linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.9.69

xfrm: Copy policy family in clone_policy

2017-12-14T08:28:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit 0e74aa1d79a5bbc663e03a2804399cae418a0321 ]

The syzbot found an ancient bug in the IPsec code.  When we cloned
a socket policy (for example, for a child TCP socket derived from a
listening socket), we did not copy the family field.  This results
in a live policy with a zero family field.  This triggers a BUG_ON
check in the af_key code when the cloned policy is retrieved.

This patch fixes it by copying the family field over.

Reported-by: syzbot 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu 
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep

2017-12-14T08:28:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit cea0cc80a6777beb6eb643d4ad53690e1ad1d4ff ]

Commit dfcb9f4f99f1 ("sctp: deny peeloff operation on asocs with threads
sleeping on it") fixed the race between peeloff and wait sndbuf by
checking waitqueue_active(&asoc->wait) in sctp_do_peeloff().

But it actually doesn't work, as even if waitqueue_active returns false
the waiting sndbuf thread may still not yet hold sk lock. After asoc is
peeled off, sk is not asoc->base.sk any more, then to hold the old sk
lock couldn't make assoc safe to access.

This patch is to fix this by changing to hold the new sk lock if sk is
not asoc->base.sk, meanwhile, also set the sk in sctp_sendmsg with the
new sk.

With this fix, there is no more race between peeloff and waitbuf, the
check 'waitqueue_active' in sctp_do_peeloff can be removed.

Thanks Marcelo and Neil for making this clear.

v1->v2:
  fix it by changing to lock the new sock instead of adding a flag in asoc.

Suggested-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: Xin Long 
Acked-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sctp: do not free asoc when it is already dead in sctp_sendmsg

2017-12-14T08:28:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit ca3af4dd28cff4e7216e213ba3b671fbf9f84758 ]

Now in sctp_sendmsg sctp_wait_for_sndbuf could schedule out without
holding sock sk. It means the current asoc can be freed elsewhere,
like when receiving an abort packet.

If the asoc is just created in sctp_sendmsg and sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
returns err, the asoc will be freed again due to new_asoc is not nil.
An use-after-free issue would be triggered by this.

This patch is to fix it by setting new_asoc with nil if the asoc is
already dead when cpu schedules back, so that it will not be freed
again in sctp_sendmsg.

v1->v2:
  set new_asoc as nil in sctp_sendmsg instead of sctp_wait_for_sndbuf.

Suggested-by: Neil Horman 
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov 
Signed-off-by: Xin Long 
Acked-by: Neil Horman 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sunrpc: Fix rpc_task_begin trace point

2017-12-14T08:28:23+00:00

[ Upstream commit b2bfe5915d5fe7577221031a39ac722a0a2a1199 ]

The rpc_task_begin trace point always display a task ID of zero.
Move the trace point call site so that it picks up the new task ID.

Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever 
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

route: update fnhe_expires for redirect when the fnhe exists

2017-12-14T08:28:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit e39d5246111399dbc6e11cd39fd8580191b86c47 ]

Now when creating fnhe for redirect, it sets fnhe_expires for this
new route cache. But when updating the exist one, it doesn't do it.
It will cause this fnhe never to be expired.

Paolo already noticed it before, in Jianlin's test case, it became
even worse:

When ip route flush cache, the old fnhe is not to be removed, but
only clean it's members. When redirect comes again, this fnhe will
be found and updated, but never be expired due to fnhe_expires not
being set.

So fix it by simply updating fnhe_expires even it's for redirect.

Fixes: aee06da6726d ("ipv4: use seqlock for nh_exceptions")
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi 
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: Xin Long 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

route: also update fnhe_genid when updating a route cache

2017-12-14T08:28:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit cebe84c6190d741045a322f5343f717139993c08 ]

Now when ip route flush cache and it turn out all fnhe_genid != genid.
If a redirect/pmtu icmp packet comes and the old fnhe is found and all
it's members but fnhe_genid will be updated.

Then next time when it looks up route and tries to rebind this fnhe to
the new dst, the fnhe will be flushed due to fnhe_genid != genid. It
causes this redirect/pmtu icmp packet acutally not to be applied.

This patch is to also reset fnhe_genid when updating a route cache.

