<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.9.308</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net/packet: fix slab-out-of-bounds access in packet_recvmsg()</title>
<updated>2022-03-23T08:00:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-12T23:29:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b9d5772d60f8e7ef34e290f72fc20e3a4883e7d0'/>
<id>b9d5772d60f8e7ef34e290f72fc20e3a4883e7d0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ]

syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb-&gt;cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]

Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631

CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246

this frame has 1 object:
 [32, 160) 'addr'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
&gt;ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
                                                                ^
 ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for &gt; 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c700525fcc06b05adfea78039de02628af79e07a ]

syzbot found that when an AF_PACKET socket is using PACKET_COPY_THRESH
and mmap operations, tpacket_rcv() is queueing skbs with
garbage in skb-&gt;cb[], triggering a too big copy [1]

Presumably, users of af_packet using mmap() already gets correct
metadata from the mapped buffer, we can simply make sure
to clear 12 bytes that might be copied to user space later.

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
Write of size 165 at addr ffffc9000385fb78 by task syz-executor233/3631

CPU: 0 PID: 3631 Comm: syz-executor233 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-syzkaller-02396-g0b3660695e80 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 &lt;TASK&gt;
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xf/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:183 [inline]
 kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x39/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:66
 memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:225 [inline]
 packet_recvmsg+0x56c/0x1150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3489
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline]
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674
 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fdfd5954c29
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8e71e48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fdfd5954c29
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffcf8e71e60
R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000000c1ff R15: 00007ffcf8e71e54
 &lt;/TASK&gt;

addr ffffc9000385fb78 is located in stack of task syz-executor233/3631 at offset 32 in frame:
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x0/0x600 include/linux/uio.h:246

this frame has 1 object:
 [32, 160) 'addr'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc9000385fa80: 00 04 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc9000385fb00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00
&gt;ffffc9000385fb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3
                                                                ^
 ffffc9000385fc00: f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1
 ffffc9000385fc80: f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for &gt; 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220312232958.3535620-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: make tcp_read_sock() more robust</title>
<updated>2022-03-23T08:00:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-02T16:17:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a09abc44c7de39f54e4bafa2c90aa4455eead8e5'/>
<id>a09abc44c7de39f54e4bafa2c90aa4455eead8e5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e3d5ea2c011ecb16fb94c56a659364e6b30fac94 ]

If recv_actor() returns an incorrect value, tcp_read_sock()
might loop forever.

Instead, issue a one time warning and make sure to make progress.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302161723.3910001-2-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e3d5ea2c011ecb16fb94c56a659364e6b30fac94 ]

If recv_actor() returns an incorrect value, tcp_read_sock()
might loop forever.

Instead, issue a one time warning and make sure to make progress.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Fastabend &lt;john.fastabend@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki &lt;jakub@cloudflare.com&gt;
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302161723.3910001-2-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nl80211: Update bss channel on channel switch for P2P_CLIENT</title>
<updated>2022-03-23T08:00:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sreeramya Soratkal</name>
<email>quic_ssramya@quicinc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-01T06:03:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=855be1e61ba05d878c0de0356e373749a46b616e'/>
<id>855be1e61ba05d878c0de0356e373749a46b616e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e50b88c4f076242358b66ddb67482b96947438f2 ]

The wdev channel information is updated post channel switch only for
the station mode and not for the other modes. Due to this, the P2P client
still points to the old value though it moved to the new channel
when the channel change is induced from the P2P GO.

Update the bss channel after CSA channel switch completion for P2P client
interface as well.

Signed-off-by: Sreeramya Soratkal &lt;quic_ssramya@quicinc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1646114600-31479-1-git-send-email-quic_ssramya@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e50b88c4f076242358b66ddb67482b96947438f2 ]

The wdev channel information is updated post channel switch only for
the station mode and not for the other modes. Due to this, the P2P client
still points to the old value though it moved to the new channel
when the channel change is induced from the P2P GO.

