd: Fix NFSv4 READ on RDMA when using readv</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chuck Lever</name>
<email>chuck.lever@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-02T19:45:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=512570b17807ec4f7d0e2f0bd349445e33c051db'/>
<id>512570b17807ec4f7d0e2f0bd349445e33c051db</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 412055398b9e67e07347a936fc4a6adddabe9cf4 upstream.

svcrdma expects that the payload falls precisely into the xdr_buf
page vector. This does not seem to be the case for
nfsd4_encode_readv().

This code is called only when fops-&gt;splice_read is missing or when
RQ_SPLICE_OK is clear, so it's not a noticeable problem in many
common cases.

Add new transport method: -&gt;xpo_read_payload so that when a READ
payload does not fit exactly in rq_res's page vector, the XDR
encoder can inform the RPC transport exactly where that payload is,
without the payload's XDR pad.

That way, when a Write chunk is present, the transport knows what
byte range in the Reply message is supposed to be matched with the
chunk.

Note that the Linux NFS server implementation of NFS/RDMA can
currently handle only one Write chunk per RPC-over-RDMA message.
This simplifies the implementation of this fix.

Fixes: b04209806384 ("nfsd4: allow exotic read compounds")
Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198053
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Timo Rothenpieler &lt;timo@rothenpieler.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 412055398b9e67e07347a936fc4a6adddabe9cf4 upstream.

svcrdma expects that the payload falls precisely into the xdr_buf
page vector. This does not seem to be the case for
nfsd4_encode_readv().

This code is called only when fops-&gt;splice_read is missing or when
RQ_SPLICE_OK is clear, so it's not a noticeable problem in many
common cases.

Add new transport method: -&gt;xpo_read_payload so that when a READ
payload does not fit exactly in rq_res's page vector, the XDR
encoder can inform the RPC transport exactly where that payload is,
without the payload's XDR pad.

That way, when a Write chunk is present, the transport knows what
byte range in the Reply message is supposed to be matched with the
chunk.

Note that the Linux NFS server implementation of NFS/RDMA can
currently handle only one Write chunk per RPC-over-RDMA message.
This simplifies the implementation of this fix.

Fixes: b04209806384 ("nfsd4: allow exotic read compounds")
Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198053
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever &lt;chuck.lever@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Timo Rothenpieler &lt;timo@rothenpieler.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: apply a floor of 1 for RTT samples from TCP timestamps</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jianfeng Wang</name>
<email>jfwang@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-30T23:49:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=fb264505b39510801e9a9184e83b162614e97be2'/>
<id>fb264505b39510801e9a9184e83b162614e97be2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 730e700e2c19d87e578ff0e7d8cb1d4a02b036d2 ]

For retransmitted packets, TCP needs to resort to using TCP timestamps
for computing RTT samples. In the common case where the data and ACK
fall in the same 1-millisecond interval, TCP senders with millisecond-
granularity TCP timestamps compute a ca_rtt_us of 0. This ca_rtt_us
of 0 propagates to rs-&gt;rtt_us.

This value of 0 can cause performance problems for congestion control
modules. For example, in BBR, the zero min_rtt sample can bring the
min_rtt and BDP estimate down to 0, reduce snd_cwnd and result in a
low throughput. It would be hard to mitigate this with filtering in
the congestion control module, because the proper floor to apply would
depend on the method of RTT sampling (using timestamp options or
internally-saved transmission timestamps).

This fix applies a floor of 1 for the RTT sample delta from TCP
timestamps, so that seq_rtt_us, ca_rtt_us, and rs-&gt;rtt_us will be at
least 1 * (USEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ).

Note that the receiver RTT computation in tcp_rcv_rtt_measure() and
min_rtt computation in tcp_update_rtt_min() both already apply a floor
of 1 timestamp tick, so this commit makes the code more consistent in
avoiding this edge case of a value of 0.

Signed-off-by: Jianfeng Wang &lt;jfwang@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kevin Yang &lt;yyd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 730e700e2c19d87e578ff0e7d8cb1d4a02b036d2 ]

For retransmitted packets, TCP needs to resort to using TCP timestamps
for computing RTT samples. In the common case where the data and ACK
fall in the same 1-millisecond interval, TCP senders with millisecond-
granularity TCP timestamps compute a ca_rtt_us of 0. This ca_rtt_us
of 0 propagates to rs-&gt;rtt_us.