Fixes: 5aad1de5ea2c ("ipv4: use separate genid for next hop exceptions")
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa 
Signed-off-by: Xin Long 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

gre6: use log_ecn_error module parameter in ip6_tnl_rcv()

2017-12-14T08:28:22+00:00

[ Upstream commit 981542c526ecd846920bc500e9989da906ee9fb9 ]

After commit 308edfdf1563 ("gre6: Cleanup GREv6 receive path, call
common GRE functions") it's not used anywhere in the module, but
previously was used in ip6gre_rcv().

Fixes: 308edfdf1563 ("gre6: Cleanup GREv6 receive path, call common GRE functions")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

netfilter: don't track fragmented packets

2017-12-14T08:28:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7b4fdf77a450ec0fdcb2f677b080ddbf2c186544 ]

Andrey reports syzkaller splat caused by

NF_CT_ASSERT(!ip_is_fragment(ip_hdr(skb)));

in ipv4 nat.  But this assertion (and the comment) are wrong, this function
does see fragments when IP_NODEFRAG setsockopt is used.

As conntrack doesn't track packets without complete l4 header, only the
first fragment is tracked.

Because applying nat to first packet but not the rest makes no sense this
also turns off tracking of all fragments.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal 
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ipv6: reorder icmpv6_init() and ip6_mr_init()

2017-12-14T08:28:21+00:00

[ Upstream commit 15e668070a64bb97f102ad9cf3bccbca0545cda8 ]

Andrey reported the following kernel crash:

kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 14446 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #82
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88001f311700 task.stack: ffff88001f6e8000
RIP: 0010:ip6mr_sk_done+0x15a/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1618
RSP: 0018:ffff88001f6ef418 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff10003edde8c RCX: ffffc900043ee000
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83e3b3f8 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: ffff88001f6ef508 R08: fffffbfff0dcc5d8 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffffff86e62ec0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88001f6ef4e0 R15: ffff8800380a0040
FS:  00007f7a52cec700(0000) GS:ffff88003ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000061c500 CR3: 000000001f1ae000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
 rawv6_close+0x4c/0x80 net/ipv6/raw.c:1217
 inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:432
 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:597
 __sock_create+0x39d/0x880 net/socket.c:1226
 sock_create_kern+0x3f/0x50 net/socket.c:1243
 inet_ctl_sock_create+0xbb/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1526
 icmpv6_sk_init+0x163/0x500 net/ipv6/icmp.c:954
 ops_init+0x10a/0x550 net/core/net_namespace.c:115
 setup_net+0x261/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:291
 copy_net_ns+0x27e/0x540 net/core/net_namespace.c:396
9pnet_virtio: no channels available for device ./file1
 create_new_namespaces+0x437/0x9b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:106
 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205
 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline]
 SyS_unshare+0x64e/0x1000 kernel/fork.c:2231
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

This is because net->ipv6.mr6_tables is not initialized at that point,
ip6mr_rules_init() is not called yet, therefore on the error path when
we iterator the list, we trigger this oops. Fix this by reordering
ip6mr_rules_init() before icmpv6_sk_init().

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov 
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

rds: tcp: Sequence teardown of listen and acceptor sockets to avoid races

2017-12-14T08:28:20+00:00

[ Upstream commit b21dd4506b71bdb9c5a20e759255cd2513ea7ebe ]

Commit a93d01f5777e ("RDS: TCP: avoid bad page reference in
rds_tcp_listen_data_ready") added the function
rds_tcp_listen_sock_def_readable()  to handle the case when a
partially set-up acceptor socket drops into rds_tcp_listen_data_ready().
However, if the listen socket (rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock) is itself going
through a tear-down via rds_tcp_listen_stop(), the (*ready)() will be
null and we would hit a panic  of the form
  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at   (null)
  IP:           (null)
   :
  ? rds_tcp_listen_data_ready+0x59/0xb0 [rds_tcp]
  tcp_data_queue+0x39d/0x5b0
  tcp_rcv_established+0x2e5/0x660
  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x122/0x220
  tcp_v4_rcv+0x8b7/0x980
    :
In the above case, it is not fatal to encounter a NULL value for
ready- we should just drop the packet and let the flush of the
acceptor thread finish gracefully.

In general, the tear-down sequence for listen() and accept() socket
that is ensured by this commit is:
     rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock = NULL; /* prevent any new accepts */
     In rds_tcp_listen_stop():
         serialize with, and prevent, further callbacks using lock_sock()
         flush rds_wq
         flush acceptor workq
         sock_release(listen socket)

Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman