linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.9.99 Linux kernel stable tree libceph: validate con->state at the top of try_write() 2018-05-01T22:13:09+00:00 Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com 2018-04-24T17:10:55+00:00 30c85553d822c2d882ed5fe1652be5acdf405509 commit 9c55ad1c214d9f8c4594ac2c3fa392c1c32431a7 upstream. ceph_con_workfn() validates con->state before calling try_read() and then try_write(). However, try_read() temporarily releases con->mutex, notably in process_message() and ceph_con_in_msg_alloc(), opening the window for ceph_con_close() to sneak in, close the connection and release con->sock. When try_write() is called on the assumption that con->state is still valid (i.e. not STANDBY or CLOSED), a NULL sock gets passed to the networking stack: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x5/0x20 Make sure con->state is valid at the top of try_write() and add an explicit BUG_ON for this, similar to try_read(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23706 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 9c55ad1c214d9f8c4594ac2c3fa392c1c32431a7 upstream.

ceph_con_workfn() validates con->state before calling try_read() and
then try_write().  However, try_read() temporarily releases con->mutex,
notably in process_message() and ceph_con_in_msg_alloc(), opening the
window for ceph_con_close() to sneak in, close the connection and
release con->sock.  When try_write() is called on the assumption that
con->state is still valid (i.e. not STANDBY or CLOSED), a NULL sock
gets passed to the networking stack:

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
  IP: selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x5/0x20

Make sure con->state is valid at the top of try_write() and add an
explicit BUG_ON for this, similar to try_read().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23706
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
libceph: reschedule a tick in finish_hunting() 2018-05-01T22:13:08+00:00 Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com 2018-04-23T13:25:10+00:00 6044c69297adb224e4a2ec1bc8680b2e51428cc9 commit 7b4c443d139f1d2b5570da475f7a9cbcef86740c upstream. If we go without an established session for a while, backoff delay will climb to 30 seconds. The keepalive timeout is also 30 seconds, so it's pretty easily hit after a prolonged hunting for a monitor: we don't get a chance to send out a keepalive in time, which means we never get back a keepalive ack in time, cutting an established session and attempting to connect to a different monitor every 30 seconds: [Sun Apr 1 23:37:05 2018] libceph: mon0 10.80.20.99:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:37:36 2018] libceph: mon0 10.80.20.99:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon [Sun Apr 1 23:37:36 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:38:07 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon [Sun Apr 1 23:38:07 2018] libceph: mon1 10.80.20.100:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:38:37 2018] libceph: mon1 10.80.20.100:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon [Sun Apr 1 23:38:37 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session established [Sun Apr 1 23:39:08 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon The regular keepalive interval is 10 seconds. After ->hunting is cleared in finish_hunting(), call __schedule_delayed() to ensure we send out a keepalive after 10 seconds. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+ Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23537 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit 7b4c443d139f1d2b5570da475f7a9cbcef86740c upstream.

If we go without an established session for a while, backoff delay will
climb to 30 seconds.  The keepalive timeout is also 30 seconds, so it's
pretty easily hit after a prolonged hunting for a monitor: we don't get
a chance to send out a keepalive in time, which means we never get back
a keepalive ack in time, cutting an established session and attempting
to connect to a different monitor every 30 seconds:

  [Sun Apr 1 23:37:05 2018] libceph: mon0 10.80.20.99:6789 session established
  [Sun Apr 1 23:37:36 2018] libceph: mon0 10.80.20.99:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon
  [Sun Apr 1 23:37:36 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session established
  [Sun Apr 1 23:38:07 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon
  [Sun Apr 1 23:38:07 2018] libceph: mon1 10.80.20.100:6789 session established
  [Sun Apr 1 23:38:37 2018] libceph: mon1 10.80.20.100:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon
  [Sun Apr 1 23:38:37 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session established
  [Sun Apr 1 23:39:08 2018] libceph: mon2 10.80.20.103:6789 session lost, hunting for new mon