This value of 0 can cause performance problems for congestion control
modules. For example, in BBR, the zero min_rtt sample can bring the
min_rtt and BDP estimate down to 0, reduce snd_cwnd and result in a
low throughput. It would be hard to mitigate this with filtering in
the congestion control module, because the proper floor to apply would
depend on the method of RTT sampling (using timestamp options or
internally-saved transmission timestamps).

This fix applies a floor of 1 for the RTT sample delta from TCP
timestamps, so that seq_rtt_us, ca_rtt_us, and rs-&gt;rtt_us will be at
least 1 * (USEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ).

Note that the receiver RTT computation in tcp_rcv_rtt_measure() and
min_rtt computation in tcp_update_rtt_min() both already apply a floor
of 1 timestamp tick, so this commit makes the code more consistent in
avoiding this edge case of a value of 0.

Signed-off-by: Jianfeng Wang &lt;jfwang@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Kevin Yang &lt;yyd@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openvswitch: Prevent kernel-infoleak in ovs_ct_put_key()</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peilin Ye</name>
<email>yepeilin.cs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-31T04:48:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=daff7f09f3419b6703dfe59c1de7283bbc4b9de3'/>
<id>daff7f09f3419b6703dfe59c1de7283bbc4b9de3</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9aba6c5b49254d5bee927d81593ed4429e91d4ae ]

ovs_ct_put_key() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack memory
into socket buffers, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole at the end
of `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4` and `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6`. Fix
it by initializing `orig` with memset().

Fixes: 9dd7f8907c37 ("openvswitch: Add original direction conntrack tuple to sw_flow_key.")
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;yepeilin.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9aba6c5b49254d5bee927d81593ed4429e91d4ae ]

ovs_ct_put_key() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack memory
into socket buffers, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole at the end
of `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4` and `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6`. Fix
it by initializing `orig` with memset().

Fixes: 9dd7f8907c37 ("openvswitch: Add original direction conntrack tuple to sw_flow_key.")
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye &lt;yepeilin.cs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: gre: recompute gre csum for sctp over gre tunnels</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lorenzo Bianconi</name>
<email>lorenzo@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-31T18:12:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=786a9368be8cf862f1c290edb17c1a7ae363c059'/>
<id>786a9368be8cf862f1c290edb17c1a7ae363c059</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 622e32b7d4a6492cf5c1f759ef833f817418f7b3 ]

The GRE tunnel can be used to transport traffic that does not rely on a
Internet checksum (e.g. SCTP). The issue can be triggered creating a GRE
or GRETAP tunnel and transmitting SCTP traffic ontop of it where CRC
offload has been disabled. In order to fix the issue we need to
recompute the GRE csum in gre_gso_segment() not relying on the inner
checksum.
The issue is still present when we have the CRC offload enabled.
In this case we need to disable the CRC offload if we require GRE
checksum since otherwise skb_checksum() will report a wrong value.

Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi &lt;lorenzo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 622e32b7d4a6492cf5c1f759ef833f817418f7b3 ]

The GRE tunnel can be used to transport traffic that does not rely on a
Internet checksum (e.g. SCTP). The issue can be triggered creating a GRE
or GRETAP tunnel and transmitting SCTP traffic ontop of it where CRC
offload has been disabled. In order to fix the issue we need to
recompute the GRE csum in gre_gso_segment() not relying on the inner
checksum.
The issue is still present when we have the CRC offload enabled.
In this case we need to disable the CRC offload if we require GRE
checksum since otherwise skb_checksum() will report a wrong value.

Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi &lt;lorenzo@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>appletalk: Fix atalk_proc_init() return path</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vincent Duvert</name>
<email>vincent.ldev@duvert.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-08-02T05:06:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5a963aa72107e8c779ce2adde41d475c709c3c52'/>
<id>5a963aa72107e8c779ce2adde41d475c709c3c52</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d0f6ba2ef2c1c95069509e71402e7d6d43452512 ]

Add a missing return statement to atalk_proc_init so it doesn't return
-ENOMEM when successful.  This allows the appletalk module to load
properly.

Fixes: e2bcd8b0ce6e ("appletalk: use remove_proc_subtree to simplify procfs code")
Link: https://www.downtowndougbrown.com/2020/08/hacking-up-a-fix-for-the-broken-appletalk-kernel-module-in-linux-5-1-and-newer/
Reported-by: Christopher KOBAYASHI &lt;chris@disavowed.jp&gt;
Reported-by: Doug Brown &lt;doug@downtowndougbrown.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincent Duvert &lt;vincent.ldev@duvert.net&gt;
[lukas: add missing tags]
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Cc: Yue Haibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit d0f6ba2ef2c1c95069509e71402e7d6d43452512 ]

Add a missing return statement to atalk_proc_init so it doesn't return
-ENOMEM when successful.  This allows the appletalk module to load
properly.