Update the bss channel after CSA channel switch completion for P2P client
interface as well.

Signed-off-by: Sreeramya Soratkal &lt;quic_ssramya@quicinc.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1646114600-31479-1-git-send-email-quic_ssramya@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg &lt;johannes.berg@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changes</title>
<updated>2022-03-23T08:00:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Yan Yan</name>
<email>evitayan@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-19T00:00:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e96d550cc635a3f4d061251ee9817674e1cf3e9e'/>
<id>e96d550cc635a3f4d061251ee9817674e1cf3e9e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e03c3bba351f99ad932e8f06baa9da1afc418e02 ]

xfrm_migrate cannot handle address family change of an xfrm_state.
The symptons are the xfrm_state will be migrated to a wrong address,
and sending as well as receiving packets wil be broken.

This commit fixes it by breaking the original xfrm_state_clone
method into two steps so as to update the props.family before
running xfrm_init_state. As the result, xfrm_state's inner mode,
outer mode, type and IP header length in xfrm_state_migrate can
be updated with the new address family.

Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1885354

Signed-off-by: Yan Yan &lt;evitayan@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e03c3bba351f99ad932e8f06baa9da1afc418e02 ]

xfrm_migrate cannot handle address family change of an xfrm_state.
The symptons are the xfrm_state will be migrated to a wrong address,
and sending as well as receiving packets wil be broken.

This commit fixes it by breaking the original xfrm_state_clone
method into two steps so as to update the props.family before
running xfrm_init_state. As the result, xfrm_state's inner mode,
outer mode, type and IP header length in xfrm_state_migrate can
be updated with the new address family.

Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1885354

Signed-off-by: Yan Yan &lt;evitayan@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>batman-adv: Don't expect inter-netns unique iflink indices</title>
<updated>2022-03-16T11:49:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Eckelmann</name>
<email>sven@narfation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-27T22:23:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=01b0a8c0479c9afff3b44a820ea3959f0b074f52'/>
<id>01b0a8c0479c9afff3b44a820ea3959f0b074f52</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6c1f41afc1dbe59d9d3c8bb0d80b749c119aa334 upstream.

The ifindex doesn't have to be unique for multiple network namespaces on
the same machine.

  $ ip netns add test1
  $ ip -net test1 link add dummy1 type dummy
  $ ip netns add test2
  $ ip -net test2 link add dummy2 type dummy

  $ ip -net test1 link show dev dummy1
  6: dummy1: &lt;BROADCAST,NOARP&gt; mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 96:81:55:1e:dd:85 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
  $ ip -net test2 link show dev dummy2
  6: dummy2: &lt;BROADCAST,NOARP&gt; mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 5a:3c:af:35:07:c3 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff

But the batman-adv code to walk through the various layers of virtual
interfaces uses this assumption because dev_get_iflink handles it
internally and doesn't return the actual netns of the iflink. And
dev_get_iflink only documents the situation where ifindex == iflink for
physical devices.

But only checking for dev-&gt;netdev_ops-&gt;ndo_get_iflink is also not an option
because ipoib_get_iflink implements it even when it sometimes returns an
iflink != ifindex and sometimes iflink == ifindex. The caller must
therefore make sure itself to check both netns and iflink + ifindex for
equality. Only when they are equal, a "physical" interface was detected
which should stop the traversal. On the other hand, vxcan_get_iflink can
also return 0 in case there was currently no valid peer. In this case, it
is still necessary to stop.

Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface")
Fixes: 5ed4a460a1d3 ("batman-adv: additional checks for virtual interfaces on top of WiFi")
Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
[ bp: 4.9 backported: drop modification of non-existing batadv_get_real_netdevice. ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6c1f41afc1dbe59d9d3c8bb0d80b749c119aa334 upstream.

The ifindex doesn't have to be unique for multiple network namespaces on
the same machine.

  $ ip netns add test1
  $ ip -net test1 link add dummy1 type dummy
  $ ip netns add test2
  $ ip -net test2 link add dummy2 type dummy

  $ ip -net test1 link show dev dummy1
  6: dummy1: &lt;BROADCAST,NOARP&gt; mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 96:81:55:1e:dd:85 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
  $ ip -net test2 link show dev dummy2
  6: dummy2: &lt;BROADCAST,NOARP&gt; mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000
      link/ether 5a:3c:af:35:07:c3 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff

But the batman-adv code to walk through the various layers of virtual
interfaces uses this assumption because dev_get_iflink handles it
internally and doesn't return the actual netns of the iflink. And
dev_get_iflink only documents the situation where ifindex == iflink for
physical devices.

But only checking for dev-&gt;netdev_ops-&gt;ndo_get_iflink is also not an option
because ipoib_get_iflink implements it even when it sometimes returns an
iflink != ifindex and sometimes iflink == ifindex. The caller must
therefore make sure itself to check both netns and iflink + ifindex for
equality. Only when they are equal, a "physical" interface was detected
which should stop the traversal. On the other hand, vxcan_get_iflink can
also return 0 in case there was currently no valid peer. In this case, it
is still necessary to stop.

Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface")
Fixes: 5ed4a460a1d3 ("batman-adv: additional checks for virtual interfaces on top of WiFi")
Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca &lt;sd@queasysnail.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
[ bp: 4.9 backported: drop modification of non-existing batadv_get_real_netdevice. ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>batman-adv: Request iflink once in batadv-on-batadv check</title>
<updated>2022-03-16T11:49:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sven Eckelmann</name>
<email>sven@narfation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-27T23:01:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=b3e3c2578144580c58c423b304118d9d6a8bef56'/>
<id>b3e3c2578144580c58c423b304118d9d6a8bef56</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 690bb6fb64f5dc7437317153902573ecad67593d upstream.

There is no need to call dev_get_iflink multiple times for the same
net_device in batadv_is_on_batman_iface. And since some of the
.ndo_get_iflink callbacks are dynamic (for example via RCUs like in
vxcan_get_iflink), it could easily happen that the returned values are not
stable. The pre-checks before __dev_get_by_index are then of course bogus.

Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
[ bp: 4.9 backported: adjust context. ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 690bb6fb64f5dc7437317153902573ecad67593d upstream.

There is no need to call dev_get_iflink multiple times for the same
net_device in batadv_is_on_batman_iface. And since some of the
.ndo_get_iflink callbacks are dynamic (for example via RCUs like in
vxcan_get_iflink), it could easily happen that the returned values are not
stable. The pre-checks before __dev_get_by_index are then of course bogus.

Fixes: b7eddd0b3950 ("batman-adv: prevent using any virtual device created on batman-adv as hard-interface")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich &lt;sw@simonwunderlich.de&gt;
[ bp: 4.9 backported: adjust context. ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann &lt;sven@narfation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show</title>
<updated>2022-03-16T11:49:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>suresh kumar</name>
<email>suresh2514@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-17T01:55:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a7b9ab04c5932dee7ec95e0abc58b0df350c0dd2'/>
<id>a7b9ab04c5932dee7ec95e0abc58b0df350c0dd2</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4224cfd7fb6523f7a9d1c8bb91bb5df1e38eb624 ]

When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.

    [  755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
    [  756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
    ...
    [  757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    [  758.031397] IP: [&lt;ffffffff8ee11acb&gt;] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280

    crash&gt; bt
    ...
    PID: 12649  TASK: ffff8924108f2100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "amsd"
    ...
     #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
        [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
        RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb  RSP: ffff89240e1a3968  RFLAGS: 00010046
        RAX: 0000000000000246  RBX: ffff89243d874100  RCX: 0000000000001000
        RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000246  RDI: ffff89243d874090
        RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0   R8: 000000000001f080   R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
        R10: ffffffffc04680d4  R11: ffffffff8edde9fd  R12: 00000000000080d0
        R13: ffff89243d874090  R14: ffff89243d874080  R15: 0000000000000000
        ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
    #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
    #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
    #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
    #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
    #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
    #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
    #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
    #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
    #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
    #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
    #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
    #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
    #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
    #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
    #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
    #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92

    crash&gt; net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
      state = 0x5  (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)

To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.