The regular keepalive interval is 10 seconds.  After ->hunting is
cleared in finish_hunting(), call __schedule_delayed() to ensure we
send out a keepalive after 10 seconds.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+
Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/23537
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
libceph: un-backoff on tick when we have a authenticated session 2018-05-01T22:13:08+00:00 Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com 2018-04-23T13:25:10+00:00 480179a1570d5d251be6c6bc02634611850d3c9a commit facb9f6eba3df4e8027301cc0e514dc582a1b366 upstream. This means that if we do some backoff, then authenticate, and are healthy for an extended period of time, a subsequent failure won't leave us starting our hunting sequence with a large backoff. Mirrors ceph.git commit d466bc6e66abba9b464b0b69687cf45c9dccf383. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+ Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
commit facb9f6eba3df4e8027301cc0e514dc582a1b366 upstream.

This means that if we do some backoff, then authenticate, and are
healthy for an extended period of time, a subsequent failure won't
leave us starting our hunting sequence with a large backoff.

Mirrors ceph.git commit d466bc6e66abba9b464b0b69687cf45c9dccf383.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman <dillaman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
strparser: Fix incorrect strp->need_bytes value. 2018-04-29T09:32:02+00:00 Doron Roberts-Kedes doronrk@fb.com 2018-04-11T22:05:16+00:00 2f7be1262873bb200ab18fe7627231c9da9f22b2 [ Upstream commit 9d0c75bf6e03d9bf80c55b0f677dc9b982958fd5 ] strp_data_ready resets strp->need_bytes to 0 if strp_peek_len indicates that the remainder of the message has been received. However, do_strp_work does not reset strp->need_bytes to 0. If do_strp_work completes a partial message, the value of strp->need_bytes will continue to reflect the needed bytes of the previous message, causing future invocations of strp_data_ready to return early if strp->need_bytes is less than strp_peek_len. Resetting strp->need_bytes to 0 in __strp_recv on handing a full message to the upper layer solves this problem. __strp_recv also calculates strp->need_bytes using stm->accum_len before stm->accum_len has been incremented by cand_len. This can cause strp->need_bytes to be equal to the full length of the message instead of the full length minus the accumulated length. This, in turn, causes strp_data_ready to return early, even when there is sufficient data to complete the partial message. Incrementing stm->accum_len before using it to calculate strp->need_bytes solves this problem. Found while testing net/tls_sw recv path. Fixes: 43a0c6751a322847 ("strparser: Stream parser for messages") Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes <doronrk@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 9d0c75bf6e03d9bf80c55b0f677dc9b982958fd5 ]

strp_data_ready resets strp->need_bytes to 0 if strp_peek_len indicates
that the remainder of the message has been received. However,
do_strp_work does not reset strp->need_bytes to 0. If do_strp_work
completes a partial message, the value of strp->need_bytes will continue
to reflect the needed bytes of the previous message, causing
future invocations of strp_data_ready to return early if
strp->need_bytes is less than strp_peek_len. Resetting strp->need_bytes
to 0 in __strp_recv on handing a full message to the upper layer solves
this problem.

__strp_recv also calculates strp->need_bytes using stm->accum_len before
stm->accum_len has been incremented by cand_len. This can cause
strp->need_bytes to be equal to the full length of the message instead
of the full length minus the accumulated length. This, in turn, causes
strp_data_ready to return early, even when there is sufficient data to
complete the partial message. Incrementing stm->accum_len before using
it to calculate strp->need_bytes solves this problem.

Found while testing net/tls_sw recv path.