Fixes: e2bcd8b0ce6e ("appletalk: use remove_proc_subtree to simplify procfs code")
Link: https://www.downtowndougbrown.com/2020/08/hacking-up-a-fix-for-the-broken-appletalk-kernel-module-in-linux-5-1-and-newer/
Reported-by: Christopher KOBAYASHI &lt;chris@disavowed.jp&gt;
Reported-by: Doug Brown &lt;doug@downtowndougbrown.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vincent Duvert &lt;vincent.ldev@duvert.net&gt;
[lukas: add missing tags]
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner &lt;lukas@wunner.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Cc: Yue Haibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>rxrpc: Fix race between recvmsg and sendmsg on immediate call failure</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-28T23:03:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=106b415d5139c44d1042c9d1205d122530cd9361'/>
<id>106b415d5139c44d1042c9d1205d122530cd9361</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 65550098c1c4db528400c73acf3e46bfa78d9264 ]

There's a race between rxrpc_sendmsg setting up a call, but then failing to
send anything on it due to an error, and recvmsg() seeing the call
completion occur and trying to return the state to the user.

An assertion fails in rxrpc_recvmsg() because the call has already been
released from the socket and is about to be released again as recvmsg deals
with it.  (The recvmsg_q queue on the socket holds a ref, so there's no
problem with use-after-free.)

We also have to be careful not to end up reporting an error twice, in such
a way that both returns indicate to userspace that the user ID supplied
with the call is no longer in use - which could cause the client to
malfunction if it recycles the user ID fast enough.

Fix this by the following means:

 (1) When sendmsg() creates a call after the point that the call has been
     successfully added to the socket, don't return any errors through
     sendmsg(), but rather complete the call and let recvmsg() retrieve
     them.  Make sendmsg() return 0 at this point.  Further calls to
     sendmsg() for that call will fail with ESHUTDOWN.

     Note that at this point, we haven't send any packets yet, so the
     server doesn't yet know about the call.

 (2) If sendmsg() returns an error when it was expected to create a new
     call, it means that the user ID wasn't used.

 (3) Mark the call disconnected before marking it completed to prevent an
     oops in rxrpc_release_call().

 (4) recvmsg() will then retrieve the error and set MSG_EOR to indicate
     that the user ID is no longer known by the kernel.

An oops like the following is produced:

	kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:605!
	...
	RIP: 0010:rxrpc_recvmsg+0x256/0x5ae
	...
	Call Trace:
	 ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x2f/0x2f
	 ____sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0x148
	 ? import_iovec+0x69/0x9c
	 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x86
	 ___sys_recvmsg+0x72/0xaa
	 ? __fget_files+0x22/0x57
	 ? __fget_light+0x46/0x51
	 ? fdget+0x9/0x1b
	 do_recvmmsg+0x15e/0x232
	 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0xb
	 ? vtime_delta+0xf/0x25
	 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x2c/0x2f
	 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x78
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 357f5ef64628 ("rxrpc: Call rxrpc_release_call() on error in rxrpc_new_client_call()")
Reported-by: syzbot+b54969381df354936d96@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 65550098c1c4db528400c73acf3e46bfa78d9264 ]

There's a race between rxrpc_sendmsg setting up a call, but then failing to
send anything on it due to an error, and recvmsg() seeing the call
completion occur and trying to return the state to the user.

An assertion fails in rxrpc_recvmsg() because the call has already been
released from the socket and is about to be released again as recvmsg deals
with it.  (The recvmsg_q queue on the socket holds a ref, so there's no
problem with use-after-free.)

We also have to be careful not to end up reporting an error twice, in such
a way that both returns indicate to userspace that the user ID supplied
with the call is no longer in use - which could cause the client to
malfunction if it recycles the user ID fast enough.

Fix this by the following means:

 (1) When sendmsg() creates a call after the point that the call has been
     successfully added to the socket, don't return any errors through
     sendmsg(), but rather complete the call and let recvmsg() retrieve
     them.  Make sendmsg() return 0 at this point.  Further calls to
     sendmsg() for that call will fail with ESHUTDOWN.

     Note that at this point, we haven't send any packets yet, so the
     server doesn't yet know about the call.