Signed-off-by: suresh kumar &lt;suresh2514@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 4224cfd7fb6523f7a9d1c8bb91bb5df1e38eb624 ]

When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.

    [  755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
    [  756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
    ...
    [  757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    [  758.031397] IP: [&lt;ffffffff8ee11acb&gt;] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280

    crash&gt; bt
    ...
    PID: 12649  TASK: ffff8924108f2100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "amsd"
    ...
     #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
        [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
        RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb  RSP: ffff89240e1a3968  RFLAGS: 00010046
        RAX: 0000000000000246  RBX: ffff89243d874100  RCX: 0000000000001000
        RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000246  RDI: ffff89243d874090
        RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0   R8: 000000000001f080   R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
        R10: ffffffffc04680d4  R11: ffffffff8edde9fd  R12: 00000000000080d0
        R13: ffff89243d874090  R14: ffff89243d874080  R15: 0000000000000000
        ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
    #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
    #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
    #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
    #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
    #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
    #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
    #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
    #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
    #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
    #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
    #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
    #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
    #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
    #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
    #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
    #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92

    crash&gt; net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
      state = 0x5  (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)

To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.

Signed-off-by: suresh kumar &lt;suresh2514@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sctp: fix kernel-infoleak for SCTP sockets</title>
<updated>2022-03-16T11:49:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-10T00:11:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=3fc0fd724d199e061432b66a8d85b7d48fe485f7'/>
<id>3fc0fd724d199e061432b66a8d85b7d48fe485f7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 633593a808980f82d251d0ca89730d8bb8b0220c ]

syzbot reported a kernel infoleak [1] of 4 bytes.

After analysis, it turned out r-&gt;idiag_expires is not initialized
if inet_sctp_diag_fill() calls inet_diag_msg_common_fill()

Make sure to clear idiag_timer/idiag_retrans/idiag_expires
and let inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() fill them again if needed.

[1]

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668
 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
 copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline]
 _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668
 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:162 [inline]
 simple_copy_to_iter+0xf3/0x140 net/core/datagram.c:519
 __skb_datagram_iter+0x2d5/0x11b0 net/core/datagram.c:425
 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0xdc/0x270 net/core/datagram.c:533
 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3696 [inline]
 netlink_recvmsg+0x669/0x1c80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1977
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 __sys_recvfrom+0x795/0xa10 net/socket.c:2097
 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2111 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x19d/0x210 net/socket.c:2111
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3247 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4975
 kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1158 [inline]
 netlink_dump+0x3e5/0x16c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2248
 __netlink_dump_start+0xcf8/0xe90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2373
 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:254 [inline]
 inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2e7/0x400 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1341
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x24a/0x620
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x40c/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
 sock_diag_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/core/sock_diag.c:277
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1093/0x1360 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
 netlink_sendmsg+0x14d9/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x594/0x690 net/socket.c:1061
 do_iter_readv_writev+0xa7f/0xc70
 do_iter_write+0x52c/0x1500 fs/read_write.c:851
 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:924 [inline]
 do_writev+0x645/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:967
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1040 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1037 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0xe5/0x120 fs/read_write.c:1037
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Bytes 68-71 of 2508 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 2508 starts at ffff888114f9b000
Data copied to user address 00007f7fe09ff2e0

CPU: 1 PID: 3478 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310001145.297371-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 633593a808980f82d251d0ca89730d8bb8b0220c ]

syzbot reported a kernel infoleak [1] of 4 bytes.

