linux-stable.git/net, branch v4.4.271

bluetooth: eliminate the potential race condition when removing the HCI controller

2021-06-03T06:22:09+00:00

commit e2cb6b891ad2b8caa9131e3be70f45243df82a80 upstream.

There is a possible race condition vulnerability between issuing a HCI
command and removing the cont.  Specifically, functions hci_req_sync()
and hci_dev_do_close() can race each other like below:

thread-A in hci_req_sync()      |   thread-B in hci_dev_do_close()
                                |   hci_req_sync_lock(hdev);
test_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags); |
...                             |   test_and_clear_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags)
hci_req_sync_lock(hdev);        |
                                |
In this commit we alter the sequence in function hci_req_sync(). Hence,
the thread-A cannot issue th.

Signed-off-by: Lin Ma 
Cc: Marcel Holtmann 
Fixes: 7c6a329e4447 ("[Bluetooth] Fix regression from using default link policy")
[iwamatsu: adjust filename, arguments of __hci_req_sync(). CVE-2021-32399]
Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

sch_dsmark: fix a NULL deref in qdisc_reset()

2021-06-03T06:22:09+00:00

[ Upstream commit 9b76eade16423ef06829cccfe3e100cfce31afcd ]

If Qdisc_ops->init() is failed, Qdisc_ops->reset() would be called.
When dsmark_init(Qdisc_ops->init()) is failed, it possibly doesn't
initialize dsmark_qdisc_data->q. But dsmark_reset(Qdisc_ops->reset())
uses dsmark_qdisc_data->q pointer wihtout any null checking.
So, panic would occur.

Test commands:
    sysctl net.core.default_qdisc=dsmark -w
    ip link add dummy0 type dummy
    ip link add vw0 link dummy0 type virt_wifi
    ip link set vw0 up

Splat looks like:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
CPU: 3 PID: 684 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.12.0+ #910
RIP: 0010:qdisc_reset+0x2b/0x680
Code: 1f 44 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54
55 48 89 fd 48 83 c7 18 53 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 20 <80> 3c 02
00 0f 85 09 06 00 00 4c 8b 65 18 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 8b 1d
RSP: 0018:ffff88800fda6bf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880050ed800 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff99e34100 RDI: 0000000000000018
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffbfff346b553 R09: fffffbfff346b553
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff346b552 R12: ffffffffc0824940
R13: ffff888109e83800 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: ffffffffc08249e0
FS:  00007f5042287680(0000) GS:ffff888119800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055ae1f4dbd90 CR3: 0000000006760002 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
 dsmark_reset+0x3d/0xf0 [sch_dsmark]
 qdisc_reset+0xa9/0x680
 qdisc_destroy+0x84/0x370
 qdisc_create_dflt+0x1fe/0x380
 attach_one_default_qdisc.constprop.41+0xa4/0x180
 dev_activate+0x4d5/0x8c0
 ? __dev_open+0x268/0x390
 __dev_open+0x270/0x390

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

mld: fix panic in mld_newpack()

2021-06-03T06:22:08+00:00

[ Upstream commit 020ef930b826d21c5446fdc9db80fd72a791bc21 ]

mld_newpack() doesn't allow to allocate high order page,
only order-0 allocation is allowed.
If headroom size is too large, a kernel panic could occur in skb_put().

Test commands:
    ip netns del A
    ip netns del B
    ip netns add A
    ip netns add B
    ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1
    ip link set veth0 netns A
    ip link set veth1 netns B

    ip netns exec A ip link set lo up
    ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
    ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::1/64 dev veth0
    ip netns exec B ip link set lo up
    ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
    ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:0::2/64 dev veth1
    for i in {1..99}
    do
        let A=$i-1
        ip netns exec A ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
	local 2001:db8:$A::1 remote 2001:db8:$A::2 encaplimit 100
        ip netns exec A ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::1/64 dev ip6gre$i
        ip netns exec A ip link set ip6gre$i up

        ip netns exec B ip link add ip6gre$i type ip6gre \
	local 2001:db8:$A::2 remote 2001:db8:$A::1 encaplimit 100
        ip netns exec B ip -6 a a 2001:db8:$i::2/64 dev ip6gre$i
        ip netns exec B ip link set ip6gre$i up
    done