 (2) If sendmsg() returns an error when it was expected to create a new
     call, it means that the user ID wasn't used.

 (3) Mark the call disconnected before marking it completed to prevent an
     oops in rxrpc_release_call().

 (4) recvmsg() will then retrieve the error and set MSG_EOR to indicate
     that the user ID is no longer known by the kernel.

An oops like the following is produced:

	kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:605!
	...
	RIP: 0010:rxrpc_recvmsg+0x256/0x5ae
	...
	Call Trace:
	 ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x2f/0x2f
	 ____sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0x148
	 ? import_iovec+0x69/0x9c
	 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x86
	 ___sys_recvmsg+0x72/0xaa
	 ? __fget_files+0x22/0x57
	 ? __fget_light+0x46/0x51
	 ? fdget+0x9/0x1b
	 do_recvmmsg+0x15e/0x232
	 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0xb
	 ? vtime_delta+0xf/0x25
	 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x2c/0x2f
	 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x78
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 357f5ef64628 ("rxrpc: Call rxrpc_release_call() on error in rxrpc_new_client_call()")
Reported-by: syzbot+b54969381df354936d96@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne &lt;marc.dionne@auristor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: Fix nexthop refcnt leak when creating ipv6 route info</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiyu Yang</name>
<email>xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-25T08:02:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd68177f26e4450d717f94363385ace914d0b671'/>
<id>bd68177f26e4450d717f94363385ace914d0b671</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 706ec919164622ff5ce822065472d0f30a9e9dd2 ]

ip6_route_info_create() invokes nexthop_get(), which increases the
refcount of the "nh".

When ip6_route_info_create() returns, local variable "nh" becomes
invalid, so the refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced.

The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
ip6_route_info_create(). When nexthops can not be used with source
routing, the function forgets to decrease the refcnt increased by
nexthop_get(), causing a refcnt leak.

Fix this issue by pulling up the error source routing handling when
nexthops can not be used with source routing.

Fixes: f88d8ea67fbd ("ipv6: Plumb support for nexthop object in a fib6_info")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang &lt;xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan &lt;tanxin.ctf@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 706ec919164622ff5ce822065472d0f30a9e9dd2 ]

ip6_route_info_create() invokes nexthop_get(), which increases the
refcount of the "nh".

When ip6_route_info_create() returns, local variable "nh" becomes
invalid, so the refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced.

The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
ip6_route_info_create(). When nexthops can not be used with source
routing, the function forgets to decrease the refcnt increased by
nexthop_get(), causing a refcnt leak.

Fix this issue by pulling up the error source routing handling when
nexthops can not be used with source routing.

Fixes: f88d8ea67fbd ("ipv6: Plumb support for nexthop object in a fib6_info")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang &lt;xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan &lt;tanxin.ctf@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Ahern &lt;dsahern@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv6: fix memory leaks on IPV6_ADDRFORM path</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-25T22:40:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=89c12bc36262e99f1d02f4b208699fa65866ff36'/>
<id>89c12bc36262e99f1d02f4b208699fa65866ff36</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8c0de6e96c9794cb523a516c465991a70245da1c ]

IPV6_ADDRFORM causes resource leaks when converting an IPv6 socket
to IPv4, particularly struct ipv6_ac_socklist. Similar to
struct ipv6_mc_socklist, we should just close it on this path.

This bug can be easily reproduced with the following C program:

  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
  #include &lt;string.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
  #include &lt;arpa/inet.h&gt;

  int main()
  {
    int s, value;
    struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
    struct ipv6_mreq m6;

    s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
    addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
    addr.sin6_port = htons(5000);
    inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::ffff:192.168.122.194", &amp;addr.sin6_addr);
    connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;addr, sizeof(addr));

    inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe80::AAAA", &amp;m6.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
    m6.ipv6mr_interface = 5;
    setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST, &amp;m6, sizeof(m6));

    value = AF_INET;
    setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &amp;value, sizeof(value));

    close(s);
    return 0;
  }

Reported-by: ch3332xr@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8c0de6e96c9794cb523a516c465991a70245da1c ]

IPV6_ADDRFORM causes resource leaks when converting an IPv6 socket
to IPv4, particularly struct ipv6_ac_socklist. Similar to
struct ipv6_mc_socklist, we should just close it on this path.