After analysis, it turned out r-&gt;idiag_expires is not initialized
if inet_sctp_diag_fill() calls inet_diag_msg_common_fill()

Make sure to clear idiag_timer/idiag_retrans/idiag_expires
and let inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() fill them again if needed.

[1]

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668
 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
 copyout lib/iov_iter.c:154 [inline]
 _copy_to_iter+0x6ef/0x25a0 lib/iov_iter.c:668
 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:162 [inline]
 simple_copy_to_iter+0xf3/0x140 net/core/datagram.c:519
 __skb_datagram_iter+0x2d5/0x11b0 net/core/datagram.c:425
 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0xdc/0x270 net/core/datagram.c:533
 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3696 [inline]
 netlink_recvmsg+0x669/0x1c80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1977
 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline]
 sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline]
 __sys_recvfrom+0x795/0xa10 net/socket.c:2097
 __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:2111 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x19d/0x210 net/socket.c:2111
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:737 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3247 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe0c/0x1510 mm/slub.c:4975
 kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:354 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x545/0xf90 net/core/skbuff.c:426
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1158 [inline]
 netlink_dump+0x3e5/0x16c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2248
 __netlink_dump_start+0xcf8/0xe90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2373
 netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:254 [inline]
 inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x2e7/0x400 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1341
 sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x24a/0x620
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x40c/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
 sock_diag_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/core/sock_diag.c:277
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1093/0x1360 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
 netlink_sendmsg+0x14d9/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline]
 sock_write_iter+0x594/0x690 net/socket.c:1061
 do_iter_readv_writev+0xa7f/0xc70
 do_iter_write+0x52c/0x1500 fs/read_write.c:851
 vfs_writev fs/read_write.c:924 [inline]
 do_writev+0x645/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:967
 __do_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1040 [inline]
 __se_sys_writev fs/read_write.c:1037 [inline]
 __x64_sys_writev+0xe5/0x120 fs/read_write.c:1037
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Bytes 68-71 of 2508 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 2508 starts at ffff888114f9b000
Data copied to user address 00007f7fe09ff2e0

CPU: 1 PID: 3478 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Cc: Vlad Yasevich &lt;vyasevich@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Neil Horman &lt;nhorman@tuxdriver.com&gt;
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner &lt;marcelo.leitner@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Xin Long &lt;lucien.xin@gmail.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310001145.297371-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ax25: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ax25_kill_by_device</title>
<updated>2022-03-16T11:49:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Duoming Zhou</name>
<email>duoming@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-08T08:12:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=cad71f1094834eb69f7ceec8100d300c26b43053'/>
<id>cad71f1094834eb69f7ceec8100d300c26b43053</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 71171ac8eb34ce7fe6b3267dce27c313ab3cb3ac ]

When two ax25 devices attempted to establish connection, the requester use ax25_create(),
ax25_bind() and ax25_connect() to initiate connection. The receiver use ax25_rcv() to
accept connection and use ax25_create_cb() in ax25_rcv() to create ax25_cb, but the
ax25_cb-&gt;sk is NULL. When the receiver is detaching, a NULL pointer dereference bug
caused by sock_hold(sk) in ax25_kill_by_device() will happen. The corresponding
fail log is shown below:

===============================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ax25_device_event+0xfd/0x290
Call Trace:
...
ax25_device_event+0xfd/0x290
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x5e/0x70
dev_close_many+0x174/0x220
unregister_netdevice_many+0x1f7/0xa60
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x12f/0x170
unregister_netdev+0x13/0x20
mkiss_close+0xcd/0x140
tty_ldisc_release+0xc0/0x220
tty_release_struct+0x17/0xa0
tty_release+0x62d/0x670
...

This patch add condition check in ax25_kill_by_device(). If s-&gt;sk is
NULL, it will goto if branch to kill device.

Fixes: 4e0f718daf97 ("ax25: improve the incomplete fix to avoid UAF and NPD bugs")
Reported-by: Thomas Osterried &lt;thomas@osterried.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou &lt;duoming@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 71171ac8eb34ce7fe6b3267dce27c313ab3cb3ac ]

When two ax25 devices attempted to establish connection, the requester use ax25_create(),
ax25_bind() and ax25_connect() to initiate connection. The receiver use ax25_rcv() to
accept connection and use ax25_create_cb() in ax25_rcv() to create ax25_cb, but the
ax25_cb-&gt;sk is NULL. When the receiver is detaching, a NULL pointer dereference bug
caused by sock_hold(sk) in ax25_kill_by_device() will happen. The corresponding
fail log is shown below:

===============================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in ax25_device_event+0xfd/0x290
Call Trace:
...
ax25_device_event+0xfd/0x290
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x5e/0x70
dev_close_many+0x174/0x220
unregister_netdevice_many+0x1f7/0xa60
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x12f/0x170
unregister_netdev+0x13/0x20
mkiss_close+0xcd/0x140
tty_ldisc_release+0xc0/0x220
tty_release_struct+0x17/0xa0
tty_release+0x62d/0x670
...

This patch add condition check in ax25_kill_by_device(). If s-&gt;sk is
NULL, it will goto if branch to kill device.

Fixes: 4e0f718daf97 ("ax25: improve the incomplete fix to avoid UAF and NPD bugs")
Reported-by: Thomas Osterried &lt;thomas@osterried.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou &lt;duoming@zju.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dcb: disable softirqs in dcbnl_flush_dev()</title>
<updated>2022-03-08T18:00:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Oltean</name>
<email>vladimir.oltean@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-02T19:39:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.tavy.me/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=19f132730d147d587dbe1133571e58d1f8c38f09'/>
<id>19f132730d147d587dbe1133571e58d1f8c38f09</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 10b6bb62ae1a49ee818fc479cf57b8900176773e upstream.

Ido Schimmel points out that since commit 52cff74eef5d ("dcbnl : Disable
software interrupts before taking dcb_lock"), the DCB API can be called
by drivers from softirq context.

One such in-tree example is the chelsio cxgb4 driver:
dcb_rpl
-&gt; cxgb4_dcb_handle_fw_update
   -&gt; dcb_ieee_setapp

If the firmware for this driver happened to send an event which resulted
in a call to dcb_ieee_setapp() at the exact same time as another
DCB-enabled interface was unregistering on the same CPU, the softirq
would deadlock, because the interrupted process was already holding the
dcb_lock in dcbnl_flush_dev().

Fix this unlikely event by using spin_lock_bh() in dcbnl_flush_dev() as
in the rest of the dcbnl code.

Fixes: 91b0383fef06 ("net: dcb: flush lingering app table entries for unregistered devices")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@idosch.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean &lt;vladimir.oltean@nxp.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302193939.1368823-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 10b6bb62ae1a49ee818fc479cf57b8900176773e upstream.

Ido Schimmel points out that since commit 52cff74eef5d ("dcbnl : Disable
software interrupts before taking dcb_lock"), the DCB API can be called
by drivers from softirq context.

One such in-tree example is the chelsio cxgb4 driver:
dcb_rpl
-&gt; cxgb4_dcb_handle_fw_update
   -&gt; dcb_ieee_setapp

If the firmware for this driver happened to send an event which resulted
in a call to dcb_ieee_setapp() at the exact same time as another
DCB-enabled interface was unregistering on the same CPU, the softirq
would deadlock, because the interrupted process was already holding the
dcb_lock in dcbnl_flush_dev().

Fix this unlikely event by using spin_lock_bh() in dcbnl_flush_dev() as
in the rest of the dcbnl code.

Fixes: 91b0383fef06 ("net: dcb: flush lingering app table entries for unregistered devices")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@idosch.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean &lt;vladimir.oltean@nxp.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220302193939.1368823-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
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