Splat looks like:
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:110!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.12.0+ #891
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15d/0x15f
Code: 92 fe 4c 8b 4c 24 10 53 8b 4d 70 45 89 e0 48 c7 c7 00 ae 79 83
41 57 41 56 41 55 48 8b 54 24 a6 26 f9 ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 6c 24 20 89
34 24 e8 4a 4e 92 fe 8b 34 24 48 c7 c1 20
RSP: 0018:ffff88810091f820 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000089 RBX: ffff8881086e9000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000089 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffed1020123efb
RBP: ffff888005f6eac0 R08: ffffed1022fc0031 R09: ffffed1022fc0031
R10: ffff888117e00187 R11: ffffed1022fc0030 R12: 0000000000000028
R13: ffff888008284eb0 R14: 0000000000000ed8 R15: 0000000000000ec0
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888117c00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8b801c5640 CR3: 0000000033c2c006 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
 skb_put.cold.104+0x22/0x22
 ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x12a/0x600
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
 mld_newpack+0x398/0x8f0
 ? ip6_mc_hdr.isra.26.constprop.46+0x600/0x600
 ? lock_contended+0xc40/0xc40
 add_grhead.isra.33+0x280/0x380
 add_grec+0x5ca/0xff0
 ? mld_sendpack+0xf40/0xf40
 ? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
 mld_send_initial_cr.part.34+0xb9/0x180
 ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x15d/0x1b0
 addrconf_dad_completed+0x8d2/0xbb0
 ? lock_downgrade+0x690/0x690
 ? addrconf_rs_timer+0x660/0x660
 ? addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0
 addrconf_dad_work+0x73c/0x10e0

Allowing high order page allocation could fix this problem.

Fixes: 72e09ad107e7 ("ipv6: avoid high order allocations")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs

2021-06-03T06:22:07+00:00

commit b7df21cf1b79ab7026f545e7bf837bd5750ac026 upstream.

It's not a good idea to append the frag skb to a skb's frag_list if
the frag_list already has skbs from elsewhere, such as this skb was
created by pskb_copy() where the frag_list was cloned (all the skbs
in it were skb_get'ed) and shared by multiple skbs.

However, the new appended frag skb should have been only seen by the
current skb. Otherwise, it will cause use after free crashes as this
appended frag skb are seen by multiple skbs but it only got skb_get
called once.

The same thing happens with a skb updated by pskb_may_pull() with a
skb_cloned skb. Li Shuang has reported quite a few crashes caused
by this when doing testing over macvlan devices:

  [] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1970!
  [] Call Trace:
  []  skb_clone+0x4d/0xb0
  []  macvlan_broadcast+0xd8/0x160 [macvlan]
  []  macvlan_process_broadcast+0x148/0x150 [macvlan]
  []  process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
  []  worker_thread+0x30/0x390

  [] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  [] Call Trace:
  []  __check_heap_object+0xd3/0x100
  []  __check_object_size+0xff/0x16b
  []  simple_copy_to_iter+0x1c/0x30
  []  __skb_datagram_iter+0x7d/0x310
  []  __skb_datagram_iter+0x2a5/0x310
  []  skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x3b/0x90
  []  tipc_recvmsg+0x14a/0x3a0 [tipc]
  []  ____sys_recvmsg+0x91/0x150
  []  ___sys_recvmsg+0x7b/0xc0

  [] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:305!
  [] Call Trace:
  []  
  []  kmem_cache_free+0x3ff/0x400
  []  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x12c/0xc40
  []  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x270
  []  netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0
  []  ? get_rx_page_info+0x8e/0xa0 [be2net]
  []  be_poll+0x6ef/0xd00 [be2net]
  []  ? irq_exit+0x4f/0x100
  []  net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0

  ...

This patch is to fix it by linearizing the head skb if it has frag_list
set in tipc_buf_append(). Note that we choose to do this before calling
skb_unshare(), as __skb_linearize() will avoid skb_copy(). Also, we can
not just drop the frag_list either as the early time.

Fixes: 45c8b7b175ce ("tipc: allow non-linear first fragment buffer")
Reported-by: Li Shuang 
Signed-off-by: Xin Long 
Acked-by: Jon Maloy 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "net:tipc: Fix a double free in tipc_sk_mcast_rcv"

2021-06-03T06:22:07+00:00

commit 75016891357a628d2b8acc09e2b9b2576c18d318 upstream.