This bug can be easily reproduced with the following C program:

  #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
  #include &lt;string.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/types.h&gt;
  #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
  #include &lt;arpa/inet.h&gt;

  int main()
  {
    int s, value;
    struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
    struct ipv6_mreq m6;

    s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
    addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
    addr.sin6_port = htons(5000);
    inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::ffff:192.168.122.194", &amp;addr.sin6_addr);
    connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&amp;addr, sizeof(addr));

    inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe80::AAAA", &amp;m6.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
    m6.ipv6mr_interface = 5;
    setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST, &amp;m6, sizeof(m6));

    value = AF_INET;
    setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &amp;value, sizeof(value));

    close(s);
    return 0;
  }

Reported-by: ch3332xr@gmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ipv4: Silence suspicious RCU usage warning</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@mellanox.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-29T08:37:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9b37a7bcdd8a55453daec94b84415e6c2f064d54'/>
<id>9b37a7bcdd8a55453daec94b84415e6c2f064d54</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 83f3522860f702748143e022f1a546547314c715 ]

fib_trie_unmerge() is called with RTNL held, but not from an RCU
read-side critical section. This leads to the following warning [1] when
the FIB alias list in a leaf is traversed with
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu().

Since the function is always called with RTNL held and since
modification of the list is protected by RTNL, simply use
hlist_for_each_entry() and silence the warning.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1867 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/164:
 #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49a/0xbd0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 164 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x100/0x184
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
 fib_trie_unmerge+0x608/0xdb0
 fib_unmerge+0x44/0x360
 fib4_rule_configure+0xc8/0xad0
 fib_nl_newrule+0x37a/0x1dd0
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f7/0xbd0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x879/0xa00
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x190
 __sys_sendmsg+0x103/0x1d0
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7d/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fc80a234e97
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffef8b66798 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc80a234e97
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffef8b66800 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000005f141b1c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fc80a2a8ac0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffef8b67008 R15: 0000556fccb10020

Fixes: 0ddcf43d5d4a ("ipv4: FIB Local/MAIN table collapse")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 83f3522860f702748143e022f1a546547314c715 ]

fib_trie_unmerge() is called with RTNL held, but not from an RCU
read-side critical section. This leads to the following warning [1] when
the FIB alias list in a leaf is traversed with
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu().

Since the function is always called with RTNL held and since
modification of the list is protected by RTNL, simply use
hlist_for_each_entry() and silence the warning.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1867 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/164:
 #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49a/0xbd0

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 164 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x100/0x184
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
 fib_trie_unmerge+0x608/0xdb0
 fib_unmerge+0x44/0x360
 fib4_rule_configure+0xc8/0xad0
 fib_nl_newrule+0x37a/0x1dd0
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f7/0xbd0
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x879/0xa00
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x190
 __sys_sendmsg+0x103/0x1d0
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7d/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fc80a234e97
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007ffef8b66798 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc80a234e97
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffef8b66800 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000005f141b1c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fc80a2a8ac0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffef8b67008 R15: 0000556fccb10020

Fixes: 0ddcf43d5d4a ("ipv4: FIB Local/MAIN table collapse")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@mellanox.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko &lt;jiri@mellanox.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cfg80211: check vendor command doit pointer before use</title>
<updated>2020-08-11T13:33:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Squires</name>
<email>julian@cipht.net</email>
</author>
<published>2020-07-06T21:13:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=7c8a863ba3cbbfdd5358c63c51f07681973babde'/>
<id>7c8a863ba3cbbfdd5358c63c51f07681973babde</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4052d3d2e8f47a15053320bbcbe365d15610437d ]

In the case where a vendor command does not implement doit, and has no
flags set, doit would not be validated and a NULL pointer dereference
would occur, for example when invoking the vendor command via iw.

I encountered this while developing new vendor commands.  Perhaps in
practice it is advisable to always implement doit along with dumpit,
but it seems reasonable to me to always check doit anyway, not just
when NEED_WDEV.

Signed-off-by: Julian Squires &lt;julian@cipht.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706211353.2366470-1-julian@cipht.net
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4052d3d2e8f47a15053320bbcbe365d15610437d ]

In the case where a vendor command does not implement doit, and has no
flags set, doit would not be validated and a NULL pointer dereference
would occur, for example when invoking the vendor command via iw.

I encountered this while developing new vendor commands.  Perhaps in
practice it is advisable to always implement doit along with dumpit,
but it seems reasonable to me to always check doit anyway, not just
when NEED_WDEV.

Signed-off-by: Julian Squires &lt;julian@cipht.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706211353.2366470-1-julian@cipht.net
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