Fixes: 43a0c6751a322847 ("strparser: Stream parser for messages")
Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes <doronrk@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ipv6: add RTA_TABLE and RTA_PREFSRC to rtm_ipv6_policy 2018-04-29T09:32:02+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2018-04-23T01:29:23+00:00 e2956fc8356549c7072a6b420b500bb5fe32c4fb [ Upstream commit aa8f8778493c85fff480cdf8b349b1e1dcb5f243 ] KMSAN reported use of uninit-value that I tracked to lack of proper size check on RTA_TABLE attribute. I also believe RTA_PREFSRC lacks a similar check. Fixes: 86872cb57925 ("[IPv6] route: FIB6 configuration using struct fib6_config") Fixes: c3968a857a6b ("ipv6: RTA_PREFSRC support for ipv6 route source address selection") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit aa8f8778493c85fff480cdf8b349b1e1dcb5f243 ]

KMSAN reported use of uninit-value that I tracked to lack
of proper size check on RTA_TABLE attribute.

I also believe RTA_PREFSRC lacks a similar check.

Fixes: 86872cb57925 ("[IPv6] route: FIB6 configuration using struct fib6_config")
Fixes: c3968a857a6b ("ipv6: RTA_PREFSRC support for ipv6 route source address selection")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: af_packet: fix race in PACKET_{R|T}X_RING 2018-04-29T09:32:02+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2018-04-16T00:52:04+00:00 55ca7b1d43a9d9958ce8544dee938e6c62c263ec [ Upstream commit 5171b37d959641bbc619781caf62e61f7b940871 ] In order to remove the race caught by syzbot [1], we need to lock the socket before using po->tp_version as this could change under us otherwise. This means lock_sock() and release_sock() must be done by packet_set_ring() callers. [1] : BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249 CPU: 0 PID: 20195 Comm: syzkaller707632 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249 packet_setsockopt+0x12c6/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3662 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849 SyS_setsockopt+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:1828 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x449099 RSP: 002b:00007f42b5307ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000070003c RCX: 0000000000449099 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000107 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000700038 R08: 000000000000001c R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000080eecf R14: 00007f42b53089c0 R15: 0000000000000001 Local variable description: ----req_u@packet_setsockopt Variable was created at: packet_setsockopt+0x13f/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3612 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849 Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 5171b37d959641bbc619781caf62e61f7b940871 ]

In order to remove the race caught by syzbot [1], we need
to lock the socket before using po->tp_version as this could
change under us otherwise.

This means lock_sock() and release_sock() must be done by
packet_set_ring() callers.

[1] :
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249
CPU: 0 PID: 20195 Comm: syzkaller707632 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676
 packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249
 packet_setsockopt+0x12c6/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3662
 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849
 SyS_setsockopt+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:1828
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x449099
RSP: 002b:00007f42b5307ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000070003c RCX: 0000000000449099
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000107 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000700038 R08: 000000000000001c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000080eecf R14: 00007f42b53089c0 R15: 0000000000000001

Local variable description: ----req_u@packet_setsockopt
Variable was created at:
 packet_setsockopt+0x13f/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3612
 SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849

Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets 2018-04-29T09:32:02+00:00 Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com 2018-04-11T21:36:28+00:00 228ce13c3064fcc8b30d21f95a9c246a23196daa [ Upstream commit 7212303268918b9a203aebeacfdbd83b5e87b20d ] syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in tcp_parse_options() [1] I believe this was caused by a TCP_MD5SIG being set on live flow. This is highly unexpected, since TCP option space is limited. For instance, presence of TCP MD5 option automatically disables TCP TimeStamp option at SYN/SYNACK time, which we can not do once flow has been established. Really, adding/deleting an MD5 key only makes sense on sockets in CLOSE or LISTEN state. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_parse_options+0xd74/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3720 CPU: 1 PID: 6177 Comm: syzkaller192004 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676 tcp_parse_options+0xd74/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3720 tcp_fast_parse_options net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3858 [inline] tcp_validate_incoming+0x4f1/0x2790 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5184 tcp_rcv_established+0xf60/0x2bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5453 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x6cd/0xd90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1469 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_sendmsg+0xd6/0x100 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1464 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 RIP: 0033:0x448fe9 RSP: 002b:00007fd472c64d38 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e5a30 RCX: 0000000000448fe9 RDX: 000000000000029f RSI: 0000000020a88f88 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000006e5a34 R08: 0000000020e68000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 00000000200007fd R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fff074899ef R14: 00007fd472c659c0 R15: 0000000000000009 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline] tcp_send_ack+0x18c/0x910 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3624 __tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5040 [inline] tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5053 [inline] tcp_rcv_established+0x2103/0x2bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5469 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x6cd/0xd90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1469 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline] __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786 tcp_sendmsg+0xd6/0x100 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1464 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline] SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 Fixes: cfb6eeb4c860 ("[TCP]: MD5 Signature Option (RFC2385) support.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 7212303268918b9a203aebeacfdbd83b5e87b20d ]

syzbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in tcp_parse_options() [1]

I believe this was caused by a TCP_MD5SIG being set on live
flow.

This is highly unexpected, since TCP option space is limited.

For instance, presence of TCP MD5 option automatically disables
TCP TimeStamp option at SYN/SYNACK time, which we can not do
once flow has been established.

Really, adding/deleting an MD5 key only makes sense on sockets
in CLOSE or LISTEN state.

[1]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_parse_options+0xd74/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3720
CPU: 1 PID: 6177 Comm: syzkaller192004 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676
 tcp_parse_options+0xd74/0x1a30 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3720
 tcp_fast_parse_options net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3858 [inline]
 tcp_validate_incoming+0x4f1/0x2790 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5184
 tcp_rcv_established+0xf60/0x2bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5453
 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x6cd/0xd90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1469
 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline]
 __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271
 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786
 tcp_sendmsg+0xd6/0x100 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1464
 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
 SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747
 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x448fe9
RSP: 002b:00007fd472c64d38 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006e5a30 RCX: 0000000000448fe9
RDX: 000000000000029f RSI: 0000000020a88f88 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000006e5a34 R08: 0000000020e68000 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 00000000200007fd R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff074899ef R14: 00007fd472c659c0 R15: 0000000000000009

Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188
 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline]
 tcp_send_ack+0x18c/0x910 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3624
 __tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5040 [inline]
 tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5053 [inline]
 tcp_rcv_established+0x2103/0x2bb0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5469
 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x6cd/0xd90 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1469
 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:908 [inline]
 __release_sock+0x2d6/0x680 net/core/sock.c:2271
 release_sock+0x97/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2786
 tcp_sendmsg+0xd6/0x100 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1464
 inet_sendmsg+0x48d/0x740 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:764
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
 SYSC_sendto+0x6c3/0x7e0 net/socket.c:1747
 SyS_sendto+0x8a/0xb0 net/socket.c:1715
 do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Fixes: cfb6eeb4c860 ("[TCP]: MD5 Signature Option (RFC2385) support.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
net: fix deadlock while clearing neighbor proxy table 2018-04-29T09:32:02+00:00 Wolfgang Bumiller w.bumiller@proxmox.com 2018-04-12T08:46:55+00:00 581cb195c59f0da31878c10e40893ec2d1d7b122 [ Upstream commit 53b76cdf7e8fecec1d09e38aad2f8579882591a8 ] When coming from ndisc_netdev_event() in net/ipv6/ndisc.c, neigh_ifdown() is called with &nd_tbl, locking this while clearing the proxy neighbor entries when eg. deleting an interface. Calling the table's pndisc_destructor() with the lock still held, however, can cause a deadlock: When a multicast listener is available an IGMP packet of type ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION may be sent out. When reaching ip6_finish_output2(), if no neighbor entry for the target address is found, __neigh_create() is called with &nd_tbl, which it'll want to lock. Move the elements into their own list, then unlock the table and perform the destruction. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199289 Fixes: 6fd6ce2056de ("ipv6: Do not depend on rt->n in ip6_finish_output2().") Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 53b76cdf7e8fecec1d09e38aad2f8579882591a8 ]

When coming from ndisc_netdev_event() in net/ipv6/ndisc.c,
neigh_ifdown() is called with &nd_tbl, locking this while
clearing the proxy neighbor entries when eg. deleting an
interface. Calling the table's pndisc_destructor() with the
lock still held, however, can cause a deadlock: When a
multicast listener is available an IGMP packet of type
ICMPV6_MGM_REDUCTION may be sent out. When reaching
ip6_finish_output2(), if no neighbor entry for the target
address is found, __neigh_create() is called with &nd_tbl,
which it'll want to lock.

Move the elements into their own list, then unlock the table
and perform the destruction.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199289
Fixes: 6fd6ce2056de ("ipv6: Do not depend on rt->n in ip6_finish_output2().")
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
llc: fix NULL pointer deref for SOCK_ZAPPED 2018-04-29T09:32:01+00:00 Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com 2018-04-20T04:54:34+00:00 7b80c16871489c7aa4b283ebc12e226b27c4c73b [ Upstream commit 3a04ce7130a7e5dad4e78d45d50313747f8c830f ] For SOCK_ZAPPED socket, we don't need to care about llc->sap, so we should just skip these refcount functions in this case. Fixes: f7e43672683b ("llc: hold llc_sap before release_sock()") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit 3a04ce7130a7e5dad4e78d45d50313747f8c830f ]

For SOCK_ZAPPED socket, we don't need to care about llc->sap,
so we should just skip these refcount functions in this case.

Fixes: f7e43672683b ("llc: hold llc_sap before release_sock()")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
llc: hold llc_sap before release_sock() 2018-04-29T09:32:01+00:00 Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com 2018-04-18T18:51:56+00:00 90e19ec22499f6182134f5a8b8461de2a0abe987 [ Upstream commit f7e43672683b097bb074a8fe7af9bc600a23f231 ] syzbot reported we still access llc->sap in llc_backlog_rcv() after it is freed in llc_sap_remove_socket(): Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 llc_conn_ac_send_sabme_cmd_p_set_x+0x3a8/0x460 net/llc/llc_c_ac.c:785 llc_exec_conn_trans_actions net/llc/llc_conn.c:475 [inline] llc_conn_service net/llc/llc_conn.c:400 [inline] llc_conn_state_process+0x4e1/0x13a0 net/llc/llc_conn.c:75 llc_backlog_rcv+0x195/0x1e0 net/llc/llc_conn.c:891 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:909 [inline] __release_sock+0x12f/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2335 release_sock+0xa4/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2850 llc_ui_release+0xc8/0x220 net/llc/af_llc.c:204 llc->sap is refcount'ed and llc_sap_remove_socket() is paired with llc_sap_add_socket(). This can be amended by holding its refcount before llc_sap_remove_socket() and releasing it after release_sock(). Reported-by: <syzbot+6e181fc95081c2cf9051@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
[ Upstream commit f7e43672683b097bb074a8fe7af9bc600a23f231 ]

syzbot reported we still access llc->sap in llc_backlog_rcv()
after it is freed in llc_sap_remove_socket():

Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
 llc_conn_ac_send_sabme_cmd_p_set_x+0x3a8/0x460 net/llc/llc_c_ac.c:785
 llc_exec_conn_trans_actions net/llc/llc_conn.c:475 [inline]
 llc_conn_service net/llc/llc_conn.c:400 [inline]
 llc_conn_state_process+0x4e1/0x13a0 net/llc/llc_conn.c:75
 llc_backlog_rcv+0x195/0x1e0 net/llc/llc_conn.c:891
 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:909 [inline]
 __release_sock+0x12f/0x3a0 net/core/sock.c:2335
 release_sock+0xa4/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:2850
 llc_ui_release+0xc8/0x220 net/llc/af_llc.c:204

llc->sap is refcount'ed and llc_sap_remove_socket() is paired
with llc_sap_add_socket(). This can be amended by holding its refcount
before llc_sap_remove_socket() and releasing it after release_sock().

Reported-by: <syzbot+6e181fc95081c2cf9051@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>