This reverts commit 6bf24dc0cc0cc43b29ba344b66d78590e687e046.
Above fix is not correct and caused memory leak issue.

Fixes: 6bf24dc0cc0c ("net:tipc: Fix a double free in tipc_sk_mcast_rcv")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy 
Acked-by: Tung Nguyen 
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le 
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Bluetooth: cmtp: fix file refcount when cmtp_attach_device fails

2021-06-03T06:22:06+00:00

commit 8da3a0b87f4f1c3a3bbc4bfb78cf68476e97d183 upstream.

When cmtp_attach_device fails, cmtp_add_connection returns the error value
which leads to the caller to doing fput through sockfd_put. But
cmtp_session kthread, which is stopped in this path will also call fput,
leading to a potential refcount underflow or a use-after-free.

Add a refcount before we signal the kthread to stop. The kthread will try
to grab the cmtp_session_sem mutex before doing the fput, which is held
when get_file is called, so there should be no races there.

Reported-by: Ryota Shiga
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo 
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment cache attacks

2021-06-03T06:22:05+00:00

commit 3edc6b0d6c061a70d8ca3c3c72eb1f58ce29bfb1 upstream.

For some chips/drivers, e.g., QCA6174 with ath10k, the decryption is
done by the hardware, and the Protected bit in the Frame Control field
is cleared in the lower level driver before the frame is passed to
mac80211. In such cases, the condition for ieee80211_has_protected() is
not met in ieee80211_rx_h_defragment() of mac80211 and the new security
validation steps are not executed.

Extend mac80211 to cover the case where the Protected bit has been
cleared, but the frame is indicated as having been decrypted by the
hardware. This extends protection against mixed key and fragment cache
attack for additional drivers/chips. This fixes CVE-2020-24586 and
CVE-2020-24587 for such cases.

Tested-on: QCA6174 hw3.2 PCI WLAN.RM.4.4.1-00110-QCARMSWP-1

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wen Gong 
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.037aa5ca0390.I7bb888e2965a0db02a67075fcb5deb50eb7408aa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames

2021-06-03T06:22:05+00:00

commit a8c4d76a8dd4fb9666fc8919a703d85fb8f44ed8 upstream.

EAPOL frames are used for authentication and key management between the
AP and each individual STA associated in the BSS. Those frames are not
supposed to be sent by one associated STA to another associated STA
(either unicast for broadcast/multicast).

Similarly, in 802.11 they're supposed to be sent to the authenticator
(AP) address.

Since it is possible for unexpected EAPOL frames to result in misbehavior
in supplicant implementations, it is better for the AP to not allow such
cases to be forwarded to other clients either directly, or indirectly if
the AP interface is part of a bridge.

Accept EAPOL (control port) frames only if they're transmitted to the
own address, or, due to interoperability concerns, to the PAE group
address.

Disable forwarding of EAPOL (or well, the configured control port
protocol) frames back to wireless medium in all cases. Previously, these
frames were accepted from fully authenticated and authorized stations
and also from unauthenticated stations for one of the cases.

Additionally, to avoid forwarding by the bridge, rewrite the PAE group
address case to the local MAC address.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Jouni Malinen 
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen 
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.cb327ed0cabe.Ib7dcffa2a31f0913d660de65ba3c8aca75b1d10f@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well

2021-06-03T06:22:05+00:00

commit 7e44a0b597f04e67eee8cdcbe7ee706c6f5de38b upstream.

Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP
should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC
protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway.

However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms
that drivers might implement.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.430e8c202313.Ia37e4e5b6b3eaab1a5ae050e015f6c92859dbe27@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame

2021-06-03T06:22:05+00:00

commit bf30ca922a0c0176007e074b0acc77ed345e9990 upstream.

As pointed out by Mathy Vanhoef, we implement the RX PN check
on fragmented frames incorrectly - we check against the last
received PN prior to the new frame, rather than to the one in
this frame itself.

Prior patches addressed the security issue here, but in order
to be able to reason better about the code, fix it to really
compare against the current frame's PN, not the last stored
one.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.bfbc340ff071.Id0b690e581da7d03d76df90bb0e3fd55930bc8a0@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg 
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman